SPOUSES TOMAS CLOMA AND VICTORIA LUZ CLOMA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIANO NOCOM, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals^[1] in
CA-GR CV No. 26373 dated February 22, 1991 which affirmed in toto the
Decision^[2]
of the RTC, NCJR, Br. 117, Pasay City in Land Registration Case No. 3089 dated
April 17, 1990.

The trial court and the respondent Court of Appeals had the same
findings of fact. We quote the facts,
supported by the evidence of the parties, as carefully related by the appellate
court, viz:

Oppositors spouses Tomas Cloma and Victoria Galvez Cloma were the
owners of two parcels of land located at Buendia Extension, San Jose, Pasay
City, Metro Manila registered in their names under TCT Nos. 17138 and 17139 of
the Register of Deeds, Pasay City (Exhs. “C”, “C-1” to “C-4”,
“D”, “D-1” to “D?4”, respectively) and were
declared for taxation purposes also in their names (Exhs. “F”,
“F-1”, “F-­2”).

Several liens and encumbrances have
been annotated on both said TCT Nos. 17138 and 17139 listed as follows:

Realty taxes on the subject lots for the
years 1983 to 1985 were not paid. On
June 6, 1985, the City Treasurer of Pasay City sent notice to the Clomas
concerning their tax delinquency (Exh. “Q”). The Clomas were also furnished under date of
June 6, 1985 with a Statement of Account of the total realty tax arrears then
due on their subject properties (Exhs. “N”, “N-1”,
“N-2”). On July 24, 1985, the
City Treasurer sent the Clomas a Second Call and Final Notice (Exh.
“P”).

Despite said notices, the Clomas appeared unperturbed and the
realty tax arrears remained unpaid. Finally, on October 21, 1985, the City Treasurer informed the spouses
Cloma in a letter that the subject properties belonging to them have been
included in the list of
delinquent properties scheduled to be sold by public auction on November 27,
1985 and that the auction sale will proceed as scheduled if the taxes due on
the lots, penalties and the cost of publication totalling P71,939.82 are not
paid on or before November 26, 1985 (Exh. “O”).

Copies of the Notice of Sale of Delinquent Properties which
included the subject lots and a great number of other lots from all over the
territorial jurisdiction of Pasay City consisting of eight (8) pages and
written in English but with the instructions of the bidding also appearing in
Filipino and Spanish aside from the English text (Exhs. “J”,
“J-1” to “J-4”), were posted at the bulletin board located
at the entrance of the Pasay City
Market and at the bulletin board at the lobby of the City Hall building per
certification of the chief of the land Tax Division of the Treasurer’s office
of Pasay City (Exh. “I”) which also certified that a town crier went
around the city for three (3) consecutive Saturdays announcing the public
auction sale scheduled to be held on November 27, 1985. The same notice of sale was published in the
Metropolitan Mail a newspaper with circulation in the national capital region,
for three (3) consecutive weeks on November 11, 18 and 25, 1985 (Exhs.
“K”, “K-1”, “L”, “M”, “M-1”).

On November 28, 1985, the City Treasurer informed the Clomas in a
letter of that date with copy of the certificate of sale as enclosure to the
effect that a certificate of sale over the subject properties has been issued
to Nocom as the highest bidder in the auction sale conducted by his office and
that they (the Clomas) have until November 26, 1986 within which to redeem said
lots (Exh. “T”). The letter
was sent by registered mail (Exh. “T-2”) which the Clomas received
per the registry return card (Exh. “T-1”).

The spouses Cloma failed to redeem the properties within the
prescribed period. On November 3, 1986,
Urban Bank of the Philippines made an offer to redeem the subject lots but the
offer was cancelled by the City Treasurer in a deed entitled “Cancellation
of Redemption” citing as ground for cancellation that the redemption was
erroneously made and is “null and void” (Exh. “W”). The City Treasurer with prior notice to the
City Auditor by letter dated July 24, 1989 signed by the City Legal Officer of
Pasay (Exh. “X”) then had refunded to Urban Bank the payment it made
(Exhs. “V”, “V-1”).

On July 27, 1989, the City Treasurer executed a Final Deed of Sale
in favor of the petitioner Exhs. “U”, “U-1”). Thereafter, petitioner Nocom had paid the
realty taxes on the properties which became due for the years 1986 to 1989
(Exhs. “G”, “G-1” to “G-­5”).

On October 5, 1989, petitioner Nocom filed the instant petition in
the lower court seeking the cancellation of TCT Nos. 17138 and 17139 in the
names of spouses Cloma and all the liens and encumbrances annotated thereon and
the issuance of new titles in his (Nocom’s) name invoking Section 75 of PD 1529
(also known as the Property Registration Decree) and Section 80 of PD No. 464,
the Real Property Tax Code.

Spouses Tomas and Victoria Cloma and PMI Colleges filed a common
Answer making admissions and denials of allegations of the petition and putting
up special and affirmative defenses, i.e., the auction sale was attended by
irregularities rendering the entire proceedings null and void; the action is
inappropriate and Section 71 of PD 1539 rather is applicable; the City
Treasurer has no authority to conduct the sale but the City Assessor who is by
law empowered to sell tax delinquent properties at public auction; redemption
was made by Urban Bank; the purchase price of P52,856.74 for the two properties
is grossly inadequate and made a tender to refund or reimburse the petitioner’s
expenses of a cashier’s check in the amount of P150,000.00. They prayed for the dismissal of the petition
for lack of merit.

Aside from the spouses Cloma and PMI Colleges, Inc., other parties
namely, Republic Planters Bank (Records, pp. 73-106), Rodrigo Caimol (id.,
pp. 56-­71) and Sandigan Lending Investors, Inc. withdrew their Opposition and
manifested in open court that they are entering into a compromise agreement
with the petitioner. Later, the other
oppositor, Sandigan Lending Investors, Inc. filed a manifestation recalling
their announced withdrawal of their opposition. Petitioner Nocom, on his part, manifested his willingness and
conformity for the lien of Sandigan Lending Investors, Inc. annotated on
Clomas’ titles, to be carried over to the new titles he is seeking to be issued
in his name, in the event his petition is upheld by the court.

Concerning the oppositors Cloma and PMI Colleges, Inc., a
stipulation in lieu of evidence was submitted by them to the effect that the
nature and scope of their testimony would be that no notices of the public
auction sale had reached them and that they have not heard of the existence of
the newspaper by the title of Metropolitan Mail. Except for said offer of testimony no other evidence was
presented in support of said oppositor’s claims.

On April 17, 1990, the lower court rendered its Decision in favor
of the petitioner Mariano Nocom the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered requiring the Register
of Deeds of Pasay City to cancel TCT Nos. 17138 and 17139 in the name of the
spouses Tomas Cloma and Victoria Galvez Cloma and to issue new titles in the
name of petitioner Mariano Nocom, free from all existing liens and
incumbrances, except that of the Notice of Levy under Entry No.
84-73999/T-17138 and 84-73999/T-17139 in favor of Sandigan Lending Investors. Let a writ of possession be issued requiring
the Deputy Sheriff of this Court to place petitioner in possession of the said
properties.

SO ORDERED.” (pp. 237-238, Records)

On April 30, 1990, the oppositors Cloma filed their notice of
appeal.

On May 3, 1990, petitioner Nocom and oppositors Republic Planters
Bank, Rodrigo Caimol and Sandigan Lending Investors, Inc. submitted to the
lower court a Compromise Agreement dated March 30, 1990 where the petitioner
agreed and bound himself to pay the claims of said oppositors who in turn,
manifested acknowledgment and recognition of the tax sale of the City Treasurer
issued in favor of the petitioner (Records, pp. 244-247).

The lower court approved the compromise agreement in its Order
dated May 4, 1990. Oppositor Republic
Planters Bank moved to have the judgment dated April 17, 1990 correspondingly
modified to include in said judgment the terms of said compromise
agreement. The lower court by an Order
dated May 14, 1990 approved the compromise agreement with an injunction to the
parties to the agreement to faithfully comply by the terms and conditions
thereof.”

As aforestated, the respondent appellate court affirmed the
Decision of the trial court.

Undaunted by the two (2) setbacks, petitioners filed the petition
at bench where they contend:

(1) The respondent Court of
Appeals erred xxx in maintaining that the LRC had jurisdiction to hear the
validity/invalidity of a tax sale and thereafter in ordering the cancellation of petitioners’ titles to the
properties in question;

(2) The Land Registration
Court does not have the power to issue a writ of possession for a buyer in a
questioned tax sale;

(3) The respondent Court of
Appeals erred in affirming as proper/legal the act of the Land Registration Court in modifying its
Decision after your petitioners had already perfected its appeal to make it
appear that the consideration of the tax sale at P52,856.74 for a property valued at P5OM is not
unconscionable;

(4) The respondent court
erred in affirming the Decision of the Land Registration Court which sustained
as legal and proper the act of the City Treasurer in cancelling a redemption
annotated on your petitioners’ titles at the time of the execution of the Final
Bill of Sale;

(5) Finally, the respondent
Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the “findings” of the Land
Registration Court that the tax sale was regularly held and had complied with
the Real Property Tax Code.

We find no merit in the petition.

We shall first rule on the arguments of petitioners assailing the
jurisdiction of the trial court sitting as a land registration court to cancel
their certificates of titles and issue new ones in favor of private
respondent. The argument clearly
overlooks the pertinent provisions of PD No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, viz:

“SEC. 75. Application
for new certificate upon expiration of redemption period. – Upon the
expiration of the time, if any, allowed by law for redemption after the
registered land has been sold on execution, or taken or sold for the
enforcement of a lien of any description, except a mortgage lien, the purchaser
at such sale or anyone claiming under him may petition the court for the
entry of a new certificate to him.

Before the entry of a new certificate of title, the registered
owner may pursue all legal and equitable remedies to impeach or annul such
proceedings.

x x x

SEC. 108. Amendment and
alteration of certificates. – No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be
made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of
a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds,
except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or other person having an
interest in the registered property, x x x, may apply by petition to the court
upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether
vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have
terminated and ceased, or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate
have arisen or been created; x x x x; and the court may hear and determine
the petition after notice to all parties interested, and may order the entry or
cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum
upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions,
requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper; x x
x. (Emphasis supplied)”

Section 2 of PD 1529 also clearly rejects
the thesis of petitioners that
the trial court cannot issue a writ of possession to effectuate the result of a
tax sale, thus:

“SEC. 2. Nature of
registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. – xxx xxx xxx

Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
applications for original registration of title, to land, including
improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions
arising upon such applications or petitions. x x x.” (Emphasis supplied)

Obviously, petitioners failed to consider
that PD 1529 has long abolished the difference between the general jurisdiction
of a regular court and the limited jurisdiction of a registration court.^[3]

To be sure, it is too late in the day for petitioners to question
the jurisdiction of the trial court. The records show that petitioners did not assail the jurisdiction of the
trial court when they filed their Answer containing a prayer for affirmative reliefs.^[4]
Voluntarily submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial court, petitioners
freely participated in all the hearings of the case and adduced their own evidence. It was only after an adverse judgment that petitioners raised the
trial court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction. Our law and policy do not sanction such a somersault. The polestar of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy^[5]
still provides good guidance on the issue, viz:

“It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction
of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining
the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important
in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but
for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated – obviously for
reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is
too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court
(Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St.
Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it
is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a
court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards
deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned
in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) – to the
effect that we frown upon the ‘undesirable practice’ of a party submitting
his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse – as well as Pindañgan
etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-­14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al.
vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc.
vs. The Court of Industrial Relations
et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil, p.
277.” (underlining supplied).

We next deal with the action of the trial court, affirmed by the
appellate court, which approved the Compromise Agreement^[6] of
the private respondent and the other oppositors after petitioner, had perfected
their appeal. The records show that in the course of the hearings of the case,
oppositors Republic Planters Bank, Rodrigo Caimol and Sandigan Lending
Investors, Inc., had informed the trial court they were willing to compromise
with private respondent. The Decision
of the trial court was given on April 17, 1990. Petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal on April 30, 1990. The Compromise Agreement dated March 30,
1990 but filed on May 3, 1990 was
approved by the trial court in a separate Order dated May 4, 1990 and
ordered incorporated in its Decision of April 17, 1990.^[7] Under
the Compromise Agreement, the said oppositors acknowledged the legality of the
tax sale in favor of the private respondent; on the other hand, the private
respondent agreed to pay their claims.^[8]

Petitioners posit the submission that the trial court approved
the Compromise Agreement “to make it appear that the consideration of the tax
sale at P52,856.74 for a property valued at P5OM is not unconscionable.”^[9]
This submission merits our scant attention. The records do not show that petitioners opposed the approval of the
Compromise Agreement in the trial court. Nor is there an iota of evidence that the value of the properties in
question is P50M. Neither is it
accurate to state that the said properties cost private respondent the
miniscule sum of P52,876.74. As rightly
pointed out by the respondent appellate court in its Resolution of May 22,
1991:^[10]

“Concerning the argument that the property may be
conservatively estimated at a value of P50 million while the consideration in
the tax sale was only P100,000.00 in payment of delinquent taxes of only
P52,000.00, and with the other circumstances attendant to the case, that
justice and equity demand a reconsideration of the decision and the dismissal
of the petition in LRC No. 3089, this additional argument also is untenable.

The records show that the petitioner had assumed and paid more than
P15 million to persons and entities to whom appellants have been indebted on
the security of said property under the Compromise Agreement dated May 4, 1990.

And about what the appellants claim that the price in the sale of
the property at auction sale, was grossly inadequate, the trial court correctly
ruled, against said argument in its decision, thus:

“Oppositors’ claim that the tax sale in favor of petitioner is
invalid due to gross inadequacy of the price is bereft of merit. The mortgages and other liens were to be
assumed by petitioner, so that in effect, the purchase price is much more than
the price actually paid by the petitioner to the City Treasurer of Pasay
City. Mere inadequacy of the price is not in itself sufficient to nullify a
public auction sale. While in ordinary
sales, for reason of equity,
a transaction may be invalidated on ground of inadequacy of the price, such
does not follow when the law
gives to the owner the right to redeem, as when the sale is made at public auction, upon the theory that the lesser the price the
easier it is for the owner to effect the redemption (Velasquez vs. Coronel, 5 SCRA 985).

Anyway, the predicament of oppositors was
the result of their own negligence. To
borrow the words of the late Justice Claudio
Teehankee: “While respondents’ plight may
merit some sympathy at the pain of losing their property for tax delinquency,
it must be borne in mind that it was primarily due to their neglect and default in paying their just tax obligation (Heirs of
Mariano v. Tajonera vs. Court of Appeals No. L-26677, March 27, 1981, 103 SCRA
467). So, also in Paguio vs. Ruiz (93
Phil. 306 [1953] citing another tax sale conducted by the City Treasurer
likewise upheld in Valbuena vs. Reyes, 84 Phil 676), the Supreme Court said:

‘Much as we sympathize with the appellee, this is one case where
the courts have no option but to apply the law and give the petitioner the
remedy she seeks. The law is positive
and leaves us no choice. It is harsh and drastic but it is a
necessary means of insuring the prompt collection of taxes so essential to the
life of the government.'” (Underlining supplied).”

Needless to state, petitioners’ charge
that the trial court approved the Compromise Agreement because it
“intended” to cure the alleged unconscionable price of the subject
lots has no basis whatsoever.

We next examine the contention that respondent appellate court
should not have affirmed the cancellation by the Treasurer of Pasay City of the
redemption made by Urban Bank. This
argument was accurately disposed by respondent appellate court when it ruled, viz:^[11]

“The action of the City Treasurer in cancelling the offer of
redemption made by Urban Bank is likewise proper. Urban Bank itself held no lien on the properties sold at public
auction which would entitle it to redeem them. What Urban Bank wanted to redeem was the property embraced by TCT No.
23932 only but that it inadvertently included the subject lots covered by TCT,
Nos. 17138 and 17139 in its offer and the City Legal Officer had ruled that
unless Mr. Mariano Nocom who purchased the lots at public auction would assign
his rights thereto, the claim of said bank is baseless (Exh.
“X”). The City Treasurer
after cancelling Urban Bank’s offer of redemption then had refunded to Urban
Bank the redemption money which said bank accepted.”

The ruling satisfied no less than the
Urban Bank. If the affected party
itself accepts the fairness of this ruling, we see no reason how petitioners
could make any further challenge as to its correctness.

Finally, we consider the contention of petitioners that they were
not notified of the public auction sale of the subject tots and that other
irregularities attended the sale in favor of the private respondent. The contention is factual in nature and is
hardly appropriate to be considered in a petition for review on certiorari. The evidence hearing on the issue has been
painstakingly analyzed both by the trial court and the appellate court and their findings coincide to the
effect that the claim of irregularities charged by petitioners has not been
proved. We agree that considering the
mass of evidence presented by private respondent, petitioners’ simple denial
that they did not receive any notice of sale cannot carry the day for
them. No less than the Treasurer of
Pasay City, a public official, testified and presented documentary evidence to
prove that every requirement of the law on notice was complied with before the
lots of petitioner were sold for non-payment of taxes for three (3) years. The Statement of Account, dated June 6, 1985
(Exhs’ “N”, “N-1″ and
“N-2”) was sent to petitioners in their address. This was followed by another Letter of
Demand (Exhs. “Q” and “Q-1”) sent on June 6, 1985. Then on July 24, 1985, a Second Call and
Final Notice (Exh. “F”) was once more sent to petitioners. As all the demands proved futile, a Notice
of Inclusion in the List of Delinquent Real Properties dated on October 21,
1985, (Exh. “O”) was also sent to petitioners. Then the Notice of Sale of Delinquent
Properties (Exhs. “J” to “J-4”) written in English, Spanish
and Tagalog was posted in three (3) conspicuous
public places in Pasay City. The notice
was also published in the Metropolitan Mail for three (3) times in three (3)
consecutive weeks (Exhs. “K” and “K-1”, “L”,
“M” and “M-1”). The
sale was then made to private respondent on November 25, 1985. The next day, November 26, 1985, the City
Treasurer formally notified petitioners about the sale, enclosed therewith the
Certificate of Sale and advised them that the period of redemption would expire
one (1) year thereafter^[12] (Exhs. “T”, “T-1” to
“T-3”). On the face of these
overwhelming evidence, petitioners did not even take the witness stand but
instead stipulated that if they would testify they would allege they did not
receive any notice of sale and that they were not aware that Metropolitan Mail
is a newspaper of general circulation. Given the cumulative impact of the testimonial and documentary evidence
of the private respondent and buttressed by the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty on the part of the City Treasurer of Pasay,
the denial of petitioners that they received notice of the sale is not entitled
to credence. Petitioners’ claim is too
easy to make and its approbation finds no sanction in our rules of evidence.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we deny the petition for review on certiorari
there being no reversible error
in the Decision dated February 22, 1991 of the respondent court in CA-G.R. CV
No. 26373. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.

^[1]
Seventh Division, penned by Mr. Justice Cezar D. Francisco, with Mr. Justices
Serafin E. Camilon and Venancio D. Aldecoa, concurring.

^[2]
The dispositive portion states:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered requiring the Register of
Deeds of Pasay City to cancel TCT Nos. 17138 and 17139 in the name of spouses
Tomas Cloma and Victoria Galvez Cloma and to issue new titles in the name of
petitioner Mariano Nocom, free from all liens and incumbrances, except that of
the Notice of Levy under entry No. 84-73999/T-17138 and 84- 73999/T-17139 in favor of Sandigan Lending
Investors. Let a writ of possession be
issued requiring the Deputy Sheriff of this court to place the petitioner in possession of the said properties.

SO ORDERED.”

^[3]
Averia vs. Caguioa, GR No. 15129, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 461.

^[4]
Rollo, pp. 199-200.

^[5]
23 SCRA 29, 35-36.

^[6]
Rollo, pp. 60-66.

^[7]
Rollo, p. 67.

^[8]
Rollo, pp. 60-62.

^[9]
Rollo,  p. 20.

^[10]
Rollo, pp. 109-111.

^[11]
Rollo, p. 98.

^[12]
Rollo, pp. 49-51.