DR. DEOGRACIAS CAMON, PETITIONER, VS. HON. CARLOS ABIERA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, RUFINO SUPLIDO,…

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental dated July 3, 1967, dismissing petitioner’s complaint for
damages amounting to P121,500 (Civil Case No. 245).

Doctor Deogracias Camon, in his amended complaint dated July 9, 1965, alleged that the
provincial board of Negros Occidental, in its resolution dated February 21, 1964 (Exh. A), allowed
him to rent the government bulldozer for six days so that he could use it on
the four parcels of sugarland situated in Himamaylan, Negros Occidental which
he occupied as lessee; that he paid the rentals in advance to Cipriano Pet, the
district engineer (Exh. B); that notwithstanding that payment, Pet and Honesto
Galeno, the officer in charge of equipment in the third engineering district,
refused to deliver the bulldozer to Doctor Camon in spite of repeated demands;
that they instructed Daniel Medes, the driver of the bulldozer, to operate it
on the adjoining sugarland of Raymundo Sancho, and that the bulldozer was used
on Sancho’s land for nine months. 
(Rufino Suplido financed the cultivation of sugarcane on the land of his
nephew, Sancho).

Doctor Camon also alleged that on April 13, 1964 Suplido and Sancho caused to be piled
stones and boulders on his land, thus frustrating Camon’s plan to plant
sugarcane.  He had to transfer his
farming operations to the eastern portion of his farm.  However, on November 13 and 14, 1964, when
the fields in the eastern portion were already prepared for the planting of
sugarcane, Medes forcibly entered that area and, by means of the bulldozer, he
scraped the top soil and devastated the land. 
The top soil was transferred to Sancho’s hacienda and was used in the
construction of roads therein.

Defendant Province
of Negros Occidental in its answer denied that there was
a lease of the bulldozer.  It pleaded
that Doctor Camon had no cause of action against the province.

Defendant Honesto Galeno admitted the lease.  He alleged that Doctor Camon used the
bulldozer for four days in April and two days in July, 1964, or for six days,
as stipulated in the lease contract.

The answer of Daniel Medes consisted of denials.  He alleged that in the operation of the
bulldozer he merely complied with the orders of his immediate superior.

Defendants Suplido and Sancho denied that they caused damages to
Camon.  They averred that Suplido was a
lessee of the bulldozer.

At the pre-trial on February
17, 1966 the counsel for defendant Pet asked that he be allowed to
file a motion to dis­miss.  Acting on
that request, Judge Carlos Abiera said that “the court orders the parties
to present whatever pleadings they may present in connection with this case and
the court will resolve within due time whatever questions that may be brought
out by the said parties” (28 tsn, p. 229 of Rollo).

Judge Abiera concluded the pre-trial by prejudging the case.  Adopting the theory of defendants Sancho and
Suplido, he said that “the court believes that Dr. Camon was influenced
only by hatred (and) jealousy because he was not given the same privileges and
preference like what they have done to Dr. Suplido” (30 tsn, p. 32, Brief
of Suplido and Sancho, p. 231, Rollo).

Judge Abiera then issued an order directing the defendants
“to file any pleading (that) they may desire within fifteen days
from” February 17, 1966
“for the consideration of the court”.

Defendant Pet, who, during the pre-trial was very vocal as to the
filing of a motion to dismiss, did not file any such motion.  On the other hand, the court’s order gave
defendants Suplido, Sancho and Medes the cue for filing motions to dismiss
dated March 2 and 4, 1966 on the ground of lack of cause of action.  Doctor Camon opposed the motions.

Although Judge Abiera said that he would resolve the motions in
due time, it took him more than fifteen months to pass upon the motions to
dismiss.  On July 3, 1967 he issued the following ungrammatical and
incongruous minute order of dismissal:

“Acting upon (should be finding) the motions to dismiss filed
by the defendants Rufino Suplido, Raymundo Sancho and Daniel Medes well
founded, the motion to dismiss insofar as these defendants are concerned, are
hereby granted, and the case is dismissed without pronouncement as to
costs.” (sic).

Doctor Camon received a copy of that order on August 11, 1967.  He perfected an appeal from that order.  Judge Abiera did not act on the appeal for a
long time.  It was only after more than
three years, or on October 24, 1970,
when he gave due course to the appeal to this Court.  (Note that in another case, Civil Case No.
347, a motion for reconsideration was submitted for Judge Abiera’s resolution
on October 21, 1968.  He resolved it nearly three years later, or
on September 10, 1971,
during the pendency of a certiorari and mandamus case in the
Court of Appeals, assail­ing his order which was under reconsideration.  For that delay and for violation of section 5
of the Judiciary Law, Judge Abiera was found guilty of serious misconduct and a
fine equivalent to his three months’ salary was imposed upon him and deducted
from his retirement benefits.  Perez vs. Abiera, Adm. Case No. 223-J, June 11, 1975, 64 SCRA 302).

The record was received in this Court on December 15, 1970.  Doctor Camon was required to file a petition
for review pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440.

The only issue is whether Judge Abiera erred in dismiss­ing the
complaint insofar as defendants Sancho, Suplido and Medes are concerned.  Although it is stated in the order that the
case was dismissed “insofar as these defendants are concerned”, yet
the last clause of the order gives the discordant impression that the case was
dismissed as to all the six defendants.

Respondent Judge not only inexcusably delayed for fifteen months
the resolution of the motions to dismiss and he not only acted carelessly in
issuing an ungrammatical and disharmonious order of dismissal, but he also
failed to articulate the factual and legal bases of the order.

Hence, appellant Camon argues in this appeal that he was denied
due process and deprived of his day in court and that respondent Judge acted
capriciously and abused his discretion.

Plaintiff Camon raised several factual issues in his complaint
which were traversed by the defendants. 
His complaint shows on its face a cause of action for damages.  Instead of dismissing the case, the lower
court should have tried those issues.

Squarely applicable to this case is the ruling that “the
dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss constitutes a denial of due
process of law if from a consideration of the plead­ings it appears that there
are issues of fact which cannot be decided without a trial of the case on the
merits” (De Leon vs. Henson and Castañeda, 111 Phil. 810; Socorro vs.
Vargas, L-29648, October 26, 1968, 25 SCRA 592, 596; Republic Bank vs.
Cuaderno, L-22399, March 30, 1967, 19 SCRA 671).

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is reversed and set
aside.  The lower court is directed to
try the case.  Costs
against defendants Sancho, Suplido and Medes.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos,
JJ., concur.