TESTATE ESTATE OF HILARION RAMAGOSA, MARIANO SUMILANG, PETITONER-APPELLEE, VS. SATURNINA RAMAGOSA, SANTIAGO RAMAGOSA, ENRIQUE PABELLA, LICERIA PABELLA AND ANDREA RAVALO, OPPOSIT…

On July 5, 1960
Mariano Sumilang filed in the Court of First Instance
of Quezon a petition for the probate of a document
alleged to be the last will and testament of Hilarion
Ramagosa, who died on December 1, 1959. 
Said document, written in Tagalog and dated February 26, 1949, institutes
petitioner as sole heir of the testator.

The petition for probate was opposed by two (2) sets of oppositors – appellants herein – who questioned the due
execution of the document, claiming that it was made under duress and was not
really intended by the deceased to be his last will and testament.  Aside from merely opposing the petition for
probate, the first set of oppositors – Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa –
also claimed that they, instead of petitioner, were entitled to inherit the
estate of the deceased.  The other oppositors, representing themselves simply as next of kin,
appropriately prayed only for the disallowance of the will.

At the hearings of the petition petitioner adduced his evidence,
and then rested his case on February
16, 1961.

Reception of oppositors‘
evidence was set for July 14, 1961.  However, on July 3, 1961 oppositors moved
for the dismissal of the petition for probate mainly on the ground that
“the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter because the last
will and testament of the decedent, if ever it was really executed by him, was
revoked by implication of law six years before his death.”  Oppositors alleged
that after making the will Hilarion Ramagosa sold to petitioner Mariano Sumilang
and his brother Mario the parcels of land described therein, so that at the
time of the testator’s death the titles to said lands
were no longer in his name.

Petitioner filed his opposition to the motion for dismissal on July 17, 1961, supplemented it by
another opposition on August 14, 1961,
and by a rejoinder on August 21, 1961.  Finally, on October 22, 1962 petitioner moved to strike out the oppositors‘ pleadings on two grounds, namely:

“1. That oppositors have no legal
standing in court and they are bereft of personality to oppose the probate of
the last will and testament of the testator; and

“2. That oppositors have no valid claim and interest in the
distribution of (the) estate of the aforesaid testator and no existing valid
right whatsoever.”

On October 18, 1963
the court a quo issued the order now subject of this appeal,
which read as follows:

“Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by the oppositors dated July 31, 1961, the same is hereby denied
for the allegations contained therein goes (sic) to the very intrinsic value of
the will and other grounds stated on said motion to dismiss are without merit. 
With respect to the motion to strike out opposition and all other
pleadings of oppositors filed by the petitioner, it
appears that opposi­tors have no relationship
whatsoever with­in the fifth degree as provided by law and therefore the oppositors
are totally strangers to the deceased whose will is under probate.  This being so, the motion to strike out
opposition and all other pleadings pertinent thereto is hereby ordered stricken
out of the record.”

The petition below being for the probate of a will, the court’s
area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof.  The testator’s
testamentary capacity and
the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are
the only questions presented for the resolution of the court.  Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of
the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is
premature.  (Nu­guid vs. Nuguid, G. R. No.
L-23445, June 23, 1966).

“To establish conclusively as against everyone and once for
all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law
and that the testator was in a con­dition to make a will, is the only purpose
of the proceedings . . . for the probate of a will.  The judgment in such proceedings determines
and can determine nothing more.”  (Alemany, et al., vs. CFI of Manila,
3 Phil. 424)

Oppositors would want the court a
quo to dismiss the petition for probate on the ground that the testator
had impliedly revoked his will by selling, prior to his death, the lands
disposed of therein.

True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of
the petition for probate.  Probate is one
thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another.  The first decides the execution of the
document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to
descent and distribution.

“The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds
of conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and
separate from the question of whether the testament was duly executed.  For one, if the will is not entitled to
probate, or its probate is denied, all questions of revocation become
superfluous:  in law, there is no such
will and hence there would be nothing to revoke.  Then, again, the revocation invoked by the opposi­tors-appellants is not an express one, but merely
implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an
abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties
concerned.  As such, the revocation would
not affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy.”  (Fer­nandez, et al. vs. Dimagiba,
L-23638 and and Reyes et al. vs. Dimagiba,
L-23662, October 12, 1967)

In their brief, oppositors do not take issue with the court a quo’s finding that they
“have no relationship what­soever within the fifth degree as provided by
law and there­fore . . . are totally (sic) strangers to the deceased whose will
is under probate.”  They do not
attempt to show that they have
some interest in the estate which must be protected.  The uncontradicted
evidence, consisting of certified true copies of the parties’ baptism and
marriage certificates, support the said court’s finding in this respect.

“It is a well-settled
rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a
probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or
in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the
estate (Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat
Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an
interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate
such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a
creditor.”  (Teo­tico
vs. del Val, etc., G. R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965)

“The reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting
the will, is not that thereby the court maybe prevented from learning facts
which would justify or necessitate a denial of probate but rather that the
courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the
proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them
to be heard with relation thereto.” (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244)

Sometime
after this case was elevated to this Court appellee
moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order appealed from is
interlocutory.  We deferred action on the motion until after
the brief of both parties had been filed. 
The motion, although now practically academic in view of our resolution of the main issues
involved, must be denied, since the order of the lower court striking out
appellants’ opposition to the probate of the will on the ground that they have
no personality to intervene in the case, was final and therefore appealable order in so far as they were concerned.

The order appealed from
is hereby affirmed, with costs against oppositors-appellants.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.