CEFERINO P. AZUCENA, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. EMMANUEL M. MUÑOZ, RESPONDENT.

It is expected of a judge, and rightly so, that he should at all
times manifest depth of commitment and concern to the cause of justice
according to legal norms, a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the
tug and pull of purely personal preferences and prejudices which he shares with
the rest of his fellow mortals.  That is
one way to assure that the rule of law will reign triumphant.  That is the test of how fitly and well he
discharges his task.  It is thus a canon
of judicial ethics that a judge called upon “to administer the law and
apply it to the facts, * * * should be studious of the principles of the law
and diligent in endeavoring to ascertain the facts.”^[1]
It is both understandable and justifiable, then, why failure to live up to such
an exacting responsibility may bring about disciplinary action extending to
removal for serious misconduct or inefficiency.^[2]

In the event that a proceeding of the above character is brought
against a judge, however, the utmost care should be taken lest one called upon to
dispense justice is himself unjustly dealt with.  There is to be an awareness that he has to
contend with the pressures of too little time and the driving need for prompt
dispatch in the disposition of cases. 
Moreover, the broad range of action allowable under statutes and
doctrines in not a few cases characterized by generality, and hence far from
precise, does result in his actuations being plausibly subject to challenge as
to its correctness by the losing party. 
As apparently did happen here, a disappointed litigant, complainant Ceferino P. Azucena, nurturing
deeply a resent­ment at his failure to obtain what his heart was set on, was
able to picture in the worst possible light what was done by respondent Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, the
Honorable Emmanuel M. Muñoz.  Charges which, on its face, were far from trivial, were filed against respondent.  Necessarily, they had to be inquired
into.  Fortunately for respondent, a
careful investigation and a thorough report by the Honorable Eulogio Serrano, Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals,
to whom the matter was referred, revealed the utter lack of merit of the
complaint against respondent.  We approve
the recommendation submitted and dismiss the charges against respondent Judge.

The complaint against respondent Judge, filed on April 17, 1968, would accuse him of
unlawful disposal of property in custodia legis, unlawful refusal to return property to its
rightful owner, unlawful defiance of a final decision of the Court of Appeals,
and unlawful infliction of damages on complainant.  The highly emotional tone of the complainant,
evidently arising from what apparently was a deep-seated sense of grievance, is
evident from this portion thereof:  “As
respondent Judge has shown no compassion, no consideration, no regard
whatsoever in this case to our laws and duly constituted authorities and to the
rights and interests of complainant as a law-abiding citizen, as a responsible
government official, as a descendant of men who had rendered services to San
Pablo City as public officials, and as a member of the Philippine bar,
respondent Judge has unlawfully inflicted additional damages upon complainant
and his family for which respondent Judge should be held accountable by way of
example or correction for the public good.”^[3]
It is prayed, therefore, that the charges be investigated and that “if
warranted by the facts and the law, respondent Judge be made to account for all
the damages sustained by complainant and his family, and his removal from the
judiciary be recommended to the President of the Philippines.”^[4]

In the answer filed on August
1, 1968, respondent Judge squarely met each of the above
imputations.  It was then set forth by
him:  “In view of all the foregoing,
respondent honestly believes that all his actuations in connection with the
aforementioned jeep in question were well within the law and even granting that
he did err in his orders and judgments, certainly the same would not constitute
serious misconduct as charged by complainant.”^[5]
He prayed that the complaint be dismissed. 
The matter was then referred, in our resolution of August 8, 1968, to Justice Eulogio
Serrano of the Court of Appeals.  His
report was submitted to us on June 22,
1970.

As to the first charge of unlawful disposal of property in custodia legis by
respondent Judge, the report sets forth the following:  “The charges of complainant Azucena on four counts, except the third (the alleged
unlawful defiance of the final decision of the Court of Appeals) revolve around
the pivotal question of whether or not the respondent judge knowingly acted
illegally in having the jeep seized by issuing a search warrant and denying the
motion for the return of the same jeep to complainant Azucena.  The legality and validity of the issuance of
the search warrant as well as the delivery of the jeep in question to Jose Catacutan was the subject of the aforesaid case of
certiorari filed by Azucena with the Court of
Appeals, the decision of which stated among other things the following:  ‘The statement in the affidavit of Jose Catacutan that the jeep was stolen from his driver, Armando
Enriquez, made the vehicle a proper object of search and seizure (Section 2(b),
Rule 126, Rules of Court).  The issuance
of the search warrant by the respondent Judge was, therefore, in order as the
jeep was the subject of a criminal complaint for theft filed with the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan.  * * * The order of the respondent Judge,
dated January 31, 1964, authorizing the return of the jeep in question to
respondent Jose Catacutan was at that time valid.’
There is therefore no need to discuss here the validity of the issuance of the
search warrant by the respondent Judge as well as his order to deliver the jeep
to Jose Catacutan to dispose of the first charge of
unlawful disposal of property in custodia legis.”^[6]

The second and fourth charges as to respondent Judge unlawfully
refusing to return property to its rightful owner and unlawfully inflicting
damages on complainant were next taken up. 
Thus:  “We come now to the
second and fourth charges which are the alleged unlawful refusal to return
property to its rightful owner and the unlawful infliction of damages on
complainant.  These charges are no doubt
based on the refusal of respondent Judge to return the jeep involved to the
complainant after the criminal case for qualified theft through falsification
of public documents was dismissed by the provincial fiscal of Bulacan which dismissal allegedly made the further holding
in legal custody of the jeep in question baseless and no longer necessary.  While apparently this contention appears
sound, nevertheless, this is applicable only to cases where the property taken
appears to have no connection in any way with the crime charged giving the
court no discretion to exercise in returning the property to the person from
whom the same was seized.  However, when
there is a controversy between the person from whose possession the property
was taken by search warrant and the person from whom it is claimed the property
was stolen as to which has the right to it the question is presented which can
be determined not on a criminal process but in a civil action (Rules of Court
in Philippines by Francisco, Vol. 5, 1958 Ed., p. 719, citing American
cases).  This citation which was
mentioned in Catacutan’s opposition (Exhibit 4, pp.
53-54) might have been in the mind of the respondent Judge when he issued his
order denying the motion to return the jeep to the complainant but without
prejudice to the proper civil action in the proper court, especially
considering the claim of Catacutan that it was proven
at the investigation of the criminal case in the office of the provincial
fiscal of Bulacan by the testimonies of a certain Mr.
Patajo of the Manila Police Department, Laboratory
Division, and of Mr. Macapagal of the Motor Vehicles
Office that the jeep in question is the same jeep that was stolen from Jose Catacutan as the chassis number of the jeep registered in
the name of Catacutan is also the chassis number
appearing in that of the jeep seized from Azucena.  No denial of this claim by the complainant
has been found in the records.  Also
cited by Catacutan in the same opposition is Article
105 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the subject of the crime
committed has to be restored to the owner even if the same be found in the
possession of a third person who has acquired it by lawful means.  Even conceding for the sake of argument that
the respondent Judge might have committed an error, the same is merely an error
of judgment which, it is believed, is not sufficient to constitute a misconduct in office by any stretch of the
imagination.”^[7]

This is what he said concerning the third charge consisting of an
alleged unlawful defiance by respondent Judge of a final decision of the Court
of Appeals:  “The remaining charge
of unlawful defiance of a final decision of the Court of Appeals is predicated
upon the erroneous impression of the complainant that the respondent Judge deliberately
ignored the decision of the Court of Appeals in the aforementioned civil action
of certiorari (CA-G.R. No. 38036-R), ordering the respondent Judge to cause the
return of the jeep in question to petitioner Ceferino
P. Azucena within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
notice of entry of final judgment.  As
already adverted to previously the said decision was received by Renato Ramos, a clerk in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Branch I presided over by the respondent Judge
on August 4, 1968, who merely attached the same to the records of the case in
said Court without in any way informing the respondent about the receipt of
said decision.  However, when the letter
(Exhibit 4-L) of complainant’s counsel addressed to the respondent reminding
him of the decision of the Court of Appeals and requesting that he or Mr. Azucena be notified of the specific date and time when the
said jeep would be delivered to the complainant was received on October 2, 1967,
respondent issued an order dated October 4, 1967 (Exhibit 4-M) directed to Jose
Catacutan ordering the latter to deliver the jeep in
question to Ceferino P. Azucena
immediately and, when he was informed by the manifestation (Exhibit 4-N) on
October 14, 1967, of the lawyer for Catacutan that
the latter died on April 2, 1967, respondent issued another order directed to
the legal heirs of Jose Catacutan for the delivery of
the aforesaid jeep to complainant Ceferino P. Azucena.  The
erroneous impression must have come about because as per the admission of the
complainant he and his lawyer did not bother to examine the records of the case
in the court to find out what action the respondent had taken following the
receipt of the decision of the Court of Appeals (t.s.n.,
pp. 61-62), and no notice of any such action was given to him or his
counsel.  Under these facts it cannot be
said with candor and sincerity that the respondent willfully defied the order
of the Court of Appeals.”^[8]

Then comes the recommendation:  “In view of all the foregoing, the
undersigned recommends that respondent Judge be absolved from all the charges
and the complaint accordingly dismissed.”^[9]
We find nothing objectionable in said report. 
We accept it.

The confidence of the people in the judiciary, so highly
essential to the rule of law, would be diluted if no action were taken by us on
charges against a respondent judge indicating on their face a degree of
seriousness and gravity.  We had no
choice, then, but to refer the matter, as was done, for investigation, although
the answer would seem to indicate that complainant, motivated undoubtedly by
what he felt was an affront to his rights, did grossly exaggerate matters.  Then came the investigation impartially and
diligently conducted by Associate Justice Serrano, to be followed by his report
recommending dismissal of the charges.

As is evident from the excerpts extensively quoted above, nothing
derogatory to respondent Judge had been proved. 
He did take pains to pass on the matter before him in accordance with
what the law provides.  There is more
than ample precedent for the action he took. 
There is not the slightest iota of proof of bias and partiality that
could be rightfully laid on his door.  He
ascertained the facts and he applied what to him was the controlling legal
principle.  When the matter is thus
accurately appraised, then, no other conclusion except that reached by Justice
Serrano is allowable.  Respondent Judge
certainly cannot be guilty of serious misconduct or inefficiency.

We should be the last to deter or discourage parties who harbor
what they feel to be a legitimate sense of grievance against a judge’s
actuation from taking the steps the law confers to assure observance of the
high standard expected of men in the judiciary. 
Considering that a judge’s reputation for probity is highly valued, as
it should be, and, in many instances, his most precious possession,
is it too much to expect of a complainant that he should ponder well and
seriously before filing charges? 
Otherwise, even if the result be acquittal, an erroneous impression as
to the judge’s capabilities, difficult to erase afterwards, might have been
created.  This admonition should not be
lost especially on one like complainant, who is a member of the Philippine bar
and, as such, presumably aware not only of his rights but of his
responsibilities to a court and its occupant.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge is absolved of the charges
filed by complainant Ceferino P. Azucena,
and the complaint against him dismissed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Villamor, J., on leave.

^[1]
Canon 5 of Judicial Ethics, 6 Moran, 63 ed., p. 361.

^[2]
According to Section 67 of the Judiciary Act of 1948:  “No district Judge shall be separated or
removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause
shall exist, in the judgment of the Supreme Court, involving serious misconduct
or inefficiency, for the removal of said judge from office after the proper
proceedings.”

^[3]
Complaint, pp. 8-9.

^[4] Ibid, p. 9.

^[5] Answer,
pp. 5-6.

^[6]
Report, pp. 6-7.

^[7] Ibid,
pp. 7-9.

^[8] Ibid,
pp. 9-10.

^[9] Ibid, p. 10.