ANTONIO B. JUSTO, PETITIONER, VS. THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND/OR THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND THE NATIONAL LIBRARY, RESPONDENTS.

The petitioner, Antonio B. Justo, was a
Senior Librarian of respondent National Library who on March 31, 1975, filed a claim for compensation
with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, Department of Labor, for his
illness of pulmonary tuberculosis which caused him to stop working since July 30, 1974.  Petitioner’s claim was denied by the Regional
Office No. 4 in a communication dated August
21, 1975, on the ground that the alleged illness of the claimant
was “not directly caused or either aggravated by the nature of your
employment with respondent” the National Library.  (p. 20, rollo)

A letter dated October
1, 1975, was sent by petitioner praying that his case be reopened
and that he be given the opportunity to present his evidence.  (p. 21, ibid.) The Assistant Chief of Section
of Regional Office No. 4 in an order dated March 22, 1976, denied the reconsideration for lack of
merit, and elevated the record of the case to the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission.  In a decision dated March 25, 1976, signed by Associate
Commissioners Dr. Herminia Castelo-Sotto
and Eugenio Sagmit, Jr.,
the order of dismissal of the claim of petitioner was affirmed.  (pp. 25-26, ibid.)

Hence this Petition for review.

Admitting that petitioner and respondent employer were not given the
opportunity of presenting their respective evidence at a formal hearing, the
Solicitor General in his Comment filed for and in behalf of the respondents,
recommends that this case be remanded to the Secretary of Labor who took over
the functions of the defunct Workmen’s Compensation Commission, for further
proceedings.

We hold, however, that on the basis of the pleadings before Us
the Court can decide on petitioner’s claim and terminate the matter here and
now.  The law being in favor of
petitioner, humane reasons aimed at promoting justice and the general welfare
of the working man justify the rendition of a decision on the merits at this
stage rather than the return of the case to the Secretary of Labor for further
proceedings as suggested by the Solicitor General.  The niceties and refinements of technical
rules on procedure must give way to effect substantial justice to the herein
petitioner-claimant.

Respondents admit that petitioner was employed with respondent
National Library, Republic of the Philippines,
and that he stopped working on July
30, 1974, due to pulmonary tuberculosis.  On this, We quote from respondents’ Comment:

“The records and personal file of petitioner with
respondent-employer National Library are more than sufficient to establish
petitioner’s claim that he stopped working on July 30, 1974 due to his ailment.  His Daily Time Record shows absence from work
at the National Library on July 30,
1974.  Certified true copies
of petitioner’s Daily Time Record are hereto attached as Annex 1 hereof; the
precise date of petitioner’s absence on July
30, 1974 having been marked as Annex 1-A.” (p. 39, ibid.)

The nature of the illness of petitioner cannot indeed be disputed
as it was diagnosed by Dr. Tomas C. Morales of the Quezon
Institute as per Physician’s Report to be moderately advanced pulmonary
tuberculosis, bilateral.  (p. 22,
ibid.) Petitioner’s confinement at the Quezon
Institute is likewise confirmed by the “Medicare Benefits Voucher”
dated October 15, 1974,
covering petitioner’s hospitalization from August 3, 1974 to September
17, 1974.  (p. 23, ibid.) The
Physician’s Report shows that as of April
11, 1975 petitioner herein was still undergoing treatment for
his advanced pulmonary tuberculosis and was incapacitated to return to work.

Having knowledge of the illness of petitioner and of the fact
that the latter stopped reporting to the Office as of July 30, 1974, it was
incumbent upon respondent employer to file with the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission a notice of the employee’s illness (Sec. 37 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, Act 3428 as amended) and controvert the right to compensation
either, on or before the fourteenth day of disability or within ten days after
it had knowledge of the alleged illness (Sec. 45, ibid.).  Failing to comply with the foregoing requirements
of the law, respondent employer renounced its right to controvert the claim of
petitioner, and perforce is obligated to compensate the latter for his
disabling illness.

“Sec. 2.  Grounds for compensation.- When an
employee suffers personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment, or contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly
caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the result of the nature
of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the
persons hereinafter specified.  x x x” (Workmen’s Compensation
Act, Act No. 3428, as amended)

“Sec. 45.  Compensation, how payable.- x x x If the employer or insurance
carrier does not controvert the injured workman’s right to compensation, such
employer or insurance carrier shall, either on or before the fourteenth day
after disability or within five days after the employer first has knowledge of
the accident, begin paying compensation x x x .” (Act 3428, as amended)

In a host of cases, among the latest of which are Arzadon vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission
and Republic of the Philippines, L-42404, December 8, 1976, and Catibog, et. al. vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission and Republic of the Philippines, L-43416, December 8, 1976, this
Court held that failure to controvert results in the loss of non-jurisdictional
defenses and an ultimate admission of compensability.^[1]

Respondent employer cannot escape liability by asserting that no
notice was given by petitioner of his claim for compensation, for failure to
give such notice assuming that there was no such notice, is not a bar to the
proceedings for compensation if it is shown that the employer had knowledge of
the illness, and such was the case here. 
(Sec. 27, Workmen’s Compensation Act)

Respondent National Library had, at the most, ten days from July
30, 1974, the date when its employee Antonio B. Justo
ceased to work, within which to controvert the employee’s right to
compensation; having neglected to do so, it must suffer the consequences
expressly provided for in the law and which time and again have been
emphatically stressed by this Court as indicated above.

The finding of Regional Office No. 4, which was affirmed by
respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission, that the illness of Antonio B. Justo was not directly caused or aggravated by the nature
of the employment with respondent National Library runs counter to the
presumption established in Sec. 44 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, that in
the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, a claim comes within the
provisions of the Act.

Tuberculosis is not an instantaneous disease; it is an imperceptible
disease caused by a germ which is breathed into and feeds on the lungs or taken
with food.  It is medically accepted that
exposure to dust and dirt is a predisposing cause of tuberculosis and tends to
produce fibrosis of the lungs which weakens resistance to any latent
tuberculosis infection and reactivates that infection.^[2]

The pulmonary tuberculosis of petitioner occurred in the course
of his employment and was aggravated by the nature of his work.  As a Senior Librarian in the government-owned
National Library, the biggest in the country, petitioner had to handle, sort
out, stack up volumes and volumes of books and loads of documents, old and new,
and in the daily process, he had contact with mold, mildew, and dust-polluted
air which, inhaled constantly, necessarily infected his lungs and weakened his
bodily resistance to disease more particularly to pulmonary tuberculosis.  Undoubtedly, petitioner’s ailment is
work-connected, work-aggravated and compensable.^[3]

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of respondent Workmen’s
Compensation Commission is set aside and respondent National Library is hereby
ordered to pay petitioner, ANTONIO B. JUSTO, the following amounts:

(1)  
Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos as disability
compensation; and

(2)  
Six Hundred (P600.00) Pesos as attorney’s fees.

It shall likewise pay the administrative fee of Sixty-one (P61.00)
Pesos.

So Ordered.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., and Martin, JJ., concur.

^[1]
General Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compen­sation Commission, et
al., 109 Phil. 60, per Labrador, J., citing Victoria’s Milling Co., Inc. vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, et al., L-10533, May 13, 1957 and Tan
Lim Te vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, et al., 104 Phil. 522;
La Mallorca vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, L-29315, Nov. 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 613, 619 per Fernando, J., citing Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Com­mission,
99 Phil. 238 and many others; Dangue vs. Franklin
Baker Co. of the Philippines, 107 Phil. 1083; Laron vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission and Republic of the Philippines, L-43344,
Sept. 29, 1976; Dinaro vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission and Republic of the Philippines, L-42457, March 31,
1976, 70 SCRA 292, 295-296; Security Services Unlimited Inc. vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, et al., 69 SCRA 269; Domingo Vallo
vs. Workmen’s Compen­sation Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines, L-41816, October 29, 1976.

^[2]
Gray, Attorney’s Textbook of Medicine, 1940 Ed. p. 639; Valencia vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission and the City of Manila, L-41554, July 30, 1976 citing
Grain Handling Co., Inc. vs. Sweeney 102 F. (2d) 464, Jour. A.M.A., Vol.
115, No. 23, Dec. 7, 1940, p. 2022.

^[3]
Blue Bar Coconut Co., et al. vs. Boo, 95 Phil. 867; Blue Bar Coconut Co.
vs. Reyes and Braza, 95 Phil. 959; Koppel
(Phil.) Inc. vs. Javellana, L-19926, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 673; Batangas Transportation Company vs. Perez, L-19522, August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 793; Manila
Railroad Company vs. Vda. de Chavez, L-20103, Sept, 30, 1964, 12 SCRA 142; National
Development Company vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al.,
L-21724, April 27, 1967, 19
SCRA 861; Caltex (Phils.)
Inc. vs. Derpo and WCC, L-19698, January 31,
1966, 16 SCRA 77; Manila Railroad Company vs. Perez and WCC, L-20171,
June 29, 1965, 14 SCRA 504; Arzadon vs. WCC
and Republic of the Philippines, Bureau of Public Schools, supra.