JOSE MANALANG, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. ARTEX DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari by Jose E. Manalang, Marcelino de Leon and
Bernardo Lactao to set aside the resolution en
banc of the Court of
Industrial Relations (CIR) dated September 14, 1962 in case 2490-ULP,^[1]
which reversed the decision of Presiding Judge Jose S. Bautista of June 30,
1962.  The latter decision ordered the
respondent Bagong Buhay
Labor Union (hereinafter referred to as the BBLU) to readmit the complainants
to active membership in the said union,
and directed the respondent Artex Development
Co., Inc, (hereinafter referred to as the Company) to reinstate them to their
former positions, with back wages from the date of their dismissal to the time of their actual
reinstatement, and with all the
appertaining rights and privileges.

The facts that gave rise to
the present petition are not
disputed.  The Federation of Free Workers
(FFW), in a letter dated May 3, 1960, informed the Company that a “great majority” of the latter’s employees had
organized the Artex Free Workers (FFW),^[2] that this new union had affiliated with the
FFW, and that a set of proposals was being formulated as the basis of a
prospective collective bargaining agreement between the said new union and the
Company.  In another letter dated May 4, 1960, the FFW asked the Company to give a
“thorough study” to the collective bargaining proposals therein
enclosed.  In its reply of May 12,
1960, the Company
stated that it had “nothing against your union”, but called attention
to the fact that it had already recognized the BBLU, which union had then been
in existence for four years, and with which it had concluded two collective
bargaining agreements.  FFW then requested
that it be furnished a copy of the
second collective bargaining agreement. 
When the Company did not honor the request, the FFW gave a copy of its
May 4
letter to the Conciliation Service,
Regional Office 3 of the Department
of Labor, on the basis of which a labor conciliator scheduled conferences
between the FFW and the Company.  After the
conferences held on May 12, 17, and 30, and June 9, 1960 in the office of the labor conciliator, the
latter ordered the Company to furnish the FFW a copy of the collective
bargaining agreement.  This order was not complied with.

In the meantime, the
board of directors of the BBLU held a special meeting on June 1,
1960, for the
purpose of taking ap­propriate steps against the petitioners herein who were
employees of the Company and members of the union.  The board found that the petitioners had
“affiliated themselves with another labor union (Artex
Free Workers [FFW]), without first
terminating their membership” with the BBLU and “without the
knowledge of the officers” of the latter union. 
On the same date, the board adopted a resolution, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:

“WHEREAS, the union after due investigation, has found Messrs.
Jose Manalang, Marcelino de
Leon and Bernardo Lactao, guilty of disloyalty
to the union and for the reason, have been expelled
from the union, thereby losing their
good standing in the union.

“WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provisions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement above mentioned, and in order to promote sanctity in the
observance of the Collective Bargaining Agreements, it has been resolved, as it
is hereby resolved, to inform the management of the Artex
Development Co., Inc., of the loss of good standing as members of the Bagong Buhay Labor Union of said Messrs. Manalang,
de Leon and Lactao, by virtue of which they should be
dismissed, as it is now resolved to ask the Company to dismiss them;

“Be it resolved further that the Company be furnished a copy of this resolution, and that the said
firm be advised that the union will be compelled to take such action as maybe
necessary to protect its interest, in case the Management should fail to comply
with its contractual obligation above-mentioned.” (emphasis supplied)

After receipt of the above resolution, the Company, having in
mind the closed-shop stipulation in the collective bargaining agreement, sent three identical letters,
all dated June 3, 1960, to the petitioners, advising them of the termination
of their employment effective June 3, 1960.

On July 20, 1960
the petitioners lodged an unfair labor
practice charge with the CIR against the Company and the BBLU. 
They alleged that they “were engaged in concerted
activities, more particularly to form the Artex Free
Workers (FFW) due to the inability and
refusal of the respondent company to furnish them with [a copy of] an
alleged collective bargaining agree­ment between the respondent labor union and
respondent company”, and that without any valid cause but “due to
said concerted activities, the company dismissed them.”

In its answer, the
respondent BBLU admitted that the petitioners
were bona fide
members thereof, but averred that they were expelled from the union, after due investigation, for acts of disloyalty.  In its answer, the Company denied the charge. 
It alleged that on March 4, 1960, it entered into a collective bargaining
agreement with the BBLU after the latter had satisfactorily demonstrated
majority representation; that the
petitioners were dismissed at the behest of the BBLU due to loss of
their good standing as union members;
and that refusal on the part of the Company of the union’s demand for the
dismissal of the petitioners would constitute a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and might result in a union strike or in other punitive
acts against the Company.

After due trial, Presiding
Judge Bautista rendered judgment
finding that the petitioners were not aware of the existence of the collective bargaining agreement, much less of its
closed-shop provision, and holding, in
consequence, that they were not bound by it.  The decision observed the
provision in question was “merely
a cloak to cover the
discriminatory dismissal of the complaints, due to their union
activities in forming another union, which
the company did not like.”
The Company was ordered to reinstate
the petitioners, with back wages from the
date of their dismissal and “all the rights and privileges formerly
ap­pertaining thereto”.  The BBLU was
ordered to readmit them to active
membership therein.

Thereafter the CIR, en banc, set aside the judgment. 
It found that the failure of the Company to furnish the peti­tioners
a copy of the collective bargaining agreement did not constitute an unfair
labor practice because furnishing them with any and all information on union
matters was the obligation of the BBLU; that the Company in dismissing them
merely complied with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement; and
that if there was any party liable under Republic Act 875, it was the BBLU and
not the Company.  The CIR, en banc,
concluded with the observation that “if warranted and desired, they [the petitioners] may file a case
against respondent labor union [BBLU] under the provisions of the Magna Charta
of Labor, unless it could be said that there
is already res judicata.”

Hence the present
recourse.

The validity of the collective
bargaining agreement of March 4, 1960
is not here assailed by the
petitioners.  Nor do they deny that they were members of the BBLU prior to March 4, 1960, and
until they were expelled from the union. 
That the BBLU was the
lawful and proper bargaining representative of the non-supervisory employees of
the Company, is not traversed.

The issue tendered for
resolution, by the petitioner’s formulation, is:  “Is it just and
lawful to enforce a contract [referring to the collective bargaining agreement]
against the employees who were unduly, unreasonably and illegally denied
knowledge of the contents thereof?” More particular reference is made by
them to the closed-shop provision of the agreement that states, “All
employees of the COMPANY must be members in good standing of the UNION as a
condition of continued employment with the COMPANY”, which provision, the
petitioners claim, they were totally unaware of.  They argue, in essence, that because they
were ignorant of the provisions of the agreement, they cannot be bound by such
agreement, and that, therefore, their dismissal from the Company on the
strength of the closed-shop provision is unlawful and constitutes an unfair
labor practice on the part of both the Company and the BBLU.

Were the petitioners really unaware of the provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement during the period from March 4, 1960, when the agreement was entered
into, to the time they organized the Artex Free
Workers which was in the following month of April?  This, in our view, is the vital issue of fact that constitutes the vertex of this
case, es­pecially because the CIR, en banc, did not make any unequivocal findings of fact
relative thereto.

A host of circumstances can be gleaned from the record that would
demonstrate persuasively that the petitioners were not unaware of the
provisions of the agreement in question prior
to their organization of the Artex Free Workers
union.

From the admitted facts that the petitioners started work­ing in the Company in December 1959,
and that they succeeded in wielding sufficient influence to persuade other
employees to join them in forming the Artex Free
Workers, we can reasonably infer
that they knew of the existence
of the first collective bargaining agreement between the BBLU and the Company,
as well especially of the fundamental provisions thereof regarding check-off or payroll
deduction of union dues and assessments, vacation and sick leaves, hospital,
medical and dental care, working hours and overtime service, union meetings,
and the duration of the ag­reement — provisions which are standard
stipulations in collective bargaining agreements
and which affect, them directly, personally and individually.  They can therefore be properly charged
with knowledge specifically of the expiry date of the agreement and, consequently, of the negotiations between the
BBLU and the Company before the said expiry date toward the execution of a second agreement – which is
the agreement in question.

Since in their petition
they do not deny that they knew of the
existence of the second agreement, it is only natural to presume
that they knew of its provisions, and that they had actually studied them in a comparative way in
order to be able to formulate the collective bargaining proposals
submitted by them (the Artex Free Workers) to the
Company on May 4, 1960.

The evidence on record is unmistakable that before the BBLU recommended the dismissal of the petitioners because they
had violated the agreement, the officials of the said union conducted an investigation of the actuations of
the petitioners.  The record does not
reveal any disavowal made by any of the petitioners of knowledge of the
closed-shop provision at any time prior to their dismissal.  Disavowal came as an afterthought and was
articulated only after they had received their notices of discharge.  Even after their dismissal, not one of them
protested either to the BBLU or the
Company.  True it is that the petitioner Manalang testified that he went to Mauricio Mariñas, personnel
manager of the Company, and protested his dismissal, but Mariñas categorically declared that Manalang
never went to see him regarding
the matter of his dismissal.

The petitioners’ further
contention that the closed-shop provision in the collective bargaining agreement is illegal because it is an unreasonable restriction of the
right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution is a futile exercise in argumentation,
as this Court has in a number of
cases sustained closed-shop as a valid
form of union security.^[3]

Finally, even if we assume, in gratia
argumentis, that the petitioners were unaware
of the stipulations set forth in the
collective bargaining agreement, since their membership in the BBLU prior
to their expulsion therefrom is undenied,
there can be no question that as long as the agreement with closed-shop
provision was in force, they were bound by it. 
Neither their ignorance of, nor
their dissatisfaction with, its terms and conditions would justify breach
thereof or the formation by them of a union of their own.  As has been aptly said, “a collective
bargaining agreement entered into by officers of a union, as agent of the members,
and an employer, gives rise to valid enforcible
contractual relations, against the
individual union members in matters that affect them peculiarly, and
against the union in matters that affect the entire membership or large classes
of its members,”^[4]
and “a union member who is employed under an agreement between the union and his employer is bound by the
provisions thereof, since it is a joint and several contract of the members of
the union en­tered into by the union as their agent.”^[5]

On the basis of all the foregoing, we do not see any unfair labor practice committed by
either the Company or the BBLU.

ACCORDINGLY, the resolution of the CIR en banc
of September 14, 1962, setting
aside the decision of the trial judge of June 30, 1962, is affirmed.  No pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
“Jose Manalang, et al., complainants vs. Artex Development
Co., Inc., et al., respondents.”

^[2]
The Artex Free Workers (FFW) was organized in April 1960.

^[3]
National Brewery & Allied Industries Labor Union of the Philippines vs.
San Miguel Philippines vs. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., et al., L-18170,
Aug, 31, 1963; Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. vs.
National Employees’ Security Union, L-9063, Dec. 21, 1956; National Labor Union vs. Aguinaldo’s Echague, L-7358,
May 31, 1955; Ang Malayang Manggagawa
ng Ang Tibay
Enterprises vs. Ang Tibay,
L-8259, Dec. 28, 1957.

^[4]
Dangel & Shriber, The
Law of Labor Unions, 1941 ed., p. 340.

^[5]
See Capra v. Local Lodge.
102 Colo. 63, cite in Dangel & Shriber, The Law of
Labor Unions, 1941 ed., p. 342.