VALLESON, INC., PETITIONER, VS. BESSIE C. TIBURCIO, RESPONDENT.

This is an appeal by certiorari taken by Valleson, Inc. from a decision of
the Court of Industrial Relations.

The facts are set forth in said decision, from which we quote:

“* * * petitioner was employed as cashier by respondent company from
September 1, 1955 up to November 23, 1957. She worked from 9:00 o’clock a.m. to
1:00 o’clock p.m. and from 4:00 o’clock p.m. to 7:00 o’clock p.m., or a total of
seven (7) hours daily, for which she was paid P3.50 a day. During her
employment, petitioner got married but inspite her marriage, she did not change
her usual signature in the payroll. There is an unwritten policy in respondent
company that all female employees should be single during their employment.
Sometime in October, 1956, petitioner personally asked the general manager of
respondent company, Mr. Rqstituto M. Sibal, (not in writing) for maternity leave
with pay but the latter refused to grant the same. On January 12, 1957,
petitioner delivered her first child. Sometime in October, 1957, petitioner
personally asked again Mr. Sibal for maternity leave with pay because she was
then pregnant on her second child but she was again refused such benefit.
Sometime in November, 1957, Ruben Mallari, the accountant of respondent company,
found a shortage of P50.00 when he checked up the cashier’s report of the
petitioner. Mallari reported the matter to Mr. Sibal and the latter immediately
conducted an investigation. It was found out that the petitioner and one Lecita
Abary, also a cashier in the respondent company, were, from time to time, taking
from their cash registers certain amounts of money and lending them to different
employees which practice was not only without the knowledge of the management
but also contrary to the rules and regulations of said store. This finding was
admitted by said cashiers in a written statement dated November 18, 1957. On
November 23, 1957, upon recommendation of the legal department of respondent
company, the two cashiers were temporarily suspended which was later made
permanent dismissal. On January 2, 1958, petitioner gave birth to her second
child.”

On April 6, 1960, Bessie C. Tiburcio filed, with the Court of Industrial
Relations, a petition which was amended on May 3, 1960, praying for differential
pay, maternity leave pay and reinstatement, in addition to attorney’s fees.
After appropriate proceedings, a decision was rendered by Hon. Amando C.
Bugayong, Associate Judge of said court, the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:

“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition for the payment of wage
differential under the Minimum Wage Law at the rate of Fifty Centavos (P0.50)
per day of work in which petitioner was paid only P3.50 a day during the period
from September 1, 1955 up to November 23, 1957 and the petition for maternity
leave with pay for the delivery of petitioner’s two children on January 12, 1957
and January 2, 1958 are hereby granted, while the petition for reinstatement
with back wages is hereby dismissed.

“In order to have an accurate computation of the wage differentials and
maternity leave with pay, the Field Corporation Auditor of this Court or any of
his assistants is hereby directed to proceed to the premises of respondent
company at 558 Carriedo, Manila and examine its payrolls, daily time records and
other pertinent papers for purposes of computing petitioner’s wage differentials
and maternity pay in accordance with this decision, and submit a report thereof
for further disposition by this Court.”

The company moved for a reconsideration of said decision, but the motion was
denied by unanimous resolution of said Court sitting en banc. Hence,
this appeal by writ of certiorari.

Petitioner Valleson, Inc. assails the decision appealed from upon several
grounds, only one of which need be considered in view of the conclusion we have
reached in connection therewith. We refer to the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations to hear and decide this case. Petitioner maintained in said
Court, and still maintains, that the same had no such jurisdiction, for the
following reasons:

1. The Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act No. 875) merely allows the Court of
   Industrial Relations to retain its jurisdiction to hear the cases, involving the
   application of Republic Act No. 602 (the Minimum Wage Law), referred to in
   paragraphs (b) and (c) of section 16 of said Act, which are
   limited, respectively, to cases in which there is “a dispute as to minimum wages
   above the applicable statutory minimum” and cases “where the demands of
   minimum wages involve an actual strike“, and the present case does not
   come under either of these two (2) categories; and

2. The right to maternity leave is not one of those which the Court of
   Industrial Relations may hear and decide under Republic Act No. 875.

We find that petitioner’s pretense is well taken. At the outset, it is
not denied that claims for maternity leave are per se beyond the jurisdiction of
the Court of Industrial Relations. The latter’s assertion for authority to pass
upon the maternity leave pay sought to be recovered by Bessie C. Tiburcio is
predicated upon the theory that her cause of action therefor is, or may be
considered, incidental to her claim for differential pay under the Minimum Wage
Law.

As regards this claim for differential pay, section 7 of Republic Act No. 875
provides:

“In order to prevent undue restriction of free enterprise for capital and
labor and to encourage the truly democratic method of regulating the relations
between the employer and employee by means of an agreement freely entered into
in collective bargaining, no court of the Philippines shall have the power to
set wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of employment except
as in this Act is otherwise provided and except as is provided in Republic Act
Numbered Six hundred two and Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred forty-four
as to hours of work.”

Upon the other hand, section 16 of Republic Act No. 602 reads:

“(a) The Court of First Instance shall have jurisdiction to restrain
violations of this Act; action by the Secretary or by the employees affected to
recover underpayment may be brought in any competent court, which shall render
its decision on such cases within fifteen days from the time the case has been
submitted for decision; in appropriate instances, appeal from the decision of
these courts on any action under this Act shall be in accordance with applicable
laws.

“(b) In the event that a dispute case before the Court of Industrial
Relations involves as the sole issue or as one of the issues a dispute as to
minimum wages above the applicable statutory minimum, and the Secretary of Labor
has issued no wage order for the industry or locality applicable to the
enterprise, the Court of Industrial Relations may hear and decide such wage
issue: Provided, however, That the Secretary of Labor shall not
undertake to fix the minimum wage for an industry or branch thereof which
involves only a single enterprise or a single employer.

“(c) Where the demands of minimum wages involves an actual strike, the
matter shall be submitted to the Secretary of Labor, who shall attempt to secure
a settlement between the parties through conciliation. Should the Secretary fail
within fifteen days to effect said settlement, he shall endorse the matter
together with other issues involved, to the Court of Industrial Relations which
will acquire jurisdiction on the case including the minimum wage issue, and
after a hearing where the views of the Secretary of Labor will be given, will
decide the case in the same manner as provided in other cases. The decision
shall be rendered by the court en banc within fifteen days after the case
has been submitted for the determination, and its finding of facts shall be
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence and shall be subject only to an
appeal by certiorari.”

It appears from this section 16 that, for the Court of Industrial Relations
to have jurisdiction over a minimum wage case, it is necessary, either that the
wage therein claimed be “above the applicable statutory minimum”, or,
else, that the demand of minimum wage therein made “involve an actual strike”.
No such actual strike is involved in the present case. Furthermore, the
differential pay claimed by Bessie C. Tiburcio is based only upon the statutory
minimum of P4.00 a day. In fact, it is not disputed that the case at bar does
not fall under subdivisions (b) and (c) of said section 16. It is
thus apparent that the Court of Industrial Relations had no jurisdiction to hear
and decide this case, insofar as the issue of differential pay is concerned,
and, consequently, as regards, the maternity leave pay.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, and this case is hereby
dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.