EUGENIO AQUINO, PETITIONER, VS. EULOGIO F. DE GUZMAN, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, DAGUPAN CITY, AND EMILIANA MENDOZA, RESPONDENTS.

LABRADOR, J.:


This is an original petition instituted in this court to compel the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Judge Eulogio F. de Guzman,
presiding, to allow the petitioner’s appeal against its judgment in
Land Registration Case No. 302, G.L.R.O. Record No. 1173 to the Court
of Appeals. The record discloses that this case was tried by said judge
jointly with civil case No. 10965, because the parties in the latter
are the same as those of the registration case, and both parties in
both cases were represented by the same attorneys. One single decision
was entered in both cases. Judgment having been rendered, against the
petitioner in both cases, his attorney presented on June 19, 1951, a
notice of appeal for both and a joint record on appeal for both cases
also (bearing titles of both cases), and deposited an appeal bond of
P60. This appeal bond was receipted for in the civil case No. 10965 on
June 30, 1951 (Annex 4 of answer.) No bond was deposited for the appeal
in the land registration case until August 1, 1951 (Annex 5 of answer.)
The record on appeal was approved, but the court gave course only to
the appeal in the civil case. Objection to the appeal in the
registration case was presented and this was sustained by the court,
whereupon the present action was filed in this court.

The petitioner contends that since the notice of appeal and the
record on appeal were embodied together in single documents in both
cases, the certification of the record on appeal in the civil case
necessarily included that of the registration case, because the record
on appeal in one case is inseparable from that in the other. The
contention is entirely without merit. The physical embodiment of both
records on appeal into one single document does not make the two cases
one, or relieve the petitioner of the obligation to file a bond in the
other. The identities of both cases are preserved; the oneness of the
record on appeal does not modify the nature of one or the other, or
merge the registration case into the civil case.

But while we hold that there is no error of law committed by the court a quo
in dismissing the appeal in the registration case, there are potent
reasons why, in the exercise of its discretion, it should have decreed
otherwise. One is the fact that the civil case is entirely dependent
upon the registration case; no recovery of possession can be decreed in
favor of, and no damages can accrue to, the plaintiff unless he is
declared the owner of the property subject of both cases. When
defendant, therefore, questioned plaintiff’s right to the possession
and to damages, he must have meant to question plaintiff’s title to the
property. The other reason is the fact that as the two cases were so
inextricably related to each other, and they were tried jointly, and
only one joint record on appeal presented, appellant’s attorney or his
client or both may have overlooked the need of filing two bonds, or
thought that one was sufficient without the other. This constitutes an
excusable oversight. Under these circumstances, the filing of the bond
in 60 days should have been excused and the appeal in the civil case
given due course and relief granted as authorized under the provisions
of Rule 38. The petition is hereby granted, but petitioner should pay
the costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.