🎧 Case Brief Lecture

WINNIE BAJET, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, RESPONDENT.

A.M. No. RTJ-00-1598. July 30, 2002 July 30, 2002

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Bajet versus Baclig

The Case

This is an administrative case filed by Winnie Bajet, a defendant in an ejectment suit, against Judge Vivencio S. Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The complainant charges the respondent judge with grave misconduct amounting to giving unwarranted benefits, manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and inexcusable negligence, and with serious neglect of duty, gross incompetence, and oppression, arising from his ex parte order granting an alias writ of execution and from his failure to decide the appealed ejectment case within the period fixed by the Constitution. The case matters because it draws the line between an erroneous but good-faith procedural ruling, which does not warrant discipline, and gross inefficiency in deciding cases, which does, and because it clarifies when the rules on proof of service of motions apply.

Procedural History

The Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31, rendered judgment against Winnie Bajet and her co-defendants in a forcible entry case, ordering them to vacate the premises, to pay reasonable compensation for its use, and to pay attorney's fees and costs. The defendants appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where the case was raffled to Branch 77, then presided by Judge Normandie Pizarro. On motion of the plaintiff, Judge Pizarro ordered the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, denied reconsideration, and a writ was issued. The defendants filed an omnibus motion to recall the writ; by then the respondent judge had taken over Branch 77, and he denied the omnibus motion. The defendants then went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari, which dismissed the petition, holding that although the motion for execution lacked proof of service, the defendants were not deprived of due process because they were heard on reconsideration. The plaintiff later filed an ex parte motion for an alias writ of execution, which the respondent judge granted. The complainant then filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman, which also served as an administrative complaint; the Ombudsman referred it to the Office of the Court Administrator, which required the respondent to comment. The case reached the Supreme Court as an administrative matter against the respondent judge.

Facts

On May 28, 1997, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31, decided a forcible entry case against Winnie Bajet and her co-defendants, ordering them to vacate two parcels of land, to pay 3,000 pesos a month as reasonable compensation from the first demand until they vacated, and to pay 3,000 pesos in attorney's fees plus costs. The defendants appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77.

On September 11, 1997, the plaintiff filed a motion for execution pending appeal, alleging that the defendants had failed to file a supersedeas bond and to deposit the rent due. Counsel for the defendants did not appear at the hearing, so Judge Pizarro considered the motion submitted for resolution and, on October 9, 1997, ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. The defendants moved for reconsideration, claiming the motion for execution lacked proof of service; Judge Pizarro denied the motion, and a writ of execution issued on November 25, 1997. The defendants then filed an omnibus motion to recall or suspend the writ. In the meantime, the respondent judge was assigned to Branch 77, and he denied the omnibus motion.

The defendants elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed their petition. On November 9, 1998, the plaintiff filed an ex parte motion for an alias writ of execution, which did not contain proof of service on the defendants; the respondent judge granted it. The complainant then charged the respondent before the Ombudsman, faulting him for entertaining the ex parte motion despite the lack of proof of service, in violation of the rules, and for failing to decide the appealed case within the period prescribed by the Constitution. The respondent admitted the delay, attributing it to heavy workload and to the inadvertence of his branch clerk, who failed to include the case in the list of cases submitted for decision.

Issues

  • Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion, manifest partiality, bad faith, or inexcusable negligence in granting the ex parte motion for an alias writ of execution despite the absence of proof of service.
  • Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for gross inefficiency for failing to decide the appealed case within the period fixed by the Constitution.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4 of Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 4. Hearing of motion. – Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

This provision fixes the general rule on notice and hearing of motions, which the complainant invokes against the respondent.

Section 6 of the same Rule provides:

SEC. 6. Proof of service necessary. – No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof.

This is the provision the complainant says the respondent violated when he acted on the ex parte motion.

Section 14 of Rule 39 provides:

Sec. 14. Return of writ of execution. – The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or the periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the parties.

This provision governs the lifetime of a writ of execution and is the basis for the Court's conclusion that the original writ had not yet lapsed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent did not commit any disciplinable error. It clarified that he was charged not with entertaining the motion for the original writ of execution but with issuing the alias writ, the motion for which lacked proof of service. Under the present Section 14 of Rule 39, the lifetime of a writ of execution is no longer sixty days but continues during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion, that is, within five years from entry. Thus the original writ issued on November 25, 1997 was still effective when the plaintiff filed the motion for an alias writ on November 9, 1998, and the alias writ was superfluous. The motion was, in effect, merely a reminder that the writ had not been implemented, and the alias writ could be construed as an order directing the sheriff to implement the original writ. The motion need not be litigated because the court may act upon it without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, and the prejudice to the defendants would have been no greater than that from the original writ. Hence Sections 4 and 6 of Rule 15, particularly the requirement of proof of service, were inapplicable. The defendants were not denied due process, having been heard on reconsideration after the original writ issued, and they could have filed a motion to stay execution on supervening circumstances. The Court stressed that to justify drastic disciplinary action, the error must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate, or in bad faith, and it found none.

On the second issue, the Court held the respondent administratively liable for gross inefficiency. A judge is mandated to render judgment not more than ninety days from the time the case is submitted for decision, and inability to do so is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. His reliance on the branch clerk did not excuse him, because a judge ought to know the cases submitted to him and is expected to keep his own record so that he may act on them promptly. The administrative responsibility for the prompt disposition of cases rests on the judge's shoulders, and the Code of Judicial Conduct requires him to organize and supervise court personnel. The Court, however, considered as mitigating his undisputed claim that he resolved all other cases within the ninety-day period, his candor in acknowledging the delay, and the lack of undue damage to the complainant.

Doctrine

A judge may be disciplined only for an error that is gross or patent, malicious, deliberate, or in bad faith; a mere error in procedure, corrected on review, does not warrant drastic disciplinary action. The requirement of proof of service under Section 6 of Rule 15 applies only to written motions that must be set for hearing; it does not apply to motions the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. Under Section 14 of Rule 39, a writ of execution remains in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion, so an alias writ issued while the original writ is still effective is superfluous. Failure to decide a case within the ninety-day period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency, for which the judge, not his clerk, bears administrative responsibility.

Disposition

The Court found Judge Vivencio S. Baclig administratively liable for gross inefficiency and ordered him to pay a fine of 1,000 pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a judge's error must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate, or in bad faith to justify discipline, while delay beyond ninety days is gross inefficiency for which the judge alone answers. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of execution pending appeal, the lifetime of a writ of execution under Section 14 of Rule 39, and the administrative liability of judges for delay.