G.R. No. L-52016. May 13, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SEVERINO DUERO, ACCUSED WHOSE DEATH SENTENCE IS UNDER AUTOMATIC REVIEW.
AQUINO,
J.:
This is an automatic
review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dated April 17,
1979, convicting Severino Duero
of robbery with homicide, sentencing him to death and ordering him to pay the
heirs of Fausta Duero an
indemnity of fifteen thousand pesos and the sum of two thousand
pesos which he took from her (Criminal Case No. 8860).
The issue is whether the
trial court erred in convicting the accused of robbery with homicide on the
basis of his oral confession to the police station commander that he
committed that offense but which confession was repudiated by him on the
witness stand and which was taken during custodial interrogation when the
accused was not informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel, as
required by section 20, Article IV of the Constitution.
There is no doubt as to
the corpus delicti or the commission
of robbery with homicide.
In the
evening of Sunday, October 24, 1976, Fausta Condino Vda. de Duero, an octogenarian housekeeper living alone, was
feloniously killed in her house located at Barrio Banguit,
Cabatuan, Iloilo (Exh. A).
She sustained two gaping wounds on the right cheek, two gaping
wounds on the neck, another gaping wound on the right shoulder and a bruise on the cheek. A piece of wire, which was used to
strangle her, was tied around her neck (Exh. A). A scythe was sticking in her neck (Letter “B” in Sketch, p. 4,
Record).
Regarded as fatal by the examining physician was the wound in the
neck which pierced the jugular vein and which was connected with the other
wound in the neck and the shoulder wound (14 tsn
June 18, 1978).
The gruesome crime was discovered in the afternoon of the
following day, October 25, by Rodolfo Prevendido, the
barangay captain.
On noticing that the windows of the old woman’s house had not been opened
in the morning, he suspected that there was something amiss. He asked Doroteo Olmos, the grandson of the old woman, to peep through the
bedroom window.
When Olmos informed Prevendido
that the old woman’s things were scattered in the bedroom, he requested Olmos to inform his
uncle, Salvador Duero, a son of the old woman, to
come to the house (p. 8, Record).
Salvador entered the house through the bedroom window and saw his
mother’s lifeless and bloodied body near the kitchen with a wire coiled around
her neck and a scythe stuck in it. He
found that money and pieces of jewelry were missing (p. 7, Record). A mallet was found on the floor near the
victim’s body.
The police and the rural health physician were notified. Patrolmen Tranquilino
O. Tormon, Jr. and Cesar Moneva
repaired to the scene of the crime. From
the fact that cooked rice and viands were found on the stove, Tormon concluded that the crime was committed at suppertime
on the preceding night (p. 11, Record).
No eyewitness testified as to the commission of the offense. The principal evidence of the prosecution is
the testimony of Lieutenant Tomas C. Lujan, the chief of police of Cabatuan.
Lujan declared that Severino
voluntarily confessed to him that he (Severino)
committed the robbery with homicide but Severino
refused to sign a confession.
Severino implicated Rufino Macaya of Lambunao, Iloilo. Lujan and his men brought Severino to Macaya’s house. Lujan found that Macaya
had nothing to do with the crime.
Lujan further testified that Severino
said that the money stolen from the old woman was in Severino’s
house at Sitio Rizal Ilawod, Barrio Banguit. Lujan and his men went to Severino’s
house. They did not find the stolen
money.
Lujan was not the only
police officer who heard Severino Duero’s
confession. Patrolman Rolando N. Alag, a member of the arresting team that picked up Duero
and brought him to Lujan, stated in his sworn statement before the mayor that Duero admitted that he took part in the robbery with
homicide, that his companions were Macaya and a
certain Junior (whose parents were Severino’s
godparents) and that it was he (Severino) who induced
the commission of the crime (p. 9, Record).
Alag further swore that after Macaya
denied any participation in the commission of the crime, Severino Duero admitted sole responsibility for it and
confessed that he took three
thousand pesos after hitting Fausta Duero on the head with a mallet, strangling her with a
piece of wire and hacking her with a scythe (p. 9, Record).
According to Alag, Severino said that the robbery with homicide was
committed on momentary impulse after Fausta Duero, who had plenty of money,
refused to lend him fifty pesos (Back of page 9, Record).
Alag confirmed his sworn statement at the
preliminary examination when the municipal judge interrogated him. Alag said
that Severino Duero made
his confession in the course of their conversation
on the way to the police station and not by reason of a formal
investigation (p. 22, Record).
Alag clarified that, according to Severino, he had to kill Fausta Duero because the old woman recognized him as the intruder
(p. 22, Record).
Patrolman Rufino Tormon, another member of the arresting team, corroborated in his sworn
statement Alag’s declaration as to Severino Duero’s confession. Tormon declared at
the preliminary examination that Severino Duero knew that Fausta Duero had money because, according to Severino,
Fausta’s daughter Mauring
repaid to Fausta the sum of one thousand one hundred
pesos (which amount Fausta had not yet deposited in
the bank), another person named Ayuy Duero paid to Fausta her debt and
Fausta had ten sacks of palay
(pp. 10 and 14, Record).
Tormon said that Severino
met Fausta at a store in the morning of October 23,
1976 (the day before the crime was committed).
Fausta was willing to lend Severino
one hundred fifty pesos (p. 14, Record).
Buenaventura Hudieras, the barangay captain of Barrio Pamulogan,
which adjoins Barrio Banguit where the old woman
resided, declared in his sworn statement that in the evening of October 26 (two
days after the commission of the crime) he was drinking liquor (biti-biti) with Severino Duero in the house of Valentino Pambo,
Hudieras’ brother-in-law. On that occasion, Severino
told Hudieras that Fausta Duero was killed by clubbing her with a mallet, choking her
with a piece of wire and hacking her with a scythe (p. 6, Record).
Hudieras stated that when he remarked that the best
thing to do was to kill the killer of Fausta Duero, Severino behaved in an
unnatural manner and said that Hudieras could testify
that he saw daily Severino harvesting palay (“Si ‘To boy nga dya, baryo
kapitan dya, sarang makatestigos nga adlaw-adlaw doon takon nagapanggarab“)
(p. 6, Record).
Hudieras confirmed his affidavit at the
preliminary examination. He said that
his suspicion was that Severino Duero
killed Fausta Duero (p. 16,
Record).
The sworn statements of Alag, Tormon and Hudieras and others
were the basis of the criminal complaint for robbery with homicide filed by
Lieutenant Lujan in the municipal court
against Severino Duero. They did not testify at the trial most probably because Lujan himself, the station commander, took the witness
stand to give evidence on the same oral confession allegedly made by Severino to the police.
To reinforce and
render credible Lujan’s testimony
on Duero’s
oral confession of guilt, Tranquilino
Duero, a second cousin of the accused, testified that
at about five o’clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1976, he met the accused in Barrio
Tabucan which is about two kilometers away
from the old woman’s house in Barrio Banguit. In the course of their conversation, Severino allegedly revealed to Tranquilino
that he (Severino) would rob his owao
or grandmother, Fausta Duero. Tranquilino said to
Severino:
“Are you an idiot?”
In answer, Severino explained that Fausta
Duero would not even lend him ten pesos or a ganta of rice, a fact known to one Roman Sipaya. The next day
when Tranquilino learned from Severino
that the old woman was killed, it occurred to Tranquilino
that Severino was responsible for the killing (2–3 tsn March 10, 1978).
Another prosecution
witness, Jose Montaño, testified that about six
o’clock in the evening of October 24,
1976, when he passed by the house of Fausta Duero, he saw Severino Duero near the stairs of the house.
Severino was calling the old woman. Montaño was just
about three meters away from Severino when Montaño passed
by him (6 tsn April 21, 1978).
Montano’s house was about one hundred meters away from Fausta’s house. He
was going to watch television in his uncle’s house.
Montaño had known Severino
Duero for about four years. He was on friendly terms with Severino. The latter
used to gather mangoes for him. Montaño was positive that Severino
killed the old woman (6 tsn April 21, 1978).
Another prosecution witness, Wilfredo Cenizal (Senesal), also a
resident of Barrio Pamulogan, testified that at
six-thirty in the morning of October 25, 1976 or about ten hours after the
commission of the crime, Cenizal had a conversation
with Severino Duero.
Severino spontaneously revealed to Cenizal that he (Severino) helped
his grandmother (owao, the colloquial term for
grandmother) who was “held up by the bandit” and that her money
amounting to two thousand pesos was taken from her. Severino recounted
to Cenizal that the old woman was struck in the head
with a hammer and wounded with a scythe.
Cenizal’s testimony was a confirmation of his affidavit
taken on October 30, 1976 by a policeman wherein he stated that, according to Severino, the old woman was killed by striking her with a
mallet, strangling her with a piece of wire and wounding her with a scythe and
that the money taken from the old woman was in a purse (buon-buon)
placed in a bamboo basket (tabungos) (p. 5,
Record). Cenizal
confirmed his affidavit at the preliminary examination (p. 17, Record).
The circumstantial evidence summarized above shows that the
prosecution had a strong case against Severino Duero in spite of
the absence of the testimony of an eyewitness.
During the trial no objection was interposed by the defense to the evidence
on Duero‘s oral confession.
Indeed, the trial court
on the basis of such evidence found Severino guilty
of robbery with homicide beyond reasonable doubt. He did not appeal from the trial court’s decision.
But the trouble is that at the trial Severino
repudiated his alleged oral confession and even claimed that he was maltreated
by the police. (Lujan in his rebuttal
testimony denied the maltreatment.) Severino said
that the victim was “the wife of my grandfather”, meaning that
“the husband of Fausta Duero
(the victim) was the grandfather of Severino
Duero” (28 and 37 tsn January 5, 1979).
As alibi, Severino testified that he
was in his house when the crime was perpetrated. His wife Salvacion,
his neighbor Adriano Lopez and his friends, the spouses Rufino
Macaya and Erlinda Macaya, confirmed his
alibi.
Severino Duero’s
counsel de oficio in this Court contends that the trial
court erred in admitting the oral testimony on Severino
Duero’s oral confession, in giving credence to the
testimonies of Lujan, Cenizal, Montaño
and Tranquilino Duero, in finding that robbery with homicide was
committed and in not sustaining Severino’s alibi.
The Solicitor General agrees with the counsel de oficio’s contention that Severino’s
oral confession is inadmissible in evidence by reason of Article IV of the
Constitution which provides:
“SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or
any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
All the foregoing
provisions are new except the first sentence, regarding the right against
self-incrimination (nemo tenetur seipsum accusare), which
is the only provision found in
section 18 of the Bill of Rights of the 1935 Constitution, now revised or expanded
in section 20. (See article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 857 as to the right of the accused, who
is in police custody, to confer and communicate at anytime with his counsel.)
If this case were to be
decided under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court’s judgment of conviction
could be affirmed. But we have to
decide it under the rule in the 1973 Constitution as to a confession obtained
while the confessant is under police custody.
And that rule applies squarely to this case (Magtoto
vs. Manguera, Simeon vs. Villaluz
and People vs. Isnani, L-37201-02, L-37424 and
L-38929, March 3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4).
Inasmuch as the
prosecution in this case failed to prove that before Duero made his alleged oral
confession he was informed of his
rights to remain silent and to have counsel and
because there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived those
rights, his confession is inadmissible in evidence.
After discarding Lujan’s
testimony on Duero’s oral confession, the rest of the
prosecution’s circumstantial evidence against him is not adequate for his
conviction. His acquittal follows as a
matter of course.
The new provisions in
section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution were adopted from the ruling in
Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 16 L. Ed. 2nd 694 (“an earthquake in the world of law
enforcement”) which specifies the following procedural safeguards for
in-custody interrogation of accused persons:
“Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he
has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed.
“The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
“If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of
the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there
can be no questioning.
“Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question
him.
“The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or
volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to
refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an
attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.”
As restated by Chief Justice Warren in the Miranda case,
the following procedure should be adhered to:
“At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to
interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he
has the right to remain silent.
“For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed
simply to make them aware of it – the threshold requirement for an intelligent
decision as to its exercise.
“More important, such a warning is an absolute pre-requisite
in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. x x
x.
“Further, the warning will show the individual that his
interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to
exercise it. x x x.
“The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied
by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the
individual in court. This warning is
needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the
consequences of forgoing it. x x x.
“An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a
lawyer. While such request affirmatively
secures his right to have one, his failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver. No effective waiver of the right to counsel
during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after the
warnings we here delineate have been given.
The accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not make a
request may be the person who most needs counsel. x x x.
“If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of
counsel before any interrogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally
ignore or deny his request on the basis that the individual does not have or
cannot afford a retained attorney. x x x.
“In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent
of his rights under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only
that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is
indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. x x
x.
“Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is
clear. If the individual indicates in
any manner, at anytime prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain
silent, the interrogation must cease. x x x. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney
and he indicates that he wants
one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain
silent. x x x.
“If the interrogation continues without the presence of an
attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. x x
x.
“An express statement that the individual is willing to make a
statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could
constitute a waiver. x
x x.
“The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance
with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent,
prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.”
In the Miranda case, the Federal
Supreme Court made it clear that what is prohibited is the “incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in
self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional
rights.”
The State’s right to prosecute
criminals may be a great right but,
as Lord Chancellor Sankey observed, it is not permissible “to do a great
right by doing a little wrong”.
The Miranda ruling does not mean
that the police should stop a person who enters a police station and states
that he wishes to confess to a crime. It
does not affect volunteered statements of guilt by persons not in police
custody.
At the risk of repetitiousness, we reproduce hereunder Chief
Justice Warren’s summary of the
procedural safeguards for persons in police custody where the interrogation is
regarded as the commencement already of the trial or adversary system:
“He (the accused) must be warned prior to any questioning
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires.
“Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout
the interrogation.
“After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity
afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these
rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement.
“But unless and until such warnings and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him.”
The above procedure was
not followed by the police in this case.
Hence, Severino Duero’s
oral confession is inadmissible in evidence.
Without that confession, the prosecution’s other evidence is not sufficient to establish
Duero’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is acquitted. He should be released immediately unless he
is being detained for another offense. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee,
Barredo, Makasiar,
Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., on official leave.