SOFRONIO MARTINADA, DAVID MARTINADA, ANDRES MARTINADA, JR., LILIA MARTINADA YEPES, LYDIA MARTINADA MACARISAS, MARINO MARTINADA AND ZENAIDA MARTINADA MODESTO, PETITIONERS, VS. DO…

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Resolution^[1]
promulgated on February 8, 1991 of the Court of Appeals^[2] in
CA-G.R. SP No. 24069 denying herein petitioners’ Petition for Review as well as
the June 28, 1991 Resolution^[3] of
the same court denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Private respondents Dorotea Bautista, Elpidio Bautista, Aniceto
Bautista, Veronica B. Alvarez, Cornelio Bautista, Jr. and Filomeno Bautista are
the heirs of the late Cornelio Bautista, registered owner of a property
designated as Lot 3, Block 15 situated at 3020 3rd Street, Guadalcanal Street,
Sta. Mesa, Manila covered by TCT No. 51930.

Sometime in 1958, Cornelio Bautista allowed petitioners Sofronio
Martinada (now deceased), David Martinada, Andres Martinada, Jr., Lilia
Martinada Yepes, Lydia Martinada Macarisas, Marino Martinada and Zenaida
Martinada Modesto to occupy the subject property for a monthly consideration of
P100.00.

On April 29, 1980, Cornelio Bautista filed an ejectment case
against petitioners with the then City Court of Manila on the ground that the
latter were not paying their monthly rentals since July 15, 1958.

Petitioners, however, alleged that they have been occupying the subject property since 1956
when it was still vacant, swampy and ownerless; that the National Housing Authority
disapproved their application to purchase the subject property but instead
awarded it to Cornelio Bautista; that sometime in 1958, Cornelio Bautista had
verbally agreed to lease the subject property to them through petitioner
Sofronio Martinada for a monthly consideration of P100.00 which can be offset
by whatever expenses they may incur for the improvement of the subject
property; that they have spent P60,000.00 for the filling materials to improve
the condition of the subject property; and that sometime in 1980, private
respondents demanded that they vacate the subject property but they refused
unless they were reimbursed for the expenses they had incurred in the
improvement of the subject property.

On May 2, 1990, the Municipal Trial Court rendered its decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered;

“1. Ordering the defendants
and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the premises situated at Lot 3, Block 15, 3020, 3rd
Street, Guadalcanal, Sta. Mesa, Manila and turn over the possession thereof to
the plaintiffs.

“2. Ordering defendants to
pay the sum of One Hundred (P100.00) a month starting July 15, 1958, less
whatever payments, if any, made by the defendants to the plaintiff, representing
the rental due the premises; up to and until defendants shall have vacated the
premises;

“3. Ordering the
defendants to pay the amount of P2,000.00 as Attorney’s Fees, plus costs of
this suit.”^[4]

On appeal by the petitioners to the Regional Trial Court, said
appellate court on December 27, 1990 modified the decision of the trial court,
the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the appealed decision with the
modification that defendants and all persons claiming rights under them are
ordered to vacate the premises situated at Lot 3, Block 15, 3020 3rd Street,
Guadalcanal Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, and to surrender possession thereof to
the plaintiffs; to pay plaintiffs the sum of P100.00 a month from February 15,
1980 until they vacate the premises, and to pay plaintiffs P2,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and costs.”^[5]

Not satisfied with said
decision, petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the respondent
Court of Appeals which was denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 8,
1991.

Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was likewise denied by the respondent Court of Appeals in a Resolution
promulgated on June 28, 1991. Hence,
this instant petition.

We find the petition unmeritorious.

Time and again, we have adhered to the principle that the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited to reviewing errors of
law that may have been committed by the lower court. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It leaves these matters to the lower court,
which has the opportunity and the facilities
to examine these matters. The Court has
repeatedly declared its policy of deferring to the factual findings of the
trial judge, who has the advantage of directly observing the witnesses on the
stand and to determine their demeanor whether they are telling or distorting
the truth.^[6] Findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and binding upon this Court unless it
is shown that they are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures.^[7] In the instant case, we have carefully
reviewed the records and found the findings of facts of the lower courts to be
fully supported by the evidence.

Petitioners’ contention
that they have a better right to the subject property having been in prior
possession, cannot operate to divest
private respondents of their rights as the registered owners. The fact
that private respondents did not reimburse petitioners for the alleged expenses
they incurred for the improvement of the subject property is no justification
for their refusal to vacate the property. As held by the respondent appellate court:

“Second, x x x. The
evidence shows that the premises belong to the plaintiff (herein private
respondent Cornelio Bautista), covered as it is by TCT No. 51930. The property was awarded by the National
Housing Authority to the plaintiff sometime in 1958. Defendants (herein petitioners) claimed the property as prior
occupants but the NHA did not validate their claim.

“Third, We cannot subscribe to defendants’ contention that they
should not be ejected because they were allowed to stay in the premises by a
certain Mr. Sofronio Martinada who had a verbal contract of lease with the
titled owner, Mr. Cornelio Bautista. Allegedly, pursuant to this verbal
contract, defendants can stay in the premises at a monthly rental of
P100.00 which can be offset by whatever they would spend for its
improvement. The evidence to support
this allegation is scant, to say the least. The petition does not show the authority of Mr. Martinada to sub-lease
the premises. Indeed, the claim of a
verbal contract can be easily concocted.

“Fourth, the trial court correctly held that the stay of the
defendants in the premises is due to the tolerance of the plaintiffs. The tolerance ended in 1980 when plaintiffs
formally demanded they vacate the premises. Defendants cannot cling to the premises by asking that they be paid for
the improvements they made in the premises. They rely on Article 546 of the Civil Code. The reliance is misplaced. The Article does not apply to lease relationships.

Moreover, the alleged
improvements worth P60,000.00 has not been clearly established in the
petition.”^[8]

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on certiorari
is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned
resolutions of the respondent appellate court are AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., no part.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 10-11.

^[2]
Fifth Division; Penned by Justice Reynato S. Puno with the concurrence of
Justice Oscar M. Herrera and Justice Abelardo M. Dayrit.

^[3]
Rollo, p. 13.

^[4]
Id., at p. 16.

^[5]
Court of Appeals’ Rollo, p. 19.

^[6]
Bernardo, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. 101680, December 7, 1992.

^[7]
Consolidated Dairy Products Co. vs.
Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 810 [1992].

^[8]
Rollo, pp. 10-11.