TESTATE ESTATE OF HILARION RAMAGOSA, MARIANO SUMILANG, PETITONER-APPELLEE, VS. SATURNINA RAMAGOSA, SANTIAGO RAMAGOSA, ENRIQUE PABELLA, LICERIA PABELLA AND ANDREA RAVALO, OPPOSIT…

Ramagosa versus Sumilang

The Case

This is the case of the testate estate of Hilarion Ramagosa, pitted against the oppositors who claimed a stake in that estate. Mariano Sumilang, the petitioner, sought the probate of a document said to be the last will and testament of Hilarion Ramagosa, written in Tagalog and dated February 26, 1949, which instituted him as sole heir. Saturnina Ramagosa, Santiago Ramagosa, Enrique Pabella, Liceria Pabella, and Andrea Ravalo opposed the probate. The case matters because it draws the boundary line between a probate proceeding and the settlement of the estate: probate decides only whether the will was duly executed and whether the testator had testamentary capacity, while questions of revocation, intrinsic validity, and succession belong elsewhere. It also teaches who may be heard in a probate proceeding.

Procedural History

On July 5, 1960, Mariano Sumilang filed a petition for probate in the Court of First Instance of Quezon. Two sets of oppositors contested the due execution of the document, claiming it was made under duress and was not really intended by the deceased to be his last will and testament. The first set, Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa, also claimed that they, instead of the petitioner, were entitled to inherit the estate. The other oppositors, representing themselves simply as next of kin, prayed only for the disallowance of the will. The petitioner presented his evidence and rested his case on February 16, 1961. Reception of the oppositors' evidence was set for July 14, 1961, but on July 3, 1961 the oppositors moved to dismiss the petition, mainly on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter because the will, if ever it was really executed, was revoked by implication of law six years before the testator's death. They alleged that after making the will Hilarion Ramagosa sold to the petitioner and his brother Mario the parcels of land described therein, so that at the time of death the titles were no longer in his name. The petitioner filed oppositions and a rejoinder, and finally moved to strike out the oppositors' pleadings on the ground that they had no legal standing and no valid claim or interest in the distribution of the estate. On October 18, 1963, the trial court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss, because its allegations went to the very intrinsic value of the will, and granting the motion to strike out the opposition and all other pleadings of the oppositors, since they had no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided by law and were therefore total strangers to the deceased. The oppositors appealed to the Supreme Court. After the case was elevated, the appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order appealed from was interlocutory, and the Court deferred action on that motion until the briefs of both parties had been filed.

Facts

Hilarion Ramagosa died on December 1, 1959. He left behind a document written in Tagalog and dated February 26, 1949, which purported to be his last will and testament and which instituted Mariano Sumilang as his sole heir. On July 5, 1960, Mariano Sumilang filed a petition for the probate of that document in the Court of First Instance of Quezon.

Two sets of oppositors came forward. They questioned the due execution of the document, claiming that it was made under duress and was not really intended by the deceased to be his last will and testament. Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa went further and claimed that they, instead of the petitioner, were entitled to inherit the estate. The other oppositors, representing themselves simply as next of kin, prayed only for the disallowance of the will.

After the petitioner rested his case, the oppositors moved to dismiss the petition. They argued that the will had been revoked by implication of law six years before the testator's death, because after making the will Hilarion Ramagosa had sold to the petitioner and his brother Mario the parcels of land described therein, so that at the time of his death the titles to those lands were no longer in his name. The trial court refused to dismiss on that ground, holding that the allegation went to the intrinsic value of the will, and struck out the oppositors' pleadings because they had no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided by law and were total strangers to the deceased. The evidence on this point consisted of certified true copies of the parties' baptism and marriage certificates, and the oppositors did not take issue with the finding in their brief.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the petition for probate on the ground that the testator had impliedly revoked his will by selling, before his death, the lands disposed of therein.
• Whether or not the oppositors, having no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree to the deceased, had the personality to oppose the probate of the will.
• Whether or not the order striking out the oppositors' opposition was a final and appealable order, so that the motion to dismiss the appeal must be denied.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote a specific article of the Civil Code on revocation. It states the governing principle of probate in the words of the Court in Nuguid versus Nuguid, which it quotes:

The petition below being for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.

This fixes the scope of the probate court's inquiry and excludes the question of implied revocation from the petition for probate.

The Court also quotes the classic statement of the purpose of probate from Alemany versus the Court of First Instance of Manila:

To establish conclusively as against everyone and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings for the probate of a will. The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more.

This confirms that probate decides execution and capacity, and nothing beyond them.

On the nature of implied revocation, the Court quotes Fernandez versus Dimagiba:

The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the testament was duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all questions of revocation become superfluous: in law, there is no such will and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy.

This shows that implied revocation touches the particular devise or legacy, not the due execution of the will, and so cannot bar probate.

On who may intervene, the Court quotes Teotico versus del Val:

It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate; and an interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor.

This defines the interest required of an oppositor, which the appellants did not have.

Finally, the Court quotes Paras versus Narciso on the reason for the rule:

The reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby the court maybe prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of probate but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation thereto.

This explains why the trial court properly struck out the opposition of total strangers.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution. True or not, the alleged sale does not affect the probate court's limited inquiry into extrinsic validity.

On the second issue, the Court held that the oppositors had no personality to intervene. They did not take issue with the trial court's finding that they had no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree and were total strangers to the deceased, and they did not attempt to show that they had some interest in the estate which must be protected. The uncontradicted evidence, consisting of certified true copies of the parties' baptism and marriage certificates, supported that finding. Under the settled rule, one who would intervene in a probate proceeding must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it, either as executor or as a claimant of the estate.

On the third issue, the Court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal. Although the motion had become practically academic in view of the resolution of the main issues, the order of the lower court striking out the appellants' opposition on the ground that they had no personality to intervene was final and therefore an appealable order in so far as they were concerned.

Doctrine

A petition for the probate of a will limits the court's inquiry to the extrinsic validity of the will. The only questions are the testator's testamentary capacity and compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, or the legality of any devise or legacy, is premature.

Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution.

An alleged implied revocation arising from the testator's sale of the properties devised is not a ground to dismiss the petition for probate. Such revocation is irrelevant to and separate from the question of due execution, and it affects not the will itself but merely the particular devise or legacy.

To intervene in a probate proceeding, a person must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it, either as executor or as a claimant of the estate. An interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, like a creditor. Strangers within the fifth degree have no such interest and may not contest the will.

An order striking out an opposition on the ground that the oppositor has no personality to intervene is final and appealable in so far as that oppositor is concerned.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court, with costs against the oppositors-appellants, and denied the motion to dismiss the appeal.

Remember This

Memorize the line: probate is one thing, the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. Examiners use this case to test the limited scope of probate, the treatment of implied revocation as affecting only the devise and not the will, and the requirement of interest before a stranger may oppose a will.