G.R. No. L-28621. February 22, 1971
MAXIMO LEOQUINCO, AUGUSTO C. GO, QUINTIN PAULINO, AMADEO MARBELLA, THOMAS DAVIS, JR., ANTONIO ROLLENAS, FLORECIO SABIDONG, POLICARPIO CALDITO, JR., COSME ROXAS AND RODRIGO GULAT…
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing Civil Case No. 10237 on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction.
In a complaint filed on 30
August 1967, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
against the Canada Dry Bottling Company of the Philippines Employees
Association and 24 other persons named therein, Maximo
Leoquinco, Augusto C. Go, Quintin Paulino, Amadeo Marbella, Thomas Davis,
Jr., Antonio Rollenas, Florencio
Sabidong, Policarpio Caldito, Jr., Cosme Roxas and Rodrigo Gulatico alleged
that they were employees of the Canada Dry Bottling Company; that on 23 August
1967, and on other working days thereafter, plaintiffs were prevented by
defendants individuals, officers and/or members of the defendant labor
association, by means of force and intimidation, from reporting to and
performing their work in the company, thus depriving them of the salaries and
wages that they would have earned and received; that the public officers
charged with the duty of securing their right to work and earn a living were
unable to provide them adequate protection in the exercise of their said right,
and that the continuance of defendants’ unlawful acts would further prevent
plaintiff from performing their legitimate work in the company and from earning
their salaries and wages necessary for the support of their respective families
and of themselves. Thus, they prayed
that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the defendants from
preventing the plaintiffs (and the vehicles driven by or carrying them) from
reporting to work and performing their jobs in the company; that after due
hearing the restraining order be made permanent and the defendants be ordered,
jointly and severally, to pay the salaries or wages that plaintiffs would have
earned from 23 August 1967 up to the date they were allowed to report back to
work, plus moral and exemplary damages, attorneys’ fees and costs. Finding the allegations of the verified
complaint to be sufficient, and upon the plaintiffs’ filing a bond for P3,000.00,
the court issued, on 31 August 1967, a writ of preliminary injunction,
restraining the defendants from preventing the plaintiffs and the vehicles
carrying them from reporting for work and performing their jobs in the company. The bond was required to answer for whatever
damages the defendants may sustain by reason of the injunction.
On 7 September 1967,
the defendants moved for reconsideration and/or dissolution of the injunction,
claiming that the case arose out of a labor dispute or was interwoven with an
action for unfair labor practice then pending before the Court of Industrial
Relations and, therefore, properly belongs to the jurisdiction of that
court. It was pointed out in the motion
that as early as 31 July 1967, the defendant labor association had filed in the
Court of Industrial Relations a complaint for unfair labor practice against
the Canada Dry Bottling Company, allegedly for interfering with the formation
and organization of the labor union, and for discriminating against or pressing
employees to withdraw their membership from the union, under threat of
dismissal from work if they would not do so; that on 17 July 1967, a notice to
strike was filed with the Bureau of Labor based on the company’s commission of
the said acts, and a strike was actually staged on 23 August 1967; and that the
acts of the defendants subject of the complaint were perpetrated in the course
of the picketing carried out by the striking members of the defendant labor
association. Attached to the motion were
copies of the unfair labor practice charges filed by the labor association in
the Court of Industrial Relations on 31 July 1967, and the formal complaint for
unfair labor practice (Case No. 4824-ULP) filed by the CIR Acting Prosecutor on
28 August 1967, against the Canada Dry Bottling Company, and George Huang, Maximo Leoquinco, Augusto Go, Antonio Rollenas,
Polly Caldito and Quintin Paulino, the Personnel Manager, Sales Manager, Sales
Supervisor and Plant Superintendent, respectively, of the defendant company. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, maintaining
that the case is cognizable by a court of general jurisdiction, citing as basis
therefor the decision of this Court in the case of Abo, et al, vs. Philame
(Kg) Employees and Workers Union, et al., G. R. No. L-19912, 30 January 1965.
After the parties were heard on the motion for reconsideration,
the court issued an order dated 25
September 1967, in part stating as follows:
“A perusal of the case shows that although the complaint of
the plaintiffs did not allege in black and white anything about a labor dispute
between plaintiffs and defendants, yet by inference from the allegations of the
plaintiffs’ complaint, it could be unmistakably deduced that the acts of the
defendants as alleged therein arose from a labor dispute or in furtherance of
an industrial dispute. Indeed the
defendants are not so fool-hardy as to prevent their co-workers from entering
the premises of the Canada Dry Bottling Company if there was no labor dispute
or a strike. Considering the fact that
defendants filed a notice of strike on 17 July 1967, before the Bureau of Labor
Relations, a Charge No. 2042 on 31 July 1967 and a Complaint for Unfair Labor
Practice before the Court of Industrial Relations, the alleged illegal acts of
the defendants in the plaintiffs’ complaint from 23 August 1967, have therefore
connections or were committed in the course of the strike staged by the
defendants against the Canada Dry Bottling Company, and hence, arose from a
labor dispute. Such being the case, the
instant case therefore falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations (NARIC Workers’ Union vs. Hon. Carmelino Alvendia, et al., G. R.
No. L-14439, 25 March 1960;
National Garments and Textiles Workers Union vs. Caluag, et al., G. R. No. L-9104, 10 September 1956), whose Judges are in a better
position to appreciate the social aspect of a labor dispute (PAFLU vs. Judge B.
Tan, G. R. No. L-9115).”
Consequently, the case was ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
and the bond posted by the plaintiffs for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction adjudged in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs moved to have the dismissal-order
reconsidered, and when the motion was denied, they came to this Court by way of
the present appeal.
Appellants anchor their argument against the dismissal-order of
the court a quo on the rule that it is the allegations of the complaint
that determine the jurisdiction of a court, and since there is no averment in
their complaint regarding the existence of employer-employee relationship or of
an industrial dispute between therein plaintiffs and defendants, they contend
that the case was beyond the competence of the industrial court to
entertain. In support of their
allegation, appellants cite the decision of this Court in the case of Abo,et al., vs. Philame
(Kg) Employees Unions, supra. Thus,
it is claimed that the court below erred in taking notice of the unfair labor
practice case in the Court of Industrial Relations involving the defendants,
although nothing to this effect was mentioned in the complaint, on the basis
alone of certain uncertified pleadings presented by the said defendants.
There is no error in the action taken by the court below. Considering that the appellants’ complaint
itself showed that there was a controversy between parties who were employees
of the same employer and prayed for preliminary injunction; that pursuant to
Section 9 (f) of the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875, as amended) –
“A case shall be held to involve or to
grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons — who are
employees of the same employer—–” (Emphasis supplied)
and that said Act severely limits the
intervention of ordinary courts in labor disputes, We see no abuse of
discretion by the court a quo in taking into account the related
facts disclosed in respondent labor organization’s opposition to the issuance
of the injunction, and in the annexes thereto, specially since they were merely
clarificatory of the averments of the appellants’
complaint that was so artfully drafted as to conceal the fact that the acts
sought to be enjoined originated or were the consequence of a strike against
the common employer.
It may be noted that appellants are not claiming that the
disputed pleadings (the complaint and formal charges for unfair labor practice)
are spurious, or that no such unfair labor practice case (No. 4824-ULP) against
Canada Dry Bottling Company and Maximo Leoquinco, Augusto Go, Antonio Rollenas, Polly (Policarpio) Caldito and Quintin Paulino, four of herein appellants, was indeed pending in
the Court of Industrial Relations when the present case was commenced in the
court of first instance. Neither is
there a recital or narration of the particular acts of violence, force or
intimidation constituting the alleged violation of the plaintiffs’ rights. Appellants merely urge that the pleadings
were not duly certified by the Clerk of the Court of Industrial Relations and,
therefore, should not have been considered by the court a quo in
issuing its order. Being attached as
annexes to the motion to dismiss, and made a pact of the allegations thereof,
the aforementioned pleadings are not public instruments which would require
attestation of certain officials for presentation as documentary evidence,
pursuant to Section 26 of Rule 123.
Secondly, it must be remembered that the assailed finding of the court
below (that the acts complained of were committed in the course of the strike
staged by the defendants and, therefore, arose from a labor dispute) was
reached after the parties were heard and the motion to dismiss as well as the
opposition thereto were duly considered.
In the circumstances, it can not be said that the court’s ruling is
totally devoid of legal support.
This leaves us with the question of whether or not the lower
court was correct in declaring itself without jurisdiction to pass upon the
issues presented in this case.
The authority of the Court of Industrial Relations to take cognizance
of cases connected with the carrying out of a strike is well recognized in this
jurisdiction. In a long line of decided
cases,[1]
this Court has held that where the acts complained of in the petition for
injunction are found to arise out of or to be connected with any case
exclusively belonging to the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations,
the case shall be heard by the said court.
In those instances, the court of first instance shall be without
jurisdiction to issue any injunctive writ, whether temporary or permanent, to
restrain the conducting by strikers of activities related to, or connected
with, the labor dispute,[2]
and where injunction is indeed proper, recourse may be had to the Industrial
Court where the main action belongs.[3]
Here, although the court below made a finding that the acts of the defendants
complained of were perpetrated in the course of a strike, appellants would take
it out of the application of the above rulings, on the ground that there exists
no employer-employee relationship between herein plaintiffs and defendants, and
that the action is for damages said to have been sustained on account of
defendants’ unlawful acts. In other
words, it is maintained that the action is not against the strike or the
strikers; it is a simple demand for payment of damages suffered by them when
they were prevented by the defendants from reporting to their place of work, a
matter that is beyond the competence of the Court of Industrial Relations to
pass upon.
This is not the first time that the argument was presented before
and ruled on by this Court. In the case
of Erlanger and Galinger, Inc. vs. Erlanger & Galinger Employees Association,[4]
involving practically the same set of facts, the resort to the court of first
instance by the company to restrain the strikers’ allegedly unlawful act of
preventing the entrance into the company premises of the non-striking employees
and from molesting and harassing the company officials and agents, was declared
improper, the recourse being to institute appropriate action in the Court of Industrial
Relations and there to secure the necessary restraining order under Section 9
(d) of the Industrial Peace Act. Then,
overruling the contention that the petition was for damages cognizable by the
court of first instance, this Court said:
“While there is merit in petitioner’s claim that the lower
court should not have dismissed its entire petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, because said petition also asks for the payment of damages
suffered by the company on account of the alleged acts of violence and coercion
committed by the respondent Union in the course of its picketing of
petitioner’s premises, whether or not such damages are recoverable, and to
what extant, would still have to depend on the evidence in the unfair labor
practice case between the parties pending in the Court of Industrial Relations,
and its final outcome.”
In other cases where the same question of
court jurisdiction was put issue, because of the allegation of damages against
the strikers, this Court sustained the authority of the Court of Industrial
elations, thus:
“Neither would the claim for damages suffice to keep the case
within the jurisdictional boundaries of the court of first instance. That claim is interwoven with unfair labor
practice. The legality or illegality of
the strike must necessarily be litigated in the unfair labor practice
case. And the ‘right to damages
“would still have to depend on the evidence in the unfair labor
practice” – – – in the CIR’. To
allow Civil Case No. 60864 to
prosper would be to bring about ‘split jurisdiction — which is obnoxious to
the orderly administration of justice’ (Associated Labor Union vs. Gomez, L
-25999 , 9 February 1967, 19 SCRA 304).”[5]
“It appearing that in addition to the labor dispute involved
herein, there were other labor cases pending between the same parties before
the Court of Industrial Relations which had been instituted prior to the
filing of the present case, among them Case No.548-ULP which involved an unfair
labor practice, we declare that the court a quo has no jurisdiction to
try the instant case for the same is already involved in those cases which had
been submitted to the industrial court for adjudication. This step is necessary in order to avoid multiplicity
of actions. If the purpose of the action
is to obtain some injunctive relief against certain acts of violence of the
laborers, the same can be obtained from the industrial court which is given
ample power to act thereon by the Magna Carta.”[6]
As thus evolved, the determinative factor in the controversy is
still the nature of the case filed in the lower court, for where it is
interwoven with or involved in the unfair labor practice case, then the weight
of authority inclines in favor of the jurisdiction of the Industrial
Court.
It has been established in this case that the defendant Union had
charged the bottling company, the common employer of plaintiffs and defendants,
of having committed acts constituting unfair labor practice that allegedly on
account of such acts of the company defendants staged the strike; and
defendants claim that it was on the occasion of the picketing that the acts
complained of were committed. Clearly,
the supposed coercion and violence perpetrated by defendants in having prevented
or blocked the entry of company officials and non-striking employees into the
company premises and, indirectly, from the continuation of the business
operations of the strike-bound firm, performed while carrying out the strike,
can not be anything but activities or actions arising from, or interwoven with,
the unfair labor practice case that they filed in the Court of Industrial
Relations. Whether or not this means
employed in staging the strike is unlawful or not, and whether or not they are
to be enjoined, are incidents that the Industrial
Court can look into.
Appellants can not even seriously contend that they can not bring
their demand for damages in the Court of Industrial Relations because they have
no interest in the unfair labor practice case between the employer and the
defendants. For it appears from the
formal charges filed by the CIR Acting Prosecutor that at least five of herein
appellants ware party-defendants in that labor dispute in the Court of
Industrial relations (pages 39-44, Record on Appeal). Besides, it is not always necessary for
bringing in parties in the said court that there should exist employer-employee
relationship between the disputants.
Thus, in one case, this Court sanctioned the filing of a third party
complaint, where the Industrial Court had already acquired jurisdiction over
the main case, for the reason that the third party complaint being a
continuation of the main action, the hearing together of the two cases would
save time and cost by avoiding duplication of evidence, and enabling the
obtaining of consistent results from identical or similar proofs.[7]
The same principle may be applied with equal force and effect in the present
case.
Additionally, it may be stated that in the exercise by the
employees of their right to express their grievances or demands against the
employers or to communicate the information to those who may resort thereto for
employment that a strike is in progress in the company, the sphere of their
activities was held to include not only the actual parties to the labor
dispute, but also those possessing related interest therewith,[8]
insulating therefrom third persons without industrial
connections with the parties whatsoever or those whose interests are absolutely
foreign to the matter in dispute. Being
employees of the same employer, plaintiffs-appellants undeniably are
interested, or at least would have related interest, in the controversy between
the employer bottling company and the defendants-appellees. For in the normal course of events, any
outcome of the labor dispute would necessarily affect the working conditions of
the employees, even of those who did not take part in the strike.
Of course, it may be said that the existence of the employees’
right to strike does not warrant the use of coercion and force in carrying it
out; that violence, force or intimidation are not inherent in labor relations, hence, the presence of these
conditions should not at once imply the existence of a labor dispute. The fact remains, however, that the acts
committed by the defendants, which were made basis of plaintiffs’ demand for
damages, were found to have arisen from, or having connection with, the labor
dispute already before the Industrial Court.
As this Court had previously ruled —
“It appearing that the issue involved in the main case is
interwoven with the unfair labor practice cases pending before the Court of Industrial
Relations as to which its jurisdiction is exclusive, it is evident that it does
not come under the jurisdiction of the trial court even if it involves acts
of violence, intimidation and coercion as averred in the complaint. These acts come within the purview of Section
9 (d) of Republic Act 875 which may be enjoined by the Court of Industrial
Relations”[9]
(Underlining supplied)
The decision of this Court in Abo vs. Philame (Kg)
Employees & Workers Union, L-19912, 30 January 1965, was cited by
appellants to support their stand that the case has been removed from the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations by the absence of any
allegation of an industrial dispute in the complaint. The contention must be denied. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter is governed by law, as applied on the established facts. It should not be made to depend on the literal
averments of the complaint – indirectly on the ability of the parties to word
or phrase their pleadings – here the actual issues are evident from the records
the case. Thus, just as this Court has
to scrutinize the concatenation of events averred in the complaint to
discourage the undesirable practice of parties of trying to divest the court of
first instance of its jurisdiction by the expediency of alleging an unfair
labor practice act,[10]
so must not the wording or phrasing of the complaint, evidently formulated with
care to avoid mention of an existing industrial dispute, be allowed to deprive
the Industrial Court of authority to pass upon the case, where the pleadings of
the parties show that jurisdiction properly belongs to said court.[11]
This Court has pointed out in Regal Manufacturing Employees Association
vs. Reyes, L-24388, 29 July 1968, 24 SCRA 352, 365, that where an employer
seeks from ordinary courts an injunction against striking employees, and an
award for damages, and it is shown that the strike was called in connection
with unfair labor practices coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations, the proper course for the Court of First
Instance is to dismiss the employers’ petition or, at the very least, suspend
action thereon until the labor disputes are settled finally by the Industrial
Court. The doctrine is applicable to the
case before Us, since the circumstance that the petitioners below were
co-employees of the strikers, and not the employer himself, can not affect the
jurisdiction over the case, and the averment of damages by reason of the strike
can not work to defeat the Court of Industrial Relations’ jurisdiction,
“as it would still have to depend on the evidence in the unfair labor
practice case in the CIR” (Associated Labor Union vs. Gomez, L-25999, 9
February 1967, 19 SCRA 304). Whether to
dismiss or to suspend the suit for injunction and damages depends on the
discretion of the court below, and in the case at bar it decided to dismiss the
action. We find no reason to modify the
resolution thus taken, which anyway does not bar the refiling
of the complaint for damages after the Court of Industrial Relations finally
resolves the pending unfair labor practice case against the employer company.
The last issue to be resolved is the question of damages. In dismissing the injunction suit, the court a
quo also ordered that “the bond (in the sum of P3,000.00) put up by
the plaintiff for the issuance of the preliminary injunction is hereby adjudged
in favor of the defendants”.
Appellants assail the award because it is undisputed that no claim for
damages had been made by the defendants-appellees in
the court below, nor had any evidence been adduced to show their
existence. The appellee
laborers endeavour to justify the award by claiming
that it is in reality an award of nominal damages, under Article 2221 to 2223
of the civil Code of the Philippines, requiring no evidence in support
thereof, and made solely “in order that a right of the plaintiff, which
has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized”. This position can not
be sustained. Nothing in the order of
dismissal, subject of this appeal, indicates any intent to award nominal
damages to defendants-appellees, specially since said
order only upheld the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. Furthermore, in Ventanilla
vs. Centeno, L-14333, 28 January 1961, this Court ruled that an award
for P2,000.00 by way of nominal damages was excessive.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order under appeal is modified by
affirming the dismissal of the appellants action in the court below, and
eliminating the award of the amount of the injunction bond in favor of the appellees. Costs
against appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
[1] Paflu vs. Caluag, L-9104,
10 September 1956, cited in Philippine Communications, Electronics &
Electricity Workers’ Federation vs. Nolasco, L-24984,
29 July 1968, 24 JVR 321; Philippine Labor Association vs. Villasor, I-26383, 3 April 1968, 23 SCRA 19; United Pepsi
Cola Sales Organization (Paflu) vs. Cañizares, 102 Phil. 887; SMB Box Factory Workers
Union vs. Victoriano, 102 Phil. 646; Fil-Hispano labor Union vs. Montesa,
L-18371, 23 April 1963, 7 SCRA 714; National Mines and Allied Workers Union vs.
Ilao, L-16884, 31 January 1963, 7 SCRA 113.
[2]
National Mines & Allied Workers Union vs. Ilao,
supra; Philippine Labor Association vs. Villasor, supra; Fil-Hispano
Labor Union vs. Montesa, supra;
SSS Employees Association vs. Soriano, L-20100,
16 July 1964, 11 SCRA 518.
[3]
Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. vs. Erlanger
& Galinger Employees Association, 104
Phil. 17; Lakas Ng Pagkakaisa
sa Peter Paul vs. Victoriano,
L-9290, 14 January 1958; Benguet Consolidated Mining
Co. vs. Coto Labor Union, 104 Phil. 500.
[4]
104 Phil. 17.
[5] 5
Philippine Communications, Electronics f Electricity Workers Federation vs.
Nolasco, L-24984, 29 July 1968, 24 SCRA 321.
[6] Benguet consolidated vs. Coto
Labor Union, 104 Phil. 500.
[7] Lakas ng Pagkakaisa
sa Peter Paul vs. Victoriano,
L-9290, 14 January 1958;
Banquet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Coto Labor
Union, 104 Phil. 500.
[8]
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (Paflu) vs.
Cloribel, L-25878, 28 March 1969, 27 SCRA 465.
[9]
National Garments and Textiles Workers Union-Paflu vs.
Caluag L-8104, 10 September 1956; Erlanger & Galinger,
Inc. vs. Erlanger & Galinger Employees
Association, supra.
[10] Nasipit Labor Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations,
L-16833, 3 August 1966, 17
SCRA 882.
[11]
Cf. Associated Watchmen & Security Union (PTWO) vs.
U. S. Lines, et
al., 101 Phil. 896.