METRO DRUG CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. EUGENIO I. SAGMIT, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. V, MINISTRY OF LABOR, RODRIGO PETILOS AND PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF ALBAY, RES…

Before this Court is a “Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari
with Writ of Preliminary Injunction”, impugning the Order, dated 18 July 1979, of public respondent
Regional Director Eugenio I. Sagmit
Jr., dismissing petitioner’s appeal.

The pertinent basic facts may be stated thus:

On 5 May 1978,
petitioner Metro Drug Corporation filed with the Regional Office No. V of the
Ministry of Labor, Legaspi City, a Report apropos of
the preventive suspension of its employee, private respondent Rodrigo Petilos, on the ground of “truck stock shortages in
the sum of P4,677.33” (Termination Case No. RO5-0789-78).

On 19 May 1978,
private respondent, in turn, filed with the same Regional Office a
“Complaint for Emergency Living Allowance” (LRD Case No. 70-78).

Petitioner presented its Position Paper in both cases on 22 August 1978, but filed the same in
LRD Case No. 70-78.

On 20 October 1978, respondent Director of Regional Office No. V of the
Ministry of Labor, Legaspi
City, believing that petitioner had
not filed any Position Paper, issued an Order directing petitioner to reinstate
private respondent Petilos with payment of back wages
computed from the date his compensation was withheld.  Petitioner maintains that contrary to Section
4, Rule XIII of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code it re­ceived no notice of
hearing for reception of the parties’ evidence whatsoever prior to receipt of
that Order and, consequently, that it was deprived of its day in Court.

On 19 December 1978,
respondent public official ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution.  Petitioner moved for reconsideration raising
the propriety of the issuance of said Writ particularly because the Order of 20 October 1978 had not yet attained
finality as the same had not been served on petitioner, and prayed that it be
given the opportunity to adduce evidence justifying Petilos‘
suspension.  Respondent Director denied
reconsideration for being without merit.

On 8 March 1979,
petitioner filed a Memorandum of Appeal, followed by a Supplemental Memorandum
on 9 March 1979, strongly
reiterating its non-receipt of the Order of October 20, 1978.

On 23 April 1979,
respondent Director withdrew the Writ of Execution after admitting that
petitioner was, indeed, not furnished a copy of the questioned Order due to
honest mistake of the office Clerk, and forthwith required service of said
Order.

On 5 May 1979,
petitioner received copy of that Order.

On 11 May 1979, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial and/or
Motion for Reconsideration on the ground of newly discovered evidence in that Petilos had committed additional misappropriations of
company funds and stocks amounting to P7,573.03, so
that on 16 January 1979, it filed against him a criminal case for Estafa in the total amount of P12,250.36.

On 15 June
1979, respondent
Director sustained Petilos‘ contention that the
Motion was dilatory in character and frivolous and denied new
trial/reconsideration.

Petitioner received a copy of the above-mentioned Order on 28 June 1979.

Again, petitioner filed a Memorandum of Appeal from both Orders
of 20 October 1978 and 15 June 1979, directed to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

On 18 July 1979,
respondent Director found the appeal to be without merit adding that
“moreover the appeal was filed out of time and the decision being
questioned had already become final and executory.  Nor may the case be elevated to the NLRC as
prayed for by (petitioner), since the Commission (NLRC) is not the proper body
to review a termination case such as the instant case but the Office of the
Ministry of Labor.” Forthwith, respondent Director ordered the issuance of
a Writ of Execution.

Hence, petitioner’s present recourse on 31 July 1979, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Director in finding in his
several Orders that its appeal was filed out of time, that it was without
merit, and that it could not be elevated to the NLRC.  It prayed that the Orders be set aside and
that respondent Director be directed to allow the appeal.  We required respondents to comment and issued
a Restraining Order enjoining them from enforcing or causing the enforcement of
the Writ of Execution issued pursuant to respondent Director’s Order of 18 July 1979.  On 12
October 1979, we resolved to give due course to the Petition,
dispensed with the filing of Memoranda, and declared this case submitted for
decision.

We find this Petition
impressed with merit.

1) In his Comment, respondent Director has not disputed petitioner’s
contention that the case had not been set for hearing.  In fact, in his Order reinstatement, he
adverted to the absence of evidence to justify preventive suspension.  Consequently, petitioner’s averment that it
was unable to present its evidence and was thus denied due process will have to
be sustained.  While the parties were
required by respondent Director to submit Position Papers, only Petilos‘ Position Paper had been considered, that of
petitioner having been misfiled in another case in­volving the same parties.

2) Contrary to respondent Director’s findings, petitioner’s appeal
was filed on time.  Petitioner received
copy of the Order of 20 October 1978
on May 5, 1979.  It filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
New Trial on 11 May 1979.  Petitioner received the Order of denial on 28 June 1979 and interposed its
appeal on 2 July 1979.  Deducting the period during which the Motion
for Reconsideration and/or New Trial was pending, petitioner’s appeal was filed
right on the tenth day.  As pointed out by the Solicitor General,
respondent Director’s reliance on section 7, Rule XIV, Book V of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code issued on 16 February 1976, which
allows only five days for an appeal from an Order of denial, is misplaced, as
the same has been superseded by Policy Instructions No. 4 issued by the
Minister of Labor on 23 April 1976 providing for a longer period of ten days
for the perfection of an appeal.

And although, as respondent Director points out, petitioner’s
notice of appeal was defective in that it asked for review of the case by the
NLRC when it should have been by the Minister of Labor, this is at best a
technicality.  It was incumbent upon
respondent Director to transmit the records of the case to the proper re­viewing
authority despite petitioner’s error, in much the same way that an appeal
erroneously brought before an appellate Court is certified to the proper Court
for determination.

We agree with the
Solicitor General that rather than remand petitioner’s appeal to the Minister
of Labor, which could prove but a futile exercise because of the absence of
evidence, the more appropriate action is to return the records to respondent
Director for the re­ception of the parties’ evidence on the circumstances
surrounding Petilos‘ suspension.

WHEREFORE, let the records of this case be remanded to
Regional Office No. V of the Ministry of Labor, Legaspi
City, which is hereby required to receive petitioner’s evidence conformably
herewith and to render judgment accordingly. 
The Restraining Order heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and De Castro, JJ., concur.