MAXIMO H. GREGORIO, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS (4TH DIVISION) AND LORENZO G. VALENTIN, RESPONDENTS.

In this special action for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, invoking
the applicable procedural rule,^[1] assail the
validity of two resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals.  The first, rendered on March 13, 1964, denied
a petition of the deceased father of petitioners, then appellant, who sought to
have elevated to such court the evidence presented in the two cases then on
appeal.  The reason for denial is set
forth thus:  “It is evident that
counsel for the appellant intends to convert the appeal from the denial of
relief into an appeal from the decision itself, which
is error.  The motion to elevate is
therefore [denied] and counsel for appellant is [given] 10 days from receipt of
this resolution to file brief.”^[2]

The aforesaid order was affirmed in another resolution of April
8, 1964, denying a motion for reconsideration, the respondent court explaining
why:  “Considering that the case of Samia vs. Medina, 50 Phil. 613 cited by counsel has no
relation to the situation at bar; considering that the provisions of Section 2,
Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court are not applicable because to grant the
motion of counsel is not to take ‘further proceedings’ but would actually set
the case back and delay its disposition (see Rule 144); and considering that
Section 2 of Rule 41, which allows
appellant to assail the decision on the merits in an appeal from a denial of
petition for relief, creates a new right for appellant in derogation of appellee’s right, and this appeal was perfected before the
Revised Rules took effect; the Court [resolved] to [deny] said motion for reconsideration,
and to [require] counsel for the appellant to file brief within [ten] 10 [days]
from receipt of this resolution.”^[3]

Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus dated April 21,
1964.  At first, it was dismissed for
being premature, according to our resolution of April 29, 1964, but thereafter,
on July 6, 1964, we reconsidered, respondent Court of Appeals as well as the
other respondent Lorenzo G. Valentin being required
to file an answer within ten days from notice thereof.

In its answer seeking the dismissal of the above petition,
respondent Valentin sought to justify what was done
by respondent Court and consequently the dismissal of the petition.

Petitioner is entitled to the writ prayed for.  It is undeniable, as respondent Court stated
in the aforesaid resolution, that the rule of court applicable as of January 1,
1964,^[4] which
would enable a party appealing from a judgment denying relief under Rule 38
likewise to “assail the judgment on the merits” for lack of support
in the evidence, gave rise to a new procedural right.  Nonetheless, under the doctrine
uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court, the retroactive application of a
procedural law is not violative of any right of a
party who may feel that he is adversely affected.

As early as 1917, in Enrile v. Court of
First Instance of Bulacan,^[5]
it was held:  “We are of the opinion
that Act No. 2588 is applicable to the present case for the reason that it
affects procedure rather than the substantive rights of the parties and tends
to remedy a condition arising in appeals from judgments of justice’s courts
rendered in actions of forcible entry and detainer
which, it is well known, has produced considerable hardship to appellants.  Whether the motion to dismiss is the correct
proceeding or not is immaterial as the action has been submitted to us on the
merits and, in dealing with it thus, Act No. 2588 may be applied.”

The above decision was quoted with approval in a case decided ten
years later.^[6] So was
Black on Interpretation of Laws.  Thus:
“Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to causes of action accrued, and actions pending and undetermined,
at the time of their passage, unless such actions are expressly excepted or unless vested rights would be disturbed by
giving them a retrospective operation.” Respondent Valentin,
in this case, cannot allege any vested right which would preclude the
application of the above principle.

Through the same Justice Villa-Real, this Court again had
occasion in 1937, after a lapse of another ten years, and with a citation of
the two above cases and the presence of an even more relevant fact, namely the
enactment of a later procedural law while the case was pending decision to
reaffirm the principle that a later law procedural in nature must be given a
retroactive effect.^[7]

This Court has, since then, adhered consistently to the above
view.^[8]
In Tolentino v. Angeles, a 1956 decision,^[9] it reiterated that
“retroactivity of laws that are remedial in nature is not
prohibited.” Moreover, in the latest case in point,^[10]
it was categorically stated:  “The
amendment being procedural in character, no vested rights could attach.”

This is not to say that under appropriate circumstances, a court
of justice would not be justified to deny a retroactive application in the
event that to do so “would not be feasible or would work injustice, * *
*.”^[11] This is not
such a case.  As a matter of fact,
further reflection would have induced the conclusion that the failure to
elevate the evidence considering the new
procedural rule, enabling a party to appeal from a judgment denying
relief under Rule 38 to dispute likewise the merits of such decision for lack of evidentiary support, might be
rendered nugatory, if retroactivity is
not imparted to it.  Not only then is it feasible, but
also, instead of working injustice, it will have precisely the opposite effect.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling the
resolution of respondent Court of March 14, 1964 as well as its resolution of April 8, 1964, denying the motion for
reconsideration.  The writ of mandamus is likewise granted to compel
respondent Court to elevate to it the evidence presented during the hearing of
the two cases on appeal, CA-G.R. Nos. 33051-R and 33052-R, at the trial before
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.  Pending the notification to petitioners that
such evidence is before it, the period for submitting their brief as appellants
is held in abeyance.  With
costs against respondents Lorenzo G. Valentin.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and
Sanchez, JJ., concur.

Castro and Capistrano, JJ., did not take part.

^[1]
Par. 2, Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:  “A judgment denying relief under Rule 38
is subject to appeal, and in the course thereof, a party may also assail the
judgment on the merits, upon the ground that it is not supported by the
evidence or it is contrary to law.”

^[2]
Annex A, Petition, Record on Appeal.

^[3]
Annex B, Ibid.

^[4]
Section 2, Rule 41, Revised Rules of Court.

^[5]
36 Phil. 574, 576-577.

^[6]
Hosana v.
Diomano, 56 Phil. 741, 745 (1927).

^[7]
Guevara v. Laico, 64 Phil. 144. Cf. Sevilla v. Tolentino,
66 Phil. 196 (1938).

^[8]
Camacho v. Court, 80 Phil. 848 (1948); People v.
Young, 83 Phil. 702 (1949); Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 (1950); Salcedo
v. Carpio, 89 Phil. 254 (1951); Castro v.
Sagales, 94 Phil. 208 (1953).

^[9]
99 Phil. 309.

^[10]
Billones v. CIR, L-17566, July 30, 1965.

^[11]
Rule 144, Revised Rules of Court.