G. R. No. L-14975. May 15, 1962
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, PETITIONER, VS. COURT Of INDUSTRIAL, RELATIONS AND DURABLE SHOE FACTORY, RESPONDENTS.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Upon appeal by the employer from a decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations ordering him to reinstate three workers (Severo
Santos, Emiliano Lopez and Amando Balagtas) with back wages until
reinstatement, this Court, while upholding the reinstatement, resolved
on May 31, 1956 (Durable Shoe Factory vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, G. R. No. L-7783) to remand the case to the Industrial Court
for new trial, in order to ascertain:
(1) Whether the employer firm, Durable Shoe Factory, closed its
operation or business on December 6, 1952 or continued thereafter; it
being only fair that the back wages should not extend beyond the
closure of business due to legitimate business reasons;
(2) The amount of back wages due the three workers involved, by
comparison with other similar workers employed, not regularly, but on a
piece basis and whose work was not steady throughout
the year; and
(3) What the workers in question earned during the lay off, which should be deducted from the back wages.
After due rehearing, the Court of Industrial Relations, by a vote of
3 to 2, found that (a) the Durable Shoe Factory had ceased operations
on December 6, 1952, on account of business conditions, leasing to
other parties its building and machineries; and did not reopen until
October, 1955; (b) that on the basis of earnings of other workers doing
similar work, who were not dismissed, their back wages should be paid
at P13 to P14 a week, as reported by examiner Salas, from November 2,
1950 to December 6 1952 as to Santos and Lopez, and from December 7
1950 to December 6, 1952 for Amando Balagtas; and (c) that the
dismissed workers could no longer be ordered reinstated because the
reopened factory used different processes in shoe manufacture.
From the decision, the National Labor Union has appealed on behalf of the three discharged laborers.
It can be seen that the issues debated at the new trial are all of
fact, determined by the Industrial Court according to its appraisal of
the evidence submitted to it in the course of the rehearing. It is a
firmly established and well-known rule that “as long as there is
evidence to support the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations,
this Court should not interfere, nor modify or reverse it, just because
it is not based on overwhelming or preponderant evidence. Its only
province is to resolve or pass on questions of law” (Dee C. Chuan vs.
Nahag, 95 Phil., 837).
The main argument raised against the majority decision is that it
accepted the report of examiner Salas, based upon the payrolls of the
Company, when the latter refused to produce them during the first trial
of the case. We do not find this fact a sufficient ground for their
rejection, there being no adequate evidence that the payrolls
ultimately presented were not genuine or that they have been tampered
with. The presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not
apply, since the documents were actually exhibited at the second
hearing. Moreover, the majority decision also took into account other
evidence besides the payrolls, such as the contracts of lease of the
employer’s building and machinery (Exhibits 22 and 23) between
December, 1952 and October, 1955, and the testimony of witnesses
regarding the closure of the Company s operations during that period.
According to established doctrine, as previously pointed out, these
findings of the court below, being of fact, should not be disturbed.
For the same reason, we should not alter the findings on the
inability of the dismissed laborers to properly perform the tasks now
required by the new processes adopted in the reopened factory. This
Court can not be expected to delve into the details of manufacturing
techniques, and must perforce rely on the findings of fact of the
Industrial Court, limiting its appellate intervention to cases of
misconstruction or misapplication of legal rules.
It is well to note that the dissenting opinion, that appellants seek
to uphold, is virtually a reiteration of the findings in the original
decree that was set aside by this Court in its 1956 decision (O.R. No.
L-7783, Durable Shoe Factory vs. Ct. of Ind. Relations).
Finally, no complaint is registered against the deduction of wages
actually earned during the lay off by laborers Amando Balagtas and
Severo Santos. But in the case of Emiliano Lopez, who was unemployed
from November 7, 1950 up to January 2, 1952, when he finally found a
permanent position as a helper in the Engineering Department of Quezon
City, the appellant Union claims that he should be declared entitled to
full compensation during the entire period that he was unemployed,
regardless of the amount of wages he subsequently earned. This argument
should have been invoked in the first appeal (G. R. No. L-7783 supra),
and now comes too late. As things now are, we are concluded by the
previous ruling that the earnings obtained in other employment should
be deducted from the back wages due the discharged laborers. That
ruling has become final and is no longer subject to reversal or
modification, being res judicata.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant Union.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.