ALFREDO MIRANDA, THROUGH PATRICIO D. SENADOR, AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM, PETITIONER, VS. DAVID GUANZON ET AL., AND COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

This is an appeal by way of certiorari from an order of the
Court of Appeals dated June 11, 1951, denying the motion filed by appellee in
CA-G. R. No. 7813-R wherein it is prayed that the appeal interposed by appellant
in :said case be dismissed on the ground that the same was not perfected within
the reglementary period.

On March 8, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Manila
rendered judgment in favor of Alfredo Miranda, now petitioner, against David
Guanzon, now respondent, In civil case No. 8465, copy of which judgment was
received by respondent on March 17, 1951;

On April 5, 1951, nineteen days from receipt of copy of said
judgment, respondent filed a notice of appeal and a cash appeal bond as well as
a record on appeal;

On April 7, 1951, the court entered an order approving the
record on appeal and directed the clerk of court to forward it to the Court of
Appeals together with all, the corresponding evidence;

On June 9, 1951, petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a
motion to dismiss the appeal alleging among other grounds that respondent failed
to perfect his appeal within the period prescribed by section 17, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court;

On June 12, 1951, respondent filed an opposition claiming that
the appeal has been perfected in due time because the case does not come within
the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. He also claims that petitioner
has already waived his right to object to the appeal.

On June 11, 1951, the Court of Appeals entered a resolution of
the following tenor:

“28. Acting on the motion filed by counsel for
plaintiff-appellee in case CA G.R. No. 7813R, Alfredo Miranda etc. vs. David
Guanzon et al., praying on the grounds therein stated for the dismissal of
appellant’s appeal and the opposition thereto of the appellant; and it appearing
that plaintiff-appellee failed to object to the approval of appellant’s record
on appeal in the lower court and that appellee’s motion was filed after
appellant’s record on appeal had been already printed for which reason dismissal
of the case at this stage of the proceedings is prejudicial to appellant; and
considering that the failure of the appellee to raise in the lower court the
question as to whether appellant perfected his own appeal within the
reglementary period is a waiver of his right to invoke the same question in this
court for the first time; motion denied.”

On July 12, 1951, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari.

As may be gleaned from the disputed resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion to dismiss for the reason that appellee failed to
object to the approval of appellant’s record on appeal in the lower court for he
sought of doing so only after said record on appeal had been printed and
certified, which dismissal, it is claimed, is prejudicial to appellant, and for
the further reason that the failure of appellee to object to the appeal in the
lower court is a waiver of his right to invoke the same question in the Court of
Appeals for the first time. Petitioner now contends that the Court of Appeals
erred in not granting his motion to dismiss the appeal because the failure of
respondent to file his record on appeal within the reglementary period is
mandatory and cannot be waived as it affects the jurisdiction of the lower
court.

It appears that the case filed by petitioner against respondent
in the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as civil case No. 8465, is
one which conies within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as may be
gleaned from the averments of the complaint and the findings made by the lower
court. Section 17, Rule 41 of the Rules provides that the appeal in a workmen’s
compensation case shall be perfected in the manner provided by the rules in
ordinary cases, but within fifteen days, and that, instead of the record on
appeal, the original record of the case shall be transmitted to the appellate
court. In this case what respondent did was to perfect his appeal like in an
ordinary case, namely, he submitted a record on appeal, instead of merely
requesting the court to elevate the original record, but instead of filing his
notice of appeal within fifteen days, as required by section 17, Rule 41, he did
so after 19 days from the receipt of the decision. Undoubtedly the filing of a
record on appeal in this case is not necessary inasmuch as the original record
of the case is the one to be transmitted to the appellate court. Be it as it
may, the fact remains that the appeal was perfected out of time and such failure
takes the case out of the jurisdiction of the court. This can clearly be
inferred from section 13, Rule 41, which provides that when the appeal is not
perfected within the reglementary period the appeal shall be dismissed.

The claim that the motion to dismiss the appeal filed by
petitioner in the Court of Appeals comes too late while his failure to file it
in the court of origin before the transmittal of the record to the appellate
court constitutes a waiver on his part to interpose such objection, is in our
opinion untenable. The requirement regarding the perfection of an appeal within
the reglementary period is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. Such failure
has the effect of rendering final the judgment of the court, and the
certification of the record on appeal thereafter cannot restore the
jurisdiction which has been lost. This dismissal can be effected even after the
case has been elevated to the Court of Appeals (section 1 [a], Rule 52).

“Failure to perfect the appeal, within the time prescribed by
the rules of court, will cause the judgment to become final, and the
certification of the record on appeal thereafter, cannot restore the
jurisdiction which has been lost. (Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao vs.
Director of Lands, 34 Phil., 623; Estate of Cordoba and Zarate vs. Alabado, 34
Phil., 920; and Bermudez vs. Director of Lands, 3G Phil., 774.)

“The period within which the record on appeal and appeal bond
should be perfected and filed may, however, be extended by order of the court,
upon application made, prior to the expiration of the original period. (Layda
vs. Legaspi, 39 Phil., 83.)

“Rules of courts, promulgated by authority of law, have the
force and effect of law; and rules of court prescribing the time within which
certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered
absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly
and speedy discharge of judicial business. (Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil.,
333.)

“Strict compliance with the rules of court has been held
mandatory and imperative, so that failure to pay the docket fee in the Supreme
Court, within the period fixed for that purpose, will cause the dismissal of the
appeal. (Salaveria vs. Aibindo, 39 Phil., 922.) In the same manner, on failure
of the appellant in a civil case to serve his brief, within the time prescribed
by said rules, on motion of the appellee and notice to the appellant, or on its
own motion, the court may dismiss the appeal (Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333).
(Alvero vs. De la Rosa, 42 Off. Gaz., No. 12, pp. 3161, 3165-3166).

“The judgments entered in the land registration cases having
become final, the court below did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the issuance of the decrees based upon such final judgments. The
failure of the petitioner to file the appeal bond within the reglementary
period was fatal. Even if the court below should have allowed him to amend his
record on appeal to include certain matters omitted or left out, the period for
the filing of the appeal bond would not have been extended because the extension
granted to amend a record on appeal did not carry with it the extension of the
reglementary period for the filing of the appeal bond.” (Salva, vs. Palacio, 90
Phil., 731.)

The cases of Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 223, and
Luengo and Martinez vs. Herrero, 17 Phil., 29, invoked by respondent, are not in
point. The objections which were deemed waived in those cases refer to questions
which do not affect the jurisdiction of the court and as such they cannot be
invoked as a precedent in the determination of this case.

Wherefore, the resolution of the Court of Appeals entered on
June 11, 1951, is set aside. The appeal interposed by respondent is dismissed,
without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, and
Labrador, JJ., concur.