A. D. SANTOS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. VENTURA VASQUEZ, RESPONDENT.

Respondent Ventura Vasquez was petitioner’s taxi driver.  Sometime on December 22 or 23, 1961, at about
11:00 a.m., while driving
petitioner’s taxicab, he vomitted blood.  Aside from his hemoptysis,
he suffered back pains, fever and headache. 
He re­ported to petitioner the fact of his having vomitted
blood.  He was sent to petitioner company’s
physician, Dr. Roman, who treated him and sent him to Sto.
Tomas Hospital where he was confined
for six days.  Thereafter, he was
admitted at the Quezon Institute.  There he stayed until March 19, 1962 under the medical care of Dr.
Mario Lirag. Dr. Lirag
diagnosed his ailment as pulmonary tuberculosis, moderately advanced in both
lungs.  Upon his discharge on March 19, 1962, he was clinically
improved.  His X-ray examination,
however, showed the same finding, i.e., PTB, moderately advanced.  He has not resumed work.

Offshoot of the foregoing is respondent’s claim filed on May 9, 1962 with the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission.^[1]  In affirming the decision of the Hearing
Officer, the Commission ordered petitioner:

“1. To pay the
claimant, thru this Commission, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
THIRTY-TWO and 30/100 (P3,732.30) PESOS as compensation as of August 11, 1964,
and P27.30 thereafter up to, a period of 208 weeks, but in no case said amount of compensation exceeds
P4,000.00;

2.     
To reimburse the claimant, thru this Com­mission,
the sum of P53.60 which he had actually spent for his treatment;

3.      To
provide claimant continuous medical, surgical and hospital services and
supplies as his illness may warrant;

4.     
To pay the claimant, also thru this Com­mission,
the sum of P277.92 as Attorney’s fees; and

5.     
To pay the Commission the sum of P43.00 as costs
based on the amount of compensation already due the claimant as of August 11, 1964, and P1.00 for every
hundred pesos which may accrue in his favor as weekly compensation pursuant to
Section 55 of the Act.”

The case is now before us
on review.

Two questions are raised
by petitioner:  (1) respondent’s claim
should have been dismissed for his failure to file the notice of injury and
claim for compensation required by Section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act; and (2) the claim for compensation is directed against Amador Santos, not
against petitioner.

1. Sickness manifested itself on December 22 or 23, 1961.  Claim was filed on May 9, 1962. 
Petitioner argues that by Section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act,
the claims should be thrown out of court. 
Because, according to petitioner, such claim was not filed within two
months following illness.

Petitioner’s case must
fail.  Stabilized jurisprudence is that
failure of the employer to file with the Commission notice of con­troversion set forth in the second paragraph of Section
45 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act is a waiver of the defense that the claim
for compensation was not filed within the statutory period and a forfeiture of
the employer’s right to controvert the claim. 
Petitioner here knew of respondent’s illness.  Yet, it did not controvert respondent’s right
to compensation.  Constructively, such
failure is an admission that the claim is compensable.^[2]

2. Petitioner’s averment that respondent driver had no cause of
action against petitioner is equally without merit.  Respondent’s claim for compensation herein is
directed against petitioner A.D. Santos, Inc. Petitioner, in answer to the
claim, categorically admitted 
that claimant was its taxi driver.  Add to this the fact that the claimant
contracted pulmonary tuberculosis by reason of his said employment.  And respondent’s cause of action against
petitioner is complete.

But petitioner cites the
fact that respondent driver, in the course of his testimony, mentioned that he
worked for the City Cab operated by Amador Santos.  This will not detract from the validity of
respondent’s right to compensation.  For,
the truth is that really at one time Amador Santos was the sole owner and
operator of the City Cab.  It was
subsequently transferred to petitioner A.D. Santos, Inc. in which Amador Santos
was an officer.  The
mention by re­spondent of Amador Santos as
his employer in the course of his testimony, in the words of this Court
in Sugay vs. Reyes, G.R. No. L-20451,
December 28, 1964, “should not be allowed to confuse the facts relating to
employer-employee relationship,” for “when the veil of corporate
fiction is made as a shield to
perpetrate a fraud and/or confuse legit­imate issues (here, the relation of
employer-employee), the same should be pierced.”

For the reasons given, the decision under review is hereby
affirmed.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles, and
Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
RO4-WC Case 2066, entitled “Ventura Vasquez,
Claimant, vs. A. D. Santos, Inc., Respondent.”

^[2] A.D. Santos, Inc. vs.
De Sapon, G.R. No. L-22220, April 29, 1966; Itemcop vs.
Florzo, G.R. No. L-21969, August 31,
1966; Nadeco vs. Rongavilla,
G.R. No. L-21963, August 30, 1967; Rio y Compañia vs. Workmen’s Compensation Com­mission,
G.R. No. L-21467, August
30, 1967; Pampanga Sugar Mills vs. Espeleta,
G.R. No. L-24073, January 30, 1968.