PETRONILO L. RUIZ, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. GERMANICO A. CARREON, AND VENUSTO C. HAMOY, RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.

Direct appeal, taken by respondents Germanico A. Carreon and Venusto C. Hamoy, from a decision
of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Norte.

Petitioner Petronilo L. Ruiz has been
chief of police of Dapitan
City since March 16, 1966, when he assumed said office.  On August
6, 1968, the Acting City Fiscal of Dapitan
filed, with its City Court, an information (Exh. B) charging petitioner herein
with “other light threats”, whereupon, the City Mayor, respondent Germanico A. Carreon, issued an
order (Exh. C) suspending
petitioner, “effective August 7,
1968”.  Subsequently, Mayor
Carreon designated respondent Venusto
C. Hamoy, a police lieutenant of the Police
Department of Dapitan, as Officer-In-Charge of said
department, during petitioner’s suspension. 
This led to the filing by petitioner herein of the present quo warranto proceedings against said respondents, upon the
ground that Mayor Carreon had no authority to suspend
him and that, accordingly, Lt. Hamoy
is usurping petitioner’s office as Chief of Police of Dapitan.  In their answer, respondents maintained that
Mayor Carreon has the power to suspend petitioner,
under the aforementioned provision of the Police Act.

After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte rendered a decision overruling
respondents’ contention and nullifying the order of suspension of petitioner
herein, as well as declaring him entitled to hold, possess, exercise and
discharge the functions and duties of Chief of Police of Dapitan,
and ordering his immediate reinstatement to said office, with all the privileges
and emoluments appertaining thereto, from the date of his aforementioned
suspension, without pronouncement as to costs. 
Hence, this appeal by respondents.

It is not disputed that petitioner herein was appointed by the
President, pursuant to Section 19 of Republic Act No. 3811, approved on June
22, 1963, which is the Charter of the City of Dapitan
and that his appointment had been duly confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.  Said provision reads:

“Sec. 19.  Appointment and removal of officials and employees.  – The
President of the Philippines,
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the city
judge, the city treasurer, the city engineer, the city fiscal, the chief of
police, the city health officer, the city assessor, the chief of the fire
department, the city superintendent of schools, and other heads of such city
departments as may be created.  Said
officers shall not be suspended nor removed except in the manner and for causes
provided by law.

“Subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Law, the City
Mayor shall appoint all other officers and employees paid out of city funds,
and they shall be suspended or removed in accordance with law.”

It is clear from the foregoing that, on February 17, 1966, when
petitioner was appointed, as well as on March 16, 1966, when he assumed his
duties, as Chief of Police of Dapitan, the power to
fill the same was vested in the President, who, likewise, had the authority to
suspend or remove him, in the mariner and for the causes provided in said R.A.
No. 3811.  Subsequently, however, or on September 8, 1966, Republic Act No.
4864, otherwise known as the Police
Act of 1966, was approved.  The pertinent
parts of Section 8 and 16 of said Act read:

“Sec. 8.  Power to Appoint.  – Upon approval of this Act, appointment to a
local police agency shall be made by the mayor from the list of eligi­bles certified by the Civil Service Commission:  Provided, That in those cities where
the city council participates in the appointment of members of the Police
Force, the said power shall be maintained in accordance with their respec­tive
charters:  Provided, further, That
all such appointments shall be on probationary basis for a period of six months
with an evaluation and recommendation report for retention or dismissal by the
chief of police prior to the expiration thereof:  Provided, furthermore, That the
power  to appoint the Chief of Police,
Assistant Chief of Police or Chief of the Secret Service of the Police
Department in accordance with the provisions of existing city charters shall
continue to be vested in the President until December 31, 1967.

“xxx               xxx                   xxx

“Sec. 16.  Suspension of Members of
the Police Force or Agency.  x
x x

 “When a member of the police force
or agency is accused in court of any felony or violation of law by the city or
municipal attorney or by the chief of the municipal police or the provincial or
assistant provincial fiscal or city or assistant city fiscal, as the case may
be, the city mayor or muni­cipal mayor concerned, shall immediately suspend the
accused from office pending the final decision by the court, and in case of
acquittal, the accused shall be entitled to immediate reinstatement and the
payment of the entire salary he failed to receive during his suspension:  Provided, however, That trial and
disposition of criminal cases against mem­bers of the police forces shall be
accorded priority by the courts.”

In consequence of these provisions of Rep. Act No. 4864, the
power of the President to appoint chiefs of police of chartered cities,
pursuant to the provisions of their respective charters, lapsed on December 31,
1967, so that beginning from January 1, 1968, the authority to fill the office
of chief of police of Dapitan was vested in its City
Mayor.  Moreover, on September 12, 1967, Rep. Act No. 5185, commonly
known as the Decentralization Act of 1967, was approved.  Section 4 thereof ordains:

“xxx               xxx                   xxx

“The City Assessor, City Agriculturist, City Chief of Police
and City Chief of Fire Department and other heads of offices entirely paid out
of city funds and their respective ass­istants or deputies shall, subject to
civil ser­vice law, rules and regulations, be appointed by the City Mayor.  x x x

“xxx               xxx                   xxx

“The suspension, removal, transfer and other personnel action
on the heads of offices and their other employees in provinces, cities and
municipalities shall be subject to the provisions of civil service law, rules
and regulations.

“xxx               xxx                   xxx.”

The issue for our determination is whether, having been appointed
by the President of the Philippines,
petitioner herein could be suspended or removed from office by respondent City
Mayor, to whom said power of appointment was
transferred by Rep. Act No. 5185, since Sept.
12, 1967, and by Rep. Act No. 4864, since Jan. 1, 1968. 
A direct answer to this question is not supplied by any of the
legislations adverted to above.  However,
Section 3 of Rule XIII of the Police Manual, issued on December 30, 1967, by the Office of the
President, upon the recommendation of the Police Commission – which was created
by said Rep. Act No. 4864, precisely to carry out the objectives thereof – is
of the fol­lowing tenor:

“Sec. 3.  Status of Chiefs of Police and other
police officers appointed by the President. 
– All chiefs of police and other police officers appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments,
shall continue to enjoy their status as presidential appointees and may be
suspended or removed only for cause and by order of the President.  x x
x.”^[1]

Explaining the reason for the inclusion of this provision in the
Police Manual, the Acting Chairman of said Commission, in his letter to
respondent Mayor, dated May 3, 1968
(Exhs. D and D-1), had this
to say:

“The need for a clearcut definition
of the security-of-time status of the chiefs of police who are appointed by the
President was not at first foreseen by the committee drafting the Police Manual
until it became too obvious in subsequent events that their security in office
was actually threatened.  To avoid the
recurrence of such situation as are plainly prejudi­cial to the integrity
and independence of said officials, and to avoid future politically-expedient
construction of Sections 14 and 16 of the Police Act of 1966, it was decided
that such a provision as was quoted above was necessary as a measure of
safeguard and protection.”^[2]

Although not a part of Republic Act No. 4864, said section 3 of
Rule XIII of the Police Manual is the official interpretation and
implementation of said Act by the very agency created therein to take charge of
its administration and enforcement.  As
such, it is entitled to great weight and consideration, and should be respected
by courts of justice, unless clearly erroneous.^[3]
We do not find it to be so.  On the
contrary, according to the last paragraph of section 8 of Rep. Act No. 4864:

“The provisions of this section shall be without prejudice to
the tenure of the in­cumbent chiefs of police, assistant or deputy chiefs of
police and chiefs of the secret ser­vice and those holding office on January 1,
1968 in accordance with existing laws and/or civil service rules and
regulations all of whom can only be removed for cause:  PROVIDED, FINALLY, That the municipal mayor,
city mayor and provincial governor shall in no case appoint special policemen
or special agents or confiden­tial agents within sixty days before and after
every election.”

Pursuant thereto, the provisions of said section 8 shall be
“without prejudice to the tenure of the incumbent chiefs of police, x x x and those holding office on January 1, 1968 in accordance with
existing laws x x x.”
One of such incumbents was petitioner herein, and, pursuant to the laws in
force on December 31, 1967,
the authority to suspend or remove him was impliedly, but clearly, vested in
the President, as the officer who had the power to appoint the Chief of Police
of Dapitan.^[4]

Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile the power of general
supervision over local governments vested in the President by the Constitution
with the alleged authority of municipal or city mayors to suspend a
presidential appointee.  Indeed, such
avowed author­ity of Mayors would enable them, in effect, to set aside an act
of the President, by seeing to it that criminal charges – even if insub­stantial
– are filed against a member of the police force appointed by the Executive, so
that the accused could – under the theory of respondents herein – be suspended
by the incumbent Mayor, thus giving the latter an opportunity to install his
own man, in lieu of said accused.

The relevance of this evil becomes more apparent when we consider
the circumstances under which the criminal case against petitioner herein for
“other light threats,” had been filed.  In this connection, the record shows that
petitioner had, prior thereto, been suspended by Mayor Carreon,
in connection with adminis­trative charges preferred against the former, on February 16, 1968, by several
policemen, mainly for disciplinary measures taken against them by the
petitioner.  The aforementioned suspension
led to the intervention of the Police Commission, whose
Acting Chairman wrote the letter above quoted explaining the reasons underlying
section 3 of Rule XIII of the Police Manual, thereby suggesting indirectly that
petitioner’s previous suspension was illegal. 
Then came the criminal case for “other
light threats,” allegedly committed by the petitioner as follows:

“That in the morning, on or about the 31st day of July, 1968,
in the City of Dapitan, Philip­pines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and orally
threaten one GERARDO C. DULALAS with some harm constituting a crime, but who by
subsequent acts showed that the said accused did not persist in the idea involved
in his threat.

“That the crime was committed with the aggravating
circumstance of advantage taken by the accused of his public position as Chief
of Police of Dapitan City.”

The undisclosed nature of the “harm constituting a
crime,” charged in this information, and the fact that Gerardo C. Dulalas, the offended party in said criminal case, is an
officer of the Police Department of Dapitan,
subordinate to petitioner, like the complain­ants in the administrative case
above referred to, considered in relation to the events preceding the filing of
said information, strongly suggest that its underlying purpose was to justify
peti­tioner’s suspension and pave the way to the appointment of another one in
his place.

In short, We find the decision of the lower court to be in accord
with the nature of the official relations between the Presi­dent and city or
municipal mayors, and with the spirit and purpose of Rep. Acts Nos. 3811, 4864
and 5185, for which reason, the deci­sion appealed from should be, as it is
hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro, Fernando, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

^[1]
Underscoring ours.

^[2]
Underscoring ours.

^[3]
In re Allen, 2 Phil. 630; Government
v. Municipality of Binalonan, 32 Phil. 634;
Molina v. Rafferty, 37 Phil, 545; Madrigal v. Rafferty, 38 Phil.
414; Guanio v. Fernandez, 55 Phil. 814; Ramos v.
C.I.R., L-22753, December 18, 1967.

^[4]
Hojilla v. Mariño, L-20574, Feb.
26, 1965; Fernandez v. Ledesma, L-18878, March
30, 1963.