INDUSTRIAL, COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (ICAWO), PETITIONER, VS. JOSE S. BAUTISTA, BALTAZAR M. VILLANUEVA, JUDGES OF THE CIR; BIENVENIDO TAN, JUDGE OF THE COURT…

This is an appeal
from the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations in Case No.
590-ULP, dismissing the complaint filed by petitioning union against
respondents Martha Enterprises Inc., Daniel Evangelista, Edgardo
Ledesma, Alejandro Dionio, Knights of Labor, Teofilo Bernal and Joaquin
Enriquez, Jr.

The complaint charged that respondents violated the
right of their employees to self-organization under the Industrial
Peace Act (Republic Act No. 875) by questioning them about their union
activities and affiliation; by inflicting bodily harm on some of them;
by threatening to dismiss employees on account of their membership in
petitioning union; by requiring employees to join the Knights of Labor
as a condition of their continued employment and by laying off members
of the petitioner for refusing to join the Knights of Labor.

After trial, the Honorable Arsenio I. Martinez found
respondent company guilty of having dismissed employees and of having
refused to re-employ them upon its reopening on account of their union
activities and accordingly ordered the company to pay backwages to the
workers concerned from the day of their dismissal up to the time the
operation of the Bulingan Logging Camp of the Martha Enterprises, Inc.
was transferred to Emiliano Bautista. The Court of Industrial Relations
found the other charges to be groundless and therefore dismissed the
same.

Both parties moved for a reconsideration of the decision. By a 3 to 2 vote, the Court of Industrial Relations en banc reversed the decision of Judge Martinez and dismissed the complaint. The resolution of the said court en banc is now before Us for review on petition of the union.

In brief, the Court of Industrial Relations found the facts to be as follows:

On September 1, 1954, the company laid off 21 temporary laborers, the
dismissal to take effect on September 3, 1954, in view of the
restriction imposed by the Bureau of Forestry on the amount of timber
that the company could cut.

On September 15, 1954, the company laid, off 55 more
laborers, the dismissal to take effect on October 15, 1954, on which
latter date the company closed its Bulingan Log ging Camp for the
following reasons appearing on Exhibits “1”, “1-A-1” to “1-A-48” and
“1-B” to “1-B-38”;

1. Our recent survey of the area revealed that the
   total forested stand now remaining would no longer warrant and justify
   large-scale logging operation;

2. The forested area left for exploitation is very rugged terrain, making operations difficult and costly;
3. The
   farther that we go inside the area the longer hauling time is required,
   thus greatly reducing our productive capacity, while on the other hand,
   more roads require additional expenses;

4. Costs in fuels, materials, equipment spare parts and accessories have risen;
5. Orders from abroad for export logs have greatly declined;
6. In
   line with the Bureau of Forestry’s policy of forest conservation, our
   annual timber quota allowed us for the year 1953-1954 has been reduced
   to 20,000 cubic meters, and may be further reduced for the year
   1954-1955;

7. The Bureau of
   Forestry has also directed us to operate on a selective logging-method,
   another factor which directly lowered our production.

On November 3, 1954, the company resumed operation of its Bulingan
Logging Camp. When some (members of the petitioning union applied for
re-employment, the company refused them on account of the closed shop
proviso of a collective bargaining agreement which It had entered into
on October 15, 1954 with the Knights of Labor. The closed shop
agreement made membership in the Knights of Labor a condition for
employment in the company. The Court of Industrial Relations found
that, although the collective bargaining agreement was signed on
October 15, 1954, yet negotiations for the same had been held since
August, 1954. The Court therefore held that under such circumstances,
it is clear that the company had no ulterior motive in entering into
agreement with the Knights of Labor. So that the closed shop agreement
being valid in accordance with the provision of Republic Act No. 875,
Section 4 (a), it cannot be said that the refusal of the company to
employ laborers, who are not members of the Knights of Labor, is a
discriminatory act punishable by law.

The Court of Industrial Relations also found from the
evidence that, Federico Lozada, president of the petitioning union
arrived on September 1, 1954 and not on September 5,1954 as believed by
Judge Martinez. It therefore, concluded that-

“* * * on September 1, 1954, when the respondent company
decided to dismiss from the service temporary laborers as shown in
Exhibit ‘3’ and on September 15, 1954, as stated in Exhibit ‘2’
(earlier in its resolution, the CIR found that the company had decided
to close its logging camp as early as September 6), the president of
the complainant union, Federico Lozada, had not even arrived at the
Bulingan Logging Camp to organize the complainant union and
consequently the workers at said camp were not yet members thereof.
Evidently, therefore, they could not have been dismissed because of
union membership or activities.”

On appeal, petitioner contends:

1. That respondent company signed the collective
   bargaining agreement on October 15, 1954 (the same day that it closed
   its Bulingan Logging. Camp) precisely to prevent the reemployment of
   its members when the company reopened on November 3, 1954. Petitioner
   argues that the closed shop agreement could not be made to apply to its
   members without doing violence to their right to self-organization as
   guaranteed by the Industrial Peace Act.^[1]

2. That
   the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations en banc, reversing
   the decision of Judge. Martinez, is without legal and factual basis to
   stand on, hence, such resolution Annex ‘B’ is not supported by
   substantial evidence.

Both contentions of the petitioner are without merit. To begin with,
petitioner does not show in what way the majority resolution reversing
the decision of Judge Martinez is not supported by substantial evidence
so as to warrant us in reviewing the facts of this case. All it does is
to quote a portion of the dissenting opinion of Judge Martinez who, in
order to defend his. decision, tried to review the evidence. We take
the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations en banc to be
conclusive in, the absence of a showing that the same have no support
in evidence in line with the rule that this Court Will not review
findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations as long as the
same are supported by evidence. (National Development Co. vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, et al, G. R. No. L-.15422, November 30,
1962; Philippine Newspaper Guild vs. Evening News, Inc., 86 Phil. 303).
This is so because the Court of Industrial Relation is governed by the
rule of substantial evidence rather than bythe rule of preponderance of
evidence as in ordinary civil cases. (Iloilo Chinese Commercial School vs. Fabrigar, et al., G. R. No. L-16600, December 27, 1961)

Here, the Court of Industrial Relations found from the evidence
that Pederico Lozada arrived at the Bulingan Logging Camp to organize
petitioning union on September 1, 1954, whereas the lay-off of laborers
was decided upon by the company as early as September 1 and 6, 1954.
Obviously, therefore, the lay-off could not have been due to the
membership of the employees in the petitioning union. On the other
hand, it was found by the court that the lay-off on September 1 and 15
was prompted by economic reasons which forced the company to close its
logging camp on October 15, 1954.

Since the closure of the logging camp and the lay-off of the
employees were for valid reasons, petitioning union can not complain
that the application of the closed shop agreement to its members when
they sought re-employment upon the reopening of the camp on November 3,
1954 was discriminatory. In Freeman Shirt Mfg. Co., Inc., et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 110 Phil., 962; We held as follows:

“The closed-shop agreement authorized under sec. 4,
subsec. 2(4) of the Industrial Peace Act above quoted should, however,
apply only to persons to be hired or to employees who are not yet
members of any labor organization. It is inapplicable to those already
in the service who are members of a minority union. To hold otherwise,
i.e., that the employees in a company who are members of a minority
union may be compelled to disaffliate from their union and join the
majority or contracting union, would render nugatory the right of all
employees to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor
organization of their own choosing, a right guaranteed by the
Industrial Peace Act (sec. 3, Republic Act No. 875) as well as by the
Constitution (Art. III, sec. 1[6]).”

This ruling was reiterated recently in Findlay Miller Timber Co.vs
PLASLU and Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G. R, Nos. L-18217,
September 29, 1962.

Since the members of the petitioning union who applied for
employment on November 3, 1954 (when the company resumed operations)
were laid off for some valid reason, they stood on equal footing with
any other persons who were applying for employment. As to the
application of the closed shop agreement to them, therefore, there can
be no objection. The Court of Industrial Relations comrmitted no error
in upholding the refusal of the company to re-employ members of the
petitioning union unless they joined the Knights of Labor.

Wherefore, the resolution dated October 9, 1958 of the Court
of Industrial Relations is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

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^[1]Section 3 of Republic Act No.
875 provides that “Employees shall have the right to self-organization
and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing
for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of
their own choosing to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection.* * *”

---

BARRERA, J.; Dissenting:

I
dissent, because it seems to me that the temporaly closing of the
Bulingan Logging Camp and the signing of the collective bargaining
agreement with a close-shop clause, precisely on the same date, October
15, 1954, were resorted to in order to do away with those laborers who
did not desire to affiliate with the Knights of Labor. The reasons for
the supposed closing of the Camp on October 15, 1954, if true, could
not have disappeared in 19 days to justify the resumption of operation
on November 3, 1954. The temporary. closing appears not to have been in
good faith and seems to have been thought of knowing that, without it,
the old employees could not have been affected by the close-shop
clause. If the discontinuance of operation is genuine, then why enter
into a collective bargaining agreement precisely on the date of the
suspension of Operation when there would be no work and hence no need
of laborers?

The discrimination seems clear to me.

Concepcion, J., concurs.