G.R. No. L-26970. March 19, 1984
BUAYAN CATTLE CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. JESUS QUINTILLAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF COTABATO, 16TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SECOND BRANCH, GEN. …
MAKASIAR, Actg. C.J.:
“x x judgment be rendered commanding and enjoining respondent
judge to desist and refrain from proceeding with Civil Case No. 631 of
the lower court; nullifying or setting aside the order for the issuance
of writ of injunction, Annex B hereof, the writ of preliminary
injunction, Annex C hereof, and the order denying the motion to dismiss,
Annex N hereof, in Civil Case No. 631 for lack of jurisdiction, and (c)
commanding respondent judge to dismiss Civil Case No. 631.xx xx xx
“Petitioner further prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises” (pp. 23-24, rec.).
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner, Buayan Cattle Co., Inc., an all-Filipino domestic
corporation, is the holder of Pasture Lease Agreement No. 8, as
successor-in-interest to Universal Realty Corporation. Said agreement,
first issued on April 18, 1952 under Commonwealth Act No. 452 (p. 46,
rec.), covers 1,000 hectares of pasture land in Southern Cotabato, “the
identification and technical descriptions of which have been laid out
and estimated and approved on November 20, 1958 by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Since the acquisition of the
aforesaid property by the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant
corporation, the same has been surrounded with fences xx x” (p. 47,
rec.).On September 11, 1964, Pasture Lease Agreement No. 2510 was
allegedly issued in favor of private respondent, Adan de las Marias. It
covered 930 hectares of land adjacent to that of petitioner’s. The
agreement was to expire on January 30, 1975.Upon issuance of Pasture Lease Agreement No. 2510, and in compliance
with the terms thereof, Adan de las Marias immediately caused a
relocation survey of the said pasture area by a forest guard of the
District Forester of Southern Cotabato to determine the extent of his
land and thereafter to fence the same. The survey showed that the
boundaries of his land extended 580 hectares into the pasture land of
the petitioner. Thereupon, he removed the petitioner’s fence and
started to set up his own boundary fence 580 hectares into the
petitioner’s pasture area.On March 31, 1965, petitioner reported to the District Forester
at General Santos, Cotabato, “that yesterday afternoon the ranch in
charge of Adan de las Marias started putting up concrete monuments along
conflicting common boundary of Adan de las Marias and Buayan Cattle
Company” and asked for advice “if the putting up of these fences was
legally sanctioned by your office x x x” (p. 48, rec.). The District
Forester sent a forest guard to investigate the report. On May 8, 1965,
the corporation again reported to the District Forester the resumption
by private respondent of the construction activities in the disputed
area. On the same date, petitioner corporation, through its Manila
office, filed a letter-complaint with the Director of Forestry against
the private respondent, alleging the non-existence of the area leased
under the latter’s pasture lease agreement and suggesting remedial
measures to protect the interests of the corporation. The Director of
Forestry wired the Forestry at General Santos, ordering the latter “to
stop alleged fencing by Adan de las Marias inside the area leased to
Universal Realty Corporation now being transferred to Buayan Cattle
Ranch until boundary conflict resolved.” Forester Benjamin Meimban was
sent by the Director’s office to settle the boundary conflict. On May
13, 1965, the acting District Forester in General Santos, Emiliano
Sonico, ordered the private respondent “to stop putting your fences
until the relocation of the correct boundary will be laid by Forester
Benjamin Meimban” (p. 48, rec.).On May 21, 1965, the corporation, through its Manila office,
complained to the Director of Forestry of the defiance of private
respondent herein of his orders, as a result of which, the Director
wired the Provincial Commander of Cotabato “for assistance to stop Adan
de las Marias from fencing inside the pasture area leased to petitioner
corporation at General Santos, Cotabato”(p. 50, rec.).Investigation on the boundary conflict began on May 24, 1965.
On May 27, 1965, the relocation of the boundaries of the
conflicting leases was commenced. Since then, the conflict between
petitioner corporation herein and private respondent has been pending
resolution by the Director of Forestry.
On September 7, 1965, due to reports of further disturbances, the
Director of Forestry issued a telegraphic order to the District
Forester, Southern Cotabato, as follows:
“UNIVERSAL REALTY REPORT BY RADIOGRAM PERTINENT PORTION QUOTE
JULIUS QUIMPO REPORTED TO ME THIS MORNING THAT ADAN DE LAS MARIAS WANTED
US TO DRIVE AWAY OUR HORSE AND COWS FROM THE AREA UNDER CONFLICT
UNQUOTE PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO CONFLICTED AREA AND SEE TO IT THAT ADAN
DE LAS MARIAS REFRAIN DISTURBANCE IN CONFLICTED AREA PERIOD CHIEF PC
CRIME REQUEST TO ENFORCE PEACE AND ORDER PERIOD COORDINATE WITH PC”
Thereafter, on September 17, 1965, the Director of Forestry sent a
telegram to private respondent herein, warning him that his
non-compliance with the lawful orders of the Director may cause the
cancellation of his pasture lease.
On September 25, 1965, private respondent filed a complaint for
injunction with preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 631,
with the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, 16th Judicial District in
General Santos, Cotabato, seeking to enjoin petitioner herein, Buayan
Cattle Co., Inc., the District Forester of Southern Cotabato, the
Director of Forestry, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Area Commander, Fourth Military Command of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, from restricting him in the exercise of his lease
rights. On the same day, the preliminary injunction prayed for was
granted. On September 29, the writ thereon was issued, thus:
“It is therefore ordered that until further orders of this Court,
you, the said Universal Realty Corporation and/or Buayan Cattle Company,
Inc., Hon. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Director of
Forestry, District Forester, Southern Cotabato, and the AFP IVth
Military Area Commander, and all your servants, attorneys, and agents,
and other acting in aid of you, are hereby ordered to desist and refrain
from driving inside and/or allowing its cows, horses, and other large
cattles within the conflicted area of 580 hectares which is within the
area covered by plaintiff’s Pasture Lease Agreement No. 2510, situated
at Sitio Balnabo, barrios of Sigil and Balnabo, General Santos,
Cotabato, and to pasture and graze therein either temporarily,
intermittently, or periodically, or for a short and limited and/or
sporadic periods, to refrain and desist from issuing an order,
either originally or by virtue of its appellate powers or jurisdiction
the Director of Forestry, which in any manner whatsoever, will
contravene or violate Pasture Lease Agreement No. 2510 entered into by
and between him for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines as
Lessor and plaintiff as Lessee on September 11, 1964 at Quezon City;
from enforcing the telegraphic order, dated September 7, 1965 and
September 17, 1965, which directed plaintiff to refrain from causing
disturbance inside the conflicted area, and also to desist and refrain
from issuing any subsequent orders which will, in any manner, violate
and infringe the terms and conditions of Pasture Lease Agreement No.
2510; or issue any order which will cause the cancellation without due
process of law of the said Pasture Lease Agreement; and to desist and
refrain from exercising police powers in the premises and from taking
and following orders from the Director of Forestry relative to the
conflicted area in violation of plaintiff’s right thereon, or to
aid, help, abet and give support to the act of defendant Universal
Realty Corporation and/or Buayan Cattle Company, Inc., and all those
acting in its behalf, in allowing, driving inside, cows, horses,
carabaos, and other large cattles, within the conflicted area of 580
hectares which is supposedly or allegedly within the area covered by
the Pasture Lease Agreement No. 2510 of the plaintiff and from further
acts of dispossession (p. 8, rec.; Italics supplied).
On October 4, 1965, petitioner filed a motion to dissolve said writ. On
October 6, 1965, said petitioner also filed a memorandum in support of
his aforesaid motion. On October 15, 1965, private respondent answered
said memorandum.
Subsequently, on October 20, 1965, the effectivity of Pasture Lease
Agreement No. 2510 was suspended by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources due to prima facie showing that forgery was committed
in the survey inspection report on special use application dated March
4, 1964, a document required for the issuance of the pasture lease
agreement (p. 138, rec.).
Before the motion for dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction
could be resolved, petitioner herein, the District Forester and the
Director of Forestry, and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources filed their answers to the complaint on October 25, 1965,
November 22, 1965 and December 13, 1965, respectively.
In its answer, petitioner questioned the relocation survey conducted by
the forest guard for having been conducted by one not competent to do
so. It also contested the validity of the said survey for not having
been made in accordance with the rules of the Bureau (p. 64, rec.).
In the same answer, petitioner filed a counterclaim against herein
private respondent “by reason of the evident bad faith and malice of the
plaintiff (now private respondent) in instituting this instant action”
(pp. 69-70, rec). Petitioner further alleged the following expenses and
damages P10,000.00 paid for the services of a counsel to protect its
legal rights over the property in question; and P5,000.00 as damages
suffered in the concept of actual and incidental expenses “which shall
continue to be increased for all the time that this case is pending
adjudication by the courts” (p. 70, rec.). Finally, petitioner alluded
to “an award of corrective, and exemplary damages in the sum of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, and for the adjudication of moral, and
nominal damages, as well as for legal costs” (p. 70, rec.). In the same
vein, petitioner sought “such other relief as may be just and equitable
in the premises” (p. 72, rec.).
On February 17, 1966, about 124 days from the date the motion to
dissolve was deemed submitted for resolution, the Judge’s order dated
January 28, 1966 was entered by the clerk of court, denying said motion
to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction (p. 11, rec).
On March 4, 1966, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 631 for absence of jurisdiction.
On April 1, 1966, opposition was filed against the motion. On June 8,
1966, the said motion was denied “for not being well taken” (p. 102,
rec). On August 1, 1966, herein petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of denial of the motion to dismiss.
On August 12, 1966, said motion was submitted for resolution. An ex
parte urgent motion to secure immediate resolution of said motion was
filed on October 4, 1966. To date, no resolution has been made on the
motion.
Thus, this petition for prohibition, certiorari and mandamus.
WE noted the expiration of Pasture Lease Agreement No. 2510 on January
30, 1975. On October 10, 1980, this Court, by resolution required the
parties to state “whether in view of the aforesaid supervening event and
the lapse of time, the instant petition has become moot and academic.”
On December 17, 1980, private respondent submitted his comments leaving
the resolution of this petition to the discretion of this Court. On
February 20, 1981, herein petitioner filed its answer stating that the
case should not be rendered moot and academic by the expiration of
respondent’s pasture lease agreement.
At the outset, We resolve the incidental issue consequent of the
expiration of Pasture Lease Agreement No. 2510 on January 30, 1975.
This Court had, in fact dismissed proceedings where the issues raised
therein have been rendered moot and academic by supervening
circumstances (E. Razon, Inc. vs. Moya, L-31690, Feb. 24, 1981, 103 SCRA
41; Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. Reyes, L-27665, May
31, 1977, 77 SCRA 205; Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, L-35234, May 26,
1977, 77 SCRA 148). WE ruled in these cases that to further rule on the
petition would serve no useful purpose.
But the case at bar, however, presents both facts and issues We cannot
relegate to oblivion. The petitioner claims damages against the private
respondent (pp. 23-24, 69, 70, 72, rec.) as the contested area of 580
hectares is significant to the party unjustly or unlawfully deprived
thereof. The maximum area allowable to any single, qualified entity
under the Pasture Land Act (Sec. 3, CA 452) is 2,000 hectares;
petitioner is leasing 1,000 hectares of pasture land, while private
respondent claims a lease right to 930 hectares of pasture land.
Further, We review the facts and see an unlawful deprivation dangerously
cloaked in a feigned contractual right. Worse, We recognize a
perversion of a writ of preliminary injunction effectively restraining,
not the wrongdoer, but the person who is in the vigilant protection of
his rights. The circumstances not only warrant, but impel Us to
consider the merits of this petition and afford a practicable relief to
the party entitled thereto.
The kernel issue is the propriety or impropriety of the injunction
complaint filed by the private respondent with the Court of First
Instance of Southern Cotabato and of the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction therein by the same court.
WE find for petitioner.
Two requisites are necessary if an injunction is to issue, namely, the
existence of the right to be protected, and that the facts against which
the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right (Araneta,
et al. vs. Gatmaitan, et al., L-8895 & L-9191, April 30, 1957, 101
Phil. 328). In particular, for a writ of preliminary injunction to
issue, the existence of the right and the violation must appear in the
allegation of the complaint. A preliminary injunction is proper only
when the plaintiff appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in his
complaint (Manila Adjusters and Surveyor Co. vs. Bocar, L-44126, Feb.
29, 1977, 75 SCRA 421). And We recall that the complaint for injunctive
relief must be construed strictly against the pleader (43 C.J.S. 867;
The Revised Rules of Court, Vicente J. Francisco, Vol. IV-A 1971, p.
206).
Upon the facts of the complaint filed (pp. 25-37, rec.), We rule that
the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the lower court is improper
and without basis. It is clear from the complaint that the first and
older possessor of the disputed area is the petitioner herein.
Moreover, his possession is by virtue of an undisputedly valid lease
agreement with the government. This affords the petitioner preference
against any other claim of right over said land. Conversely, any
subsequent claimant can raise no more than a doubtful claim over the
property in question, which dubious claim militates against the issuance
in his favor of a writ of preliminary injunction. Preliminary
injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse (Angela Estate, Inc. vs. CFI of Negros Occidental, L-27084, July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 500).
Furthermore, in actions involving realty, preliminary injunction will
lie only after the plaintiff has fully established his title or right
thereto by a proper action brought for the purpose (Liongson vs.
Martinez, No. 11553, Oct. 8, 1917, 36 Phil. 148). To authorize
temporary injunction, the complainant must make out at least a prima
facie showing of a right to the final relief (43 C.J.S. 433; Francisco, supra, p. 175).
WE note that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the lower
court left private respondent unperturbed in the occupation of the
disputed area. This, in effect, sanctioned his usurpation. Clearly,
from the complaint itself, the private respondent was the usurper. It
was he who unilaterally removed the fence of the petitioner and
set his own boundary fence 580 hectares into the petitioner’s pasture
land, thus violating herein petitioner’s superior right thereto. The
protective mantle of preliminary injunction should not have been
afforded to the usurpation by private respondent. Injunctions are not
available to take property out of the possession or control of one party
and place it into that of another whose title has not clearly been
established (Emilia vs. Bado, L-23685, April 25, 1968, 23 SCRA 183; Pio
vs. Marcos, L-27849, April 30, 1974, 56 SCRA 726). The office of the
writ of injunction is to restrain the wrongdoer (Calo vs. Roldan, L-252,
March 30, 1946, 76 Phil. 445, 451-452), not to protect him.
“There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate which
requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or (which
is) more dangerous in a doubtful case than the issuing of an
injunction; it is the strong arm of equity that never ought to be
extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot
afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages. The right must be clear,
the injury impending or threatened, so as to be averted only by the
protecting preventive process of injunction” (28 Am. Jur. 201;
Francisco, supra, p. 179).
Reviewing the records of this petition, We note the following undisputed
facts that militate against private respondent’s alleged lease right
over the disputed area:
1. Petitioner, Buayan Cattle Company, Inc., was a prior lessee (since 1952) in the actual, peaceful and continued possession (at lease since 1958) of the disputed area until the private respondent herein, Adan de las Marias, on the strength of a pasture lease granted only in 1964, unilaterally removed
the former’s fences and immediately established his own boundary fence
580 hectares into the petitioner’s pasture land (pp. 28, 29, 47, rec.).2. Meanwhile, Annex A to private respondent’s answer to this
petition (p. 138, rec.; order of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources dated October 20, 1965 suspending the effectivity of
Pasture Lease Agreement No. 2510) and Annex B to the memorandum for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction filed by herein petitioner
on January 25, 1967 (affidavit of District Forester Emmanuel Elayda on
the forgery of his signature appearing in the Inspection Report on
Special Use Application dated March 4, 1964; pp. 284-286, rec.)
unequivocally raise doubts as to the veracity and validity of Pasture
Lease Agreement No. 2510; and3. Finally, the relocation survey caused by the private
respondent to determine the exact location of the pasture land allegedly
awarded to him under Pasture Lease Agreement No. 2510 is questioned as
irregular for having been conducted by a forest guard, a person not
competent to do so. The validity of the said survey itself is also
contested as not having been made in accordance with the rules of the
Bureau of Forestry.
The strong arm of equity, this transcendent or extraordinary remedy of
injunction should not be lightly indulged in but should be used
sparingly and only in a clear and plain case (The Value of Preliminary
Injunction, 95 SCRA 716, 718-719, citing 28 Am. Jur. 198).
Even assuming, arguendo, that Pasture Lease Agreement No. 2510 is valid
as to the documents and the relocation survey aforestated, still We
maintain and rule that the complaint for injunction filed by private
respondent herein and the writ of preliminary injunction issued therein
are, at least, premature.
Private respondent admits the presence of an actual possessor under a
lease right in the disputed area prior to his own entry and occupation
thereof. Assuming that private respondent’s lease right is equally
valid as that of the present possessor, herein petitioner, the former’s
course of action should not have been to destroy the petitioner’s fence
and enter the disputed area and set up his own fence therein. Private
respondent should seek the aid of a competent court and not take the law
into his own hands. Usurpation is not sanctioned as a method of
acquiring possession. The Civil Code provides:
“Article 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force
or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto.
He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of
the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if
the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.”
Moreover, private respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
WE find the following provisions of law pertinent:
(1) Under the Revised Administrative Code —
“Section 79(c). Power and supervision. — The Department Head
shall have direct control, direction and supervision over all bureaus
and offices under his jurisdiction and may, any provision of existing
law to the contrary notwithstanding, repeal or modify the decision of
the chief of said bureaus or offices when advisable in the public
interest.xx xx xx
“Section 84. Bureaus and offices under the Department of
Agriculture and Commerce shall have executive supervision over the xx
Bureau of Forestry xx x.xx xx xx
“Section 1838. Leasing of forest land for special purposes. —
The Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, may upon such terms as he may deem
reasonable, lease or grant permits for the use of forest xx xx.”
(2) Forestry Administrative Order No. 6-2, Series of 1941.
“Section 5. Conflict. — A forest land permittee or licensee
who believes that another permittee or licensee or any other person is
encroaching upon the land applied for by him shall report the matter to
the Director of Forestry or the District Forester concerned within
ninety (90) days after the alleged encroachment commenced; otherwise,
his complaint shall not be considered.“Section 6. Investigation of claims and conflicts. — Adverse
claims when properly asserted and reports of conflict received within
the time specified in the next preceding section, shall be caused to be
investigated, if this has not yet been done, by the Director of
Forestry. The investigation shall be made whenever possible on the very
ground and after both parties have been advised of the hour and the
date when and the place where it will be held, and the nature of the
case. The notice of the investigation shall be served upon them at
least one week before the date set for the investigation.”
Evidently, the foregoing cited provisions outline the administrative
procedure which the private respondent herein should have pursued prior
to invoking the aid of the competent court. Consonant with the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies, where a remedy is available
within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before
recourse can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative
agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to
prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts (Cruz vs. Del
Rosario, L-17740, Dec. 26, 1963, 9 SCRA 755; Miguel vs. Reyes, L-4851,
July 31, 1953, 93 Phil. 542; Coloso vs. Board of Accountancy, L-5760,
April 20, 1953, 92 Phil. 938; Arnedo vs. Aldanese, 63 Phil. 768).
Such failure here results in the absence of a cause of action (Pineda vs. CFI of Davao, et al., L-12602, April 25, 1961, 1 SCRA 1020) making judicial resort premature (Villanueva vs. Ortiz, L-11412, May 23, 1958, 103 Phil. 875).
The conflict of rights to possession which arose from the subsequent
issuance of Pasture Lease Agreement No. 2510 is of such nature as to
demand the “exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact . .” (42
Am Jur 698; Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers and Election Law,
Neptali A. Gonzales, 2nd Ed., 1966, p. 112).
Further, We note that Civil Case No. 631 is a complaint for injunction.
The remedy of injuntion does not issue except upon the condition,
common to all special remedies, that no other ordinary, speedy and
adequate remedy exists for avoiding or repairing the damage done, or
which may be done, by an act in violation of the plaintiff’s rights
(Palafox vs. Madamba, No. 4735, Aug. 7, 1911, 19 Phil. 444; Devesa vs.
Arbes, No. 4891, March 23, 1909, 13 Phil. 273). The administrative
procedure afforded by the laws above-cited is ordinary, speedy and
adequate. The administrative proceedings are pending with the District
Forester of Southern Cotabato. Hence, complainant in Civil Case No. 631
is not entitled to an injunction as there is already an action pending
in which he may obtain relief (Francisco, supra, p. 222).
OUR cardinal statement, therefore, is that private respondent does not
have a cause of action for injunction. His right to the disputed area
is doubtful. And even assuming that he has a right to the said pasture
land, still, not having exhausted the administrative remedies available
to him, the action for injunction in Civil Case No. 631 is, at least,
premature for absence of a cause of action.
The act of private respondent in unilaterally entering the petitioner’s
land is unlawful and unjust. The petitioner’s act of repelling the
private respondent’s entry into the former’s land is sanctioned by law,
thus:
“Article 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the
right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof.
For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary
to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion
or usurpation of his property.xx xx xx
“Article 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his
possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in
or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and
the Rules of Court” (Civil Code of the Philippines).
The letter-complaint filed by herein petitioner is consonant with the
procedure sanctioned by the Revised Administrative Code and Forestry
Administrative Order No. 6-2, series of 1941. The orders issued by the
Director of Forestry, including those dated September 7 and 17, 1965 are
well within the powers of said office.
WE hold therefore, that respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion
when he issued the writ of preliminary injunction dated September 29,
1965 in Civil Case No. 631. That injunction had the effect of
restraining, not the wrongdoer, but the person in the vigilant
protection of his rights and those who come to the latter’s help. In
Chief, PC vs. Judge, CFI of Caloocan City (Nos. L-22308 & L-22343-4,
March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 607), We ruled that the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain any interference with the illegal
operation of a cockpit was in grave abuse of discretion. The rule
equally applies here.
Finally, We consider the proposition of herein private respondent that
while this Court can compel the lower court to act on the complaint in
Civil Case No. 631, IT cannot compel the latter, by mandamus, to dismiss
said case as prayed for by herein petitioner (p. 132, rec.). True, mandamus is
not available to compel a court to do a discretionary act (Caltex
Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, L-28472, April 30, 1968, 23 SCRA 492). Mandamus is not available to compel a judge to decide a case or motion in a particular way (Pio vs. Marcos, supra;
Santiago Labor Union vs. Tabigne, L-21028-29, May 29, 1966, 17 SCRA
286; Dy Cay vs. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521). But, where the complaint
filed in the lower court is decidedly without a cause of action, as in
this case, then mandamus will lie to compel the dismissal of
said complaint. In this latter case, the dismissal is not
discretionary, but ministerial, and therefore subject to mandamus.
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED, THE ORDER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
A WRIT OF INJUNCTION AND THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION TO DISMISS IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 631 ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID.
THE CASE IS REMANDED TO THE LOWER COURT ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF HEARING
THE HEREIN PETITIONER BUYAN CATTLE CO., INC. ON THE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES
AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT ADAN DE LAS MARIAS. COSTS AGAINST SAID
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., in the result.