WATERFRONT PHILIPPINES, INC., WELLEX INDUSTRIES, INC., AND THE WELLEX GROUP, INC., PETITIONERS, V. JUDGE GENIE G. GAPAS-AGBADA, IN HER CAPACITY AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE …
DIAMANTE, F. N., J.:
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure filed by
petitioners which seeks to annul the Orders dated August 2, 2013[2] and September 30, 2013[3]
of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 100, in Civil
Case No. Q-04-52629. The dispositive portion of the August 2, 2013
Order reads, thus:
“WHEREFORE, the defendants are considered to have waived their
rights to present further evidence. They are given ten (10) days from
receipt hereof to submit their formal offer of evidence. Plaintiff is
likewise given ten (10) days from receipt of defendants’ formal offer of
evidence to comment thereto after which, the incident shall be deemed
submitted for resolution.“SO ORDERED.”[4]
The instant controversy arose from the Complaint[5]
filed by respondent Social Security System (SSS) “For Sum of Money
with Damages, With Prayer For Issuance Of A Writ Of Preliminary
Attachment” against petitioners Waterfront Philippines, Inc. (WPI),
Wellex Industries, Inc. (WII) and Wellex Group, Inc. (WGI) before the
RTC. In its Complaint, SSS alleged that on October 28, 1999, it
entered into a Three Hundred Seventy Five Million Peso
(P375,000,000.00)-“Contract of Loan with Real Estate Mortgage and
Assignment of Shares with Option to Convert to Shares of Stock,”[6]
with the petitioners. The said amount will finance the completion,
renovation and upgrading of WPI’s hotel facilities. SSS’ prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment was granted[7] by the RTC (through then Presiding Judge Marie Christine A. Jacob[8]) on June 18, 2004.
On September 16, 2004, petitioners filed a “Motion to Set
Aside Order of Attachment”. The following day, they filed an “Amended
Motion to Set Aside Order of Attachment”, praying for the setting aside
or discharge of the writ of preliminary attachment for being improperly
issued as there is no valid ground to support the same. On October 4,
2004, SSS filed its comment/opposition thereto to which a Reply dated
October 21, 2004 was filed by the petitioners. However, on January 10,
2005, the RTC denied[9] the
petitioners’ “Amended Motion to Set Aside Order of Attachment” and
consequently granted SSS a period of fifteen (15) days within which to
post a bond.
Meanwhile, petitioners WGI[10] and WII[11]
filed two separate motions to dismiss SSS’ Complaint since according
to them, the same states no cause of action, which were both denied[12] by the RTC on July 18, 2005.
Dissatisfied with the RTC’s January 10, 2005 Order, SSS filed
a Motion for Partial Reconsideration and prayed that it be allowed: 1)
to post a real property bond in lieu of a cash/surety bond; and, 2)
an extension of thirty (30) days within which to file the same.
Petitioners filed their Comment/Opposition thereto dated March 7, 2005,
to which SSS filed its Reply on March 31, 2005 and, thereafter,
petitioners’ Rejoinder dated April 15, 2005. The RTC granted[13]
SSS’ motion for partial reconsideration to which the petitioners filed
a Motion for Reconsideration dated August 25, 2005. In turn, SSS filed
its Comment/Opposition (dated October 3, 2005) to the reconsideration
pleas of the petitioners.
During the intervening time, SSS filed its Compliance (dated
September 9, 2005) with the July 18, 2005 Order of the RTC and attached
therein a list of “Identified SSS-Owned Properties to be Used as
Property Bond” with copies of certificates of title duly registered
under its name and their corresponding valuation, prepared by the SSS
Asset Management Department. A few days after or on September 12, 2005,
the RTC issued an Order[14]
approving SSS’ property bond as secured by the real properties listed in
the aforesaid Compliance and accordingly directed the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment. An “Urgent Joint Motion for
Reconsideration” was filed by the petitioners to the said Order, but the
same was withdrawn through their “Manifestation of Withdrawal” dated
October 28, 2005.
The RTC’s approval of the property bond and the subsequent
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment were brought before this
Court by the petitioners via a petition for certiorari with
urgent application for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction entitled “Waterfront Phils., Inc., et
al. vs. Judge Marie Christine Jacob and SSS” docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
91928. On March 28, 2006, this Court issued a Resolution granting
petitioners’ application for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. On August 24, 2006,[15]
this Court’s Former Fourth Division rendered a Decision granting
petitioners’ petition for certiorari thus nullifying and setting aside
the assailed RTC Orders dated June 18, 2004, January 10, 2005, July 18,
2005 and September 12, 2005. SSS appealed this Court’s pronouncement to
the Supreme Court but to no avail,[16] hence, an entry of judgment[17] was accordingly issued by the High Court on January 3, 2007.
Consequently, the case was set for hearing before the RTC. A Pre-Trial Order[18]
was issued by the RTC on August 8, 2008 after petitioners were able to
file their respective answers to the complaint and the parties, their
respective Pre-Trial Briefs.[19]
Following the presentation of its three witnesses, SSS filed its
Formal Offer of Evidence dated August 27, 2010. As stated in the RTC’s
August 3, 2010 Order, the hearing for the presentation of
petitioner’s evidence was set on October 26, 2010. On October 14,
2010, SSS received a copy of petitioners’ Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Extension of Time to Submit Judicial Affidavits asking the RTC for an
extension of fifteen (15) days or until October 15, 2010 within which to
submit the judicial affidavits of their witnesses and the RTC gave the
petitioners up to October 30, 2010 to comply thereto.
Another Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Judicial Affidavits and Motion for Postponement of Hearing[20]
dated October 14, 2010 was received by SSS from the petitioners,
praying for an extension of fifteen days from October 5, 2010 or until
October 30, 2010 within which to submit the required judicial
affidavits. Again, another Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Last Extension
to Submit Judicial Affidavits[21]
dated October 29, 2010 praying for a last extension of twenty days from
October 30, 2010 or until November 19, 2010 within which to submit the
judicial affidavits was received by SSS from petitioners. From that
time on or on November 8, 2010, the RTC granted[22]
petitioners’ Motion dated October 14, 2010 allowing a last extension of
time or until November 19, 2010 to file the required judicial
affidavits of their witnesses and setting the presentation of their
evidence on January 28, 2011, March 29, 2011 and May 17, 2011. On
December 6, 2010, the RTC simply noted[23] the filing of petitioners’ judicial affidavits for witnesses Elvira A. Ting and Lauraine San Roque.
The moment that: 1) the presentation of petitioners’ lone
witness Elvira Ting was terminated; and, 2) the Judicial Affidavit of
their first witness Lauraine San Roque was declared inadmissible (per
motion of respondent SSS), petitioners were ordered[24] to submit the judicial affidavit of their second witness on or before September 28, 2012.
On September 26, 2012, SSS received a copy of petitioners’
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Postponement of Hearing and Motion for
Extension to Submit Judicial Affidavit[25]
begging that the hearing set on October 05, 2012 be reset to November
23, 2012. They also pleaded that they be given an extension of up to
November 16, 2010, (instead of the September 28, 2012 deadline
previously advanced by the RTC), to submit the judicial affidavit of
their witness.
In the meantime, the hearing for the continuation of
petitioners’ evidence was reset on April 26, 2013 and May 31, 2013.
Conspicuously however, the judicial affidavit of petitioners’ second
witness has been nonexistent yet.
On May 28, 2013, SSS got hold
of petitioners’ Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Postponement of Hearing
dated May 28, 2013 requesting that the hearing be reset to July 5, 2013
or August 2, 2013 for the presentation of their second witness.
Come the August 2, 2013 at 8:30 (in the morning) hearing,
SSS’ counsel appeared but without knowledge that there was an Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion for Postponement of Hearing dated July 22, 2013[26]
to postpone the August 2, 2013 to September 27, 2013. Impatient with
the absence of petitioners’ counsel coupled with her continuous failure
to submit the required judicial affidavit, not to mention petitioners’
successive motions for postponement of hearing, SSS’ counsel (who
extremely disapproved the postponement of the August 2, 2013 hearing),
moved that the right of petitioners to present additional evidence be
considered waived, which was granted by the the RTC in its Order dated
August 2, 2013. With the denial of petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration,[27] they are now before Us via the present recourse and basically wanted Us to rule on whether
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in declaring them to have waived their right to
present evidence.[28]
We agree with the petitioners’ assertion that due process was
not accorded upon them since they were unjustly deprived of their right
to present evidence to support their cause.
It is the policy of the Court to afford party-litigants the
amplest opportunity to enable them to have their cases justly
determined, free from the constraints of technicalities. Since rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice, it is well recognized that this Court is empowered to suspend
its operation, or except a particular case from its operation, when the
rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the
ends of justice. Oft-cited is the rule that it is a far better and more
prudent course of action for a court to excuse a technical lapse and
afford the parties a review of the case on the merits to attain the ends
of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a
grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a
miscarriage of justice.[29]
Matter of factly, the High Court in Go v. Tan,[30] relaxed the application of the Rules and gave a chance to the movant to present evidence, viz:
“The fundamental purpose of procedural rules is to afford each
litigant every opportunity to present evidence on his behalf in order
that substantial justice is achieved. Court litigations are primarily
for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by
which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is
the best way to ferret out such truth. The dispensation of justice and
vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by
technicalities.“If petitioner will not be given a chance to air his side or raise his defenses vis-a-vis respondents’ claims for damages which were awarded to them by the trial court ex parte,
the same may result in injustice to him. We are, therefore, convinced
that setting aside the order of default and the judgment by default of
the lower court is in order. Although respondents Michael Tan and his
mother have been evicted in the premises, there still remains a
controversy regarding damages allegedly sustained by them by reason of
petitioner’s alleged illegal acts. By conducting a full blown trial,
both parties will be able to present their evidence, thus affording them
the opportunity to enforce and protect their respective rights.”
In the case at bench, We find acceptable the petitioners’ justification why they failed to present their evidence, thus:
“61. While petitioners have previously asked for postponements,
these postponements were granted by the former Judge precisely since
they were anchored on meritorious grounds. The Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
to Postpone the 02 August 2013 hearing is likewise founded on
meritorious ground—the unavailability of petitioners’ last witness who
was still in the USA for medical treatment and who was not given ample
notice. In the case at bar, there are circumstances that justify
postponement but such notwithstanding, petitioners’ Motion was denied.“62. It is worth pointing out that the 02 August 2013 hearing
was set by the Court without conferring with the parties after the
appointment of Assisting Presiding Judge. Due to short notice, it is
beyond petitioners control that their witness could not make it to said
hearing. However, petitioners moved for resetting on the following
month, particularly on 27 September 2013, which was a reasonable time
from 02 August 2013.”[31]
We give the stamp of approval to the foregoing explanation put
forward by the petitioners. It did not evince an intent to delay the
proceedings nor of lack of interest to prosecute the case. In the same
manner that We are convinced with the following adequate grounds laid
down by petitioners in support of their stand (that the alleged delays
in the proceedings cannot be attributed solely upon them). We find their
posture worth quoting, to wit:
“70.b. Respondent Judge made an erroneous and unfair conclusion
that the defendants failed to present Mr. Magadia as witness since
October 26, 2010.“From said statement, it would appear that there was no movement
in the proceedings since October 26, 2010, which is not only
inaccurate but downright unfair.“It bears stressing that during the interim period from October
2010 up to the present, WPI presented the testimony of Ms. Elvira A.
Ting. In fact, the re-cross examination on her was terminated only last
August 2012. Also, the postponement of the hearings cannot be all
attributed to petitioners. As noted in the 02 August 2013 Order, the ‘subsequent
scheduled hearings were cancelled due to the promotion of the then
Presiding Judge Marie Christine A. Jacob as Justice to the Court of
Appeals and the promotion of then Acting Presiding Judge Ma. Belen
Ringpis-Liban as Justice to the Court of Tax Appeals.‘ It should
be noted likewise that the delay in the proceedings may be attributed
also to some external factors such as the leave of then Honorable
Judge; the annual Court inventory; and recently, by the Mandatory
Encoding Period for Quezon City Trial Courts from April 16-30 under OCA
Circular No. 52-2013. It would be unfair to put all the blame to
petitioners.“70.c. While the case was filed in 2004, it should be noted
that delays may also be attributed to private respondent who took more
than a year before complying with the posting of a bond; the suspension
of the proceedings due to the issuance of the Preliminary Injunction by
the Court of Appeals, the continuance moved by SSS due to the
unavailability of its witness and its non-conformity with the required
Judicial Affidavit form.”[32]
We can easily peruse from the foregoing that the series of
postponements sought by petitioners and counsel appeared to be justified
and were not vexatious and oppressive as wrongly conveyed by the SSS.
The intention and willingness of petitioners to present evidence can be
gleaned from the above-quoted unavoidable meritorious circumstances.
Withal the events of postponements, however, the indispensability of
substantial justice commands that they should have been given their day
in court. The grant of a reasonable continuance would have been more
realistic judicial discretion to search for the truth, than to have a
speedy disposition of the case at the expense of a fundamental right.
While it is true that the right to present evidence may be waived
expressly or impliedly, it cannot be said that petitioners had waived
said right in the case at bench.
We find it helpful to mention that the High Court, in De Guzman v. Elbinias, et al.,[33]
has consistently maintained that “although a speedy determination of an
action implies a speedy trial, speed is not the chief objective of a
trial. Careful and deliberate consideration for the administration of
justice, a genuine respect for the rights of all parties and the
requirements of procedural due process and an adherence to the Court’s
standing admonition that the discretion given judges in the granting or
denial of motions for postponement and the setting aside or denial of
orders previously issued ‘should always be predicated on the
consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or of
the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be
served thereby’. These are more important than a race to end the trial.”
In PLDT v. Genovea,[34]
the Supreme Court re-opened the case in order that PLDT can introduce
evidence. Verily, in the case at bench, We have no reason not to give
a chance to petitioners its day in court for presentation of evidence.
Lest We be misunderstood, this Court’s concurrence with PLDT v. Genovea case is really nothing more than being faithful with the tenet of substantial justice.
It may not be amiss to point out that the amount involved in
the case at bench is extremely high and to hastily declare the
petitioners to have waived to present further evidence (as what the RTC
did) will unjustly deprive them to fully ventilate their claim and to
adduce evidence in support of their position. Emphasis should be made
that what should guide judicial action is the principle that a
party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the
merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life,
liberty, honor or property to technicalities. The rules of procedure
should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed.[35]
Unwittingly, the RTC’s action does not inspire public confidence in
the administration of justice, hence, We cannot acquiesce to its
findings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The Orders dated August 2, 2013 and September 30, 2013 of the Quezon
City Regional Trial Court, Branch 100, in Civil Case No. Q-04-52629 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Resultantly, the case at bench is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Lantion[*] (Acting Chairperson) and Sadang, JJ., concur.
[*] Vice J. C. C. Librea-Leagogo per Office Order No. 160-14-AGT dated April 24, 2014
[1] Rollo, pages 3-47
[2] Id. at 49-51
[3] Rollo, page 48
[4] Order dated August 2, 2013, page 3; Rollo, page 51
[5] Rollo, pages 60-83
[6] Id. at 90-102
[7] Id. at 169-170
[8] Now, a member of this Court
[9] Id. at 171
[10] Rollo, pages 163-168
[11] Id. at 156-162
[12] Id. at 172-173
[13] Id. at 172-173
[14] Id. at 174
[15] Rollo, pages 176-201
[16] Id. at 202
[17] Id. at 203
[18] Id. at 248-247
[19] Id. at 231-242
[20] Id. at 300-303
[21] Id. at 304-307
[22] Rollo, page 310
[23] Id. at 311
[24] Id. at 312
[25] Id. at 313-316
[26] Rollo, pages 248-250
[27] Id. at 48
[28] Petition, pages 16-17; Rollo, pages 28-29
[29] Go v. Tan, G.R. No. 130330, September 26, 2003
[30] Supra
[31] Petition, page 19; Rollo, page 21
[32] Petition, page 22; Rollo, page 24
[33] G.R. No. 57395, April 17, 1989, citing Amberti v. CA, 89 SCRA 240
[34] 116 SCRA 395
[35] Tan v. Dumarpa, G.R. No. 138777, September 22, 2004