J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE AUDITOR GENERAL, RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.

From our decision of February
18, 1970, reversing the judgment of the lower court holding that
Republic Act No. 2616 as amended is unconstitutional, a printed motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner-appellee on March 31, 1970 reiterating its arguments
as to its alleged invalidity for being violative of
the due process and equal protection guarantees.  On May
27, 1970, a detailed opposition to such a motion for
reconsideration was filed by the Solicitor General, the Honorable Felix Q.
Antonio, on behalf of respondents-appellants. 
Then came a rejoinder of petitioner, on June 15, 1970, to the pleading of the
Solicitor General.  The motion for
reconsideration is thus ripe for determination. 
With due recognition of the vigor and earnestness with which petitioner
argued its motion, based on what it considered to be our applicable decisions,
the Court cannot grant the same.  Our
decision stands.

1.  It was a unanimous Court
that could not locate a constitutional infirmity vitiating Republic Act No.
2616 directing the expropriation of the Tatalon
Estate in Quezon City.  There are points of differences in the three
written opinions, but there is none as to the challenged legislative act being
invulnerable on the grounds therein asserted to justify its
sought for nullification.  While, to
repeat, petitioner apparently remains unconvinced, standing fast on the
contentions to which it would seek to impart greater plausibility, still the
intent of the framers of the Constitutional Convention, as shown not only by
the specific provisions allowing the expropriation of landed estates, but also
by the social justice provision as reflected in our decisions, save possibly
Republic v. Baylosis,^[1]
preclude a favorable action on the impassioned plea of petitioner for a reconsideration
of our decision.  At any rate,
petitioner-appellee can take comfort in the separate
opinion of Justice Teehankee, with which four other
members of the Court, including the Chief Justice, are in agreement, to enable
it to raise questions, the answers to which, if its view would be sustained,
would certainly afford sufficient protection to what it believes to be an
unconstitutional infringement on its property rights.

2.  It may not be amiss to
make more explicit and categorical what was held in our opinion that Section 4
of Republic Act No. 2616 prohibiting a suit for ejectment
proceedings or the continuance of one already commenced even in the absence of
expropriation proceedings, is unconstitutional, as held in Cuatico
v. Court of Appeals.^[2]
Greater emphasis likewise should be laid on our holding that while an
inaccuracy apparent on the face of the challenged statute as to the ownership
of the Tatalon Estate does not suffice to call for
its invalidity, still to erase even a fanciful doubt on the matter, the
statement therein found in Section 1 of the Act that in addition to petitioner-appellee, Gregorio Araneta &
Co., Inc. and Florencio Deudor,
et al. are included, cannot be understood as conferring on any juridical or
natural persons, clearly not entitled thereto, dominical rights over such
property in question.

3.  In the aforesaid decision
of Cuatico v. Court of Appeals, reference was made to
the amendatory Act, Republic Act No. 3453 to Section 4 as it originally was
worded in Republic Act No. 2616, the amendment consisting of the
following:  “Upon approval of this
amendatory Act, no ejectment proceedings shall be
instituted or prosecuted against the present occupants of any lot in said Tatalon Estate, and no ejectment
proceedings already commenced shall be continued, and such lot or any portion
thereof shall not be sold by the owners of said estate to any person other than
the present occupant without the consent of the latter given in a public
instrument.”^[3]
The question before the Court, according to the opinion penned by Justice
Bautista Angelo, was:  “Are the
provisions embodied in the amendatory Act which prescribe that upon approval of
said Act no ejectment proceedings shall be instituted
or prosecuted against any occupant of any lot in the Tatalon
Estate, or that no ejectment proceedings already
commenced shall be continued, constitutional and valid such that it may be said
that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in denying the petitions for
suspension filed by petitioners?”^[4]

Then came this portion of the
opinion:  “This is not the first
time that this Court has been called upon to pass upon the validity of a
provision which places a landowner in the situation of losing his dominical
rights over the property without due process or compensation.  We refer to the provisions of Republic Act
2616 before they were amended by Republic Act No. 3453.  Note that, as originally provided,
Republic Act No. 2616 prohibited the institution of an ejectment
proceeding against any occupant of any lot in the Tatalon
Estate or the continuance of one that has already been commenced after the
expropriation proceedings shall have been initiated and during the pendency of the same. 
On the surface this provision would appear to be valid if the same is
carried out in the light of the provisions of our Constitution relative to
cases of eminent domain, for in that case the rights of the owner of the
property to be expropriated are protected. 
But then an attempt came to circumvent that provision in an effort to
safeguard or protect the interest of some occupants of the land, which reached
this Court for adjudication, as when some occupants attempted to block their ejectment upon the plea that the government would soon
start expropriation proceedings even if no sufficient funds were appropriated
to provide compensation to the owner and even if it was not in a position to
take possession of the estate, and so the owner contested the attempt invoking
its rights under the Constitution.  And
this Court upheld the contention of the owner by declaring the attempt
unconstitutional.”^[5]

The conclusion that inevitably was called for is worded
thus:  “It is, therefore, imperative
that we declare, as we now do, that Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3453 which
prohibits the filing of an ejectment proceeding, or
the continuance of one that has already been commenced, even in the absence of
expropriation proceedings offends our Constitution and, hence, is
unenforceable.”^[6]

What we said then, we reaffirm now, as was indeed evident in our
decision sought to be reconsidered but perhaps not given the importance which,
in the opinion of petitioner-appellee, it was
entitled to.  Nothing in our decision can
be taken to detract in any wise from the binding force and effect of the Cuatico ruling which declared unconstitutional Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 3453.

4.  We likewise ruled that
the mistake imputed to Congress in apparently recognizing the rights of
ownership in entities or individuals not possessed of the same could not
invalidate the challenged statute.  In
the same way, it cannot be made the basis for non-existent rights of ownership
to the property in question.  It is in
that sense that, as noted in our decision, no fear need be entertained that
thereby the petitioner-appellee would be adversely
affected.  The government certainly would
not pay to a party other than the owner the claim for just compensation which,
under the Constitution, it is required to meet. 
Neither, then, can any party who is not in that situation have any
standing whatsoever.  This much is beyond
dispute.  To repeat, the apprehension
entertained by petitioner-appellee, perhaps
indicative of its excess of caution, is without legal foundation.

WHEREFORE, the motion for the reconsideration of our
decision of February 18, 1970,
filed by petitioner-appellee, is denied.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, and
Barredo, JJ., concur.

Villamor, J., took no part.

^[1] 96 Phil. 461 (1955).

^[2] L-20141-42, Oct. 31, 1962, 6 SCRA 595.

^[3] Ibid,
pp. 597-598.

^[4] Ibid, p. 598.

^[5] Ibid, p. 599.

^[6] Ibid, p. 601.