TEODORO ALMIROL, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.

On June 28, 1961
Teodoro Almirol purchased
from Arcenio Abalo a parcel
of land situated in the muni­cipality
of Esperanza, province
of Agusan,
and covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of “Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo.” Sometime
in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the
Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan City
to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer certifi­cate
of title.  Registration was refused by
the Register of Deeds upon the following grounds, inter alia, stated in his letter of May 21, 1962:

“1.  That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237
is registered in the name of Arcenio Aba­lo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal
property;

“2.  That in the sale of a conjugal pro­perty
acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil Code
it is necessary that both spou­ses sign the document; but

“3.  Since, as in this case, the wife has already
died when the sale was made, the sur­viving husband can not dispose of the
whole property without violating the existing law (LRC Consulta
No. 46 dated June 10, 1958).

“To effect the registration of the afore­said deed of absolute
Sale, it is necessary that the property be first liquidated and transferred in
the name of the surviving spouses and the heirs of the deceased wife by means
of extrajudicial settlement or par­tition and that the consent of such other
heir or heirs must be procured by means of another document ratifying this sale
executed by their father.”

In view of such refusal, Almirol went
to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a
petition for mandamus (sp. civ. case 151), to compel
the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale and to issue to him the
corresponding trans­fer certificate of title, and to recover P5,000 in moral dam­ages and P1,000 attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation.  It is Almirol’s assertion that it is but a ministerial duty of
the respondent to perform the acts required of him, and that he (Almirol) has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.

In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000
damages, the respondent reiterated the grounds stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, averred that the
petitioner has “other legal, plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law by
appealing the decision of the respondent to the Honorable Commissioner of Land
Registration,” and prayed for dismissal of the petition.

In its resolution of October
16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that “mandamus does not
lie * * * because the ade­quate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep.
Act 1151”, dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner.

Hence the present appeal by Almirol.

The only question of law tendered for resolution is whether
mandamus will lie to compel the respondent to re­gister the deed of sale in
question.

Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a
sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and
transmission of rights over real properties, these do not constitute legal
grounds for his refusal to register the deed. 
Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to
determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.^[1]

“Whether the document is invalid,
frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Re­gister of Deeds to
decide, but a court of com­petent jurisdiction.” (Gabriel
vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al, G.R. No.
L-17956, Sept. 30, 1963)

“* * * the supposed invalidity of the con­tracts of lease is
no valid objection to their registration, because invalidity is no proof of
their non-existence or a valid excuse for denying their registration.  The law on registration does not require that
only valid in­struments shall be registered. 
How can parties affected thereby be supposed to know their in­validity
before they become aware, actually or constructively, of their existence or of
their provisions?  If the purpose of
registration is merely to give notice, then questions regard­ing the effect or
invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided after, not before,
registration.  It must follow as a
necessary consequence that registration must first be allowed, and validity or
effect litigated af­terwards.” (Gurbax Singh
Pablo & Co. vs. Re­yes and Tantoco, 92 Phil.
182-183)

Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of
Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when
confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the
ground that it is invalid. For under the said section, when he is in doubt as to
the proper step to be taken with respect to any deed or other instrument
presented to him for registration, all that he is supposed to do is to submit
and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall,
after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on
the doubtful question.  Section 4 of R.A.
1151 reads as follows:

“Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land
Registration. – When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the
proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed,
mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for registration, or where any
party in inte­rest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with reference to
any such matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land
Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating
the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by
the party in interest; and thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of
the mat­ter shown by the records certified to him, and in case of registered
lands, after notice to the par­ties and hearing, shall enter an order prescrib­ing
the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. 
His decision in such cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all
Registers of Deeds:  Provided, fur­ther,
That when a party in interest disagrees we ruling or resolution of the
Commissioner and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be
appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the
notice thereof.”

The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a quo
correctly dismissed the petition for mandamus. 
Section 4 above-quoted provides that “where any party in interest
does not agree with the Register of Deeds * * * * the question shall be
submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration,” who thereafter
shall “enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be
made”, which shall be “conclusive and binding upon all Registers of
Deeds.” This administrative remedy must be re­sorted to by the
petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts.

ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the lower court of October
16, 1963 is affirmed, at petitioner’s cost.

Reyes, Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles, and
Fernando, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., on leave.

^[1] In
re Consulta filed by Francisco on behalf of Cabantog, 67 Phil. 222, 228; Smith Bell & Co., Ltd. vs.
Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 61; Register
of Deeds, Pasig, Rizal vs.
Heirs of Hi Caiji, et al., 99 Phil. 25, 29-31;
Mendoza vs. Abrera, et al., G.R. No. L-10519, April 30, 1959; Agricultural
Credit Cooperative Association of Hinibiran vs.
Yulo Yusay, et al., G.R.
No. L-13313, April 28 1960; Dulay, et al. vs. Her­rera, G.R. No. L-17084,
August 30, 1962.