NICANOR BALTAZAR, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Appeal taken by San Miguel Brewery, Inc. to reverse the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 32478 ordering it to
pay appellee Nicanor M. Baltazar the total amount of P1,680.00 representing his
separation pay of one (1) month and the money value – at the rate of P240.00
monthly – of six months accumulated sick leave he was entitled to.

It appears that Baltazar was appointed salesman-in­-charge of
appellant’s Dagupan warehouse on October 1, 1955 with a basic monthly pay of
P240.00, P5.00 per diem and a commission
of P.075 per case sold.

On October 9, 1956 sixteen regular workers at appel­lant’s
Dagupan warehouse went on a strike.  For
the purpose of relieving the tension prevailing at the place – because it was alleged
that the unfair treatment dispensed to the employees by Baltazar was the cause
of the strike – Baltazar was recalled to appellants Manila office on October 13
of the same year upon recommendation of
its sales supervisor and industrial relations officer, who found out,
after a personal investigation, that the employees‘ grievance was well founded.  The day
following Baltazar‘s recall to
Manila the strikers returned to work voluntarily.

When Baltazar reported at appellant’s main office in Manila on
October 15, 1956, the latter’s sales supervisor informed him that he was not to
return to Dagupan anymore.  Thereafter,
he reported for work at the main office afore­said from October 16, 1956 until
November 2 of the same year, apparently without being given any specific work
or assignment.  From November 3, 1956 up to December 19 of
the same year, or a period of more than one end one-half month,
he absented himself from work without prior autho­rity from his superiors and
without advising them or any­body else of the reason for his prolonged
absence.  For this reason,
pursuant firstly, to existing rules and re­gulations considering ten unexcused
or unauthorized absences within a
calendar year as sufficient ground for an outright dismissal
from employment, and secondly, the provisions of appellant’s health,
welfare end retirement plan requiring that
sick leave, to be considered authorized or excusable, must be certified
to by the company physician, appellant, by
a letter dated December 31, 1956, informed Baltazar that he was dismissed
for cause effective November 30 of the same year.

Four months later, or more specifically on May 2, 1957, Baltazar
commenced the present action.  After
trial upon the issues arising from the parties’ pleadings, the trial court
ruled that Baltazar’s dismissal was justified,
and, as a consequence, dismissed
his complaint.  For insufficiency of
evidence, the court also dismissed appellant’s counterclaim.  But despite the dismissal of Baltazar‘s com­plaint end the finding that his
dismissal from employment was for
cause, the trial court ordered appellant to pay him one month separation pay, plus the cash value
of six months accumulated sick leave.  So
We are now urged to reverse this portion of the
decision upon the following grounds:

“I.   The trial court erred in requiring the defendant-appellant
to pay separation pay after having found and declared as an established fact that the dismissal of plaintiff-appellee
was fully justified.

“II.  The trial court erred in awarding
plaintiff-appellee the money equivalent of an ‘accumulated sick leave of six (6) months as terminal leave‘ despite its express findings to the
effect that (1) sick leave benefits un­der defendant-appellant’s health, welfare and retirement plan may be
enjoyed only if and when the sickness is certified to by the company physician
– a requirement which was admittedly not
complied with, and (2) said benefits are ‘non-commutative end may not therefore be commuted to cash’.”

The trial court found that appellee’s absence for forty-eight
successive days was without permission
or authority of his superiors and, as a result, ruled that it was sufficient
cause for his dismissal in accordance with the rules and regulations of his
employer.  This must be deemed final,
because Baltazar
did not appeal.

It is settled in this jurisdiction that one not employed for a definite period is not entitled to one month notice or
to one month salary in lieu thereof if his dismissal was for cause (Republic Act No. 1052; Marcaida
vs. Philippine Education Company, 53 O.G. No. 23, p. 8559).  In the Marcaida case this Court, speaking
through the now Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, said the following:

“Republic Act No. 1052
makes reference to termination of employment, instead of dismissal,
precisely to exclude employees separated from the service for causes attributable to their own fault.

“Again, Republic Act No. 1052 is limited in its operation, to
cases of employment without definite period. 
When the employment is for a fixed
dura­tion, the employer may terminate it even before the expiration of the
stipulated period, should there be a substantial
breach of his obligations by the employee; (Articles 1169, 1191 and 1198,
Civil Code of the Philippines; Pabalan
vs. Velez, 22 Phil. 29; Gonzales
vs. Haberer, 47 Phil. 380; Hodges vs. Gra­nada, 59 Phil. 429; De la Cruz vs. Legaspi, 51 Off. Gaz. 6212) in which
event the latter is not entitled to advance notice or separation pay.  It would, patently, be absurd to grant a right thereto to an employee guilty of the same breach of
obligation, when the employment is without a definite period, as if
he were en­titled to greater protection than employees engaged for a fixed
duration.  x x x.  It is doubtful whether Congress could validly re­quire the employer to give
the separation pay in question if the employment were
terminated due to the fault of the employee. 
Indeed, the imposition of said obligation, under such conditions, would
expose Republic Act No. 1052 to the charge that it would con­stitute an
unreasonable restraint upon the liberty of the employer, and a deprivation of
his property without due process of
law.”

We rule therefore that appellee is not entitled to one month
separation pay.

In connection with the question
of whether or not appellee is entitled to the cash value of six months accumulated
sick leave, it appears that while under the last paragraph of Article 5 of appellant’s Rules and Re­gulations of the Health, Welfare and Retirement Plan
(Exhibit 3), unused sick leave may
be accumulated up to a maximum of six months, the same is not commutable or pay­able
in cash upon the employee’s option.

In our view, the only meaning and import of said rule end
regulation is that if on employee does not choose to enjoy his yearly sick
leave of thirty days, he may accumulate such
sick
leave up to a maximum
of six months and enjoy this six months
sick leave at the end of the sixth year but may not commute it to cash.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Sanchez and Fernando,
JJ., reserve their vote.

Capistrano, J., did not take part.