MUNICIPALITY (NOW CITY) OF LEGASPI, PETITIONER, VS. A. L. AMMEN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., RESPONDENT.

There is a need for an inquiry into the jural
consequences attaching to the reconstitution of a title in this petition for
the review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  The case had its origin in an action before
the Court of First Instance of Albay, a complaint
being filed by now respondent A. L. Ammen Transportation
Co., Inc. for the recovery of the possession of a piece of land against the
Province of Albay the Municipality of Legaspi and twenty-four private individuals occupying
portions thereof.  Earlier, it was shown
that said respondent, as plaintiff, filed a petition for the reconstitution of
its Transfer Certificate of Title covering said lot on the ground that it lost
its previous title.  It was successful,
the Court of First Instance of Albay issuing an order
authorizing such reconstitution.  The reconstitution
notwithstanding, one of the defendants, and now sole appellant, petitioner City
of Legaspi, did not surrender possession.  Hence the filing of such complaint.  Respondent A. L. Ammen
Transportation Co., Inc. as plaintiff, was un­successful, its complaint for the
recovery having been dismissed.

It elevated the matter on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the judgment of the lower court, declaring that the reconstituted
certificate of title “is valid and that [re­spondent A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc.] is the registered owner of
Lot No. 1114 of the Legaspi Cadastre.”^[1]
The City of Legaspi in turn instituted a petition for
certiorari to review such decision of the Court of Appeals.  On the facts as found by it, which we are not
at liberty to alter, we sustain the Court of Appeals.

What were the facts as found by the Court of Appeals?  According to its decision now under
review:  “We note that the – issues
raised and the evidence adduced on behalf of appellee
city and even the findings of the trial court relate to the acquisition or
ownership of the lot, its alleged registration as a result of a
cadastral survey and hearing, and the reconstitution of the title to the
land.  Since, however, the fact of
reconstitution is not in dispute, there is no need in this action to go into
the question of acquisition or ownership of the property or
to deter­mine whether the reconstituted title thereof was obtained in bad faith
or in a fraudulent manner.  In fact, as
far as the reconstitution is concerned, it is unsafe for this Court at this
instance to make any finding as to whether it was procured in bad faith or
fraudulently since the record of the reconstitution proceeding is not before
us; besides there is the presumption of regularity in the granting of the
reconstituted title.”^[2]

To show why the appeal of
respondent A. L. Ammen Transpor­tation Co., Inc. from
the decision of the lower court was meritorious, the Court of Appeals referred
to the applicable statutory provision which leaves no doubt that the
reconstituted certificate of title has the same validity and legal
effect as the original there­of.^[3]
The force to which such statutory language is entitled was clearly set forth in
the leading case of Philippine National Bank v. de la Viña,^[4]
where this Court, speaking through justice J. B. L. Reyes, stated:  “it appears that prior to the
institution of these proceedings with the court below, there had already been a
judicial reconstitution of the original certificates of title upon petition of
the registered owner.  Unlike in the
extrajudicial reconstitution of titles, wherein there is the statutory
reservation that the new title ‘shall be without prejudice to any party whose
right or interest in the property was duly noted in the original, at the same
time it was lost or destroyed’ (Sec. 7, Republic Act No. 26), a judicially
reconstituted title, by express provisions of the statute (Sec. 10, ibid),
‘shall not be subject to the encumbrance referred to in section 7’ of the Act.
Evidently, the statute would not ordinarily allow the reconstitution of liens
and other encumbrances not noted in the judicially reconstituted owner’s
certificate of title.”

Even the objection based on procedure on due process grounds
could not prosper for as clearly set forth in the above decision:  “While it may be true that no notice was
sent by registered mail to the petitioner bank when the judicial reconstitution
of title was sought, such failure, however, did not amount to a jurisdictional
defect.  The proceedings therein being in
rem, the cadastral court acquired jurisdiction
to hear and decide the petition for the reconstitution of the owner’s title
upon compliance with the required posting of notices and publication in the
Official Gazette.”^[5]

With the above conclusive
pronouncement of this Court to which, as was to be expected, the Court of
Appeals paid deference, the first three assigned errors of the City of Legaspi, the sole appellant, could thus be disposed
of.  The Court of Appeals did not err in
holding that the fact of reconstitution of title to the land in question is not
in dispute, in concluding that the proceedings before the lower court was not
in the nature of a direct attack on the legality of the issuance of the
reconstituted title, and in declaring respondent A. L. Ammen
Transportation Co., Inc. as the owner of Lot No. 1114 on the basis of the
reconstituted title.  As the fourth error
deals with the alleged “overwhelming evidence” to rebut the
presumption of legality in the issuance of the re­constituted title is factual,
it cannot be inquired into in this petition for review.

Necessarily, likewise,
the fifth alleged error to the effect that petitioner should vacate the
premises within a period of one year and to pay damages would be
unavailing.  It may require further
reservation though.  The ably written
brief of petitioner, represented by City Fiscal Aquilino
P. Bonto, “emphasized that the land in dispute
is now a public road (Quezon Avenue) making up one of
the vital arteries of commerce and trade in Legaspi
City.  It is the principal outlet to and
from the Pier Area where vessels both coastwise and unload their cargoes; from
the Pier Area it leads to the market and the commercial sector of the City; and
from various points it is the most convenient road to the Post Office, the
frontage of which abuts the land in litigation. 
Ordering the petitioner to vacate the property would in effect cut off
access to the areas of trade and commerce, thereby adversely affecting the
economic potential of petitioner and its inhabitants.  Generally the closing of the road would
otherwise create serious inconvenience to vehicular pedestrian traffic to which
Quezon Avenue has been devoted since 1947, or a
period of seventeen years.”^[6]

Such a problem thus gives
rise to a matter of public interest. 
Fortunately, it is not a new one in this jurisdiction.  The appro­priate solution, was
indicated in the leading case of Alfonso v. Pasay
City where this Court, through Justice Montemayor, held:  “In the present, Alfonso remains up to
now the owner of the land in question, Lot No. 4368 of the Cadastral Survey of Pasay, because being registered land, the City of Pasay or its predecessor, Municipality of Pasay, did not
and could not acquire it thru prescription. 
As registered owner, he could bring an action to recover possession at
any time because possession is one of the attributes of ownership of land.  However, said restoration of possession by
the City of Pasay is neither convenient nor feasible
because it is now and has been used for road purposes.  So, the only relief available is for the City
of Pasay to make due compensation, which it could and
should have done years ago since 1925.”^[7]

That respondent A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. with an equally well-written
brief prepared by its counsel, Atty. Ramon C. Fernandez, is not insensible to
such a solution is indicated therein, where the following is set forth:  “In the instant case, the Court of
Appeals has given the petitioner a period of one year within which to
expropriate the portion occupied by the road if it does not want to return the
portion in question to the respondent, ALATCO.”^[8]

It is thus obvious why
the last assignment of error is equally not persuasive.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals of November 18, 1963, as modified by its resolution of January 22, 1964, is affirmed. 
Without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and
Castro, JJ., concur.

Capistrano, J., did not take
part.

^[1]
Decision of the Court of Appeals, Annex A, Brief for the Petitioner, p.
22.  In a resolution dated January 22,
1964, acting on a motion for reconsideration of respondent A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., the Court of Appeals
modified this decision by ordering now petitioner City of Legaspi
to pay plaintiff P200.00 a year as rental beginning January, 1948.

^[2]
Ibid, p. 20.

^[3]
Section 7, Republic Act 26, provides: “Reconstituted certificates of title
shall have the same validity and legal effect as the originals thereof: Provided,
however, That certificates of title reconstituted
extrajudicially, in the manner stated in sections
five and six hereof, shall be without prejudice to any party whose right or
interest in the property was duly noted in the original, at the time it was
lost or destroyed, but entry or notation of which has not been made on the
reconstituted certificate of title. This reservation shall be noted as an encumbrance
on the reconstituted certificate of title.”

^[4]
L-14601, August 31, 1960.

^[5]
Ibid. Cf. Wright, Jr. v. Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Co., L-18904, July
11, 1964; Arches v. Billanes,
L-20452, April 30, 1965.

^[6]
Brief for the Petitioner, p. 13.

^[7]
106 Phil. 1017, 1022 (1960).

^[8]
Refutation of the Fifth Error Assigned, Brief for the Respondent, p. 12.