ANASTACIA PABALATE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. LORENZO ECHARRI, JR., DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

This is an appeal taken from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental in its Civil Case No. 5279,
dated September 3, 1964, dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint, with costs.

The plaintiffs filed the complaint on April 18, 1959 (amending it on May 30 following)
for recovery of possession of a parcel of land, plus damages.  After the defendants filed their respective
answers the case was submitted for decision on the following stipulation of
facts:

“1.  That the parties agree that the subject matter
of this case is lot No. 2498 of the Cadastrel Survey
of Escalante, Negros Occidental;

“2.  That the said Lot No. 2498 of Escalante
Cadastre was originally registered in the name of Heirs of Victorio
Pabalate under Original Certificate of Title No. 228
of the land records of this province by virtue of a Homestead Patent No. 8854
issued on February 20, 1926;

“3.  That on September 21, 1927, the heirs of Victorio Pabalate, namely, Andres
Pabalate, Sabas Pabalate, Fabian Pabalate, Anselma Pabalate, Dionisio Pabalate and Ardiana Pabalate, sold, conveyed and transferred the aforesaid Lot
No. 2498 of Escalante Cadastre unto Lorenzo Echarri,
Sr. predecessor of plaintiffs, Lorenzo Echarri, Jr.,
by virtue of Escritura de Compra
y Venta
ratified and acknowledged before Notary Public, Maria L. Vda.
de Ferrer, as Doc. 117; page
No. 31, Book 1, Series of 1927;

“4.  That by virtue of the afore­mentioned Escritura de Compra Y Venta, Lorenzo Echarri, Sr.,
during his lifetime and after his death his heir, Lorenzo Echarri, Jr., since
1927 up to the present had been in continuous, exclusive and open possession in
the concept of owner of said property;

“5.  That defendant, Francisco Rasquin
is lessee of said property from defendant, Lorenzo Echarri,
Jr., whose lease contract will terminate at the end of the crop year 1964-65
and the parties agree that said defendant be dropped as a party in the present case;

“6.  That Andres Pabalate,
Sabas Pabalate, Fabian Pabalate, Anselma Pabalate, Dionisio Pabalate and Ardiana Pabalate who sold and conveyed the said property Lot No.
2498 in favor of Lorenzo Echarri, Sr., are the
children of Victorio Pabalate
and his wife Florencio Onio
and the plaintiffs herein with the exception of Dionisio
Pabalate and Ardiana Pabalate are the descendants of the deceased, Andres, Sabas, Fabian and Anselma
Pabalate.”

Upon the foregoing stipulation the court a quo
upheld the defendants plea of laches on the part of the plaintiffs and consequently
dismissed the complaint, citing the decision of this Court in the case of Mejia
de Lucas vs. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277.  The propriety of the said defense is the only
issue here – as well, of course as the
applicability of the ruling in that decision.

We find for the defendants on both counts.  In the Mejia case the essential facts are
similar to those in the case before us.  The
land there in dispute was acquired by
free patent issued in 1916 pursuant to Act No. 926.  A few days afterwards the patentee deeded the
land to another, who held possession thereof until his death.  In 1940 his successor transferred the land to
the defendant Gamponia, from whom the plaintiff, a
grand-daughter of the patentee, sought to recover it after 37 years since the
original conveyance.  This Court held:

“Upon a careful
consideration of the facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find, however,
that while no legal defense to the action lies, an equitable one lies in favor
of the defendant and that is, the equitable defense of laches.  We hold that the defense of prescription or
adverse possession in derogation of the title of the registered owner Domingo
Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable defense of laches.  Otherwise stated, we hold that while
defendant may not be considered as having
acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessor’s long continued possession
for 37 years, the original owner’s right to recover back the possession of the
property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the long period of 37
years and by patentee’s inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand.”

The appellants stress the fact that the free patent acquired by
their predecessor in 1926 was not issued under Act No. 926 but under Act No.
2874, and that while under the former statute a sale of the land within the
prohibited period of seven (7) years was merely voidable,
a sale under the latter statute
within five (5) years from the issuance of the patent is absolutely null and
void.  We do not see that this difference
is at all material in regard to the question of laches.

This defense is an equitable one and does not concern itself with
the character of the defendant’s title, but only with whether or not by reason
of the plaintiff’s long inaction or inexcusable neglect he should be barred
from asserting this claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be
inequitable and unjust to the defendant. 
Indeed, Section 122 of Act No. 2874, which declares that a conveyance
within the prohibited period is null and void, makes no reference whatsoever to
any right of the patentee or his heirs to recover the property thus illegally
conveyed.  What it provides is that such
conveyance “shall produce the effect of annulling and canceling the grant,
title, patent, or permit originally issued . . . and cause the reversion of the
property and its improvements to the government.” In other words, the
plaintiffs cannot avail of the nullity of the conveyance as an excuse to avoid
the consequences of their own unjustified inaction and as a basis for the
assertion of a right on which they had slept for so long, especially since such
right is not expressly conferred by the law in the first place.

Angeles et al., vs. Court of Appeals, 102 Phil. 1006, is invoked
by the appellants.  Our decision in that
case, as well as its citation of Eugenio et al., vs. Perdido et al., 97 Phil. 41, is not here applicable.  Those cases involved the question of
prescription, and specifically held that an action or defense for the
declaration of the nullity of a contract that is inexistent and void ab initio does not
prescribe.  The case before us does not
involve the statutory defense of prescription but the equitable doctrine of laches, which we
find to be proper under the facts stipulated by the parties.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from
is affirmed, with costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.