G.R. No. L-55972. May 13, 1981
PHILIPPINE HOLDING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PASAY CITY, BRANCH XXXIX, AND ROMULO C. FIGUEROA, RE…
TEEHANKEE, J.:
This is a special civil
action of certiorari and mandamus complaining of the Order dated
October 1, 1980 as well as the Order
dated December 1, 1980 of the Court of First Instance of Pasay, Branch XXXIX, as having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion, the first Order recalling the writ of execution issued on June
18, 1980 in Civil Case No.
7222-P, entitled “Philippine Holding Corporation vs. Romulo
Figueroa” and the second Order denying the motion for reconsideration
filed by herein petitioner. Petitioner
prays to compel respondent Judge to order immediate execution of the judgment
of eviction and to issue the corresponding writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction for the purpose.
The Court hereby sets
aside the two orders and grants the
writ of mandamus prayed for, since the said orders were issued in
violation of the specific and mandatory provisions of Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court.
For a brief statement of
the undisputed facts:
In a decision dated
October 17, 1978 of the City Court of Pasay,
Branch IV, respondent Romulo Figueroa was ordered
evicted from the premises owned by petitioner corporation located at 1400 Roxas Boulevard corner Salud
Street, Pasay City by virtue of the expiration of the
contract of lease thereon between said respondent as lessee and herein
petitioner as lessor.
For unexplained reasons, petitioner did not receive a copy of the
decision until after it filed, on January 15, 1979, a motion for the early decision of the case
and City Judge Francisco Llamas issued an order that a copy of the decision be
sent to petitioner’s counsel.
Surprisingly also, respondent Figueroa received a copy of the decision
only much later on March 5, 1979.
After respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the decision of
eviction had been denied, the City Court issued the corresponding writ of
execution on petitioner’s motion.
On May 4, 1979,
respondent Figueroa filed a notice of appeal dated May 2, 1979 from the decision of the Pasay
City Court and at the same time filed a supersedeas
bond consisting of a first lien or mortgage executed in favor of petitioner
over two parcels of land located at Agoo, La Union.
In the Court of First Instance, after respondent failed to
deposit the monthly rentals that had fallen due since the perfection of the
appeal, petitioner moved for execution on February 12, 1980.
This was reiterated on May 13,
1980 and again on June 13,
1980. Finally, on June 18, 1980, respondent Judge
granted the motion and ordered execution of the lower court’s decision. On July
23, 1980, respondent, on his own behalf, filed an ex-parte Motion to Recall Writ of Execution Pending
Appeal. The following day, or on July 24, 1980, respondent Judge
issued an order suspending the writ of execution and thereafter recalled the
same on October 1, 1980,
reasoning thus:
“The Court ordered the execution of the appealed decision on
the ground that the defendant failed to pay or deposit the current monthly
rental of the premises. Upon review of
the motion to recall writ of execution, the Court noted that the defendant, to
stay execution, offered real estate property the value of which, according to
defendant, is more than sufficient to cover up the money judgment as well as
current and future monthly rentals. On
the firm and honest belief that this property is sufficient to pay the current
monthly rentals, the defendant did not anymore pay the same in Court. The defendant is offering another parcel of
land situated in Baguio
City to answer for the current
monthly rentals.
The Court, although aware
of the mandatory provisions of Sec. 8, Rule 70, Revised
Rules of Court, deems it a wiser policy and a more sound exercise of discretion
to liberalize its application in the interest of justice and equity.”
When petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, the
instant petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed wherein
petitioner submits that respondent judge’s Order dated October 1, 1980 recalling the writ of execution previously issued in the case and
Order dated December 1, 1980 denying its
motion for reconsideration were
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Petitioner accordingly
prays that mandamus issue to compel
respondent Judge to perform his ministerial duty of ordering immediate
execution of the lower court’s decision of eviction against respondent for
non-payment of rentals falling due during respondent’s appeal.
Respondent Judge, while
admitting in his questioned Order that the provisions of Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court are mandatory, recalled the writ
of execution because he “deems it a wiser policy and more sound exercise
of discretion to liberalize its application in the interest of justice and
equity.” This is patently grave abuse of discretion and officiousness on
the part of respondent Judge.
Section 8, Rule 70
of the Rules of Court mandatorily provides that in ejectment cases, “if judgment is rendered against the
defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been
perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved
by the municipal or city court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the
action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs
accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency
of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from
time to time under the contract,
if any, as found by the judgment
of the municipal or city court to exist.
In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the court the
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding
month or period at the rate determined by the judgment, on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. x x
x.”
The law is explicit and is beyond respondent Judge’s discretion
or notion of what would be a “wiser policy.” In a case where the
defendant in an eviction case did not file a supersedeas bond or, as in the case at bar, did not make
any monthly deposit of the rentals, the lessor, like
petitioner in the case at bar, is entitled as a matter of right to the
immediate execution of the municipal or city court’s judgment for the restoration
of possession and the payment of the accrued rentals or compensation for the
use and occupation of the premises.[1]
In such cases, execution is mandatory.[2] The only exceptions are the existence of
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which
prevented the defendant from posting the supersedeas bond
or making the monthly deposit, or the occurrence of supervening events which
brought about a material change in the situation of the parties and which would
make the execution inequitable[3] – none of which holds in the case at bar.
When the supersedeas bond is not
filed or the current rents are not deposited with the court as required by the
cited Rule, the duty of the court to order the immediate execution of the
appealed decision is ministerial and imperative.[4]
The mere offer of additional bond by respondent in lieu of the
required monthly deposit of rentals does not justify the recall of the writ of
execution already issued. For when the
judgment in an ejectment case is appealed, the stay
of the execution is conditioned upon the monthly payment to plaintiff or
deposit in court of the accruing rentals or compensation for the property. The failure of the defendant-lessee to make
cash deposits for current rentals calls for immediate execution of the
judgment, even if the supersedeas bond
filed covers both the back rents and current rents[5]
and the Court of First Instance has no
discretion in the
matter and no power to extend the time for making such
payment.[6]
It has long been settled that the supersedeas bond
answers only for the rents or damages down to the time of the perfection of the
appeal and not for the future rents or damages arising during the appeal, which
rents are guaranteed to be covered by the monthly cash deposits required by the
Rule. The Court of First Instance has no
authority to accept a bond in lieu of cash deposit for future rents.[7]
ACCORDINGLY, the orders of respondent Judge dated October 1, 1980 and December 1, 1980 are hereby set aside
and annulled. The writ of mandamus
is likewise issued commanding respondent Judge to immediately issue upon
receipt hereof the corresponding writ of execution. With costs against private
respondents. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ.,
concur.
[1]
De Pages and Vda. de Rodriguez
vs. Hon. Canonoy, 116 Phil. 898; Paulino
Sr. vs. Hon. Surtida, 109 Phil. 621;
De Laureano vs. Adil,
72 SCRA
148.
[2]
Arcega vs.
Dizon, 76 Phil. 164; Carbungco
vs. Amparo, 83 Phil. 638; Chieng
Hung vs. Tam Ten, 21 SCRA 211.
[3]
Cunaan vs. Rodas, 78
Phil. 800; Laurel vs. Abalos, 30 SCRA 281; De Laureano vs. Adil, supra.
[4]
De la Cruz vs. Burgos, 28 SCRA 977.
[5]
Acibo vs. Macadaeg,
11 SCRA 446.
[6]
Lapuz vs. CFI of Pampanga,
46 Phil. 77.
[7]
Ysrael vs.
CA, 78 Phil. 831; Acibo vs. Macadaeg, supra, citing Moran, 3 Comments on the
Rules of Court, 300; 304; 305 (1963).