ALBA PATIO DE MAKATI, ANASTACIO ALBA AND CLAUDIO OLAVARIETA, PETITIONERS, VS. ALBA PATIO DE MAKATI EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, HERMOGENES CAGANO, RUPERTO CRUZ, LUCIO CAGANO, AND BONI…

This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations dated April 30, 1973 and the Resolution promulgated by the
Court of Industrial Relations en banc dated November 6, 1973
denying the Motion for Recon­sideration in Case No. 5478-ULP entitled
“Alba Patio de Makati Employees Association, et al. vs. Alba Patio de
Makati, et al.”

This case stemmed from a complaint filed by the Prosecutor of the CIR
based on sworn statements filed by individual complainants, namely:
Hermogenes Cagano, Ruperto Cruz, Lucio Cagano and Bonifacio Aclado, who
were the President, Vice-President, Secretary and Auditor,
res­pectively, of the Alba Patio de Makati Employees Association.

The complaint charges petitioners of unfair labor practice for violating
the terms of the Collective Bar­gaining Agreement by committing the
following acts: (1) allowing non-union members from sharing in the
ser­vice charge and locking-out the employees for nine (9) days when the
union officers demanded for reimbursement; (2) failing and refusing to
terminate the services of some union members who were expelled by the
complainant union for acts of disloyalty induced by the management,
violative of the union-shop clause; and (3) forcing pri­vate respondents
to resign and making them sign papers prepared by management with the
threat that if the private respondents do not resign, the establishment
would be closed.

The first charge has reference to the provisions of the CBA (Exhibits
“A-2” and Exhibit “1-B”) entered into between Alba Patio de Makati and
Alba Patio de Makati Employees Association, to wit:

“10% of the total amounts of service charge collected every month
as re­flected by the sales book will be retained by the restaurant for
general breakage. The remaining amount after the 10% has been deducted
will be distributed twice a month following collection by the restaurant
to the employees covered by this agreement in the manner they may agree
upon.” (t.s.n., p. 3, March 30, 1971).

Management admits allowing employees not covered by the CBA to share in
the collection of the service charge, thereby reducing the individual
shares of the employees but maintains that it was done in the spirit of
fairness and to boost the morale of everybody working in the restaurant
and that anyway the practice had been discontinued long before the
complaint was filed. (Decision of the CIR, Rollo, p. 159).

Records show that the amount given to non-covered employees from
September 1, 1969 to March 30, 1970 was reimbursed to the union members
in three installments, (Exhibits 3, 4, and 5) the first paid on June 5,
1970, the second on June 23, 1970 and the third on July 7, 1970, in
three (3) equal amounts of P2,131.31 each.

Complainants further accuse management of locking-out the employees from
April 14 to 22, 1970 without notice to the union members, violative of
the no lock-out clause embodied in the CBA, when they demanded the
reimbursement of the amounts paid to the employees not covered by the
CBA. Management denies such a lock-out and avers that what happened was
a closure of the establishment from April 14 to 22 due to an “internal
misunderstanding” bet­ween the establishment and the employees
concerning catering service in Forbes Park which suddenly was not
available when five (5) substitute waiters refused to render service to
the great embarrassment of the business.

The second charge pertains to a violation of the union-shop clause of
the CBA which required membership in the union as a condition of
continued employment in the restaurant and that management is bound to
dismiss, upon demand of the union, any employee who ceased to be a
member in good standing of the union. (t.s.n., pp. 33-34, March 30,
1971). The union had expelled four employees, Raquing Yupo, Francisco
Ibañez, Manuel Dante and Rodolfo Canalita, as members of the union for
acts of disloyalty, after due investigation. The union demanded from
management for their dismissal in accordance with the union-shop clause
embodied in the collective bargaining agreement, but management refused
on the ground that the union officers never specified why these
individuals were dismissed and management had reason to believe that the
individual complainants who were then officers of the union, sought the
dismissal of the said three persons because they dared ask for an
accounting for union funds. (t.s.n., pp. 56-57, August 5, 1971).

The third charge concerns the resignation of the four (4) individual
complainants allegedly made under threats of management that should
private respondents do not resign, the establishment would be closed.
Management refutes this accusation and counters that their re­signation
was voluntary and of their own free will.

The Hearing Examiner of the Court of Industrial Relations found the
petitioner establishment guilty of Unfair Labor Practice for the three
(3) charges. The Hon. Presiding Judge Ansberto Paredes affirmed the
findings of the said examiner and adopted it as the decision of the CIR.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but
was denied.

Hence, the instant Petition for Review.

Petitioner assigns six (6) errors committed by the lower court, as follows:

I

The Court of Industrial Relations erred in taking cognizance of the
instant case because it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the suit.

II

The Court of Industrial Relations erred in concluding that the herein respondents were “forced” to resign.

III

Respondents were no longer members of the union, nor was there an
employer-employee relationship when the complaint was filed on July 17,
1970 and therefore the Court of Industrial Relations erred in taking
cognizance of the case.

IV

The Court of Industrial relations erred in finding petitioners guilty of
unfair labor practice on the premise that petitioners violated the
collective bar­gaining agreement when management shared the service
charges with personnel not covered by the collective bargaining
agreement and in concluding that petitioners locked-out the members of
the union when the union demanded reimbursement (pars. 4 & 5,
Complaint).

V

The Court of Industrial Relations erred in concluding that petitioners
were guilty of unfair labor practice in that despite demands by the four
private respondents to dismiss three other employees for alleged
disloyalty to the union, petitioners failed to comply.

VI

The decision of the Court of Industrial Relations is void because it
violates the substantive provisions of Article X, Section 9 of the
Constitu­tion of the Philippines and Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of
Court.

Petitioner’s first assigned error that the CIR erred in taking
cognizance of the case, relying on the theory that though there were
violations of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, such
causes of action gave rise only for specific performance cognizable by
the ordinary courts of competent jurisdiction and not for a complaint of
unfair labor practice cognizable by the CIR, is without merit.

Petitioner’s reliance as authority on the case of Pagkakaisang
Itinaguyod etc. vs. Ang Tibay, 20 SCRA 45, where this Court enunciated
that “the violation by the employer of the terms of a collective
agreement may be redressed, not in the Court of Industrial Relations,
but in regular courts, like breaches of ordinary obligations and
contracts” is misplaced. In the Pagkakaisang Itina­guyod case
and other prior cases like Malaya Workers Union (PAFLU) et al. vs. Court
of Industrial Relations, L-17880-81, April 23, 1963, 7 SCRA 697; Baguio
Gold Mining Co. vs. Tabisola, et al., L-15265, April 27, 1962, 4 SCRA
1139; Cagalwan vs. Customs Canteen, et al., L-16031, Oct. 31, 1961, 3
SCRA 403; National Labor Union vs. Insular-Yebana Tobacco Corp.,
L-15363, July 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 924, the complaint for unfair labor
practice was dismissed by the CIR but there was still a breach by the
employer of the obligations imposed by the CBA, though not as an unfair
labor practice, and in such a situation, the employee is not entirely
bereft of any remedy for he may still go to the regular courts and there
ventilate his grievance just like in an ordinary contract or
obligation. In the case at bar, the CIR did not dismiss the complaint
for unfair labor practice and in fact found petitioner guilty of such
unfair labor practice. It was, therefore, proper for the CIR not to
dismiss the case and rightly so, assumed juris­diction thereof.

That the CIR is vested with jurisdiction to try and hear the case is
squarely ruled in Campos, et al. vs. Manila Railroad Co., et al., 5 SCRA
93 where We stated with appro­val the jurisdiction of the CIR in labor
disputes, thus:

“We may, therefore, restate, for the benefit of the bench and the
bar, that in order that the Court of Industrial Relations may acquire
jurisdiction over a controversy in the light of Republic Act No. 875,
the following circumstances must be present: (a) there must exist
between the parties an employer-employee relationship, or the claimant
must seek his reinstatement; and (b) the controversy must relate to a
case certified by the president to the CIR as one involving national
interest, or must have a bearing on an unfair labor practice charge, or
must arise either under the Minimum Wage Law. In default of any of
these circumstances the claim becomes a mere money claim that comes
under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.”

Here, the individual respondents seek reinstatement as shown by their
prayers in the complaint and here, the controversy relates to an unfair
labor practice by the employer restaurant against the individual
complainants.

Petitioner’s argument that though there was a violation of the CBA, such
violation did not constitute an unfair labor practice because there was
a conspicuous absence in the statute, the Industrial Peace Act (R.A.
No. 875) making a violation of the CBA an unfair labor practice, is
untenable.

The Industrial Peace Act enumerates what are unfair labor practices under Section 4 thereof, which reads:

“Sec. 4. Unfair labor practices. – (a) It shall be unfair labor practice for an employer:

(1) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 3;

(2) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an
employee shall not join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one
to which he belongs;

(3) To initiate, discriminate, assist or interfere with the
formation or adminis­tration of any labor organization or to contribute
financial or other support to it;

(4) To discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or dis­courage
membership in any labor organization: provided, that nothing in this
Act or in any other Act or statute of the Republic of the Philippines
shall preclude any employer from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment mem­bership
therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the
employees as provided in Section 12, but such agreement shall not cover
members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization. (As amended by Rep. Act 3350
which took effect June 17, 1961);

(5) To dismiss, discharge, or otherwise prejudice or
discriminate against an employee for having filed charges or for having
given or being about to give testimony under this Act;

(6) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees subject to the provisions of Sections 13 and 14.”

We reject petitioners’ contention that it is not legally justifiable to
maintain that a violation of the collective bargaining agreement is an
unfair labor practice for under the legal maxim “expressio unius est
exclusio alterius” (the express mention of one person, thing or
consequence is an express exclusion of all others), there is no express
mention that a CBA violation is an unfair labor practice in the list of
unfair labor practices cited above and that since the provision making
it an unfair labor practice by employers when they violate a collective
bargaining agreement was provided under Presidential Decree No. 442,
Title VI entitled “Unfair Labor Practice”, Chapter I, Article 294, any
violation of a collective bargaining agreement before the new provision
or amendment was not an unfair labor prac­tice. The prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter is to the effect that “a violation of the
provisions of the CBA is an unfair labor practice.”

A review of Our judicial rulings will show that in Pambujan Sur United
Mine Workers vs. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, the Supreme
Court, speaking through Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief
Justice, ruled that “the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations ‘shall be exclusive’ to prevent ‘unfair labor practices’ which
term embraces a refusal to bargain collectively (Sec­tion 4, par. 6 of
the Industrial Peace Act) and termination or modification of the
collective bargaining agreement (Section 13 of the Industrial Peace Act)
including inferen­tially any breach or disregard of such agreement.

In the case of Republic Savings Bank vs. CIR, 21 SCRA 261, it was held by this Court that:

“Some other members of this Court believe without necessarily
expressing approval of the way the respondents expressed their
grievances, that what the bank should have done was to refer the
letter-charge to the grievance committee. This was its duty, failing which it committed an unfair labor practice under section 4 (a) (6) of the Industrial Peace Act.
For collective bargaining does not end with the execution of an
agreement. It is a continuous process. The duty to bargain imposes on
the parties during the term of their agreement the mutual obligation ‘to
meet and confer promptly and expeditiously and in good faith xxx for
the purpose of adjusting any grie­vance or question arising under such
agreement’ and a violation of this agreement is, by sections 4(a) (6) and (b) (3) of the Industrial Peace Act an unfair labor practice.”

In the case of Security Bank Employees Union-NATU vs. Security Bank and
Trust Company, 23 SCRA 503, Justice Fernando (now Chief Justice)
speaking for the Court, said:

“It being expressly provided in the Industrial Peace Act that
unfair labor practice is committed by a labor union or its agent by its
refusal ‘to bargain collec­tively with the employer’ and this Court
having decided in Republic Savings Bank case that collective bargaining
agreement does not end with the execution of an agreement, being a
continuous process, the duty to bargain necessarily imposing on the
parties the obligation to live up to the terms of such a collective
agreement if intered into, it is undeniable that non-compliance
therewith constitutes an unfair labor practice.”

In the case of Alhambra Industries, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, 35 SCRA 550, Justice Claudio Teehankee speaking for the
Court, declared that:

“Failure on petitioner’s part to live up in good faith to the
terms of its collective bargaining agreement by denying the privileges
and benefits thereof to the fifteen drivers and helpers, its salesmen
and propagandiests was a serious violation of petitioner’s duty to bargain collectively constituted unfair labor practice in any language.”

In Shell Oil Workers’ Union vs. Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd.,
39 SCRA 276, Justice Fernando (now Chief Justice) made a categorical
reiteration:

“The Shell Company in failing to manifest fealty to what was
stipulated in an existing collective bargaining contract, was then
guilty of an unfair labor practice act.”

Then finally, in MRR Yard Crew Union vs. Philippine National Railways,
72 SCRA 88, Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Supreme Court, declared
that:

“Moreover, to deny binding force to the May 24, 1962 collective
bargaining agreement would place premium on a refusal by respondent
company to comply with the terms of said agreement – a gesture which in
the recent case of NDC vs. NDC Employees and Workers Union, We denounced
as an unfair labor practice.”

From the cases cited above and the rulings therein, it is clear that a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement per se is an unfair
labor practice act, as it constitutes a refusal to bargain collectively.
Therefore, the acts of management in allowing non-union members to
share in the distribution of service charges and locking out the
employees violative of the CBA are without question unfair labor
practices. In fact, the question as to whether or not management
violated the CBA is no longer in issue as it is deemed admitted from the
very act of management in reimbursing the union for the service charges
it gave to non-union members. This is borne out by the records of the
case as evidenced by Exhibits “3”, “4” and “5”, all proofs of the checks
paid by management to the association for reimbursement.

Now, to the second, third, fourth, and fifth assignment of errors which
question the findings of fact by res­pondent court. It is the
well-settled rule that the find­ings of fact of the CIR, if supported by
substantial evi­dence, are binding on the Supreme Court. (Alhambra
Indus­tries, Inc. vs. CIR, L-22219, Aug. 28, 1969, 29 SCRA 138). In the
absence of any convincing proof of misapprehension of facts by the CIR
or grave abuse of discretion in ascertaining the facts, as to the issues
and facts presented, and thereafter concluding that petitioner is
guilty of an unfair labor practice, the Supreme Court must affirm the
findings of fact of the court below.

The last assignment of error by the petitioner is that the court’s
decision is void because it violates the substantive provisions of
Article X of the Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of
Court.

We find no merit in petitioner’s contention that when the presiding
judge adopted the report of the Hearing Examiner as the court’s
decision, the judge reneged on his duty to personally and directly
prepare the decision, thus violating the constitutional provision of
Article X, Section 9 providing that “every decision of a court of record
shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is
based,” and Rule 36 of the Rules of Court which says that “all
judgments determining the merits of the case shall be in writing
personally and directly pre­pared by the judge, stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him and
filed with the Clerk of Court” (Sec. 1, Rule 36).

We hold that under the facts of the case at bar, peti­tioners were
neither deprived of their day in court nor was there a violation of due
process. In Gonzales vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor, 116 SCRA 573, We
ruled that “a case referred to a hearing officer or a commissioner of
the CIR fulfills the requirements of due process on the basis of which a
judgment on the merits can be rendered.” Specifically, the Court said:

“The petitioner’s claim that the order of dismissing the complaint
in NLRC (Ad Hoc) Case No. 0385 ‘does not partake of the nature of
judgment or order on the merits’ contemplated by our Rules and the
Supreme Court’ since the said order was merely based on the Fact Finding
Report of the Labor Mediator and issued ‘without the benefit of
investi­gation or presentation of evidence in support of their
respective stand,’ is also devoid of merit. In the case of Manila
Trading and Supply Co. vs. Philippine Labor Union, the Court said: When
the Court of Industrial Relations refers a case to a commissioner for
investigation, report and recommendation, and at such investigation the
parties are duly represented by counsel, heard or at least given an
opportunity to be heard, the require­ments of due process has been
satisfied even if the Court failed to set the report for hearing and a
decision on the basis of such report, with the other evidence of the
case, is a decision which meets the requirements of a fair and open
hearing.”

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED, and the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Industrial
Relations en banc subject of the instant petition for review are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Aquino, Acting C.J., (Acting Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, Acting C.J., on leave.