ERIBERTA R. CARIÑO, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, BUREAU OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND/OR THE COMPENSATION APPEALS & REVIEW STAFF, DEPARTMEN…

This is a petition for certiorari praying that the
decision of the respondent Commission dated January 16, 1976, be set aside
and/or declared null and void ab initio; that the decision of the Acting Referee of
the Regional Office No. 4, Department of Labor, Manila, dated October 14, 1975
be reinstated; that an additional amount of P300.00 be awarded as attorney’s
fees; and that the disability benefit award be increased from P5,677.50 to the maximum of P6,000.00.

The only ground relied upon by the petitioner is that the
respondent Commission had no valid authority to review a decision of the Acting
Referee after it had become final and executory, for
failure of the aggrieved party to seasonably file a petition for relief from judgment
as provided for in the rules of the Commission.

Petitioner Eriberta R. Cariño was a former teacher in the Bureau of Public
Schools.  She started working in the
Bureau of Public Schools as classroom teacher on June 30, 1930 and stopped working on April 15, 1973 due to disability for labor.  Petitioner was on sick leave of absence from
September 11 to September 30, 1972
due to “acute gastro-enteritis, secondary to anemia and infection.”

On October 14, 1975, Acting Referee G. Marmita
rendered a decision in R04-WC Case No. 150050 “awarding to the petitioner
a disability compensation benefit for the sum of P5,677.50, plus a weekly sum
of P43.75 until the illness is cured but not to exceed P6,000.00, x x x,” the reason being that
“petitioner contracted hypertension, rheumatism, acute gastro-enteritis
and anemia, all supervening in the course of her employment x x,” but without reimbursement of medical expenses as
there were no official receipts to support the same.  Copy of the Acting Referee’s decision was
received by counsel for the respondent, Republic of the Philippines,
on October 21, 1975.

On November 24, 1975, respondent Republic of the Philippines
filed with the defunct Workmen’s Compensation Commission a verified petition to
elevate records for relief from judgment, on the ground that it was prevented
from appealing the aforementioned award of the Acting Referee by reason of
accident and/or excusable negligence, pursuant to and in accordance with
Sections 1 and 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission.  Acting on the said petition
to elevate records for relief from judgment, the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, through then Associate (Medical) Commissioner Herminia
Castelo-Sotto, and concurred in by Associate
Commissioner Eugenio I. Sagmit,
Jr., after a review of the records, reversed the decision of the acting referee
and absolved the respondent Republic of the Philippines from any liability
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, despite its own findings that:

“x x x x claimant was employed with the respondent as classroom
teacher sometime in 1930.  Her service
was interrupted by the outbreak of the Second World War.  She was reinstated thereafter and continued
serving the respondent as classroom teacher until she was given in 1971, a last
rate of salary of P3,992.00 per annum.  A medical certificate attached to the records
shows claimant to have acute enterocolitis with
secondary anemia and acute infection, for which she applied for sick leave of
absence from September 11 to 30, 1972.  There is, likewise, a photofluoro­graphy
examination report purportedly taken on the claimant on August 9, 1969, showing her right hemithorax to have hazy apex and her left hemithorax to be apparently clear.  No other medical document could be found in
the record of this case.”

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

The issues raised by the herein petitioner are:  (1) whether or not the petition to elevate
records for relief from judgment was filed on time and for causes allowed by
law; and (2) may the decision or award issued by the Acting Referee in the
original case still be set aside and substituted with another by the WCC after
the lapse of the period for the filing of a petition to elevate records for
relief from judgment?

Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 22 of the WCC Rules provide:

“Section 1.  Petition to Elevate Records
for Relief from Judgment.  – When
a decision, award, or order on the merit has been rendered or issued by the
Chief of the Unit or Hearing Officer or Referee in a case, and the aggrieved
party thereto by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence has been
unjustly deprived of a hearing therein or has been prevented from taking an
appeal, he may file a petition with the Commission pray­ing that the records be
elevated to said Commission for review and the questioned decision, award or
order be set aside.”

“Section 3.  Time for Filing
Petition; Contents and Verification. 
– The petition under Section 1 hereof must be verified, filed within
thirty (30) days after the petitioner learns of the decision, award, or order
or other proceedings sought to be set aside and not more than three (3) months
after such decision or award was entered or such proceedings were taken, and
must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence relied upon and the facts constituting the petitioner’s
good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.”

The decision of the Acting Referee in the original case clearly
states that respondent’s counsel failed to appear for the hearing despite
notice.  In other words, respondent
through counsel even during the trial on the merits of the original case waived
its right to interpose defenses, if any it had (Annex “A”, p. 12,
rec.).  It could hardly be said therefore
that the respondent had been unjustly deprived of a hearing therein through
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence; for prudence demand that if
it could not attend the hearing which was held in Manila, the office of the
Solicitor General could have deputized the legal officer of the Department of
Education to appear at the hearing.

Again, the counsel for the respondent received the decision of
the Acting Referee on October 21, 1975, yet, allegedly “due to pressure
of, work,” counsel for the respondent waited up to November 24, 1975, the
34th day counted from receipt of said decision to file the petition for relief
from judgment despite his claim that he knew that the respondent had valid
defenses in the original action.  This, again is not the excusable negligence contemplated
under Section 1, Rule 22 of the WCC Rules. 
Pressure of work by counsel is not a valid excuse for the late filing of
the required pleading in this case (Pantoja vs. ECC,
L-43317, Dec. 29, 1978; Bilbao vs. Rep., 80 SCRA 178 [1977]).

The purpose of Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 22 of the Rules of the
WCC is to give meaning to the doctrine of finality of judgment.

Section 3 of Rule 22 of the WCC Rules afore-quoted clearly states
that the petition to elevate records for relief from judgment rendered by the
Chief of the Unit or Hearing Officer or Referee in a case must be verified and
filed within 30 days after petitioner learns of the decision or award.

The respondent filed its petition to elevate records only on the
34th day counted from receipt of a copy of the award in question (see Memo for
Respondent, p. 5, last par.).  It is thus
clear that the respondent Commission in taking cognizance of the petition to
elevate records acted beyond the scope of its authority since the award in
question has become final and executory.  Thus, in a case, the Honorable Supreme Court
said:

“Notwithstanding that on the face of the pleading and from the
record itself, it was patent that the decision-award had long become final and executory and that the petition for relief (prescinding from the validity or lack thereof of the reason
given was filed also outside the reglementary grace
period therefor (within 30 days from knowledge of the
decision-award and within 3 months from entry thereof) respondent Commission
nevertheless took cognizance thereof and in its decision of March 8, 1976
reversed the decision-award and dismissed the claim “‘for lack of
merit” [La Paz Martinez vs. WCC, et al., L-43744, Oct. 8, 1976].

“RULING:  “The
statutory periods for appeal and for petitions for relief from judgment are not
merely matters of form but of substance, dealing as they do with the very
jurisdiction of the commission.

“As reaffirmed by the Court in Soliven
vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, it is settled doctrine that ‘(the) basic
rule of finality of judgments is applicable indiscriminately to one and all and
regardless of whether respondent employer be a public or private employer,
since the rule is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and
sound practice that at risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and
award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed
by law’ x x x” [Amado T. Cruz vs. Compensation Commission & Republic,
L-42739].

The decision of the Acting Referee dated October 14, 1975, copy of which was received by
the counsel for the respondent on October
21, 1975, became final and executory on November 20, 1975 and could no
longer be set aside by the Commission as the petition to elevate records for
relief from judgment was filed beyond the reglementary
period.

On the merits of the instant case, the success of petitioner’s
claim for disability is nothing short of inevitable.  It cannot be otherwise since herein
petitioner is well aided by the legal presumption and doctrines consistently
adhered to by this Court.

Indeed, there is the work-connected or work-aggravated principle
which can be stated thus:  When an injury
or illness occurs in the course of one’s employment, the rebuttable
presumption is that said injury or illness arose out of such employment, or to
say the least, was aggravated by it.  In
the instant case, petitioner had rendered continuous service to her employer,
which is the Government, for almost forty-three (43) years since 1930,
interrupted only by a brief sick leave of absence from September 11 to
September 30, 1972 due to acute gastro-enteritis, secondary to anemia and
infection, after which she resumed work for her employer until April 15, 1973
when she actually stopped working. 
Fairness and justice cannot but lead Us to
grant that petitioner’s nature of work as a classroom teacher, which, in the
words of the Acting Referee of Regional Office No. 4, “involved stresses,
strains, fatigue and exposures to the elements,” affected her physical
condition such that she eventually contracted hypertension, rheumatism, acute
gastro-enteritis and anemia.  Since all
these supervened during petitioner’s long period of employment, the presumption
arises that they arose out of employment or was at least aggravated by it.

The burden is thus shifted to the respondent-employer to prove
otherwise by substantial evidence, that is, that the ailment could not have
been caused by the nature or conditions of the employment (see NASSCO vs. WCC,
et al., 19 SCRA 254, Jan. 31, 1967,
L-22628).  In other words, it was clearly
incumbent upon the employer “to prove by substantial evidence, after a
preliminary link of the illness to the employ­ment was established, that the
said ailment did not or could not have arisen out of or been
aggravated by the petitioner’s employment” (Vargas vs. Phil. Amer.
Embroideries, Inc., 34 SCRA 680, Aug. 31, 1970, L-23762).  Failure on the part of the employer to
establish such evidence of non-work connection, or non-work aggravation, to say
the very least, is fatal to its contest of the claim for disability.  As was held in the case of
Ma. Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC [60 SCRA 228, Oct. 21, 1974, L-29998]:

“It is now well-settled that once it is established that the
illness supervened during employment, as in this case, there is a rebuttable presumption that such illness arose out of the
employment or was at least aggravated by it and the employer has the burden of
proving the contrary by substantial evidence. 
Were the petitioner failed to discharge that burden.  It did not adduce substantial evidence
tending to show that the disease which caused the death of the late Alfonso
Castillo was not service-connected.  x x“

To the same effect are the rulings of this Court in the cases of Vda. De Flores vs. WCC (78 SCRA 17, July 21, 1977, L-43316); Espino vs. WCC (78 SCRA 189, July 29, 1977, L-43638); Dimaano vs. WCC (78 SCRA 506,
Aug. 31, 1977, L-43553); and Vallo vs. WCC (L-41816,
73 SCRA 623, Oct. 29, 1976).

A thorough explanation in this respect was made in Abana vs. Quisumbing (L-23489, 22
SCRA 1278, 1272-1283, March 27, 1968). 
The Court declared thus:

“While there is that possibility that factors other than the
employment of the claimant may also have contributed to the aggravation of his
illness, this is not a drawback to its compensability.  For, under the law, it is not required that
the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of
claimant’s illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for.  It is enough that his employment had
contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease.  It has been repeatedly held that under the
Workmen’s Compensation Law, it is not necessary for a claimant to carry the
burden of proof to establish his case to the point of demonstration.  It is sufficient to show that the hypothesis
on which he bases his claim is probable.”

Clearly then, a mere showing that the nature of the claimant’s
work and duties did or could have aggravated her illness would suffice, and
entitles said claimant to the benefits due her under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, considering further that herein claimant had dedicated the best years of
her life to the service of her employer.

A reasonable compensation is all that the petitioner herein prays
for.  It must be so heard and granted if
We are to give effect to the objectives enshrined in the Workmen’s Compensation
Act which seek to “give relief to the workman x x
x and secure him and his dependents against becoming
the object of charity x x x”
(Manansala vs. Republic, L-38184, 57 SCRA 231, 234,
May 30, 1974, citing ITEM-COP vs. Florzo, 17 SCRA
1104).

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT WORKMEN’S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE RESPONDENT
BUREAU OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS IS HEREBY DIRECTED

I.  TO PAY

A. THE PETITIONER-CLAIMANT ERIBERTA CARIÑO

(1)     
THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00)
PESOS BY WAY OF DISABILITY COMPENSATION; AND

(2)     
ATTORNEY’S FEES EQUIVALENT TO TEN
PERCENT (10%) OF THE AMOUNT OF THE AWARD;

II.   TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER HEREIN HER MEDICAL
AND HOSPITAL SERVICES DULY EVIDENCED BY PROPER RECEIPTS THEREFOR; AND

III.   TO PAY THE SUM OF SIXTY-ONE (P61.00) PESOS
AS ADMINISTRATIVE FEE.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Acting C.J., (Chairman),
Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.