G.R. No. L-13827. September 28, 1962
BENJAMIN MASANGCAY, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
before the Commission on Elections with contempt for having opened three boxes
bearing serial numbers 1-8071, 1-8072 and 1-8073 containing official and sample
ballots for the municipalities of the province of Aklan, in violation of the
instructions of said Commission embodied in its resolution promulgated on
September 2, 1957, and its unnumbered resolution dated March 5, 1957, inasmuch
as he opened said boxes not in the presence of the division superintendent of
schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of
the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens’ Party, as required
in the aforesaid resolutions, which are punishable under Section 5 of the
Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Masangcay was then the
provincial treasurer of Aklan designated by the Commission in its resolution in
Case CE-No. 270, part II 2 (b) thereof, to take charge of the receipt and
custody of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of
their distribution, among the different municipalities of the province.
In compliance with the summons issued to Masangcay and his co-respondents to
appear and show cause why they should not be punished for contempt on the basis
of the aforementioned charge, they all appeared before the Commission on October
21, 1957 and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereupon, evidence was presented by
both the prosecution and the defense, and on December 16, 1957 the Commission
rendered its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as
charged and sentencing each of them to suffer three months imprisonment and pay
a fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment of two months in case of
insolvency, to be served in the provincial jail of Aklan. The other respondents
were exonerated for lack of evidence.
Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the
constitutionality of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which grants the
Commission on Elections as well as its members the power to punish acts of
contempt against said body under the same procedure and with the same penalties
provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in that the portion of said
section which grants to the Commission and members the power to punish for
contempt is unconstitutional for it infringes the principle underlying the
separation of powers that exists among the three departments of our
constitutional form of government. In other words, it is contended that, even if
petitioner can be held guilty of the act of contempt charged, the decision is
null and void for lack of valid power on the part of the Commission to impose
such disciplinary penalty under the principle of separation of powers.
There is merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections lacks power
to impose the disciplinary penalty meted out to petitioner in the decision
subject of review. We had occasion to stress in the case of Guevara vs. The
Commission on Elections[1] that under the
law and the constitution, the Commission on Elections has not only the duty to
enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also
the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in
connection with the elections. In this sense, we said, the Commission, although
it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the
Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative
body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies
that by express provision of law come under its jurisdiction. The difficulty
lies in drawing the demarcation line between the duty which inherently is
administrative in character and a function which calls for the exercise of the
quasijudicial function of the Commission. In the same case, we also expressed
the view that when the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot
exercise the power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently
judicial in nature, as can be clearly gleaned from the following doctrine we
laid down therein:
“* * * In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty;
it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not
exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such
power is inherently judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said: ‘The power
to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to
the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the
administration of justice’ (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil.,
271; U.S. vs. Loo Hoe, 36 Phil, 867; In Re Sotto, 46 Off. Gaz., 2570; In Re
Kelly, 35 Phil., 944). The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a
necessary incident and attribute of courts (Slade Perkins vs. Director of
Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by administrative bodies has been
invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony (People vs.
Swena, 296 P., 271). And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in
furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid (Langenberg vs.
Lecker, 31 N.E., 190; In Re Sims, 37 P., 135; Roberts vs. Hacney, 58 S.W.,
810).”
In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce
and for whose violation the charge for contempt was filed against petitioner
Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial
function for they merely concern the procedure to be followed in the
distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the different
municipalities. In fact, Masangcay, who as provincial treasurer of Aklan was the
one designated to take charge of the receipt, custody and distribution of
election supplies in that province, was charged with having opened three boxes
containing official ballots for distribution among several municipalities in
violation of the instructions of the Commission which enjoin that the same
cannot be opened except in the presence of the division superintendent of
schools, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the
Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party, and the Citizens’ Party, for he ordered
their opening and distribution not in accordance with the manner and procedure
laid down in said resolutions. And because of such violation he was dealt as for
contempt of the Commission and was sentenced accordingly. In this sense, the
Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and so
its decision is null and void.
Having reached the foregoing conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to pass on
the question of constitutionality raised by petitioner with regard to the
portion of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which confers upon the
Commission on Elections the power to punish for contempt for acts provided for
in Rule 64 of our Rules of Court.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from insofar as petitioner Benjamin
Masangcay is concerned, as well as the resolution denying petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration, insofar as it concerns him, are hereby reversed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
[1] 104 Phil., 268; 55 Off. Gaz. (6) 1013.