G.R. No. L-30206. March 30, 1970
PAZ BAYOT VDA. DE CORPUS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOSEFINA PHODACA-AMBROSIO, ETC., AND SOLEDAD G. COLLAS, ETC., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal, taken by the defendants, from an order of the Court of
First Instance of Manila granting plaintiff’s motion for execution of the
judgment in the case at bar, which appeal was certified to us by the Court of
Appeals, purely questions of law being raised therein.
As owner and lessor of a real estate
located at No. 801 Tennessee St., Manila,
on July 16, 1962, plaintiff
Paz Bayot Vda. de Corpus
filed, with the Municipal Court of Manila, a complaint, for unlawful detainer, against Dominador B. Ambrosio and Soledad G. Collas,
the latter in her capacity as administratrix of the
Intestate Estate of the late Damiana D. Ambrosio, as lessees and occupants of said property, for
the purpose of ousting them therefrom and recovering
unpaid rentals and the corresponding compensation for the use and occupation
thereof, as well as attorney’s fees. It
would seem that, decision having been rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the
defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, which, based upon
a compromise agreement reached by the parties rendered on February 12, 1963, the following:
“D E C I S I O N
“When this case was called for hearing today, the plaintiff
and defendant, assisted by their respective counsels, submitted an amicable
settlement which reads as follows:
“COME NOW the plaintiff and the defendant and to this
Honorable Court respectfully submit the following AMICABLE AGREEMENT:
‘1. That the defendants admit that they are bound
to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally the amount of P4,070.00, or FOUR
THOUSAND AND SEVENTY and xx/100 pesos , as of January 31, 1963, by way of rents
in arrears, of the property they leased from plaintiff at 801 Tennessee,
Manila, at the rate of P350.00 a month;
‘2. That the defendants will pay the plaintiff in
partial satisfaction of these rents the amount of Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) on or before the 21st day of this month of February, 1963;
‘3. That they furthermore bind themselves to pay
the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P500.00, within the first ten
days of every succeeding month, commencing March, 1963, of which the amount of
P350.00 shall be in payment of the rent for the preceding month and P150.00 in
payment of the balance of the rentals in arrears, and after their full
satisfaction, the monthly payments shall be reduced to P350.00;
‘4. That no payments shall be recognized unless
evidenced by a receipt signed by the plaintiff or her attorney-in-fact, Jose Echevarria, and that her or his acceptance of any sum less
than that, or beyond the period, fixed therein shall not be deemed a waiver of
any of the rights granted the plaintiff by this compromise;
‘5. That the terms of the lease shall be one (1)
year beginning the first day of this month, renewable from year to year by
agreement in writing among the plaintiff and the defendants, provided that they
pay the accrued and current rents as herein above provided;
‘6. That should the defendants fail to comply
with paragraphs 2 and 3 hereof, or to vacate the leased premises upon
termination, for any other cause, of the lease or any extension thereof,
execution shall immediately issue in this case, for their eviction from the
premises and the satisfaction of all unpaid rents;
‘7. That the defendants warrant that the following
pieces of property belong to them, free from any liens, encumbrances, or claims
of third persons, and may be levied upon, aside from any other property
belonging to them, in satisfaction of the judgment to be rendered in accordance
therewith:
‘(1) Freezer and (2) Oven
Gas Range
“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed and requested that the
foregoing agreement be approved, and that judgment be rendered in accordance
therewith.
“Manila, Philippines,
February 12, 1963.
“PAZ
BAYOT VDA. DE CORPUS
Plaintiff
By:
(Sgd.) JOSE ECHEVARRIA
Attorney-in-Fact
“(Sgd.) DOMINADOR B. AMBROSIO
In His own
Representation as
Defendant, 801 Tennessee,
“Assisted by:
“JOAQUIN AND ZALDARRIAGA
“By:
(Sgd.) LUIS ZALDARRIAGA
Counsel for the
Plaintiff
480 Borja Bldg., Manila
Rizal Avenue
“(Sgd.) SOLEDAD
G. COLLAS
“Defendant in
her capacity as
Administratrix
of the Intestate Estate
of MRS. DAMIANA D.
AMBROSIO
“Assisted by:
“TIRONA, NAVARRO and AMBROSIO
“By:
“(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLE
“Counsel for the
Defendant
“1720 Piy Margal, Manila
“WHEREFORE, the above-quoted amicable agreement is hereby
approved and judgment is rendered in accordance with the terms and conditions
set forth therein. No pronouncement is
made as to costs.
“SO ORDERED.”
Having died sometime in January, 1964, Dominador
B. Ambrosio was, by an order dated July 21, 1964, substituted by his
widow, Josefina Phodaca-Ambrosio, as one of the
defendants in the case.
On August 14, 1964,
plaintiff moved for the execution of said decision of February 12, 1963, and, despite defendants’
opposition thereto, the motion was granted by the Court of First Instance, in
an order dated November 28, 1964. A writ of execution was, accordingly, issued,
the enforcement of which was suspended by a restraining order of the same
court, dated December 5, 1964. The latter was, however, reconsidered and
lifted on January 27, 1965, and, a reconsideration of the order to this effect
having been denied, on February 17, 1965, the defendants interposed the
present appeal from the aforementioned orders of November 28, 1964 and February
17, 1965, to the Court of Appeals, which certified the appeal to the Supreme
Court, by resolution dated January 31, 1969.
Defendants maintain that the trial court has erred in not holding
that:
I.
“x x x the compromise agreement of February 12, 1963 is void ab
initio.
II.
“x x x even if we assume the validity of the compromise
agreement, the only matters deemed adjudicated by it are the matter of ‘unpaid
rentals’ alleged in the complaint upon which the compromise was based, and since
all such unpaid rentals have been paid, the compromise has been completed.
III.
“x x x the plaintiff is estopped from
attempting to enforce the alleged amicable agreement by execution.
IV.
“x x x as shown by the subsequent facts and circumstances, there
is in truth and in fact a lease contract that is valid, in force and in effect
between the parties which cannot be disturbed by means of execution.
V.
“x x x there are new matters and new controversies which have
never been submitted to the trial court which have never been decided in the
decision of February 12, 1963. And necessitate the filing of a new action by
plaintiff, thereby rendering irregular, illegal, and anomalous, the execution
order in question.”
1. Relying upon Art. 2032 of
the Civil Code, reading:
“The court’s approval is necessary in compromises entered
into by guardians, parents, absentee’s representatives, and administrators or
executors of decedents’ estates.”
defendants maintain that the compromise
agreement incorporated into the decision of February 12, 1963, is void, insofar as defendant Soledad Collas is concerned, she being the administratrix
of the estate of Damiana D. Ambrosio,
deceased. This pretense is, however,
untenable, said compromise having been approved by the Court of First Instance
of Manila, in the case at bar. Besides,
having complied, although somewhat irregularly, with the provisions of the
compromise agreement and availed of the benefits thereof, from February 12,
1963 to February 12, 1964, as well as invoked it in support of their alleged
right to renew their contract of lease thereafter, the defendants are now
barred or estopped from assailing the validity of
said agreement and of the decision based thereon.[1]
At any rate, since the validity of the compromise agreement was not assailed in
the lower court, such question may not be raised for the first time in this
appeal.[2]
2. It is urged by the
defendants that the compromise agreement merely settled the issue as regards
“unpaid rentals” and that, the same having already been satisfied,
“the compromise has been completed, ” meaning, perhaps, that their
obligations under said agreement must be deemed fully discharged.
This pretense is devoid of merit.
It is true that defendants’ default in the payment of rentals had led
to the filing of the unlawful detainer case, and that
the desire to settle that case had induced both parties to enter into said
agreement. It is not true, however, that
the same is limited in its scope to the collection of the rentals overdue and
that the obligations arising from said agreement were completely extinguished
upon the satisfaction of the rentals in arrears. The agreement clearly and explicitly covered
other subjects, such as: (a) the granting to the defendants of a new lease
contract for one year, from February 1, 1963; (b) the sums of money to be paid
monthly beginning from March, 1963; (c) the possibility of renewing said
contract of lease from year to year, subject to certain conditions; and (d) the
provision to the effect that “execution shall immediately issue” in
case “the defendants fail x x x to vacate the leased premises upon termination, for any
other cause, of the lease or any extension thereof.” As a matter of fact,
being mainly for the benefit of the defendants, there is every reason to
believe that the foregoing stipulations must have been entered into at their
behest.
3. In support of the third
assignment of error, defendants allege that (a) the decision of February 12,
1963 “is not a judgment” that can “acquire the character of an executory judgment”; (b) owing to an act of the
plaintiff, later to be discussed, she is deemed to have “renounced her
rights to said decision”; (c) plaintiff is bound, under the compromise
agreement, to renew the contract of lease with the defendants, from year to
year; and (d) plaintiff had sought to increase the rental without judicial
approval.
The first ground is premised upon the theory that, according to Saminiada v. Mata,[3] a
decision based on a compromise agreement is not a judgment. The only question involved in that case was
whether the court could grant a “petition for relief” from said
decision, considering that the petition had been filed on May 26, 1950, or over
120 days from the rendition of the decision on January 18, 1950, and more than
90 days after the denial, on February 18, 1950, of a motion for reconsideration
thereof.
Although a majority of the members of the Court voted to decide
the issue in the affirmative, there was no majority as regards the
reasons therefor.
Four (4) justices opined that a decision based upon a compromise
agreement is merely a “judgment by consent”, and that, as such, it
does not, like any other decision, become final and executory
until the expiration of the period to appeal.
They, moreover, held that, since the agreement and the decision merely
provided for the segregation, by a qualified surveyor, of a portion of the land
sought to be partitioned, the agreement was not complete until judicial
approval of the report of the commissioner charged with the duty of effecting
the partition, and that, meanwhile, the decision approving the compromise
partook of the nature of an “interlocutory” order. Three (3) justices merely concurred “in
the result” or “dispositive part” of
the decision of the Supreme Court granting the petition for relief. One member of the Court dissented.
The Saminiada case does not bear out
defendants’ pretense, for: (a) the view
to the effect that a decision based upon a compromise agreement does not
become immediately final and executory, was that of
only four (4) members of the Court, who did not even constitute a
majority of those who participated in the decision, apart from being less than
the six (6) votes required by law for a decision of the Supreme Court; (b) said
view is inconsistent with that adhered to in subsequent cases[4]
and the explicit provision of Art. 2037 of the Civil Coder;[5]
(c) the Saminiada case involved a question of partition,
which does not end with a decision decreeing the same, and requires
an order – unnecessary in cases like the one at bar – approving the
actual partition effected subsequently to said decision; (d) even the
aforementioned four (4) members of the Supreme Court acknowledged, in the Saminiada case, that a decision based upon a compromise is
a judgment; and (e) the decision in the present case has actually been
executed, although partly, so that, its final character is beyond question.
As regards the second ground, it appears that on August 5, 1963, plaintiff filed a
motion for execution because of defendants’ default in the payment of rentals,
and that such motion was withdrawn by the plaintiff, on September 21, 1963, upon payment of the rentals
overdue. Defendants now allege that this
withdrawal implied a renunciation of plaintiff’s rights under the decision of February 12, 1963, and that she is
now in no better position than an ordinary lessor,
who must file a new action to eject the defendants herein.
The case of Dimayuga vs. Raymundo[6]
has been cited in support of this stand. That case involved a writ of execution
directing defendants’ ejectment as ordered in the
decision. Yet, plaintiff did not enforce
said writ against defendant Gaspara Raymundo, not only because she had subsequently satisfied
the rents in arrears, as well as made a payment in advance, but, also,
because she had a subsequent agreement with the plaintiff, pursuant to
which the latter would receive as rental more than double the amount awarded in
said decision. Still later, however,
plaintiff moved for an alias writ of execution, which was issued, but
later cancelled, owing to the aforesaid payment. The Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s petition
for a writ of certiorari to annul
said order of cancellation of the writ of execution.
Manifestly, the Dimayuga case is not in
point. The decision rendered in the ejectment case contemplated the immediate ouster of the
defendant, not the continuance of her possession, much less a new contract of
lease. However, by accepting, subsequent
to said decision, an advance payment, and, especially, in agreeing to allow the
defendant to continue in possession of the leased premises at a much higher
rental, there had been a new contract of lease between them, and,
accordingly, a renunciation of plaintiff’s right under said decision, which
was inconsistent with said contract. In
the case at bar, the decision of February 12, 1963, in accordance with the
compromise agreement, explicitly granted the defendants the right to
hold the property in question, as lessees thereof, for a term extending to
almost one (1) year beyond said date, or up to February 1, 1964, which,
moreover, was “renewable from year to year”, by agreement among the
parties. None of the terms of
said compromise agreement had been modified or altered by plaintiff’s
acceptance of the rentals overdue up to August, 1963. What is more, said acceptance was made
subject to the understanding that “the judgment rendered by the Court on February 12, 1963, shall remain in
full force and effect.”[7]
Such understanding was confirmed by the fact that, thereafter and up to now,
defendants maintain that they are entitled to a yearly renewal of their
contract of lease, begin from February 1, 1964, pursuant to said agreement
and decision. Indeed, paragraph 4 of
the compromise agreement provides that acceptance by the plaintiff or her
representative “of any sum less than that or beyond the period fixed”
therein “shall not be deemed a waiver of any of the rights granted the
plaintiff” by said agreement.
The last two grounds are clearly untenable. The stipulation, in the compromise agreement,
to the effect that the term of the lease, in favor of the defendants, shall be
“renewable from year to year by agreement in writing among the
plaintiff and the defendants,” refutes the theory of automatic
renewal. Indeed, had the parties contemplated
a compulsory renewal, under the very same terms and conditions stipulated in
the compromise, said “agreement in writing” would have been
absolutely unnecessary and utterly useless.
The need therefor clearly indicates that the
renewal would require another contract, under such terms and conditions
as may be agreed upon.
4. The fourth assignment of
error is anchored upon a deed executed on December 14, 1966 by one of the
original defendants, the late Dominador B. Ambrosio, and his wife, now widow, Josefina Phodaca-Ambrosio – who, later, substituted him as such
defendant -with the conformity of plaintiff herein.
It is alleged that by virtue of said deed, “there was in
effect a continuation and reaffirmation of the compromise and lease contract
contained therein” and that, having withdrawn, in December 1964, the
judicial deposit made by the defendants for rentals due prior thereto,
plaintiff must be deemed to have recognized the contractual relations that they
now claim to have with her, and, accordingly, confirmed the existence of a
lease contract with them. This
conclusion is disproved by the terms of said deed of December 14, 1966,
paragraph 4 of which explicitly declares, not only that the decision of
February 12, 1963 “remains in full force and effect, ” but, also,
that the relation between them shall be “subject to the motion filed x x x by the parties thereto, dated
September 21, 1963,” paragraph 3 of which states “that the judgment
rendered by this Court on February 12, 1963, shall remain in full force and
effect.”
Pursuant to said decision, there is indeed a contractual relation
between the parties herein, namely, that established by their compromise
agreement; but, pursuant thereto, their lease contract expired on February
1, 1964, no “agreement in writing” having been made by the
parties renewing or extending the lease beyond said date, and plaintiff’s
right to a writ of execution accrued “immediately” thereafter. Needless to say, the theory to the effect
that, by withdrawing the rentals deposited by the defendants in the Court of
First Instance, the plaintiff had admitted or acknowledged said renewal or
extension, is manifestly devoid of merit, for section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court explicitly authorizes such withdrawal, without the effect imputed
thereto by the defendants herein.
5. Under the last assignment
of error, it is urged that the following are “new questions and new
controversies” that have never been submitted to the trial court and
require a new action, namely:
a.
Whether withdrawal of plaintiff’s motion for
execution implied a renunciation or novation of the
judgment of February 12, 1963.
b.
Whether by refusing to renew the contract of
lease and demanding a higher rate of rental, plaintiff had converted her
obligation under said judgment into a potestative
one and terminated it unilaterally.
c.
What is the effect of the agreement of December 14, 1964?
d.
What is the effect of the withdrawal by the
plaintiff of the rentals deposited by the defendants prior thereto.
and that, accordingly, the writ of
execution issued by the lower court is irregular, illegal and anomalous.
Suffice it to say that, except as regards the penultimate
question (c), all others have already been disposed of. It may be added, however, as regards question
(b), that there was absolutely no “obligation”, on the part of either
party, to renew the contract of lease upon expiration of the term stipulated in
the compromise agreement. The “agreement
in writing” therein required for a renewal necessarily implied “freedom”
of both parties not to enter into such agreement.
As regards question (c), Mr. & Mrs. Ambrosio
stated, in said deed of December 14,
1964:
“1. That we are presently making repairs on the
improvements introduced by Dominador and his first
wife on the house of Paz Bayot Vda.
de Corpus located at 801 Tennessee,
Malate, Manila,
as well as other works therein.
“2. That these repairs and works we are making or
will make shall be at our expense and we will secure the permit and comply with
the other requisites necessary for their execution.
“3. That in the event we vacate the aforesaid house
belonging to Paz Bayot, Vda.
de Corpus on the termination for any cause of the contract of lease thereover, we will not demand the reimbursement for improvements provided in Article 1678 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines for the reason that the value of the
repairs, improvements, and other works above-mentioned shall be deemed to be in
substitution for and patent of the walls and other parts of the house which Dominador B. Ambrosio as lessee
removed and which he promised to restore on the termination of the
lease.
“4. And that the making of the repairs and other
works above referred to and this document shall not in any way be understood to
modify or change the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila
in Civil Case No. 52981, which we hereby affirm remains in full force and
effect, subject to the motion filed therein by the parties thereto, dated
September 21, 1963.
“xxx xxx xxx.”[8]
Contrary to the theory now advanced by the defendants, they had
explicitly declared and agreed that “the making of the repairs and other
works” referred to in said deed of December 14, 1964, and the execution
thereof did not “in any way modify” the aforementioned decision of
February 12, 1963, and the same “remains in full force and effect.”
Pursuant thereto, the writ complained of is in order.
Being in accordance with law, the orders appealed from are,
accordingly, affirmed, with costs against the defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
[1] Llacer v. Muñoz, 12 Phil.
328; Mirasol v. Municipality of Tabaco, 43 Phil. 610, 614-615; NAMARCO v. Tan,
L-17074, March 31, 1964; Castrillo v. Court of
Appeals, L-18046, March 31, 1964.
[2]
Nielson & Co., Inc. vs. Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Co., L-21601, Dec. 28, 1968; Universal Motors Corporation v.
Dy Hian Tat, L-23788, May 16, 1969; Yturralde
v. Azurin, L-22158, May 30, 1969.
[3] 92
Phil. 426, decided January 2, 1953.
[4] Republic
v. Estenzo,
L-24656, Sept. 25, 1968; Guilas v. David, L-24280, May 27, 1968; Sabino v. Cuba, L-18328, Dec. 17, 1966; Serrano
v. Miave,
L-14678, March 31, 1965; Sotto v.
Reyes, L-18439, Aug. 21, 1963; Araneta v. Perez, L-16187, April 30, 1963; Piano
v. Cayanong,
L-18603, Feb. 28, 1963; Tria v. Lirag, L-13994, April 29, 1961.
[5] “Art.
2037. A compromise has upon the parties
the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in
compliance with a judicial compromise.”
[6] 76
Phil. 143.
[7] Record
on Appeal, p. 19.
[8] Underscoring
supplied.