THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VICENTE MAHINAY AND ISIDRO MAHINAY, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

The sad fate that befell Ptolomeo Talisic, for whose death Vicente Mahinay
and Isidro Mahinay,^[1]
father and son, were prosecuted and thereafter convicted of murder, apparently
was motivated by the firm determination of the father that the prospective
marriage between his daughter, Fortunata, and the
deceased should not take place as the parents of the deceased “were
engaged in the practice of witchcraft and sorcery.”^[2]
From the judgment of reclusion perpetua
with all the accessory penalties as well as the indemnification to the heirs of
the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00, they appealed to this Court.  The plea for reversal is anchored on the
constitutional presumption of innocence,^[3]
which, according to them, had not been overcome, the first two errors assigned
being that their guilt had not been shown beyond reasonable doubt and that the
element of moral certainty as to their participation in the crime charged was
lacking, with the third impugning the actuation of the lower court for lending
credence to the testimony of the prosecution and disregarding that of the
defense.  The task before this Court then
is to examine with care the evidence of record and to ascertain whether the
lower court arrived at its decision contrary to the above mandate of the fundamental
law.  It must be admitted that the
counsel for appellants, Attorney Luis V. Diores,
submitted an exhaustive brief to sustain such a contention.  In his valiant attempt to demonstrate that
culpability beyond reasonable doubt had not been shown, he tried to discredit
the testimony of the two principal witnesses, one of whom directly saw the gory
event and the other saw the appellants at the scene of the tragedy, by
assailing their credibility.  The
difficulty confronting counsel is thus apparent.  This Court has consistently adhered to the
doctrine of according respect to findings of fact of the trial judge, unless it
could be shown that a fact or circumstance has been overlooked or has been
misinterpreted.  More specifically, as
far as this case is concerned, with such positive identification of the
appellants as the perpetrators of the act, along with the third accused, Gaudioso Jayme, still at large at
the time of the trial, the task of overturning their conviction is far from
easy.  Under such circumstances, the
defense of alibi, as repeatedly held by this Tribunal, is futile and
unavailing.  A thorough scrutiny of the
records of the case, in the light of controlling principles, does not call for
a reversal.

From the evidence of the prosecution, it was shown that the
deceased Ptolomeo Talisic,
sometime in November 24, 1968,
accompanied by Sulpicio Antolihao
and Quintin Ubay, went to
the house of appellant Vicente Mahinay, the father of
Fortunata Mahinay, his
sweetheart the past four years, the purpose being to ask for her hand in
marriage.^[4]
They were informed by him that he would give them his answer the next day, and
accordingly they came back the next morning.^[5]
Vicente Mahinay, who was contacted in his farm, gave
a negative answer; he was opposed to his daughter Fortunata
marrying Ptolomeo, the reason given being his belief
that the Talisic family was engaged in the practice
of witchcraft and sorcery.^[6]
That did not deter the family of the deceased from renewing on November 28, 1968, again with the
help of Ubay and Antolihao,
the proposal of marriage, but the father was adamant in his refusal.^[7]
The daughter, Fortunata, was of a different mind; she
confided to Antolihao that regardless of the wishes
of her father, she would marry Ptolomeo in the month
of January, 1969.^[8]
On December 29, 1968, at
about four in the afternoon, Ptolomeo saw Fortunata at the Carbon market at Cebu City;
they agreed to meet at Barrio Cotcot which was then
celebrating its barrio fiesta.^[9] Fortunata went home and, together with her aunt, Ildefonsa Mahinay, proceeded to Cotcot, where they were together until about seven-thirty
in the evening, when they parted company, it turned out for the last time.^[10]
That same evening of December 29, 1968, the spouses Jacinto Longakit
and Esperanza Tundag, coming from Cotcot
and proceeding towards their house et Sitio Balingasao, Cotcot, Liloan, Cebu, were traversing a
trail via Mahayahay when they heard a man’s shout for
help, apparently from a distance of about twelve arms-length.^[11]
Leaving his wife, Esperanza, and proceeding to the place where the voice came
from, he saw from a distance of about five-arms length, Ptolomeo
Talisic with his right hand being held by appellant
Vicente Mahinay and his left hand by appellant Isidro
Mahinay while Gaudioso Jayme was striking Ptolomeo with
a piece of wood.^[12]
He fell down, and the two appellants, father and son, with Jayme,
continued attacking him.^[13]
Apprehensive for his own safety, Longakit returned to
the place where he left his wife and told her to rush back home.^[14]
On January 1, 1969, Matias Talisic, a brother of Ptolomeo, was informed by another brother, Alfredo, that
the deceased did not come home after attending the Cotcot
fiesta on December 29, 1968.^[15] Matias and Alfredo proceeded to the house of the Mahinays, where Fortunata and her
aunt, Ildefonsa, informed them that they were with Ptolomeo when they went home from Cotcot,
even adding that they invited Ptolomeo to stay with
them overnight and to go home only the next morning.^[16]
The two ladies, replying to the inquiry of the Talisic
brothers, said that Ptolomeo was not in the house.^[17]
It was the brother, Matias, who not being satisfied
with the answer given by them, went back later to the Mahinay
residence and noticed at a distance of thirty meters a two-foot long wooden
club, a cigarette pack with sticks of cigarettes inside, and overturned stones.^[18]
When he arrived at the house of the Mahinays, he saw
Vicente and he inquired about the whereabouts of Ptolomeo,
receiving the reply from the latter that he did not know, coupled with the
suggestion that a telegram should be sent to Ormoc.^[19]
Quite worried about his brother’s fate, he decided to keep on looking.^[20]
The search for Ptolomeo Talisic
ended on January 3, 1969
when his dead body was discovered in the farm of Gaudioso
Jayme.^[21]
The police and a doctor were summoned to the place to conduct an investigation
and autopsy.^[22]
Appellant Vicente Mahinay arrived at the scene of the
exhumation at about five o’clock in
the afternoon and immediately he said, “That shirt is mine,”
referring to the sweater which was found near the body of Ptolomeo.^[23]
He also prodded the policeman who was then at the scene of the exhumation to
immediately arrest Gaudioso Jayme,
his own nephew, who was reared by and lived with him until marriage, as the
person responsible for the killing of Ptolomeo.^[24]
The sweater and the shoes which were found near the body of Ptolomeo
were given by Vicente to Gaudioso Jayme
when the latter was still living with Vicente.^[25]
Upon the discovery of Ptolomeo’s body, Gaudioso disappeared from the barrio and his whereabouts
had not been found.^[26]
The autopsy conducted on the body of Ptolomeo^[27]
revealed that the victim died between five to six days before the date of the
autopsy on January 3, 1969.  His death thus occurred on or before December 29, 1968.^[28]

It was on the basis of such evidence that the conviction of
appellants was predicated.  The
thirty-page decision^[29]
of Judge Francisco Ro.  Cupin is notable for the care and circumspection with which
the respective versions of the prosecution and defense were appraised and
analyzed.  As noted at the outset, there
is no justification for a reversal.

1. It is readily apparent why the brief for appellants in their
first two assignments of errors alleged that their guilt had not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt and that there was no moral certainty as to their
participation in the offense.  For prior
to the presumption of innocence being expressly embodied in the 1935
Constitution,^[30]
the controlling rule of evidence was that there must be a showing beyond
reasonable doubt of the culpability of the person accused.  As set forth in the opinion of Justice Trent
in the leading case of United States v. Lasada,^[31]
a 1910 decision:  “It is incumbent
upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt, and if there remains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt or
innocence this doubt must be resolved in his favor and he must be
acquitted.  By reasonable doubt is not
meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is that doubt endangered by
an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation,
to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.  Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded
by the law to convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty is required,
and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to
constitute the offense.”^[32]
As a matter of fact, in the first case after the 1935 Constitution, relying on
the constitutional presumption of innocence, People v. Dalmani,^[33]
Justice Laurel relied on the Lasada doctrine:  “There are, however, facts and
circumstances of record which considered in isolation may seem unimportant, but
if taken together and considered in the light of certain events now to be
referred to, are sufficient to raise in the mind of this court a grave doubt as
to the guilt of the defendant-appellant Dalmani,
‘that doubt en­dangered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability
after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of
guilt.”^[34]
In two other cases, People v. Peralta,^[35]
and People v. Sarmiento,^[36]
the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Moran, in acquitting the accused in both
instances, spoke of this Court being unable “with a peaceful mind” in
the former, and letting its mind “rest at ease” in the latter to
explain why such Consti­tutional presumption of innocence had not been
overcome.

2. Even a cursory reading of the appealed decision would readily
disclose why the trial judge reached the conclusion that the guilt of
appellants was proved beyond reasonable doubt, the stage of moral certainty
being reached.  As a matter of fact,
there was reference to such a question in the appealed decision:  “Was the evidence of the prosecution
sufficient enough to establish the guilt of the accused for the commission of
the crime of murder beyond a shade of doubt?”^[37]
Moreover, he made clear that as the prosecution, in his own language,
“leaned heavily on the testimonies” of the eyewitnesses, Jacinto Longakit and the witness Vicente Tagalog
who, while not seeing the perpetration of the act, saw the two appellants with
the other accused leading a carabao on the top of
which was the body of a man at the scene of the crime, “it is incumbent
upon the Court to evaluate their respective declarations with caution.”^[38]
That norm of conduct he did observe; in the next pages of the decision, there
was a careful analysis of the defense raised by appellants.  Only then did he state why a finding of guilt
against them is justified.  Thus:  “After a careful review of the evidence
and mature deliberation, the Court is definitely convinced that the accused had
been sufficiently identified to have committed the crime charged in the
information, and that they should be held liable for the death of Ptolomeo Talisic.  The Court is persuaded by the evidence on
record that prosecution witness Jacinto Longakit saw
the accused Vicente Mahinay, Isidro Mahinay and Gaudioso Jayme beat and club to death Ptolomeo
Talisic at about midnight
of December 29, 1968, in Sitio Mahayahay, Liloan, Cebu.  This fact was corroborated by another
witness, Vicente Tagalog, who saw the same three
accused passed by leading a carabao with the body of
a man loaded on the back of a carabao.  While it is true that there were inconsistencies
and discrepancies extracted by the accused from the witnesses for the
prosecution on cross-examination, the Court has observed that these were minor
matters and not very material to the case. 
Besides, if the prosecution witnesses’ testimony at times varied at
length, the fact was that they were sufficiently explained on redirect and on
rebuttal; they could easily reconcile the alleged discrepancies to the material
points raised in the case at bar.”^[39]

Nor did the trial judge stop there:  “The Court believes that credence should
be given more weight in favor of the government witnesses.  In the first place, no motive has been shown
why they should fabricate the facts and foist a very serious crime against the
accused.  Secondly, the identification of
the accused by prosecution witnesses Jacinto Longakit
and Vicente Tagalog were clear and positive,
considering that they had the best oppor­tunity for observation.  Not only that, these prosecution witnesses
have known for quite a long time all the accused considering that they live in
the same place and being familiar with their movements, their figures, and the
manners and peculiarities of their individual personalities, these must have
been literally burned into their memory to enable them to identify the accused
vividly with confidence.  Following the
argument of the defense that these two prosecution witnesses had shown serious
discrepancies and contradictions in their testimonies on the witness stand, it
is the opinion of the court that even the most intelligent witnesses commit
inconsistencies and discrepancies as to a particular fact, but this does not
necessarily render such testimony unworthy of credence.  In fact, our Supreme Court has consistently
held:  ‘Where the testimony of a witness
is in conflict in some of its details with her extrajudicial confession due to
her imperfect memory in matters of detail and also to the lengthy
cross-examination to which she was subjected by a renowned and justly feared
criminal lawyer, but the contradictions in important parts have been
satisfactorily explained by her and on the whole her statement agree as to the
main and ultimate facts the testimony of the witness may be given weight.’
(People vs. Go, et al., 38 Phil. 203, 213).”^[40]

1. Clearly then, the first two assignments of error that there was
no showing of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the stage of moral
certainty was not reached find no support in the evidence of record.  Under the facts as testified to by disinterested
witnesses, possessed of a high persuasive quality, the insistence on the
constitutional presumption of innocence is futile.

2. It is likewise evident considering the foregoing, that there is
no basis for the third assignment of error that the lower court should not have
given credence to the testimony for the prosecution and should not have
disregarded the evidence for the defense. 
A rational mind bent on objectively appraising the matter would have
reached the same conclusion.  What was
testified to by the prosecution was clearly deserving of belief.  This observation found in the decision would
further bolster the stand of the trial judge: 
“Besides, the Court has observed the behavior of the accused which
was unusual and inconsistent with human experience.  Their actions betray their guilty
conscience.”^[41]
Again, an excerpt from the opinion of Justice Trent in Lasada
would demonstrate how well-grounded in the law was the actuation of the lower
court:  “The trial judge had an
opportunity to see these witnesses, hear them testify, and observe their
demeanor on the witness stand.  This is
one of the best ways of determining the credibility of a witness.  After hearing all these witnesses testify he
was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the witnesses for the prosecution
testified the truth.  In view of these
facts we must give great weight to the findings made by the trial court.  We only have the record, and, as we have
said, the testimony for the prosecution is reasonable.  It is direct and positive.  In view of the clear and explicit findings
made by the trial court, and after a careful consideration of the testimony
presented, we are fully satisfied that the defendant is guilty of this
crime.”^[42]

3. That is the norm invariably followed by this Court since
then.  There is a restatement of such a
principle in a fairly recent decision, People v. Carandang:^[43]
“Thus in People v. Angcap, it was said:  ‘There is need to stress anew that this Court
has long been committed to the principle that the determination by a trial
judge who could weigh and appraise the testimony as to the facts duly proved is
entitled to the highest respect, unless it could be shown that he ignored or
dis­regarded circumstances of weight or influence sufficient to call for a
different finding.’ So it was announced by Justice Moreland in 1915 in one of
the first cases of consequence enunciating such a doctrine.  As he pointed out, in the event of a conflict
in the testimony of the witnesses, “the peculiar province of the trial
court is to resolve the question of credibility, and, unless there is something
in the record impeaching by fair interpretation the resolution of the trial
court in relation to that question, this court will assume that he acted
fairly, justly, and legally in the exercise of that function.” So it has
been since then.  In a case reported in
the latest volume of the Philippine Reports, Justice Paredes,
speaking for this Court succinctly stated “that with respect to the
credibility of witnesses, the trial court’s findings and conclusions, command
great respect and weight.” Its more usual formulation was also set forth
by Justice Malcolm in these words: 
“After everything is said and done, we come back, as we invariably
do in cases of this nature, to a recognition of the rule that the Supreme Court
will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing on the
credibility of the opposing witnesses, unless there appears in the record some
fact or circumstances of weight and influence, which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted.”^[44]

4. Lastly, there is the defense of alibi, certainly in the light of
so many past decisions hardly sufficient to call for a reversal of the
conviction.  Another excerpt from People
v. Carandang is relevant:  “Nor is their case for a reversal bolstered
by their plea of alibi.  This is not to
lose sight of the fact that the presence elsewhere of the accused would
preclude their participation in a crime. 
Such a fact, if there be such, has to be shown though by evidence that
commands assent.  Unfortunately for
appellants in this case, they were unable to do so.  The categorical nature of the identification
made by the offended spouses placed a burden on them too difficult to overcome
by the allegation that they could not have been the perpetrators of the foul
deed.”^[45]
The case for the prosecution was stronger in this case.  Appellants were identified by disinterested
witnesses.  The matter was more
succinctly put in People v. Berame:^[46]
“The defense of alibi was indisputably devoid of merit.  There was positive identification.”^[47]

WHEREFORE, the decision of December 23, 1969, finding appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
all the accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum
of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs, is affirmed.  In the service of their sentence, the
appellants are entitled to be credited with the full period of their preventive
imprisonment.

Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion,
Jr., and Santos,
JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

^[1] A
certain Gaudioso Jayme was
likewise charged in the information, but at the time the case was tried, he had
not yet been apprehended.

^[2]
Decision, 2.

^[3]
Article IV, Section 19 of the Constitution, insofar as pertinent, reads:  “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, * * *.”

^[4] T.s.n., Session of August
20, 1969, 101-102; August
21, 1969, 128; Session of September
25, 1969, 71.

^[5] Ibid,
Session of August 21, 1969,
129.

^[6] Ibid,
Session of August 21, 1969;
Ibid, Session of September 2,
1969, 12.

^[7] Ibid,
Session of August 21, 1969,
130.

^[8] Ibid,
Session of August 21, 1969,
137-138.

^[9] Ibid,
Session of August 20, 1969,
103.

^[10] Ibid,
Session of August 20, 1969,
104-105.

^[11] Ibid,
Session of August 18, 1969,
36-38.

^[12] Ibid,
Session of August 18, 1969,
38.

^[13] Ibid,
Session of August 18, 1969,
38-39.

^[14] Ibid,
Session of August 18, 1969,
40.

^[15] Ibid,
Session of August 25, 1969,
150-151.

^[16] Ibid,
Session of August 25, 1969,
151-152.

^[17] Ibid,
Session of August 25, 1969,
153.

^[18] Ibid,
Session of August 21, 1969,
153-154.

^[19] Ibid.

^[20] Ibid.

^[21] Ibid,
Session of August 21, 1969,
155-156.

^[22] Ibid,
Session of August 21, 1969,
156-157.

^[23] Ibid,
Session of August 21, 1969,
156.

^[24] Ibid,
Session of August 21, 1969,
156-157.

^[25] Ibid,
Session of September 10, 1969,
83-84.

^[26] Ibid,
Session of September 10, 1969,
84.

^[27] Ibid,
Session of July 22, 1969,
12; Exhibit J.

^[28] Ibid,
Session of July 2, 1969,
30-31.

^[29]
Appendix A.

^[30]
The present constitutional provision, insofar as the accused is presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, is a reproduction of Article III,
Section 1, paragraph 17 of the 1935 Constitution.

^[31]
18 Phil. 90.

^[32] Ibid,
96-97.

^[33]
63 Phil. 188 (1936).

^[34] Ibid,
192.  Cf. People v. Castañeda, 63 Phil. 480 (1936); People v. Manoji, 68 Phil. 471 (1939); People v. Marcos, 70
Phil. 468 (1940).

^[35]
67 Phil. 293 (1939).

^[36]
69 Phil. 740 (1940).

^[37]
Decision, 15.

^[38] Ibid,
15-16.

^[39] Ibid,
21-22.

^[40] Ibid,
22-23.

^[41] Ibid,
28.

^[42]
18 Phil. 90, 100.

^[43]
L-31012, August 15, 1973,
52 SCRA 259.

^[44] Ibid,
267-268.  Angcap,
L-28748, Feb. 29, 1972, 43
SCRA 437.  The excerpt from the opinion
of Justice Paredes came from People v. Cristobal, 110 Phil. 741 (1961) and that from Justice
Malcolm came from People v. De Otero, 51 Phil. 201 (1927).  Cf. People v. Macaraeg,
L-32806, Oct. 23, 1973, 53 SCRA 285; People v. Cudalina,
L-34969, April 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 499; People v. De la Victoria, L-30037,
June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 400; People v. Ordonio,
L-33829, Dec. 19, 1975, 68 SCRA 397; People v. Sarile,
L-37148, June 30, 1976, 71 SCRA 593; People v. Berame,
L-27606, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 184; People v. Alonso, L-32163, Oct. 19,
1976, 73 SCRA 483; People v. Velasco, L-31920, Oct. 29, 1976, 73 SCRA
574.

^[45]
52 SCRA 259, 268.

^[46]
L-27606, July 30, 1976, 72
SCRA 184.

^[47] Ibid,
191.