BENITO FERRER Y RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. POTENCIANO PECSON, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

On March 1, 1949, petitioner Benito Ferrer y Rodriguez was
accused before the Municipal Court of Manila of serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence under criminal case No. 10050 of said court. The
complaint alleged that on February 2, 1949, in the City of Manila, petitioner,
driver of a jeepney, operated it along Dapitan Street in a careless, reckless
and imprudent manner as a result of which said jeepney driven by him sidewiped
another jeepney thereby causing a collision, inflicting on a passenger named
Avelino Tiu physical injuries consisting of fracture compound, communited,
middle third, humerus left; fracture compound, communited, neck, radius, left,
fracture, simple, middle third, radius, ulna left, which injuries have required
and will require medical attendance for a period of from six (6) to eight (8)
months and have prevented and will prevent the said offended party from engaging
in his customary labor during the same period of time. After trial the Municipal
Court of Manila found him guilty and sentenced him to three (3) months of
arresto mayor. Defendant appealed the case to the Court of First Instance of
Manila.

On November 27, 1950, petitioner through counsel filed a motion
to dismiss the case on the ground that the Municipal Court of Manila had no
jurisdiction over the offense and, consequently, the court of first instance had
no appellate jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was denied by Judge Potenciano
Pecson presiding over the court of first instance, but upon motion for
reconsideration, the same judge in his order of June 6, 1951 (Annex D), granted
the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
On a motion for reconsideration filed by the fiscal, Judge Pecson in his order
dated August 29, 1951 (Annex E), revoked his order of June 6, 1951 (Annex D) and
declared his first order of December 14, 1950, denying the motion to dismiss as
in force. Counsel for defendant Ferrer asked for a reconsideration of this order
and upon denial of his motion by order of the respondent judge dated October 31,
1951 (Annex I), has filed the present petition for certiorari to revoke the
order of August 29, 1951 (Annex E), and to reinstate the order of June 6, 1951
(Annex D).

After a careful study of this case, we are inclined to agree
with the petitioner. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be
determined by the law at the time of the institution of the action (People vs.
Pegarum, 58 Phil., 715). At the time that the complaint in this case was filed
on March 1, 1949, in the Municipal Court of Manila, the law penalizing the act
imputed to the petitioner was the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3932),
section 67 of which provides that if as a result of negligence or reckless or
unreasonably fast driving any accident occurs resulting in death or serious
bodily injury to any person, the one responsible upon conviction shall be
punished by imprisonment for not less than fifteen (15) days nor more than six
(6) years in the discretion of the court.

According to a series of cases decided by this court, among
them that of Eustaquio vs. Liwag (86 Phil., 540) and People vs. Moreno (60
Phil., 712), an act of negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving
resulting in death or serious physical injuries to any person, should be
prosecuted under section 67 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law and not under the
Revised Penal Code.

The criminal jurisdiction of a justice of the peace or a
municipal court as defined in the Judiciary Act of 1948 approved in June, 1948,
is confined to offenses in which the penalty is not more than six (6) months.
From this it is dear that the Municipal Court of Manila had no jurisdiction over
this case where a maximum penalty of six (6) years may be imposed; and if it had
no original jurisdiction, the court of first instance presided over by Judge
Pecson had likewise no appellate jurisdiction.

It is true that section 67 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law
(Act No. 3932) was amended by section 16 of Republic Act No. 587 which went into
effect on January 1, 1951, in the sense that acts of negligence or reckless or
unreasonably fast driving resulting in death or serious bodily injury upon any
person shall be prosecuted and punished under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code. But this Act may not be given retroactive effect so as to confer on
the municipal court jurisdiction which it did not have when it tried and decided
the case against petitioner. It may be true that the provisions of the Pena]
Code are more favorable to the petitioner in this case as regards the penalty,
but when the very accused (herein petitioner) far from invoking the benefits of
said Republic Act No. 587, disregards it and instead, invokes the Revised Motor
Vehicle Law (Act No. 3932) which was in force at the time that the acts imputed
to him were committed, at least for that reason alone the question of
retroactivity can not and will not be considered.

Respondents contend that under the Judiciary Act of 1948 as
well as the Charter of the City of Manila, the Municipal Court of Manila is
given jurisdicton to try criminal cases of assaults where the intent to kill is
not alleged or is not evident from the evidence, regardless of the penalty
attached to the crime. But it is obvious that acts of negligence in the
operation of a motor vehicle which cause a collision and result in physical
injuries can hardly be regarded as assaults without the intent to kill.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for certiorari is
hereby granted and the order of respondent judge of June 6, 1951 (Annex D)
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction is hereby reinstated. No costs.

Paras C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and
Labrador, JJ., concur.