G.R. No. L-29333. February 27, 1969
MARIANO LL. BADELLES, PROTESTANT-APPELLANT, VS. CAMILO P. CABILI, PROTESTEE-APPELLEE.
FERNANDO, J.:
Two election protests
against the duly proclaimed Mayor and Councilors of Iligan
City, after the Nov. 14, 1967 elections, based on the allegations of flagrant
violations of certain mandatory provisions of the Election Code, to be more
specifically set forth hereafter, were dismissed in a single order by the Court of First Instance
of Lanao del Norte, the Honorable Teodulo
C. Tandayag presiding. The cases are now before us on appeal.
In one of them,[1] the election of Honorable Camilo P. Cabili to the Office of
City Mayor of Iligan City, was
contested by protestant, now appellant,
Mariano Badelles.
In the other,[2] the protestants are the now appellants, Bonifacio P. Legaspi and Cecilia
T. Barazon, who along with the five protestees[3] were among those who were registered
candidates voted for in such election for councilors in the City of Iligan, with the protestees being
credited with the five highest number of votes, with protestants Legaspi and Barazon obtaining
sixth and seventh places respectively.
In such order of dismissal, it was admitted that while
irregularities as well as
misconduct on the part of election officers were alleged in the election
protests filed, there was however an absence of an allegation that they would
change the result of the election in favor of the protestants and against the protestees, that such irregularities would destroy the
secrecy and integrity of the
ballots cast, or that the protestees knew of or participated
in the commission thereof. For the lower
court then, the lack of a cause of action was rather evident.
Hence the order of dismissal of March 23, 1968, which was sought
to be fortified by the invocation of the doctrines that voters should not be
deprived of their right to vote occasioned by the failure of the election
officials to comply with the formal prerequisites to the exercise of the right
of suffrage and that the rules and regulations for the conduct of elections
while mandatory before the voting should be considered directory thereafter. The validity of such order of dismissal is
now to be inquired into by us in this appeal.
In the petition of protestant Badelles,
dated December 8, 1967, and marked as received
the next day by the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, 15th Judicial District, it was stated that
both he and protestee Camilo
P. Cabili were the duly registered candidates for the
Office of City Mayor or Iligan City, both having
filed their respective certificates of candidacy in accordance with law and as
such candidates voted for in the November 14, 1967 election. It was then alleged that the Board of
Canvassers, on November 25, 1967,
proclaimed as elected protestee for having obtained
11,310 votes while protestant was credited with 8,966 votes. Protestant would impugn the election of Cabili on the ground that there were “flagrant
violations of mandatory provisions of law relating to or governing elections *
* *” in that more than 200 voters were registered per precinct contrary to
the provision limiting such number of 200 only and that no publication of the
list of voters for each precinct was made up to the election day itself,
enabling persons who under the law could not vote being allowed to do so. As a result
of such alleged “flagrant violations of the laws relation to or governing
elections” around 8,300 individuals were allowed to vote illegally.
It was likewise asserted that not less than 8,000 qualified
voters were unable to exercise their right of suffrage in view of their
failure, without any fault on their part, to have the proper identification
cards or the non-listing of their names in the list of voters. It was stated further that even in the case
of those individuals provided with identification cards with their names
included in the list of voters, they could not avail themselves of their right
of suffrage as their applications for registration could not be found. Mention was also made of the fact that the
final lists of voters and the applications for registration were delivered to
their respective precincts late on election day itself
thus preventing them from voting.
Moreover, confusion, so it was alleged, was caused by the excessive
number of voters being listed and many having been assigned to precincts other
than the correct ones.
What was thus objected to
is the fact that illegal votes were cast by those not
qualified to do so, numbering 8,300 or more and that an approximately equal
number, who were duly registered with the Commission on Elections, Iligan City, were unable to vote due to the above
circumstances. The proclamation then
could not have reflected the true will of the electorate as to who was the
mayor elected, as the majority of protestee
Cabili over the protestant consisted of only 2,344
votes.
The prayer was among others for the proclamation of protestee as well as other candidates for elective
positions in the City of Iligan
being set aside and declared null and void, protestant pleading further that he be granted other such relief as may
be warranted in law and equity.
The protest of the candidates for councilor Legaspi
and Barazon, in the other case against protestees[4]
was in substance similarly worded. The
prayer was for the setting aside and declaring null and void the proclamation
of protestees, with protestants seeking such other,
relief which should be theirs according to law and to equity.
In the first case, protestee Cabili moved to dismiss
the petition on the following grounds:
“1. That the protest was filed beyond the reglementary
period allowed by the Revised Election Code; 2. That [the lower court] has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case, the Commission on
Elections being the proper body to hear the same; 3. That the complaint states
no cause of action.”[5] This very same
grounds were relied upon in a motion to dismiss by protestees
Actub and Cabigon, filed in
the other suit.
As above noted, in a single order of March 23, 1968, the two above election protests were dismissed, the lower court
being of the opinion that neither petition alleged a cause of action “to
justify [it] to try the
same.” The first ground of the motion to dismiss to the effect that
the protests in both cases were filed beyond the reglementary
period was rejected. The claim as to
lack of jurisdiction was likewise held to be without merit. The single order of dismissal in both cases as indicated was based on the lack of
a cause of action.
The reasoning followed by the lower court in reaching the above
conclusion that there was no cause of action proceeded along these lines: “Mere irregularities or misconduct on
the part of election officers which do not tend to affect the result of the elections
are not of themselves either ground for contest or for proper matters of
inquiry. * * * There is no allegation in
the protest that the alleged irregularities committed by the election officers
would tend to change the result of the election in favor of the protestants and against the protestees. There is no allegation in the petition that
the 8,000 voters who failed to vote were all voters of protestants
and the 8,300 illegal voters who voted were for the protestees. There is, therefore, no legal and practical justification for the court to
inquire into the irregularities committed by the election officials, as alleged
in the petition, for it would not give any benefit in favor of the protestants
to the end that they will be declared the duly elected mayor and councilors,
respectively, of this City.”[6]
It was further stated in such order of dismissal: “There is
no allegation in the petition that the irregularities committed by the election
officials have destroyed the secrecy and integrity of the ballots cast. There is no allegation in the petition that
the noncompliance of the election officials of the
provisions of the election laws regarding the registration of voters were
intentional on their part for the purpose of committing frauds for the benefit
of the protestees.
There is no allegation in the petition that because of the alleged
irregularities committed by the election officials in not following the
provisions of the election laws regarding the registration of voters and the
distribution of the precincts, that all the votes cast during said elections
are illegal, nor is there an allegation in the protests that the irregularities
committed by the election officials would affect the election in favor of the protestees.”[7]
A greater regard for the cause of accuracy ought to have
admonished the lower court from asserting in an uncompromising tone the absence
of an allegation that the protestants in both cases
failed to allege that if the facts pleaded by them were proved the result would
not have been different. It is true the
complaints could have been more explicitly worded, but as they stood, the
absence of such a claim could
not be so confidently asserted.
To repeat, both protests were dismissed. We do not discount a certain degree of plausibility
attaching to the line of reasoning thus pursued by the lower court. We are not unaware of the undeniable fact
that both petitions were not distinguished by skill in their drafting or
precision in their terminology.
Nonetheless the seriousness and gravity of the imputed failure to have
the elections conducted freely and honestly, with such irregularities alleged,
give rise to doubts, rational and honest, as to who were the duly elected
officials. Such allegations, it is to be
stressed, would have to be accepted at their face value for the purpose of determining whether there is a
cause of action, a motion to dismiss amounting to a hypothetical admission of facts thus
pleaded. We cannot in law and in
conscience then sustain the order of dismissal.
Without the lower court having so intended, the dismissal would
amount to judicial abnegation of a sworn
duty to inquire into and pass upon in an appropriate proceeding allegations of
misconduct and misdeeds of such character.
Accordingly, we reverse.
Abes v. Commission on Elections[8]
points the way, but the lower court was apparently impervious to its
teaching. It may not be controlling, but
it furnishes more than a hint. It would
seem, though, that for the court below, its message did not ring out loud and
clear.
The opinion in the Abes case, penned by Justice Sanchez, starts thus: “Petitioner’s cry for relief, so their
petition avers, is planted upon the constitutional mandate of free, orderly,
and honest elections. Specifically,
they list a number of repressible acts.” Among those mentioned were that
blank official registration forms were taken from the office of the Quezon City Comelec Register
several weeks before election day, November 14, 1967; that active campaigning
within the polling places by Nacionalista leaders or
sympathizers of Nacionalista candidates were allowed;
that voters were permitted to vote on mere mimeographed notices of certain Nacionalista candidates; that voters were compelled to fill
their official ballots on open tables, desks and in many precincts outside the
polling places; that thousands of voters sympathetic to the Nacionalista
candidates were allowed to vote beyond the hours for voting allowed by law;
that identification cards were
delivered by partisan leaders of respondents Nacionalista
candidates, and those who did not signify their preference for Nacionalista candidates were not given such cards; that the
precinct books of voters were not sealed within the deadline fixed by law; and
that the resulting effect of irregularities was to prevent fully fifty-one per
cent of the registered voters from voting.
One of the issues raised on the above facts is whether or not the
Commission on Elections could annul the aforesaid election in Quezon City on the above
allegations of fraud, terrorism and other illegal practices committed before
and during the election. The petition
did not prosper; it was dismissed. The
remedy, we held, lay not with the Commission on Elections but with the courts
of justice in an election protest.
In the language of Justice Sanchez: “The boundaries of the forbidden area
into which Comelec may not tread are also marked by
jurisprudence. That Comelec
is not the proper forum to seek
annulment of an election based on terrorism, frauds and other illegal
practices, is a principle emphasized in decisions of this Court.” For as
announced in Nacionalista
Party v. Commission on Elections,[9] assuming that there be
a failure to conduct an election in a free, orderly and honest manner,
“the duty to cure or remedy the resulting evil” did not rest with the
Commission on Elections but in “some other agencies of the
Government.” More specifically, with reference to provincial and municipal
officials, election contests “are entrusted to the courts.” Then came this express affirmation: “The power to decide election contests
necessarily includes the power to determine the validity or nullity of the
votes questioned by either of the contestants.”
As so emphatically
observed in the Abes opinion, “there has been
neither deviation nor retreat from the foregoing pronouncement.” After
which came the following: “The
ratiocination advanced that there was failure of election due to rampancy of
terrorism, frauds, and other irregularities, before and during elections, such
that allegedly about 51% of the registered voters were not able to vote, will
not carry the day for petitioners. For,
in the first place, this is grounded upon bare assertions. Respondents contest the correctness thereof. And in the answer of respondents Amoranto, Mathay and others, they
aver that out of 162,457 registered voters in Quezon City, 100,382 voters actually cast their votes –
about 62% of the registered voters. But
above all, as pointed out in City Board of Canvassers vs. Moscoso,
[the] nullity of an election for municipal officials should be determined in a
petition contesting the election of
municipal officers-elect to be filed before the Court of First Instance.”
Why an election protest is more fitly and appropriately the procedure for determining whether
irregularities or serious violations of the electoral law vitiated the conduct of elections was clearly and
succinctly explained in the Moscoso decision above
cited, the opinion coming from Justice Makalintal.[10]
Thus: “The question of whether or
not there had been terrorism, vote-buying and
other irregularities in the 1959 elections
in Tacloban City should be ventilated in a
regular election protest, pursuant to section 174 of the Election Code, and not
in a petition to enjoin the city board of canvassers from canvassing the
election returns and proclaiming
the winning candidates for municipal offices.”
It would follow then that if the grievance relied upon is the
widespread irregularities and the flagrant violations of the election law, the
proper remedy is the one availed of here, the protest.
That such should be the case should occasion no surprise. Time and time again,[11]
we have stressed the importance of preserving inviolate the right of
suffrage. If that right be disregarded or frittered away, then popular
sovereignty becomes a myth.
As Justice Laurel correctly pointed out: “As long as popular
government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be
the modality and form devised, must continue
to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied
into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the
interest of good government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the
adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the
enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate
source of the established authority.”[12]
A republic then to be true to its name requires that the
government rests on the consent of the people, consent freely given,
intelligently arrived at, honestly recorded, and thereafter counted. Only thus can they be really looked upon as
the ultimate sources of established authority.
It is their undeniable right to have officials of their unfettered
choice. The election law has no
justification except as a means for assuring a free, honest and orderly
expression of their views. It is of the
essence that corruption and irregularities should not be permitted to taint the
electoral process.
It may not always be thus unfortunately. That should be the ideal however. If there be a failure to observe the mandates
of the Election Code, the aggrieved parties should not be left remediless. Under the law as it stands, it is precisely
an election protest that fitly serves that purpose.
It was sought to be thus utilized in these two cases, perhaps in
a rather awkward and far from entirely satisfactory manner. That in itself is no reason for the courts to
slam the door against any opportunity for redress. Yet, that is what would happen if the order
of dismissal complained of were not set aside.
Hence the inevitability of its reversal. The scope of our decision must not be
misinterpreted however. All that it
directs is that the protestees in both cases be
required to answer. Thereafter, if, as
is not unlikely, there be a denial of the serious imputations made as to the
alleged irregularities, the lower court could properly inquire into what
actually transpired. After the facts are
thus ascertained in accordance with the accepted procedural rules, then the
appropriate law could be applied.
It must be clearly emphasized that we do not at this stage
intimate any view as to the merit, or lack of it, of either protest. That would be premature to say the
least. All we do is to set aside the
order of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of March 23, 1968, is reversed and the two cases
remanded to the lower court for proceeding and trial in accordance with this opinion
and the law. Without
costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Capistrano, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
[1]
G.R. No. L-29333.
[2]
G.R. No. L-29334.
[3]
Felix Z. Actub, Providencio
P. Abragan, Manuel F. Celdran,
Casimero P. Cabigon and
Benito Ong.
[4]
Felix Z. Actub, Providencio
P. Abragan, Manuel F. Celdran,
Casimero P. Cabigon, and
Benito Ong.
[5]
Motion to Dismiss of Protestee Cabili.
[6]
Order of the lower court of March 23, 1968, pp. 6-7.
[7]
Ibid, p. 8.
[8]
G.R. No. L-28348, December 15, 1967.
[9]
85 Phil. 149 (1949).
[10]
City Board of Canvassers v. Moscoso,
G.R. No. L-16365, September 30,
1963.
[11]
Cf. Gardiner v. Romulo, 26
Phil. 521 (1914); Garchitorena v. Crescini, 39 Phil. 258 (1918); Cailles
v. Gomez, 42 Phil. 496 (1921); Mandac v.
Samonte, 49 Phil. 284 (1926); De Leon v. Cruz,
92 Phil. 403 (1952); Ticao v. Nañawa, G.R. No. L-17890, August 30, 1962; and City Board of Canvassers v.
Moscoso, G.R. No. L-16365, September 30, 1963.
[12]
Moya v.
Del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199, 204 (1939).
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CONCURRING OPINION
BARREDO, J.:
I concur whole-heartedly in everything contained in the ably
written opinion of our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Fernando,
including, of course, the disposition he makes therein of these cases before
Us. It may not be amiss, nonetheless, to
add a few words which I consider appropriate, in the light of my experience in
handling some election cases before my appointment as Solicitor General.
The thing that has struck me most in these two cases, both
denominated as election protests, is that the prayers of the two petitions
therein are identical in that they do not ask for the seating of the
petitioners, who call themselves protestants, in the places of the protestees –
respondents. What they ask in the main is
that “the proclamation of the protestees as duly elected (mayor and
councilors) be set aside and declared null and void.” This sole principal
prayer was precisely what gave appellees in both cases cause to contend that
(1) the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, it being allegedly the Commission on Elections that has such
jurisdiction, and (2) neither of the petitions state any cause of action. Of course, the trial court properly overruled
the first ground. It is, however, best
for all concerned that the observations and arguments adduced by the trial
judge in disposing of the second ground are placed in proper light.
Ruling on the first ground above-stated, His Honor held thus:
“Mere irregularities or misconduct on the part of election
officers which do not tend to affect the result of the elections are not of
themselves either ground for contest or for proper matters of inquiry. x x x There is no allegation in the protest
that the alleged irregularities committed by the election officers would tend
to change the result of the election in favor of the protestants and against
the protestees. There is no allegation
in the petition that the 8,000 voters who failed to vote were all voters of
protestants and the 8,300 illegal voters who voted were for the
protestees. There is, therefore, no
legal and practical justification for the court to inquire into the irregularities
committed by the election officials, as alleged in the petition, for it would
not give any benefit in favor of the protestants to the end that they will be
declared the duly elected mayor and councilors, respectively, of this
City.”
‘The failure of election of officers to obey the mandatory provisions
of a statute relating to the conduct of the election and designed to secure the
secrecy and integrity of the ballot may so taint the votes with irregularity as
to cause the rejection of the entire votes of the district. It should be remembered, however, that all
statutes tending to limit the citizen in the exercise of the right of suffrage
are to be construed liberally in his favor, and that the courts are loath to
disfranchise voters who are wholly innocent of wrongdoing. As a consequence, it is a firmly established
general rule that voters will not be rejected, even though election officers
fail to comply with the directory provisions of a statute, if there is no
fraud or other irregularity and failure to comply is unintentional; nor is it
material in this connection that the failure of the election officers to
perform their duty subjects them to penalties.
Likewise, the courts will not permit the will of the voters to be
defeated by fraud on the part of election officers if it is possible to avoid
such a result. In short, a fair election
and an honest return should be considered
as paramount in importance to minor requirements which prescribe the
formal steps to reach that end, and the law should be so construed as to remedy
the evils against which its provisions are directed and at the same time not to
disfranchise voters further than is necessary to attain that object. In case of a violation of the law on the part
of an election officer, punishment may be provided therefor, and in this way
the law can be rendered effectual may be provided therefor, and in this way the law can be
rendered effectual without going to the extent of depriving a voter of his
right to have his vote counted in consequence of such violation. It may, therefore, be stated as a general
rule that if ballots are cast by voters who are, at the time, qualified to cast
them and who have done all on their
part that the law requires of voters
to make their voting effective, an erroneous or even unlawful handling
of the ballots by the election officers charged with such responsibility will
not be held to disfranchise such voters by throwing out their votes on account of erroneous procedure
had solely by the election officers,
provided the votes are legal votes in their inception and are still capable of
being given proper effect as such. Nor will an election be set aside
because of irregularities on the
part of the election officials unless it appears that such irregularities
affect the results. (18 Am. Jur. Sec. 225, pp. 331-332, cited on pp. 621-622, Revised Election
Code by Francisco).’
“There is no allegation in the petition that the
irregularities committed by the election officials have destroyed the secrecy
and integrity of the ballots cast. There
is no allegation in the petion
that the non-compliance of the election officials of the provisions of the
election laws regarding the registration of voters were intentional on their
part for the purpose of committing frauds for the benefit of the
protestees. There is no allegation in
the petition that because of the alleged irregularities committed by the
election officials in not following the provisions of the election laws
regarding the registration of voters and the distribution of the precincts,
that all the votes cast during said elections are illegal, nor is there an allegation in the
protests that the irregularities committed by the election officials would
affect the election in favor of protestees.”
‘A misconduct or irregularity committed by an election official is
not a sufficient ground to annul
the votes cast in the precincts where the person elected neither knew of nor
participated in the misconduct and it is not shown that any elector who voted for the persons elected
either participated in such misconduct.
(18 Am. Jur. Sec. 228, p. 333, cited on page 622, Revised Election Code
by Francisco).’
While this ruling is, on
the whole, correct, His Honor failed to emphasize that the cases before him
were precisely ones for the annulment and setting aside of the election for
Mayor and Councilors in the City of Iligan and that, therefore, the only
question that should be resolved is whether or not the facts alleged in the
petitions in question constitute sufficient grounds for such relief. Instead, the trial court made as may be seen
above, a long discourse on the thesis that “the purpose of an election
contest is to correct the canvass,” and that “the general rule is
that whatever may be the cause of an election contest, the true gravamen of the case is to determine who
receives the highest number of votes, etc.” (pp. 5-8, Order in question)
and then held that there was no allegation in both petitions that “would
give any benefit in favor of the protestants to the end that they will be
declared the duly elected mayor and councilors, respectively, of this
City,” ergo, the said petitions do not state any cause of action. More specifically, the trial court looked in
vain for allegations to the effect that “the alleged irregularities
committed by the elections in favor of the protestants and against the protestees.”
(p. 7, id.) For example, His Honor reasoned out that “there is no
allegation … that the 8,000 voters who failed to vote were all voters of
protestants and the 8,300 illegal voters who voted were for the
protestees.” (id.)
I am afraid that such
discourse, if quite impressive as an exposition of considerable learning in
election law matters, is rather irrelevant.
I believe that what should be emphasized in these cases is that ruling
in Our decision to the effect that in an election protest, (otherwise entitled
at times, petition or complaint or motion of protest) it is not necessary to
allege that the true results of the election in question would be in favor of
protestant and against protestee on the basis of the legal votes, or that the
proclaimed result would be changed if the facts alleged are proven, when the
sole ground of protest and the only purpose of the protestant is to have the
whole election in a precinct or municipality annulled and set aside. Indeed, as pointed out in the brief of appellants:
“In the case No. G. R. L. No. 29333, the prayer is for the
annulment of the proclamation of protestee-appellee Camilo P. Cabili and of
the local elections held in Iligan City on November 14, 1967, while in Case
No. G. R. No. L-29334, the prayer is for the annulment of the proclamation of
protestee-appellees Felix Z. Actub, et als, and of the local elections held in
Iligan City on November 14, 1967.
“Section 177 of the Revised Election Code provides:
“Sec. 177 – Decision of the Contests – The court shall
decide the protest x x x and
shall declare who among the parties has been elected, or in the proper case,
that none of them has been legally elected.
x x x”
“Under the above-quoted provision of law, the courts are
authorized to declare that none of the candidates has been legally elected,
which in effect would mean that the elections are annulled.
“If it were not the intention of the lawmaker not to authorize
the courts to annul an election, such authority would not have been provided in
Section 177 of the Revised Election Code quoted above.
“Francisco, in his book How to Try Election Cases, 1952
Edition, p. 82, citing as authorities the decisions of this Honorable Court in
Bustos vs. Moir and Fajardo, 35 Phil. 16; and Manalo vs. Sevilla, 24 Phil. 609,
states:
‘The court is authorized, in a proper case, not only to recount
the ballots and reject those which it considers illegal and accept those which
it considers valid but it is also authorized, in a proper case, to annul the
election completely.’ (Underlining supplied)
“It is therefore clear that the trial court erred in holding
that the purpose of the protestants in filing these protest is not in accord
with the purpose of the Revised Election Code in allowing a defeated candidate
to file an election protest.”
In other words, I like to
make it very clear that an election protest may be filed not only for the
purpose of having the protestant declared elected, but even for the purpose
alone of having the election annulled. Otherwise
stated, protestants may come to court, not necessarily to win an
election, but even if solely to have the court declare that no one has won
because the election is void and that it is
obvious and pure common sense that in the latter case, the protestant
does not have to allege the probability of his being the real victor, for in
such a case, his prayer precisely is – that it be declared, using the language
of the law, “that none of them has been legally elected.” Surely, the
following ruling of the trial court:
“An election contest is a summary proceeding the object of
which is to expedite the settlement of the controversy between candidates as
to who received the majority of the legal ballots (Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26
Phil. 522, 524). The purpose of an election
contest is to correct the canvass of which the proclamation is a public
manifestation and the power granted by law to the court must agree with and be
adequate to such an object. Hence, the
court can directly declare which candidate is to be elected leaving the
canvass made by the Board null and void, and the candidate so declared elected
may assume position of the office (Aquino vs. Calabia & Sahagun, 55 Phil.
984). It being the policy of the law to
give effect to elections, the general rule is that whatever may be the cause of
an election contest, the true gravamen of the case is to determine who receives
the highest number of votes (20 C. J. 217).
In an election case, the court has an imperative duty to ascertain by
all means within its command who is the real candidate elected by the
electorate. (Ibasco vs. Ilao, G. R. No.
L-17512, December 29, 1960). Hence, only
candidates have the right to file an election protest. (Gil Hermanos vs. Hord, 10 Phil. 217).
“From the foregoing authorities, it could be concluded that
the purpose of the election law to allow a candidate to file an election
protest is for the court to
determine whether the protestant or the protestee is the winner of the
election under protest. In the present
case, the object of the protestants in filing their protests based on the
prayer of their petitions is not to declare
them the duly elected mayor and councilors, respectively, of this City but
merely to declare null and void the
proclamation and election of the protestees as well as the elections
held in Iligan City on November 14, 1967.
The purpose, therefore,
of the protestants in filing these protests is not in accord with the purpose
of the Revised Election Code in allowing a defeated candidate to file an
election protest.”
must be emphatically denounced as a
misreading by His Honor of the real import of the authorities cited by
him. Such proposition represents the most narrow concept of the judicial
remedies in matters of election. No
single precedent in extant jurisprudence whether here or in any other country
can be found to support it. I am equally confident that no thesis
in any of the existing legal publications can be referred to as upholding such
an illogical idea. To sanction such a
ruling is to kill almost entirely all hopes for a clean, orderly and honest
suffrage in this country, which the
Commission on Elections alone may not be able to achieve in all possible
cases. Indeed, as pointed out by
appellants the trial court would have been right if it had only adhered to the decisions already rendered by
this Court on the subject, cited by said appellants in their brief.
The real issue then in
these cases is whether or not the facts alleged in the respective petitions of appellants constitute
sufficient ground or grounds for annulment of the election of Mayor and
Councilors in Iligan City, held in November, 1967. On this score, it has to be admitted that, indeed,
the petitions of appellants which appear
to have been prepared by a single counsel are not as accurately and precisely worded as to fit exactly into the
pattern that may perhaps be most ideal in cases of this nature, but I cannot go
along with His Honor’s ruling that the allegations in said petitions are legally inadequate to serve as a
basis for the relief of annulment of the election therein prayed for. His Honor seemed to be more concerned with
what he considered the need for direct averments that the irregularities and violations of the election law alleged by
appellants resulted in the destruction of the “secrecy and integrity of
the ballot cast,” that “all the votes cast in said elections are
illegal” and that “the irregularities committed by the election
officials would affect the election in favor of the protestees.” (p. 8,
id.) I feel that His Honor was asking too much and unnecessarily because, as
they appear to me, these allegations as well as the others His Honor considered
as indispensably required, are more in the nature of legal conclusions, not
supposed to be averred in the pleadings, rather than statements of ultimate
facts. The truth of the matter is that,
viewed as a whole, the petitions in question sufficiently lead to the
conclusion that what appellants are complaining about is that the elections
held in Iligan City in November, 1967 were characterized by general and
specific circumstances that leave rational doubt as to whether or not the true
will of the people of said City could be reflected in the proclaimed
results. In the more polished and
inimitable language of Mr. Justice Fernando, “x x x the seriousness and
gravity of the imputed failure to have the elections conducted freely and
honestly, with such irregularities alleged, give rise to doubts, rational and
honest, as to who were the duly elected officials.”
It is my considered opinion that while it is truly desirable that
election protests should be discouraged where they have hardly any basis in
fact or in law, the earlier to free from doubt the title to their respective
offices of those chosen to direct the affairs of our government, whether
national or local, thereby giving them the peace of mind and freedom of action
gravely needed in the formulation of policies and the implementation thereof,
courts should also be careful in seeing to it that their doors are not untimely
shut to complaints regarding the commission of electoral frauds, irregularities
and illegalities, the most despicable banes of popular suffrage, which though
unhappily worded are fairly indicative of a situation wherein the will of the
electorate has not been freely and clearly expressed. To my mind, the rule followed in an unbroken
line of decisions of this Court, to the effect that the commission of irregularities
by election officials, no matter how serious, and the actual discovery of
frauds and violations of law by either candidates or voters, are not in
themselves sufficient to cause the annulment of an election unless so expressly
provided by law, or that the frauds, illegalities and irregularities are so
rampant and diffusive as to place the result of such election in grave doubt,
is one that governs more the rendition of judgments in election cases and the
evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the elections in question, as
portrayed in the evidence already presented before the court, rather than as a
strict criterion for determining whether a complaint or petition or motion of
protest sufficiently states a cause of action for annulment. Respecting contrary opinion others may
entertain on the matter, I regard it as a sound rule that pleadings in election
cases, at least, should not be subjected to such minute examination as should
be done to facts duly established after proper hearing, if only because facts
are unerring manifestations of the truth, while allegations in pleadings often
suffer from the common flaws in the means of human expressions as well as from
the usual imperfections of human language.
If words are but children of thoughts, parents and off-springs do not
always, as among men and animals, look exactly alike. Pleadings in such cases must, therefore, be
read with more liberality so as to make it difficult, if not impossible for
grievances against the suppression in one form or another of the expression of
the popular will, well-grounded in fact, may not be thrown out merely because
of lack of skill and precision in the formulation of the corresponding
protests. More importance should be
given to the substantial matters sufficiently appearing in such pleadings as
intended to be brought to the court for a remedy, than to the form, at times,
ambiguous and often ungrammatically phrased, in which they are expressed. In any event, in case of doubt as to which
should be done, such doubt must be resolved in giving due course to the protest, unless it is manifestly evident that the same
has been filed for other than legitimate purposes.
As already indicated, my vote is for the reversal of the appealed order sustaining the motion
to dismiss filed by appellees in the court below, because I agree with the
decision herein of Mr. Justice Fernando that there are enough indications,
within the four corners of the questioned petitions, of irregularities and
illegalities which, if proven, may result in the annulment of the elections
prayed for by appellants.