DELFIN B. ALBANO, PETITIONERS VS. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF ISABELA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed with this Court
praying (a) that the decision of respondent court dated March 22, 1962,
as well as its order of April 18, 1962, in Electoral Case No. Br. II-3,
be declared null and void; (b) that respondent court be ordered to
immediately declare the result 6f the judicial recount it conducted in
said electoral case and forthwith transmit such declaration to
respondent provincial board of canvassers; (c) that respondent
provincial board of canvassers be ordered, after the Commission on
Elections has lifted its order of suspension of the canvass and
respondent court has transmitted to it the result of the judicial
recount, to immediately resume the canvass of the votes for the office
of representative, and after the canvass is completed, to proclaim the
winner in the election for said office; and (d) that, meanwhile, the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March 29, 1962
be maintained until further order from this court.

It appears that respondent provincial board of canvassers has
already finished the canvass of the votes for the position of
representative of the lone congressional district of Isabela, with the
exception of the votes in four precinct of the municipality of Reina
Mercedes, nine precincts in the municipality of Cabagan, and one
precinct in the municipality of Sto. Tomas, when the canvass was
suspended by order of the Commission- on Elections, while, on January
31, 1962, this Court, in Albano vs. Arranz, 61 Off. Gaz. 4995, rendered
decision the dispositive part of which reads:

“Wherefore, and without prejudice to the right of
any proper party to petition for a recount of the votes in the
precincts involved, the writ of prohibition prayed for is granted, and
the respondent court is ordered to permanently refrain from proceeding
in any way with Civil Case No. 365, now pending therein, and from
taking any action in relation thereto. Costs against respondent Samuel
Reyes.”

In line with the reservation contained in the aforesaid decision,
petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Isabela the
corresponding petition for correction and/ or judicial recount, which
was substantiated after respondent has filed his answer and after
several incidents had ensued which retarded the proceeding with the
result that, after opening the ballot boxes involved, the recount
resulted in the complete and exact confirmation of the allegation
regarding the falsification of the copies of the election return in
question. Respondent court, however, instead of making a declaration of
the result of the recount as required by law, rendered decision on
March 22, 1962 dismissing the petition on the ground that no evidence
was presented by petitioner that the recount would affect the result of
the election. Whereupon, petitioner filed a motion for new trial
calling the attention of the court to, among others, (a) the fact that
the allegation which the court ruled has not been proven was impliedly
admitted in the answer because the denial thereof was general, (b) the
fact that in the proceedings in G.R. No. L-19260 (Albano vs. Arranz, 61
Off. Gaz., 4995) brought before this Court it was already an admitted
fact that the alteration, if established, would operate to the
detriment of petitioner and (c) that, in any event respondent never
raised such issue at any stage of the proceeding and that, the recount
having been completed, the only thing remaining was for the court to
announce the result of the recount.

During the hearing of the motion for new trial, respondent court
hinted that it may allow the presentation of additional evidence if
proper petition to that effect were filed, and so, on April 3, 1962,
petitioner filed such petition wherein he offered to submit additional
evidence in the form of affidavits, besides adverting that the issue
raised was not genuine for the simple reason that respondent cannot
deny that the recount would vitally affect the result of the election.
Petitioner even asked that a subpoena duces tecum be issued for the
production of official documents showing the status of the canvass at
the time the same was suspended. But respondent court denied said
request. Instead, on April 18, 1962, it issued an order denying the
motion for new trial, as well as the motion supplementing it, based
merely on procedural grounds.

Hence the present petition.

It should be observed that the petition for recount was filled in
line with the reservation contained in the dispositive part of the
decision of this Court rendered in Albano vs. Arranz, 61 Off. Gaz.
4995, and said petition was predicated on Section 163 of the Revised
Election Code, which provides:

“SECTION 163. When statements of a precinct are contradictory.—
In case it appears to the provincial board of canvassers that another
copy or other authentic copies of the statement from an election
precinct submitted to the board give to a candidate a different number
of votes and the difference affects the result of the election, the
Court of First Instance of the province, upon motion of the board or of
any candidate affected, may proceed to recount the votes cast in the
precinct for the sole purpose of determining which is the true
statement or which is the true result of the count of the votes cast in
said precinct for the office in question. Notice of such proceeding
shall be given to all candidates affected.”

It appears that, after respondent was given an opportunity to
answer, and after several incidents had ensued affecting certain
procedural matters, respondent court ordered the opening of the ballot
boxes and proceeded to recount the votes in all of them, the recount
resulting in the complete and exact confirmation of the allegation of
petitioner regarding the falsification of the copies of the election
return presented by the provincial treasurer. But respondent court,
instead of making a declaration of the result of the recount as it
found, rendered decision dismissing the petition on the simple ground
that no evidence was presented by petitioner that the recount will
affect the result of the election for the office of representative.

Is this dismissal justified under the circumstances obtaining in this case?

Our answer is in the negative. To begin with, the question raised by
respondent court motu proprio relative to the allegation that
petitioner failed to present evidence that the recount will affect the
result of the election came up after the recount had been completed and
after it was definitely confirmed that the return was falsified. This
fact alone, which confirms the claim that if the recount is made it
will affect the result of the election, is in itself clear proof of the
truth of the allegation. If such were not the case, petitioner would
not have filed his petition. His petition would have no purpose
whatsoever.

In the second place, if respondent court was really of the opinion
that the proof of such allegation was indispensable before a recount
could be made, it should not have proceeded with it in the first place,
but should have first required that such evidence be presented. No such
move was made until after the recount had been completed. To require
the production of such evidence at that stage of the recount would
indeed be a surplusage because the very subsequent finding of the court
furnished its justification.

In the third place, respondent court has been somewhat harsh in
dealing with petitioner with regard to this matter, for it appears that
after having hinted that it would allow the presentation of necessary
evidence on the matter if a move to that effect were made by
petitioner, it closed every avenue to that effect when it denied
petitioner such opportunity on a mere technicality. In effect,
petitioner not only submitted affidavits of qualified witnesses but
asked that the provincial board of canvassers be required to produce
official documents necessary to show that the recount would affect the
result of the election, but respondent court denied such request on
mere procedural grounds.

Finally, it appears that the issue raised is not genuine for
respondent never denied specifically such issue nor made any attempt to
disprove it, as in fact lie cannot do so in the face of the result of
the recount. And even the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-19260
which authorized the filing of a petition for recount is predicated
upon the factual premise that the alteration found in the return would
operate to the detriment of petitioner. This statement can only mean
that if such alteration is established it would necessarily affect the
result of the election.

It is well to emphasize once again that the authority given to a
court of fir3t instance to allow the recount of votes under Section 163
of the Revised Election Code is restrictive in nature. The law is
explicit that the proceeding is summary in character and merely
consists in the mathematical counting of the votes received by each
candidate. It does not involve any appreciation of the ballots or
determination of their validity as is required in an election contests.
Its only purpose is to count the number of votes as they appear in the
face of the ballots.^[1] Thus, as
this Court has aptly said: “The purpose of the law is to offer a prompt
relief to a simple controversy that can immediately be settled through
a summary judicial proceeding that may dispense with the long drawn and
complicated proceedings of a full-dressed election contest and, at the
same time * * * to restore public tranquility by dispelling all doubts
as to the true number of votes cast in a given precinct. Legal technicalities should be used to help in arriving at a clear intention of the law and not to defeat said intention.^[2]” (Italics supplied) Verily, in this instance, legal technicalities were applied to defeat the purpose of the law.

The case of Chiongbian vs. The Honorable Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental, et al., G. R. No. L-19312, February 5, 1962 cannot
be invoked as a precedent, for there the ballots and the ballot box in
question had been tampered with. Surely, if a ballot box is tampered
with, a recount becomes futile. The ballots cannot reflect the true
will of the voters. No such showing was made in this case. The only
attempt was to present evidence aliunde to prove that certain
ballots were marked. This is a matter that comes within the province of
an election contest. It is not the function of a summary proceeding
under Section 163 of the Revised Election Code.

Wherefore, petition is granted. The decision of respondent court
dated March 22, 1962, as well as its order of April 18, 1962, are
hereby set aside. Respondent court is hereby ordered to immediately
declare the result of the judicial recount it conducted in Electoral
Case No. Br. II—3 and transmit its declaration to respondent provincial
board of canvassers in order that the latter may resume the canvass as
required by law. The injunction issued herein is lifted. Costs against
respondent Samuel Reyes.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Conception, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera and Paredes, JJ., concur.

^[2] Board of Election Inspectors vs. Piccio, 81 Phil., 577; See also Cawa, et al. vs. Hon. Vicente del Rosario, et al., supra.