SPOUSES TOMAS CLOMA AND VICTORIA LUZ CLOMA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIANO NOCOM, RESPONDENTS.
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Cloma versus Court of Appeals
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by the spouses Tomas Cloma and Victoria Luz Cloma against the Court of Appeals and Mariano Nocom. The Clomas owned two registered parcels of land in Pasay City, and they lost those lands at a public auction sale conducted by the City Treasurer for non-payment of realty taxes. Nocom, the highest bidder, then went to the trial court sitting as a land registration court to cancel the Clomas' certificates of title and to secure new titles in his own name. The case matters because it settles three questions every reviewee must know: whether a land registration court may cancel titles and issue new ones after a tax sale, whether it may issue a writ of possession to the buyer, and how far the Court will disturb the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the regularity of that sale.
Procedural History
Nocom filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, sitting as a land registration court, seeking the cancellation of the Clomas' transfer certificates of title and of all liens annotated thereon, and the issuance of new titles in his name. The Clomas and PMI Colleges, Incorporated filed a common answer raising affirmative defenses, while other oppositors, namely Republic Planters Bank, Rodrigo Caimol and Sandigan Lending Investors, Incorporated, entered into a compromise agreement with Nocom. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Nocom, ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel the Clomas' titles and to issue new titles in Nocom's name, and directing the issuance of a writ of possession. The Clomas appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in full. The Clomas then filed the present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Facts
The spouses Cloma owned two parcels of land in Pasay City, covered by transfer certificates of title in their names and declared for taxation purposes also in their names. Several liens and encumbrances were annotated on both titles, including mortgages in favor of PMI Colleges, Incorporated, deeds of assignment with recourse, notices of levy on execution, and a certificate of sale of delinquent property in favor of Mariano Nocom.
Realty taxes on the lots for the years 1983 to 1985 were not paid. The City Treasurer sent the Clomas a notice of tax delinquency and a statement of account, both dated June 6, 1985, and a second call and final notice on July 24, 1985. On October 21, 1985, the City Treasurer informed the Clomas that the properties had been included in the list of delinquent properties scheduled for public auction on November 27, 1985, and that the sale would proceed unless the taxes, penalties and costs totalling 71,939 pesos and 82 centavos were paid on or before November 26, 1985. The notice of sale was posted at the bulletin board at the entrance of the Pasay City Market and at the lobby of the City Hall, a town crier announced the auction for three consecutive Saturdays, and the notice was published in the Metropolitan Mail for three consecutive weeks. Nocom emerged as the highest bidder, and a certificate of sale was issued to him. The Clomas failed to redeem within the one-year period.
Urban Bank of the Philippines later made an offer to redeem, but the City Treasurer cancelled the redemption on the ground that it was erroneously made and void, and refunded the payment to the bank. A final deed of sale was then executed in favor of Nocom, who paid the realty taxes due for the years 1986 to 1989. Nocom then filed the petition for cancellation of the Clomas' titles. The Clomas and PMI Colleges, Incorporated put up the defense that the auction sale was attended by irregularities, that the City Treasurer had no authority to conduct the sale, that redemption had been made by Urban Bank, and that the purchase price was grossly inadequate. On the last point, they offered to reimburse Nocom's expenses through a cashier's check in the amount of 150,000 pesos.
Issues
- Whether or not the land registration court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the validity of the tax sale and to order the cancellation of the petitioners' certificates of title.
- Whether or not the land registration court had the power to issue a writ of possession in favor of the buyer in a questioned tax sale.
- Whether or not the trial court erred in approving the compromise agreement after the petitioners had perfected their appeal, allegedly to make it appear that the consideration of the tax sale was not unconscionable.
- Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the act of the City Treasurer in cancelling the redemption made by Urban Bank.
- Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in sustaining the findings that the tax sale was regularly held and complied with the Real Property Tax Code.
Applicable Provisions
Section 75 of Presidential Decree Number 1529, the Property Registration Decree, provides:
Section 75. Application for new certificate upon expiration of redemption period. Upon the expiration of the time, if any, allowed by law for redemption after the registered land has been sold on execution, or taken or sold for the enforcement of a lien of any description, except a mortgage lien, the purchaser at such sale or anyone claiming under him may petition the court for the entry of a new certificate to him. Before the entry of a new certificate of title, the registered owner may pursue all legal and equitable remedies to impeach or annul such proceedings.
This provision is the very basis of Nocom's petition, since it authorizes the purchaser at a tax sale to ask the court for a new certificate after the redemption period expires.
Section 108 of the same decree provides:
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or other person having an interest in the registered property may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased, or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties interested, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper.
This provision confirms that the registration court may order the cancellation of a certificate and the entry of a new one upon petition.
Section 2 of the same decree provides:
Section 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to land, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions.
This provision supplies the jurisdictional anchor for the trial court's action, including its power to issue the writ of possession.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the land registration court had jurisdiction. The petitioners' argument overlooked Sections 75 and 108 of the Property Registration Decree, and the Court stressed that the decree had long abolished the difference between the general jurisdiction of a regular court and the limited jurisdiction of a registration court. The Court added that it was too late in the day for the petitioners to question jurisdiction, because they had filed an answer with a prayer for affirmative reliefs, participated in all the hearings, and adduced their own evidence, raising the objection only after an adverse judgment. The Court quoted its ruling in Tijam versus Sibonghanoy:
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court could issue a writ of possession, since Section 2 of the decree vests in the Court of First Instance the power to hear and determine all questions arising upon petitions filed after original registration.
On the third issue, the Court rejected the charge that the compromise agreement was approved to cure an unconscionable price. The records showed that the petitioners did not oppose the approval of the agreement in the trial court, and there was no evidence that the properties were worth 50 million pesos. The Court noted that the buyer had assumed and paid more than 15 million pesos to the creditors under the compromise agreement, and that mere inadequacy of the price does not nullify a public auction sale where the law gives the owner the right to redeem.
On the fourth issue, the Court upheld the cancellation of Urban Bank's redemption. Urban Bank held no lien on the properties that would entitle it to redeem them, it had meant to redeem only another property, and it accepted the refund of its redemption money. The Court reasoned that if the affected party itself accepted the fairness of the ruling, the petitioners could not further challenge it.
On the fifth issue, the Court held that the question of notice and irregularities was factual and not appropriate in a petition for review on certiorari. The findings of the trial court and the appellate court coincided that the irregularities were not proved, and the Treasurer of Pasay City testified and presented documentary evidence that every requirement of the law on notice was complied with before the lots were sold.
Doctrine
A purchaser at a tax sale may, after the expiration of the redemption period, petition the land registration court for the entry of a new certificate of title in his name under Section 75 of the Property Registration Decree, and the registered owner may pursue all legal and equitable remedies to impeach or annul the proceedings before the new certificate is entered. The registration court may order the cancellation of a certificate and the entry of a new one under Section 108, and it may issue a writ of possession under Section 2, because the decree has abolished the distinction between the general jurisdiction of a regular court and the limited jurisdiction of a registration court. A party who invokes the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief cannot later repudiate that jurisdiction after an adverse judgment. Mere inadequacy of the price does not nullify a public auction sale where the owner has the right to redeem. Finally, findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, when supported by evidence, are not to be disturbed in a petition for review on certiorari.
Disposition
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which had affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Mariano Nocom.
Remember This
The single line worth memorizing is that the Property Registration Decree abolished the distinction between the general jurisdiction of a regular court and the limited jurisdiction of a registration court, so the registration court may cancel titles, issue new ones, and grant a writ of possession after a tax sale. Examiners like to use this case on the jurisdiction of land registration courts, on the doctrine of estoppel by laches against a party who attacks jurisdiction only after losing, and on the rule that mere inadequacy of price does not invalidate a tax sale where redemption is available.