VICTORIA JULIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. EMILIANO DALANDAN AND MARIA DALANDAN, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

Disputing the correctness of the lower court’s order of April 29,
1961 dismissing the complaint, plaintiff elevated the case^[1]
to this Court on appeal.

Plaintiff’s complaint – which defendants, by a motion to dismiss
successfully overturned in the court below – is planted upon a document. 
Annex “A” of the complaint, labeled in the national language “SALAYSAY” (Statement).  It was
in the form of an affidavit subscribed and sworn to by one Clemente Dalandan on September 8, 1950.  By the terms of this writing, Clemente Dalandan, deceased
father of defendants Emiliano and Maria Dalandan, acknowledged that a four-hectare piece of riceland in Las Piñas, Rizal belonging to Victoriana Dalandan,
whose only child as heir is plaintiff Victoria Julio, was posted as security for an obligation which
he, Clemente Dalandan,
assumed but, however, failed to fulfill. 
The result was that
Victoriana’s said land was foreclosed.  The key provisions of said
document are:^[2]

“3. Na ang lupang
palayang ito na pagaari ni
VICTORIANA DALANDAN at sa kasalukuyan
ay walang ibang tagapagmana kung di si VICTORIA JULIO, ay napafianza sa akin nuong bago
pa dumating ang huling digmaan at dahil sa hindi
ako nakatupad sa aking pananagutang
na sasagutan ng bukid niyang
ito ay naembargo ang nasabi niyang
lupa;

[That this riceland owned by VICTORIANA
DALANDAN whose sole heir is VICTORIA JULIO was posted as security for an
obligation assumed by me even before the outbreak of the last war and because I
failed to fulfill the obligation secured by her said farm the same was
foreclosed;]

“4. Na dahil dito
ay ako samakatuwid ay nanagot sa kanya
(VICTORIA JULIO), sa pagkakaembargo
ng lupa niyang
iyong kung kaya’t nagkasundo kami na ako ay nanagot
sa kanya sa pagkaembargong iyon at ipinangako ko sa kanya
na ang lupa niyang iyon na naembargo ng dahil sa aking pananagutan
ay aking papalitan ng bukid din na
may mahigit na APAT (4) na hectarea (o humigit kumulang sa APAT NA KABANG BINHI);

[That because of this, and as agreed upon between us, I accordingly
held myself liable to Victoria Julio for the foreclosure of her said land, and
I promised her that I would replace her aforesaid land which was foreclosed
because of my obligation with another farm of more than four (4) hectares, that
is, one planted to four cavanes of seedlings, more or
less;]

“5. Na hindi maaring
pilitin ang aking mga anak
(EMILIANO AT MARIA DALANDAN), na hingin
ang ani ng bukid na nabangit
sa itaas ng salaysay na
ito;

[That my children (EMILIANO AND MARIA DALANDAN) may not be forced
to give up the harvest of the farm herein?above mentioned;]

“6. Na hindi rin
maaring hingin kaaggad sa lalong
madaling panahon ang kapalit ng
bukid na may apat na kabang
binhi;

[That neither may the land – which was exchanged for the farm with
four cavanes of seedlings – be demanded
immediately;]”

Victoria Julio, in turn, joined Clemente
Dalandan in the execution of, and also swore to, the said document, in
this wise:

“Na, ako VICTORIA JULIO, na binabanggit sa itaas nito
sa salaysay ni CLEMENTE DALANDAN, ay nagpapa­tunay
na tutoong lahat ang kanyang
salaysay na iyon at tinatanggap ko ang kanyang
mga sinasabi.”

[That I, VICTORIA JULIO, mentioned in the above statement of
CLEMENTE DALANDAN, attest to the truth of, and accept, all that he stated
therein.]

Back to the complaint herein. 
Plaintiff went on to aver that the Iand of Clemente Dalandan
set forth in the document, Annex “A” of the complaint, referred to
six small parcels described in paragraph 4 thereof with a total area of barely
two hectares – “the only land owned by Clemente,
Dalandan at the time of the execution of the document”
– except fifty plots or “banigan” (saltbeds), which were previously conveyed to plaintiff’s
mother by means of pacto de retro
sale and title to which had already been
vested in the latter; that after the death of Clemente
Dalandan, plaintiff
requested from defendants, Clemente’s
legitimate and surviving heirs who succeeded in the possession of the land thus
conveyed, to deliver the same to her; that defendants
“insisted that according to the
agreement” neither delivery of the land nor the fruit thereof could
immediately be demanded, and that
“plaintiff acceded to this contention of defendants and allowed them to
continue to remain in possession” thereof; that demand have “been made upon defendants to fix the period
within which they would deliver
to the herein plaintiff the above-described parcels of land, but defendants have refused and until
now still refuse to fix a specific time within which they would deliver to
plaintiff the aforementioned parcels of land.” Predicated upon the
foregoing allegations, plaintiff prayed for judgment against defendants:

“(a) Adjudging the herein plaintiff as owner of the land described in paragraph 4 hereof;

(b) Fixing a time within which defendants should deliver the said
parcels of land to the herein plaintiff as
well as the fruits
thereof;

(c) Adjudging that upon the expiration of the said time defendants
convey and deliver to the herein plaintiff the said parcels of land as well as the fruits thereof;

(d) Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00
as attorneys’ fees;

(e) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the suit; and
granting such other relief and remedy as
may be just and equitable in the premises.”

Defendants met the complaint with a motion to dismiss grounded
on:  (1) prescription of plaintiff’s
action; (2) pendency of another suit between the same
parties for the same cause; and (3) release and/or abandonment of the claim set
forth in plaintiff’s complaint.

By its order of April
29, 1961, the lower court ruled that plaintiff’s suit, viewed either as an action for specific
performance or for the fixing of
a term, had prescribed.  Reason:  the 10-year period from the date of the
document had elapsed.  The lower court
found it unnecessary to pass
upon the other grounds for the motion to dismiss.  Hence, this appeal.

1. The threshold problem, basic to an understanding of the issue herein
involved, is the meaning to be attached to the document now under review.  Undoubtedly, had more felicitous terms been
employer the intention of the parties could easily be read.  Unfortunately, ineptness of expression exacts of us an examination of the
document.  Familiar rules of
interpretation of documents tell us that in ascertaining the intention of the
parties, the contents thereof should not be interpreted piecemeal; all parts, provisions or terms are to be considered;
each paragraph, clause or phrase must be read not in isolation, but in the
light of the entire writing; doubtful ones should be given that sense which may result from all of them,
considered as
a whole.  Such construct will be
adopted as will result from an overall view of the document itself.

It is in this perspective that we now look into the writing.  Adding
to paragraph 4 of the deed, defendants take the position that the deceased Clemente Dalandan simply
“promised” to Victoria Julio a farm of about four hectares to replace
the land of Victoriana
Dalandan (mother of Victoria Julio) which was
foreclosed.  But this view loses sight of the later
provisions thereof.  By paragraph 5, Clemente’s children may not be forced to give up the
harvest of the farm mentioned in the deed. 
This was followed by paragraph 6 which states that Victoria Julio may not immediately
demand the substitute (kapalit) for the forfeited
land.  These last two statements in the
deed express the dominant purpose of the instrument.  They convey the idea that the naked ownership
of the land in substitution was, indeed, transferred to Victoria Julio.  Else, there would have been no sense in the
proviso that the fruits as well as the physical possession of the land could
not immediately be demanded by
Victoria Julio from Clemente’s children, the herein defendants.  For, the right to demand fruits and physical
possession of property has been
known to be attributes of ownership.

The disputed complaint in paragraphs 6 and 7 thereof, in essence,
avers plaintiff’s request for the delivery of the real property; defendant
answer that “according to the agreement” neither land nor fruits therein could immediately be taken
away from them, and plaintiff’s conformity thereto; and plaintiff’s demands
that the period for delivery be fixed and
defendants’ refusal.

The allegations of the complaint just noted carry us to another
aspect of the document:  defendants’
rights over the land vis-a-vis plaintiff’s.  What rights were transmitted to defendants by
their father, Clemente Dalandan?  Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the document supply the
answer.  They are usufructuaries
for an undetermined length of time.  For
so long as that
period has not been fixed and has not elapsed, they hold the property.  Theirs is to enjoy the fruits of the land and
to hold the same as trustees of Victoria Julio. 
And this because, by the deed, Clemente Dalandan divested himself of the ownership – qualified
solely by withholding enjoyment of the fruits and physical possession.  In consequence, Clemente
Dalandan cannot transmit to his heirs, the present
defendants, such ownership.^[3] Nemo dat quod
non habet.  And then, the document is a
declaration by Clemente Dalandan,
now deceased, against
his own proprietary interests. 
Such document is binding upon his heirs.^[4]

2. But, defendants aver that recognition of the trust may not be
proved by evidence aliunde.  They argue that by the express terms of
Article 1443 of the Civil Code, “[n]o express trusts concerning an immovable
or any interest therein may be proved by parol
evidence.” This argument overlooks the fact that no oral evidence is necessary.  The express trust imposed upon defendants by
their predecessor appears in the document itself.  For, while it is true that said deed did not in definitive words institute
defendants as trustees, a duty is therein
imposed upon them – when the proper time comes – to turn over both the fruits
and the possession of the property to Victoria Julio.  Not that this view is without statutory
support.  Article 1444 of the Civil Code
states that:  “No particular words
are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.” In
reality, the development of the trust as a method of disposition of property,
so jurisprudence teaches, “seems in large part due to its freedom from
formal requirements.”^[5]
This principle perhaps accounts for the provisions in Article 1444 just
quoted.  For, “technical or
particular forms of words or phrases are not essential to the manifestation of
intention to create a trust or to the establishment thereof.”^[6]
Nor would the use of some such words as “trust” or “trustee”
be essential to the constitution of a trust, as we have held in Lorenzo vs. Posadas, 64 Phil. 353, 368.  Conversely, the mere fact that the word
“trust” or “trustee”
was employed would not necessarily prove an intention to create a
trust.  What is important is whether the trustor
manifested an intention to create the kind of relationship which in law is
known as a trust.  It is unimportant that the trustor should know that the relationship “which he
intends to create is called a trust, and whether or not he knows the precise
characteristics of the relationship which is called a trust.”^[7]
Here, that trust is effective as against defendants and in favor of the
beneficiary thereof, plaintiff Victoria Julio, who accepted it in the document
itself.^[8]

3. Plaintiff is not
to be handicapped by a lack of a clear statement as to the actual description of
the land referred to in the trust deed, basis of plaintiff’s cause of
action.  Obviously, the document was not
prepared by a learned scrivener.  It
imperfectly speaks of a “farm of more than four (4) hectares.” But
averment in the complaint is not lacking to clear the uncertainty as to the
identity of the land mentioned in that document.  Plaintiff points out in paragraph 4 of her complaint
that while said deed does not specifically define its boundaries, “the
parties to the said document actually refer” to the land which was “the
only land owned by Clemente
Dalandan at the time of
the execution” thereof, and which is set forth in small parcels
under said paragraph.  This allegation in
the complaint does not add any new term or stipulation to the writing.  Rather, it explains an obscurity occasioned
by lack of precision in a clumsily prepared document.  Thus it is, that authorities are not wanting
in support of the view that “in so far as the identity of land
involved” in a trust is concerned, “it has also been held that the writings, in being
considered for the purpose of
satisfying the statute of frauds, are to be considered in their setting,
and that parol
evidence is admissible to
make clear the terms of a trust
the existence of which is established by
a writing, x x x.”^[9]

4. This case having been brought before us on a motion to dismiss,
we need but stress that we are to be guided solely by the averments of the complaint.  So guided, we must say that there is
sufficient showing in the complaint that there is an acknowledgment on the part
of defendants that they hold the property not as their own, but in trust.  There is no statement in the complaint
intimating disavowal of suit trust; the complaint alleges refusal to deliver
possession.  In the sense in which we
understand the complaint to be, it cannot be said that plaintiff’s action to
recover the property thus held in trust has prescribed.  Given the fiduciary relation which according to the complaint is recognized by defendants,
the latter may not invoke the statute of limitations as a bar
to plaintiff’ action.^[10]

5. Even on the assumption that defendants have not been constituted
as trustees
under the document in question, still we arrive at the same conclusion.  For, plaintiff’s action is aimed by
an alleged owner of real property at recovery of possession thereof,
conditioned upon the fixing of the period therefor.  Since plaintiff claims ownership, possession,
in the words of this Court, “is a mere consequence of ownership.”^[11]
It may not be said that plaintiff’s suit is barred by the statute of
limitations.  She is protected by Article
1141 of the Civil Code, which reads: “Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.” We take this
view for the obvious reason that defendants’ motion to dismiss on this score is
directed at the prescription of plaintiff’s action – not on acquisitive
prescription.

6. Defendants in their brief draw attention, by way of counter
assignment of error, to their claim that this case should also be dismissed
upon the ground that there exists another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause, and on the further ground of release and/or
abandonment.

The facts bearing on this issue are: In Land Registration Case
N-706, G.L.R.O. Record No. N-7014, Court of First Instance of Rizal, defendants are applicants.  That case – so defendants aver – covers the
very same land set forth in plaintiff’s complaint.  In their opposition to that application,
herein plaintiff prayed that the same land – the subject of this suit –
(covered by Plan PSU-129514) be registered “in the names of the herein
applicants and oppositor with the specific mention
therein that the herein oppositor owns fifty salt
beds therein and having an absolute right to the use of the depositories.”
Defendants argue that if plaintiff was the real owner of the entire area,
opposition should have been presented on the whole, not merely as to fifty salt
beds.

Parenthetically, the question of ownership over the portion of
fifty salt beds had already been resolved by this Court in a decision
promulgated on February 29, 1964
in L-19101 (Emiliano Dalandan
and Maria Dalandan plaintiffs, vs. Victoria Julio, et
al., defendants).  There, this Court
affirmed the order dismissing the complaint filed by defendants herein,
plaintiffs therein, for the repurchase of fifty salt beds which were the
subject of a sale with pacto de retro
executed on September 24, 1932
by Clemente Dalandan in
favor of Victorian Dalandan, predecessor of
plaintiff.

There is no point
in the argument that an action is pending between plaintiff and
defendants.  Because, with the exception
of the fifty salt beds – which according to the complaint is not included in
the deed -plaintiff filed no opposition to defendants’ application for land registration.  Failure to so object in reference to the registration
of a bigger portion of the land, simply means that there is no case
between the parties in reference thereto in the land registration proceeding.

Not that plaintiff released or abandoned the claim to that bigger
portion.  For, there is an averment in the complaint that
an agreement exists between plaintiff and defendants to defer delivery thereof;
and that defendants thereafter refused to fix the period for such delivery.  So that, on the assumption that defendants
should succeed in obtaining title to the property in the land registration
case, such would not bar Victoria Julio from requiring them to execute a
conveyance of the property in her favor, in the event she (plaintiff herein)
prevails in the present case.  And this,
because defendants could here be declared as mere trustees of plaintiff, if the
averments of the complaint are found to be true.^[12]

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal dated April 29, 1961 dismissing the complaint is hereby reversed
and set aside, with instructions to remand the case to the court below for
further proceedings.

Costs against defendants appellees.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Castro,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Civil Case No. 324-R of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
entitled’ “Victoria Julio, plaintiff, vs. Emiliano Dalandan and Maria Dalandan
defendants.”

^[2]
All English translations of the provisions of this document are ours.

^[3]
Articles 774, 775, 776, 781, Civil Code.

^[4]
Section 32, Rule 130, Rules of Court.

^[5]
54 Am. Jur. , p. 50.

^[6]
Id.

^[7]
See Scott on Trusts, Vol. I, pp.
146-147, cited in IV Tolentino, Civil Code of
the Philippines, 1962 ed., p. 612.

^[8]
Article 1446, Civil Code.

^[9]
89 C.J.S., p. 766; emphasis supplied.  See also V Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 110-114.

^[10]
“The juridical concept of a trust, which in a broad sense involves, arises
from, or is the result of, a fiduciary relation between the trustee and the cestui que trust
as regards certain property – real, personal, funds or money, or choses in action – must not be confused with an action for
specific performance.  When the claim to
the lots in the
cadastral case was withdrawn by the respondents relying upon the assurance and
promise made in open court by Dr. Mariano Yulo in
behalf of Jose Yulo y Regalado,
the predecessor-in-interest of
the petitioners, a trust or a fiduciary relation between them arose, or
resulted therefrom, or was create, thereby.  The trustee cannot invoke the statute of
limitations to bar the action
and defeat the right of the cestui clue
trustent.” Pacheco vs. Arro, 85 Phil. 505, 514-515.

“The action brought by the
plaintiffs is clearly an action for the specific conveyance of the property
registered in the name of defendants’ predecessor in interest.  The deceased vendor was issued the certificate of title
for and in behalf, and in trust for the benefit, of the plaintiffs.  The action is one to compel a trustee to
convey the property registered in his name intrust
for the benefit of the cestui que trust, and the same does not prescribe,
” Manalang vs. Canlas,
94 Phil. 776, 777-778, citing cases.

“Prescription cannot be set up
as a defense in an action that seeks to recover property held in trust for the
benefit of another.  Neither could laches be set up as a defense in the case at bar, it being
similar to prescription.” Cuison vs. Fernandez, 56 O.G. No. 33, pp. 5162,
5164.

“And while implied or
constructive trust prescribes in 10 years, the rule does not apply where a
fiduciary relation exists and the trustee recognizes the trust.  Continuous recognition of a resulting trust precludes any
defense of laches in a suit to declare and enforce
the trust.  “De Buencamino
vs. De Matias, L-19397, April 30, 1966.

^[11]
Atun vs. Nuñez, 97
Phil. 762, 764.

^[12]
Manalang vs. Canlas,
supra.