WINNIE BAJET, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, RESPONDENT.

On May 28, 1997, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch
31, rendered a decision against the defendants in Civil Case No. 14303, entitled
Praxedes Pacquing Flores vs. Winnie Bajet, et al., a case for forcible entry.
The MeTC ordered the defendants to vacate the two parcels of land they were
occupying; to jointly and severally pay plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 a month
as reasonable compensation for the use of the premises, starting from the date
of the first demand until such time defendants shall have vacated the premises;
and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus cost of
suit.^[1]

The defendants elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City. The case was docketed therein as Civil Case No. Q-97-31799 and was raffled
to Branch 77 thereof, then presided by Judge Normandie B. Pizarro.^[2]

On September 11, 1997, the plaintiff-appellees filed a Motion for Execution
pending appeal,^[3] alleging that the
defendants-appellants failed to file a supersedeas bond and to deposit with the
RTC the amount of rent due. However, counsel for defendants-appellants failed to
appear on the date set for the hearing on the motion. Thus, Judge Pizarro issued
an Order^[4] considering the motion
submitted for resolution.

On October 9, 1997, Judge Pizarro issued an Order^[5] directing the issuance of a writ of
execution.

On October 20, 1997, the defendants-appellants Winnie Bajet, et al. filed an
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration^[6] of
the Order of October 9, 1997 granting the motion for execution.
Defendant-appellants claimed that the motion for execution did not contain proof
of service to them.

Judge Pizarro, in an Order dated November 11, 1997,^[7] denied the defendants-appellants’ motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit.

On November 25, 1997, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a Writ of
Execution^[8] pursuant to the Order dated
October 9, 1997.

On November 28, 1997, the defendants-appellants filed an Omnibus Motion^[9] praying for the recall or suspension of
the implementation of the writ of execution, reiterating that the motion for
execution did not contain any proof of service.

In the meantime, respondent Judge Vivencio S. Baclig was assigned presiding
judge of Branch 77 vice Judge Pizarro. Respondent judge denied the Omnibus
Motion in an Order dated May 29, 1998.^[10]

Subsequently, defendants-appellants filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ
of preliminary injunction. Petitioners (defendants-appellants) challenged the
RTC Order dated October 9, 1997, directing the issuance of a writ of execution
pending appeal; the Order dated November 11, 1997, denying the
defendants-appellants’ motion for reconsideration; and the Order dated May 29,
1998, denying the defendants-appellants’ Omnibus Motion. Petitioners alleged
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it acted upon the motion
for execution pending appeal without proof of actual receipt of the copy of said
motion by petitioners.

On October 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision^[11] dismissing the petition for certiorari.
The court held that while indeed the motion for execution did not contain any
proof of service, petitioners were not deprived of due process since they were
heard on motion for reconsideration.

On November 9, 1998, the plaintiffs-appellees filed an Ex Parte Motion for
Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution,^[12]
which respondent judge granted in an Order^[13] dated November 12, 1998. The motion did
not contain any proof of service on the defendants-appellants.

In the meantime, the case was re-raffled to Branch 84 of the Quezon City RTC
after respondent judge inhibited himself. Judge Areola, on May 31, 1999, issued
an Order denying complainant’s motion for reconsideration and/or to quash/lift
alias writ of execution. On July 16, 1999, Judge Areola ordered the issuance of
another Alias Writ of Execution. Subsequently, Judge Mariflor P. Punzalan
Castillo rendered a decision affirming the decision of the Quezon City MeTC,
Branch 31.^[14]

On January 28, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman received a criminal
complaint from Winnie Bajet, one of the defendants-appellants in Civil Case No.
Q-97-31799, charging Judge Vivencio S. Baclig with violating the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Complainant added that the charge also served as her
administrative complaint against respondent judge.

On February 12, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman referred the complaint to
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), which required respondent judge to
comment.

Complainant accuses respondent judge of giving “unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference” to the plaintiff-appellant, of “manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence.” She also charges him with “serious
neglect of duties, gross incompetence and oppression.” Specifically, complainant
faults respondent judge for entertaining the ex parte motion for issuance of
alias writ of execution despite lack of proof of service. This is purportedly in
violation of Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides:

SEC. 4. Hearing of motion. – Except for motions which the court may act upon
without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall
be set for hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other
party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for
good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

More to the point, Section 6 of the same Rule provides:

SEC. 6. Proof of service necessary. – No written motion set for hearing shall
be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof.

In addition, respondent judge allegedly failed to decide the case within the
period prescribed by the Constitution.^[15]

Respondent judge claims that he acted within the bounds of law in granting
the Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution even though the
motion did not contain any proof of service. He argues that since the
defendants-appellants failed to file a supersedeas bond and to deposit the
rentals, “it [was] mandatory for the regional trial court to order execution of
the appealed judgment. Its duty to do so is ministerial and imperative.”^[16]

It bears clarifying that respondent judge is charged not with entertaining
the motion for the original issuance of a writ of execution but with issuing the
alias writ of execution, the motion for which did not contain any proof of
service.

Alias writs of execution are usually issued in lieu of the original writ of
execution that had already lapsed. Before the 1997 revision to the Rules of
Civil Procedure, the lifetime of a writ of execution, under then Section 11,
Rule 39 “was 60 days from its receipt by the officer required to enforce the
same and after said period, the writ becomes functus officio.”^[17]

Sec. 11. Return of writ of execution. – The writ of execution may be
made returnable, to the clerk or judge of the court issuing it, at any time not
less than ten (10) days nor more than sixty (60) days after its receipt by the
officer who must set forth in writing on its back the whole of his proceedings
by virtue thereof, and file it with the clerk or judge to be preserved with the
other papers in the case. A certified copy of the record, in the execution book
kept by the clerk, of an execution by virtue of which real property has been
sold, or of the officer’s return thereon, shall be evidence of the contents of
the originals whenever they, or any part thereof, have been lost or
destroyed.

Apparently, plaintiffs-appellees in Civil Case No. Q-97-31799 were of the
impression that the writ of execution issued on November 25, 1997 had already
lapsed when they filed their motion for an alias writ on November 9, 1998.

However, it must be noted that under the present Section 14, Rule 39, the
lifetime of the writ of execution is no longer 60 days but “during the period
within which the judgment may be enforced by motion, that is, within 5 years
from entry thereof.”^[18]

Sec. 14. Return of writ of execution. – The writ of execution shall
be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been
satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within
thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the
court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during
the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer
shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken
thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The
returns or the periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings
taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished
the parties.

Thus, the original writ of execution, which was issued on November 25, 1997,
was still effective when plaintiff-appellee filed his motion for issuance of
alias writ of execution on November 9, 1998. The alias writ was superfluous;
there was no need for respondent judge to issue one.

Viewed in this light, the motion in question was nothing more than a mode by
which the plaintiff-appellee informed or reminded the court that the writ had
not yet been implemented. Likewise, the “alias” writ of execution may be
construed as an order directing the sheriff to implement the “original” writ.
The motion need not be litigated since the court “may act upon the same without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party.”^[19] The prejudice to the
defendants-appellants that would result from an order directing the
implementation of the writ would have been no greater than the previous issuance
of the “original” writ. As there was no need for a hearing on the motion, the
provisions of Sections 4 and 6 of Rule 15 – in particular, that of proof of
service to the adverse party – are inapplicable.

Defendants-appellants could not have successfully argued that they were
deprived of due process as a result of the ex parte issuance of the “alias”
writ. First, they were already heard on motion for reconsideration after the
court issued the “original” writ. Second, if defendants-appellants wished to
stay execution because of, say, “supervening circumstances”^[20] or some other ground, they could have
filed a motion to that effect. The “original” writ, to repeat, was still in
effect and had not expired.

While respondent judge’s rationale for issuing the “alias” writ is based on
grounds different from those stated herein, in the end, he did not commit error
in granting the motion ex parte. In any case, to justify the taking of drastic
disciplinary action, the law requires that the error or mistake, should there be
any, must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith.^[21] The Court does not discern any
inclination on his part to give “unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference”
to the plaintiff-appellant or of any “manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence” when he issued the order granting the alias writ.

Nevertheless, respondent judge is administratively liable for the delay in
deciding Civil Case No. Q-97-31799. Indeed, he admitted the delay and “some sort
of administrative lapse” on his part, and “plead[s] on bended knees for…
understanding, compassion and mercy.” He explained that his heavy workload
caused him to rely greatly on his subordinate, who inadvertently failed to
include Civil Case No. Q-97-31799 in the list of cases submitted for
decision.

(a) At the time of my appointment as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 77,
Quezon City, in November 1997, I was on detail at the RTC, Branch 17, Manila.
And having been previously detailed for more than 2-1/2 years at the RTC, Branch
157, Pasig City, I had to continue hearing the cases which I have started in
Pasig City by virtue of an existing Supreme Court Circular mandating it. So in
the early months of my stint in the RTC of Quezon City, I was hearing cases in
three (3) different courts: in RTC, Branch 77, Quezon City, in RTC, Branch 157,
Pasig City, and in RTC, Branch 17, Manila. I heard cases in Quezon City in the
morning, and held sessions in Pasig City and Manila alternately in the
afternoon. Because of such tight schedule, I devised a simple system by which I
could be reminded of the cases for decision in Quezon City. I caused the posting
of two (2) white boards, wherein, upon my instruction, the Branch Clerk of
Court, Atty. Jennifer A. Pilar, listed all the cases submitted for decision and
stating therein the dates of submission for decision and the due dates for
deciding them. But they inadvertently failed to include the subject appealed
ejectment case in the list, as has been attested to by Atty. Jennifer A. Pilar
in her attached Affidavit which has been marked as Annex “O”;

(b) In or about March, 1997, I was directed to continue handling the election
protest, entitled “Alan Peter Cayetano vs. Loida Labao”, in Branch 157, RTC,
Pasig City, wherein I had previously inhibited myself on the ground of
delicadeza extremada. I had to personally open about seven
hundred 700 ballot boxes and, in doing so, I had to go to Pasig City every
afternoon, I think, for more than two (2) months and toiled into the late
afternoon and even early evening to complete the examination of the ballots in
about 700 ballot boxes in Taguig, Metro Manila.

(c) After I decided the election protest sometime in June, 1998, I studied
the records of five (5) inherited cases which were sent to me by the Office of
the Court Administrator for decision. Although, I believed that these cases
should have been decided by the new Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 157,
Pasig City, I dutifully decided the cases, which were old cases with voluminous
records, and submitted my decisions to the Office of the Court Management,
Office of the Court Administrator sometime in September, 1998.^[22]

The Court finds the foregoing explanation unacceptable. A judge is mandated
to render judgment not more than ninety (90) days from the time the case is
submitted for decision and his inability to decide a case within the required
period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.^[23]

Respondent judge’s reliance on the branch clerk of court whose alleged
carelessness caused the delay does not excuse him from liability. As the OCA, in
its Report, pointed out, “a judge ought to know the cases submitted to him for
decision or resolution and is expected to keep his own record of cases so that
he may act on them promptly.”^[24]
Ultimately, the administrative responsibility for the prompt and speedy
disposition of cases rests on the judge’s shoulders. The Code of Judicial
Conduct requires judges to organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure
the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the
observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.^[25] The same Code charges him with the duty
of diligently discharging administrative responsibilities, maintaining
professional competence in court management, and facilitating the performance of
the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.^[26]

Respondent’s undisputed claim that he resolved all other cases within the
90-day period, his candor in acknowledging the delay, and the lack of undue
damage upon complainant caused by the delay, however, serve to mitigate his
liability.^[27] Court Administrator
Alfredo L. Benipayo recommended that respondent be fined the amount of One
Thousand Pesos.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Vivencio S.
Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City administratively liable for
gross inefficiency. He is ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of One Thousand
Pesos (P1,000.00) and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug,
Ynares-Santiago, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

^[2] Ibid.

^[3] Id., Annex “A.”

^[4] Id., Annex “B.”

^[5] Id., Annex “C.”

^[6] Id., Annex “D.”

^[7] Id., Annex “E.”

^[8] Id., Annex “F.”

^[9] Id., Annex “G.”

^[10] Id., Annex “K.”

^[11] Id., Annex “L.”

^[12] Id., Annex “M.”

^[13] Id., Annex “N.”

^[14] Supplemental Comment, p. 1.

^[15] Complaint, p. 1.

^[16] Comment, pp. 4-5, citing Base vs.
Leviste, 99 SCRA 575 (1980) and Hualam Construction and Development Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 612 (1992).

^[17] I Regalado, F. D., Remedial Law
Compendium 439-440, 6th Ed.

^[18] Id., at 440.

^[19] Rules of Court, Rule 15, Section
4.

^[20] This Court has recognized
exceptions to the rule in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases that
appealed judgments in favor of the plaintiff are immediately executory if the
defendant fails to comply with the requisites for staying such execution.
(Section 19, Rule 70, Rules of Court.) “Supervening events occurring subsequent
to the judgment bringing about a material change in the situation of the parties
which makes execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for
the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances,” are
such exceptions. See Puncia vs. Gerona, 252 SCRA 424 (1996).

^[21] Fernandez vs. Español, 289 SCRA 1
(1998); Punio vs. Go, 296 SCRA 1 (1998); Guerrero vs. Villamor, 296 SCRA 88
(1998).

^[22] Comment, pp. 6-7.

^[23] Re: Report on the Judicial Audit
Conducted in the RTC, Br. 68, Camiling, Tarlac, 305 SCRA 61 (1999); Request of
Judge Masamayor, RTC-Br. 52, Talibon, Bohol, For Extension of Time to Decide
Civil Case No. 0020 and Criminal Case No. 98-384, 316 SCRA 219 (1999); Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Quiñanola, 317 SCRA 37 (1999).

^[24] Citing Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Amelita D.R. Benedicto, 296 SCRA 62 (1998).

^[25] Rule 3.09.

^[26] Rule 3.08.

^[27] Bernardo vs. Fabros, 307 SCRA 28
(1999).