THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MIGUEL BALUYOT Y DULAY, PABLO PINCA Y NARCA AND ANTONIO BALINJARI Y NAVAL, ALIAS TONY BALUYOT, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

This is an automatic
review of the decision rendered on October 7, 1970 by the Circuit Criminal Court of the Fifth Judicial District holding sessions in Malolos, Bulacan (Judge Abelardo M. Dayrit, presiding), convicting the defendants Miguel Baluyot y Dulay, Pablo Pinca y Narca and Antonio Balinjari
y Naval, alias Tony Baluyot, of the crime of robbery
with homicide and sentencing each and all of them to death, “with the
other accessories of the law; to proportionately indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P12,000.00; to correspondingly pay the said heirs by way of moral and exemplary
damages in the amount of P20,000.00, proportionately; and similarly, to
proportionately pay the costs of these proceedings.”

The information under
which the aforenamed defendants were charged reads as
follows:

“The undersigned
Provincial Fiscal accuses Miguel Baluyot y Dulay, Pablo Pinca y Narca and Antonio Balinjari y
Naval, alias Tony Baluyot of the crime of robbery
with homicide, penalized under the provisions of Art. 294, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

“That on or about the
6th day of August 1970, in the Municipality of Malolos,
Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said
accused Miguel Baluyot y Dulay, Pablo Pinca
y Narca and Antonio Balinjari
y Naval, alias Tony Baluyot, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, take and rob money from Gerry Sureta alias Marcelino Carceles y Abasola, then driving
a taxi marked AIRLANE with plate No. 14-97, 40-TX 870 (TX-9345 s/69), to the
damage and prejudice of the said Gerry Sureta
alias Marcelino Carceles y Abasola; that simultaneously, on the occasion of or during
the commission of robbery, to enable them to take, steal and carry away the
said money, the said accused, in furtherance of their conspiracy, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation and armed with a deadly weapon (dagger) fan-knife, did
attack, assault and stab the said Gerry Sureta alias Marcelino Carceles y Abasola, hitting him in the neck, thereby inflicting serious wounds (stab wounds), which directly caused the
death of said Gerry Sureta alias Marcelino
Carceles y Abasola.

“That in the commission of this crime, the following
aggravating circumstances were present, to wit: 
(1) nighttime, (2) craft and (3) abuse of superior strength.”

Upon arraignment on September 28, 1970, all the accused, assisted by attorney de
oficio, Atty. Oscar Torres, pleaded not guilty
to the information.  The following day –
September 29 – when the case was called for trial, the prosecution started
presenting its evidence.  The accused
were assisted by the same attorney de oficio,
Atty. Oscar Torres, who manifested that he was appearing as counsel for the
accused in that day’s trial only.  The
prosecution thereupon called, as
its first witness, Dr. Ricardo V. Evangelista, a medico-legal officer of the
Provincial Hospital of Malolos, Bulacan.  Among other things, Dr. Evangelista
identified the post-mortem findings on the deceased Marcelino
Carceles y Abasola alias
Gerry Sureta (Exh. A, p. 4, t.s.n., September 29, 1970-Bacani) and the
diagram he prepared in connection with the said post-mortem findings (Exh. A-1, Idem.).

Trial was continued the
following day, September 30, 1970.  The accused
were this time assisted by another counsel de oficio,
Atty. Godofredo
Linsangan.  At
this hearing, the prosecution called on its second witness, one Democrito Mendoza, a corporal of the police force of Malolos, Bulacan.  Among other things, Corporal Mendoza
identified the first accused Miguel Baluyot and the
statement given by the latter to the police
(Exh. B, p. 2, t.s.n.,
Sept. 30, 1970, Idem.).  The same witness also identified the third
accused Antonio Balinjari
y Naval, alias Tony Baluyot, and the state­ment given
by said accused to the police (Exh. C, p. 3, t.s.n., Idem.).  The last witness presented by the
prosecution on this day was Guillermo R. Cruz, patrolman of the Malolos Police Force. 
Among other things, this witness identified the second accused Pablo Pinca y Narca and the statement
given by the said accused to the police
(Exh. D, p. 9, t.s.n.,
Idem.).

Thereafter,
the continuation of the trial was reset for October
7, 1970.  At
this hearing, the accused were assisted by another counsel de oficio, Atty. Eduardo Villafuerte, who was appointed by the trial court after the
accused informed it that they had no lawyer. 
Then the trial court asked the new counsel de oficio what
his pleasure was, and the latter requested that he be given a few minutes
within which to confer with the accused. 
The trial court gave him
twenty (20) minutes within which to “consummate” his conference.  Accordingly, when the session was resumed, Atty. Villafuerte
manifested that after conferring with the accused, they intimated … their
desire to withdraw their former plea of not guilty and to substitute in lieu thereof the plea of
guilty to the offense charged.”

Without inquiring from
the prosecution what its stand was on the motion of counsel for the accused,
the trial court, addressing itself to all the accused, said:

“COURT

“You have heard
the manifestations of counsel.  Do you
now affirm the truthfulness and correctness of the manifestation of counsel to
the effect that you now desire to withdraw your former plea of not guilty and
to substitute the same with that of guilty to the offense charged?

“Q
– Miguel Baluyot
y Dulay?

“A  – Yes,
your Honor.

“Q
– Pablo Pinca
y Narca?

“A  – Yes,
your Honor.

“Q – Antonio Balinjari y
Naval?

“A  – Yes,
your Honor.

“Q – Are you now ready to hear your sentence?

“A  – Yes,
your Honor.

“Alright” (pp. 2-3, t.s.n.,
October 7,
1970, Placido).

Then and there, and
without much ado, the trial court dictated in open court its decision under
review, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court declares
the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
information (Art. 294, Par. (1), Revised Penal Code) and in view of the
attendance of the lone mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty to
the offense charged and the presence of three (3) generic aggravating
circumstances, one of which was necessarily offset by the lone mitigating circumstance of
the said voluntary plea of Guilty, as prescribed in Art. 64 of the Revised
Penal Code, the Court is constrained to impose upon each of the accused the DEATH PENALTY, with the
other accessories of the law; to proportionately indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P12,000.00; to correspondingly
pay the said heirs by way of moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00, proportionately; and similarly, to
proportionately pay the costs of these proceedings ….”

Before this COURT, the accused are represented, by duly
designated counsel de oficio, Atty.
Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.  In the brief he filed on December 6, 1972, counsel
assigned only one error, to wit: 
“The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellants and
imposing the supreme penalty on the basis alone of their plea of guilty to the
information and the aggravating circumstances alleged therein without the court
ascertaining whether or not there was evidence to support the existence of such
aggravating circumstances”, and prayed for “the remand of the case
for further trial in the lower court.”

On March 28, 1973, Acting Solicitor General Hector G. Fule, Assistant Solicitor General Jaime M. Lantin and Solicitor Reynato S. Puno, filed a manifestation, which has been considered as appellee’s brief, virtually joining the cause of the
defendants-appellants by enumerating in one page a long chain of cases previously
decided by this COURT, and praying that the decision under review be vacated
and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

WE have painstakingly reviewed, the
record of this case and WE find both the lone error assigned by appellants and
the manifestation of the Solicitor General well-taken.

Hence, WE set aside the decision of the trial court.

To start with, the court a quo did not even
ascertain for itself whether the accused completely understood the precise
nature of the charge and the meaning of the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime, craft and abuse of superior strength as having attended the
commission of the crime, so as to obviate any doubt as to the possibility that
they have misunderstood the nature and gravity of the charge to which they were
pleading guilty.  The trial court did not
conduct a dialogue with the accused on their educational attainment especially
considering that a cursory perusal of their signatures on the statements they
gave to the Malolos Police Force (Exhs.
A, B and C) tends to show that they have very little or scanty education.  More­over, from the transcript, WE have noted
that after the arraignment, trial was held on three dates and on each day the
accused were assisted by three (3) different counsel de oficio.  In
the hearing of October 7, 1970 – the day the decision under review was rendered
– the counsel de oficio who assisted
the accused was designated by the trial court only after the case was called
for trial, i.e., after the accused had informed the trial court that they did
not have a lawyer.  Under these
circumstances, it is not unreasonable to assume that said counsel de oficio proceeded to trial without first fully
investigating the facts of the case and that his interview with the accused,
even if it lasted for twenty (20) minutes as the record insinuates, was not,
and could not have been sufficient to enable him to acquire a fairly good
grasp, much less a com­prehensive knowledge, of the relevant facts of the
case.  Incidentally, under the Rules of
this Court, whenever an attorney de oficio
is employed or assigned by the court to defend the accused at the trial, he
shall be given a reasonable time to consult with the accused and prepare his
defense before proceeding further in the case, which shall not be less than two
(2) days in case of trial (Sec. 5, Rule 116, Revised, Rules of Court).  The record, incidentally, does not show the
existence of a “good cause” to justify the trial court in shortening
the trial fixed by the Rules.

The court a quo cannot plead ignorance of the prevailing injunction directed
towards trial judges to exercise patience and circumspection in explaining to
the accused not only the nature and meaning of the accusation and the full
import of their plea of guilty but also the meaning – in layman’s language – of
the aggravating circumstances that attended the commission bf the crime,
because not very long before the rendition of the decision under review, this
COURT in three (3) cases (People vs. Apduhan, 24 SCRA
798, August 30, 1968; People vs. Arpa, 27 SCRA, 1037,
April 25, 1969; and People vs. Solacito, 29 SCRA 61,
August 25, 1969) had already enunciated its long-settled rule on the
matter.  As a matter of fact, in the Arpa case, WE had occasion to reiterate the said rule of
practice, recommended since the early cases of US vs. Talbanos
(6 Phil. 541, 543, Oct. 29, 1906) and
US vs. Rota (9 Phil. 426, Dec. 21, 1907), and thereafter set out in Sec. 5,
Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

“Plea of guilty – Determination of
punishment.  – Where the defendant
pleads guilty to a complaint or information, if the court accepts the plea and
has discretion as to the punishment for the offense, it may hear witnesses to
determine what punishment shall be imposed.”

Furthermore, the court a
quo did not even consult the
testimonies of the three State witnesses – namely, the doctor and the police
officers who took down the statements of the accused – who testified during the
first and second hearings, at least with the end in view of ascertaining the
degree of the penalty that should be imposed after accepting the plea of guilty
of the accused.  What the court a quo did was only to ask the accused whether they
were ready to receive their sentence after they had affirmed the
“truthfulness and correctness” of their counsel’s manifestation on
their change of plea.  In short, the
court a quo did not even inform the accused that their plea of
guilty might mean death for all of them.

WE
deeply lament this attitude of the court a quo.  Be that as it may, however, WE only hope that hereafter trial courts would strictly comply with the rigid standard set
in the following cases after Apduhan, Arpa and Solacito, all of which
have invariably, consistently and firmly established and stressed the duty of
trial courts before accepting the plea of guilty of an accused to a capital
offense.  These cases are:

1. The case of People vs. Englatera (34
SCRA, 2456, July 31, 1970), where WE found it proper to invite the attention of
the court a quo and
of all trial courts in general to what WE said in Apduhan
ant Solacito cases on the matter of what the trial
court should do upon arraignment of a defendant charged with a capital offense,
before he is allowed to enter a plea of guilty;

2. The case of People vs. Estebia (40
SCRA, 90, July 29, 1971), where, in addition to reiterating what WE said in the
Englatera case, WE also stressed on the need for care
and prudence before accepting the plea of guilty of an accused especially in
capital offenses;

3. The case of People vs. Flores (40 SCRA, 230, July 30, 1971), where this COURT, speaking through
then Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal,
said:

“The norm that should be allowed where a plea of guilty is entered by the defendant, especially in cases where the capital
penalty may be imposed, is that the
court should be sure that defendant fully understood the nature of the
charges preferred against him and the character of the punishment provided by
law before it is imposed.”

4. The case of People vs.
Simeon (47 SCRA, 129, September 28, 1972), where WE made reference to
numerous other cases, such as US vs. Talbanos, supra;
US vs. Rota, et al., supra; US
vs. Agcaoili (31 Phil. 91, March 31, 1915); People vs. Bulalake (106
Phil. 767, December 28, 1959); and People vs. Arpa, supra,
not to mention the 1971 and 1972 cases of People vs. Estebia,
supra, and People vs. Esteves (L-34811, August
22, 1972);

5. The case of People vs. Ibañez (61
SCRA 468, 473, December 20, 1974),
where this COURT, speaking again through then Chief Justice Querube
C. Makalintal, said:

“The trial court
disregarded our injunction in People vs. Apduhan (24
SCRA, 817) to all trial judges to ‘refrain from accepting with alacrity
an accused’s plea of guilty, for while justice
demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous
in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable
conviction.’ In People vs. Lacson (55 SCRA, 589),
this Court had occasion to reiterate the rule ‘that in capital offenses the
taking of testimony, notwithstanding the plea of guilty, is the proper and prudent course to follow to establish the guilt and precise
degree of culpability of the accused not only to satisfy the trial judge but to
aid the Supreme Court in determining whether accused really and truly
understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequence of his plea.’

“What this Court said in People vs. Busa
(51 SCRA, 317) is particularly apropos: 
‘In sum and substance, it will not suffice, under the law providing for
compulsory review of death sentences by this Court, that the accused’s plea of guilty is admitted and, on the basis
thereof, that judgment is summarily
rendered.  The essence of judicial review
in capital offenses is that while society allows violent retribution for
heinous crimes committed against it, it always must make certain that blood of
the innocent is not spilled, or that the guilty are not made to suffer more
than their just measure of punishment and retribution.  Thus, a judgment meting out penalty of death
is valid only if it is susceptible
of a fair and reasonable examination by this Court.”

6. The case of People vs. Domingo (68 SCRA, 50, 54, November 13,
1975), where, aside from reiterating the rule on the duty of trial courts to
exercise solicitous care before sentencing the accused on a plea of guilty,
especially in capital offenses, WE also said that trial judges should give
ample opportunity to the counsel de oficio
to examine not only the records
of the case but also the scene of
the crime as well as to confer with the accused lengthily so that he can
properly, intelligently, and fully represent and defend the interests of the
accused; and

7. The latest case of People vs. Hondolero
(G.R. No. L-40633, August 25, 1976), where WE reiterated the rule long
established since the Talbanos, Rota and Agcaoili cases, supra, that “since there is no law prohibiting the taking of
testimony after a plea of guilty, where a grave offense is charged, this Court
has deemed such taking of testimony the prudent and proper course to follow for
the purpose of establishing not only
the guilt but as well as the precise
degree of culpability of the defendant.”

WE hasten to add what WE
said in People vs. Ricalde (L-34673, January 30,
1973), which is somehow identical in most, if not all, respects to the case at
bar.  In that case, this COURT, speaking
through Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, sounded once more its concern over the
failure of trial courts to comply strictly with the procedural paths WE have adverted to as early as the Talbanos
case.  Said this COURT:

“Our previous decisions have repeatedly warned against the
danger of the plea of guilty being improvidently entered in capital cases.  WE have uniformly stressed the importance of
the trial court’s receiving evidence notwithstanding the plea of guilty in
order that no reasonable doubt may remain as to the guilt and the degree of
culpability of the accused.  We have time
and time again reminded judges that they are duty bound to be extra solicitous
in seeing to it that when an
accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the
import of inevitable conviction (US vs. Jamad, 37
Phil. 305; People vs. Bulalake, 106 Phil. 767; People vs. Arpa, 27
SCRA, 1037).

“In the case at bar, We are not satisfied that the trial judge
has properly discharged this basic duty enjoined of him.

“As pointed out by both the counsel for the appellant and the
Solicitor General, the trial judge limited himself to asking two brief questions from the appellant:  whether the appellant was aware of the con­sequences
of his change of plea from not guilty to that of guilty, and whether the
appellant knew that notwithstanding such plea of guilty the only possible
penalty was that of death.  The record is
completely bereft of any indication that the court diligently ascertained for
itself whether the appellant completely understand the full meaning
significance and implications of his plea of guilty.  The court likewise failed to inform the
appellant of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the amended information
and their effect on his plea.  Again, the
court failed to ask the appellant whether he was invoking mitigating
circumstances in his favor.  Finally, the
court did not make any inquiry, which inquiry was obviously called for, why the
appellant had a sudden change of plea after he had previously pleaded not
guilty to the charge against him.  In
sum, the trial court failed to take the necessary precautions to forestall the
entry by the appellant of an improvident plea of guilty before passing judgment
upon him.”

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION
OF THE COURT A QUO OF OCTOBER 7, 1970, FINDING THE ACCUSED
GUILTY OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE AND SENTENCING EACH AND ALL OF THEM TO THE
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH, IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE CASE REMANDED TO IT FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN CONFORMITY WITH THIS DECISION.  WITHOUT PRONOUNCEMENT AS TO
COSTS.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Muñoz Palma, Concepcion, Jr., and Martin, JJ., concur.