SANTOS TABUENA, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. COURT OP APPEALS, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

In Civil Case No. B-152 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
which was an action for mandamus with damages, judgment was rendered
for petitioner Tabuena. The dispositive part of the decision reads:

    “Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

     (1)
The defendant Eugenio de la Cruz, in his official capacity as Director
of the Forest Eesearch Institute, is hereby commanded to appoint the
plaintiff, Santos Tabuena, to the position of Administrative Assistant
II in the Forest Products Research Institute with compensation at the
rate of P2,760 per annum within five (5) days from notice of this
decision;

     (2) The defendant, in his personal capacity,
is hereby sentenced to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P230 a month
commencing from June 16, 1958 until he shall have been appointed and
assumed office as Administrative Assistant II in the Forest Products
Research Institute, plus the sum of P3,000 for moral damages and P1,000
for attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, aside from the costs of
the suit.”

Notice of appeal was filed by respondent De la Cruz, who therein
manifested that no appeal bond was required to perfect his appeal.
Thereupon, Tabuena filed two motions, both dated April 27, 1959, one,
asking the trial court to require respondent De la Cruz to file an
appeal bond; and the other, praying that, pending appeal, the trial
court order execution of its judgment in so far as it commands the
appointment of Tabuena to the position of Administrative Assistant II.
After hearing further argument for and against the motions, the trial
court issued two orders, both dated July 8, 1959, requiring respondent
de la Cruz to file an appeal bond, and pending appeal directing
respondent to comply with that portion of the judgment ordering the
appointment of Tabuena to the position mentioned. A motion for
reconsideration of the above orders was denied (Annex “Q”).

De la Cruz then instituted certiorari proceedings in the Court of
Appeals to annul the twin orders of July 8, 1959 and that of July 31,
1959 denying his motion for reconsideration. In due course, the Court
of Appeals rendered its decision dated October 29, 1959, annulling both
orders complained of and making permanent the preliminary injunction it
had issued. Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration, Tabuena
brought to this Court the instant petition for review by certiorari.

The Court of Appeals sustained the contention of De la Cruz that he
was exempted from filing an appeal bond, as a public officer sued in
his official capacity; and that consequently, with the filing of the
notice of appeal, the trial court lost Jurisdiction to order the
immediate execution of its judgment.

We find this conclusion untenable. The general rule is that an
appeal bond is required for the purpose of paying for costs which the
appellate court may award against the appellant (Sec. 5, Rule 41). As
an exception, an appeal bond is not required of the Government when it
is the unsuccessful party, because no costs are supposed to accrue
against the Republic of the Philippines unless otherwise provided by
law (Sec. 1, Rule 131). But exemption from the filing of bonds applies
only where the action is brought by or against public officers
impleaded merely as nominal representatives of the Government, and sued
purely in their official capacity (Tolentino vs. Carlos, 66 Phil. 140; Chan vs. Villanueva, et al., L-5420, April, 1952; Araneta, et al. vs. Gatmaitan, et al., 1G1 Phil., 328; Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. vs. Rafferty, 39 Phil. 145; Gov’t. of PI vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance, 34 Phil., 157).

It appears exceedingly clear in this case that respondent De la Cruz
was sued not only in his official capacity as director of the Forest
Product Research Institute, but also in his personal capacity for
having acted allegedly in manifest bad faith, “with the purpose of
persecuting, discriminating against or committing injustice to the
petitioner” (par. 13, Ann. “F”); and accordingly, the judgment of the
court of origin made him personally liable for damages in varying
concepts. Whether or not the trial court committed error in awarding
damages against Dela Cruz in his personal capacity is immaterial here,
this being more properly cognizable in an appeal from the main case.
For our purpose, what is decisive is the dual character in which he was
sued and the judgment rendered by the trial court. At least on
principle, a public officer, by virtue of his office alone, is not
immune from damages in his personal capacity arising from illegal acts
done in bad faith (Art. 27, N.C.C.; 43 Am. Jur., 86, 89- 90). A
different rule would sanction the use of public office as a tool of
oppression.

Whether the trial court had (sufficient reasons for executing its
decision is quite another matter. Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court, execution may issue before the expiration of the time to
appeal, in the discretion of the court, “upon good reasons to be stated
in a special order”. Among its reasons for ordering the immediate
appointment of Tabuena, the trial court took into account his length of
service in the government, the delay that might be entailed in the
final disposition of the case, and the consequent prejudice to Tabuena
and his family in the meantime. These circumstances may call for
sympathy, but hardly warrant the immediate execution ordered. As a
solemn trust, occupancy of a public office cannot accommodate the
vagaries of personal fortunes. Execution pending appeal must be for
weighty reasons in all cases. Said principle is underscored in case
public office is involved.

Moreover, the following considerations are pertinent—

“If the judgment is executed and, on appeal, the same is reversed, although there are provisions for restitution, oftentimes, damages may arise which cannot be fully compensated.
Accordingly, execution should be granted only when these considerations
are clearly outweighed by superior circumstances demanding urgency * *
*.” (Aguilos vs. Barrios, 72 Phil. 285; Ledesma, et al. vs. Teodoro, et. al,, 98 Phil., 232; 52 Off. Gaz. [2] 784, italics supplied).

“Lastly,
if the respondents are reinstated and paid their back salaries from
city funds, and then the appeal in the main case is decided against
them, the city stands to suffer irreparable injury because it is hardly
to be expected that the said policemen shall be able to make
restitution.” (City of Bacolod, et al. vs. Hon. Enriquez, et al., 101
Phil., 644; 55 Off. Gaz. [51] 10545). That respondent De la Cruz might
retire before the case is finally disposed of cannot render the
judgment ineffective because then, his successor in office may be
substituted as respondent (Section 18, Rule 3). On the other hand,
unless the appeal is unquestionably dilatory, the allusion made by the
trial court that the appeal being taken by respondent is only for the
purpose of delay (Annex “Q”) cannot be a valid reason. This assumption
prematurely judges the merits of the appeal (City of Bacolod vs.
Enriquez, et al., supra). Whether or not Tabuena is entitled to the
office to which he was ordered appointed by the trial court is
precisely the very core of the main case.

At any rate, the continued vacancy of the position of Administrative
Assistant II in the Forest Products Research Institute does not appear
so disruptive of public functions as to impel a provisional appointment
of one whose rights to said office have yet to be finally resolved.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals setting aside the
trial court’s execution of its judgment pending appeal is affirmed; the
orders of the trial court dated July 8, 1959 and July 31, 1959, in so
far only as they require respondent to file an appeal bond in Civil
Case No. B-152, are reinstated; and respondent De la Cruz is hereby
given a period of ten (10) days from entry of our judgment within which
to file his appeal bond in said Civil Case B-152.

The records of this case are hereby ordered remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. No
costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautisa Angela, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, and De Leon, JJ., concur.