IN RE WILL OF ALEJANDRO SOMOZA, LEONARDO P. MARTINEZ, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. ALICIA S. BANOGAN, ET AL., OPPOSITORS AND APPELLEES.

The above-entitled case was
instituted by the former administrator (deceased Emiliano S. Arnaiz)
for and in behalf of the heirs of the deceased Alejandro Somoza, on
February 1, 1946. Since then, up to the termination of the case, Atty.
Leonardo P. Martinez, appeared as counsel, first for the probate of the
will of the decedent, and later for the administration of the estate
left by him. Sometime on November 19, 1956, Messrs. Alejandro Somoza,
Jr. and Francisco Banogon, in representation of all the heirs, entered
into a contract with Atty. Martinez, for professional services, whereby
it was agreed-

1. The Party of the Second Part shall
   handle all legal matters in connection with this administration case
   No. 476 and to prepare the necessary papers or documents legitimately
   belonging to said special case up to its termination.
2. All
   other cases, which anay come up during the continuance of this Special
   Case No. 476 involving the property, rights or interests of the
   testator or his heirs and requiring appearance of attorney in any
   courts of justice, are EXCLUDED from this contract. Should the Party of
   the First Part or their co-heirs desire to utilize the services of the
   Party of the Second Part in such cases, another contract concerning
   fees shall be entered into between them.

2. That, for and in consideration of the services
   which the Party of the Second Part may have rendered or may render in
   connection with this Special Case No. 476, the Party of the First Part
   agrees to pay him the sum of eight hundred pesos (P800.00), Philippine
   Currency.

4. That it is the intention of the Party,
   of the First Part and their co-heirs to terminate this Special Case as
   soon as possible by paying in full, within the shortest period
   possible, the account of the estate to the Agricultural and Industrial
   Bank or by subrogating themselves in place of the deceased father.

For
one reason or another, the case was not closed and terminated as
expected. Up to the filing of his claim for Attorney’s fees, Atty.
Martinez had already received P1,320.00 as compensation for the
services rendered by him as counsel in this case.

On March 5, 1957, in the same proceedings, a
petition was filed stating that the reasonable value of all the
services rendered by him up to the termination of the case is P6,000.00
that this amount be taken and considered as part of the expenses of
administration minus the amount of P1,320.00 already paid, out of the
proceeds of the product of the estate and duly approved by the court
and that the said amount of P1,320.00 is not a reasonable compensation.
In support of his claim, Atty. Martinez made an itemization of the
services rendered by him, together with an information as to the real
worth and income of the estate, and the length of time it took this
case to be closed and terminated. While admitting the existence of the
cortract for professional service above-mentioned, Atty. Martinez now
contends that the same is not binding for the reason that the heirs
were not duly authorized by the former administrator to enter into such
contract. On the other hand, the heirs allege that Atty. Martinez had
been fully paid for his services in accordance with the contract in
question and that he had also been paid an additional sum of P520.00,
for other incidental services.

The lower court, in denying the petition of Atty.
Martinez for additional payment of attorney’s fees, in an order of
Sept. 30, 1957, held—

“*
* * The general rule is that a written contract for professional
services control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the
Court to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Sec. 22, Rule 127). There
is no doubt the relationship of attorney and client in this particular
case and what is important to determine now is whether the fee as
stipulated in the contract and paid is reasonable, considering the
importance of the subject matter of controversy, the extent of the
services rendered and the professional standing of the attorney. It
would be idle to impugn the contract movant entered into with the heirs
of the estate and by which he benefited. As a lawyer, he knows its
validity and the obligation thereunder was enforced. The act of the
heirs were impliedly ratified by the administrator when periodical
payments were made to him. To determine the reasonableness of the
claim, we should not necessarily lay importance to the delayed period
of the proceedings where there was no continuous service rendered or
shown. Rather, we should take into account the nature of the work done.
(Arce vs. National Bank, 62 Phil. 569). The specification of
services submitted by movant shows the ordinary preparation of initial
papers connected with testate proceedings, the appointment of
administrator, non-controversial motions, opposition, reports of
accounts, appearance in court for their approval, negotiations for
loans and other matters. For these services, he received, according to
the contract, P800.00 and for other incidental services, P520.00 or a
total of P1,320.00 which, considering all factors in this case, We
believe is fair and reasonable compensation for services rendered by
movant attorney.

Petitioner Martinez appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
certified the case to us, it appearing that only questions of law are
involved:

“* * A written contract for services
shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court
to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Sec. 22, Rule 127). Whether the
fees as provided in the contract was unconscionable or unreasonable,
will have to be determined, in accordance with some guiding principles
announced by this Court, in already familiar cases, one of which is the
Delgado vs. De la Rama, 43 Phil. 419, where We held-

“* * * The circumstances to be considered in determining the
compensation of an attorney are: (1) The amount and character of the
services rendered; (2) the labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the
nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the
services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount
of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy or
involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called for in
the performance of the services; (7) the professional character and
social standing of the attorney; 8) the results, secured, it being a
recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee
when it is contingent than when it is not.

We have gone over the records of the case and we find no plausible
reason to alter or modify the factual findings and legal conclusions
reached by the trial court in the above quoted decision. His Honor had
considered all the factors and circumstances of the claim, and gave the
opinion, in which we concur, that the guiding principles here-tofore
recited, are riot obtaining in this particular case. It may be added,
in this connection, that the petitioner being, a lawyer, apparently of
long experience and good standing, is presumed to have sized up the
entire situation before entering into the contract, portions of which
are above quoted. Emphasis is laid on the fact that petitioner-attorney
had been rendering services for almost 11 years, before he entered into
the said contract. It must be stated, however, that even the time
employed is not an appropriate basis for fixing the amount of
compensation (De Guzman vs. Visayan Transit Co., 68 Phil. 643).

The resolution appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Regala and Makalintal JJ., concur.