JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA AND HON. ANDRES REYES, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (BRANCH VI), PETITIONERS, VS. BRAULIO STO. DOMINGO AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPOND…

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada
invokes the authority of this Court to overturn the judgment of the Court of
Appeals – voting three to two – which (1) declared that the Court of First
Instance of Rizal acted with grave abuse of
discretion for not resolving on the merits respondent Braulio
Sto. Domingo’s motion for reconsideration of its
decision of October 29, 1968,
and (2) nullified said trial court’s order of November 25, 1968 which held final and executory the decision aforementioned declaring petitioner
the winner in the election contest for the mayoralty of San
Juan, Rizal.

The controlling facts may be recited as follows:

In the local elections in San Juan, Rizal
held on November 14, 1967, candidates for Mayor were then incumbent Mayor Nicanor Ibuna, Nacionalista Party official candidate; respondent Braulio Sto. Domingo, Liberal
Party official candidate; petitioner Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, independent; and Enrique Lenon, also
independent.  On December 31, 1967, the municipal board of
canvassers proclaimed Braulio Sto.
Domingo as elected Mayor with 7,926 votes as against Joseph Ejercito
Estrada with 7,882, or a plurality of 44 votes. 
Nicanor Ibuna ran
third with 6,775 votes.  Enrique Lenon obtained 55 votes. 
In due course, petitioner Estrada lodged an election protest, and
respondent Sto. Domingo counter-protested, in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal.^[1]
On October 29, 1968,
judgment was rendered in said election protest, thus:

“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby annuls and
sets aside the proclamation of the protestee, Dr. Braulio Sto. Domingo and hereby
proclaims and declares the protestant, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada as the Mayor duly elected for the Municipality of San Juan, Province of
Rizal in the elections held on November 14, 1967, with
a plurality of 192 votes, with costs against the protestee.”

Sto. Domingo’s counsel was served with
copy of the decision on October 30,
1968.

At 1:45 p.m. on November 4, 1968, the last day of the
five-day period to appeal statutorily fixed by Section 178, Revised Elec­tion
Code, Sto. Domingo filed a motion to reconsider the
decision.  Copy of the motion was sent to
Estrada’s counsel by registered special delivery mail and with notice that the
motion would be heard on the following Saturday,
November 9, 1968 at 8:30 a.m.  Attached to the motion was registry receipt
17713.  Sto.
Domingo therein averred that the trial judge erred (1) in reviewing and
annulling the decisions of the other branches of the same court on the
exclusion of voters; (2) in rejecting “Boyong”
and “Dr. Boyong” votes; (3) in rejecting protestee’s (private respondent’s) evidence on the tam­pering
of ballots after revision; and (4) in appreciating certain ballots.

Came the morning of November
9, 1968.  Sto.
Domingo and his counsel appeared in court. 
Absent were Estrada and his counsel, both of whom until then had not
received copy of the motion.  For lack of
proof that Estrada had received notice of the motion for reconsideration of November 4, 1968, the hearing thereof
was reset for November 16, 1968
at 8:30 a.m.

In the afternoon of November 9, 1968 Estrada, who got wind of
what took place in the trial court that morning, filed an “omnibus
motion” alleging that Sto. Domingo’s motion for
reconsideration was not legally sanctioned, flimsy and frivolous, a mere scrap
of paper, and intended for delay.  He
prayed that that motion be stricken out and that the judgment be immediately
executed as it had become final and executory.  The omnibus motion he set for hearing on November 12, 1968 at 8:30 a.m.

Parenthetically, Estrada’s counsel was personally served a copy
of the motion for reconsideration only on November 11, 1968 upon the court’s verbal order given on
the 9th of November.  The copy sent by
registered mail reached his counsel only on November 13, 1968, four days after it was set for hearing
(November 9, 1968, 8:30 a.m.).

At the November 12 hearing, the judge advised the parties to
submit memoranda of authorities and reset both the omnibus motion and the
motion to reconsider on November 16, 1968.

It was on the scheduled hearing of November 16 that Sto. Domingo completed proof of service by mail of his
motion for reconsideration by the presentation of the registry return card
postmarked November 13, a certification by the Acting Postmaster of Makati as to the mailing of registered letter No. 17713 on Novem­ber 4, 1968, and the affidavit
of Manuel B. Busico who posted the mail.  Estrada’s counsel orally moved for the
immediate resolution of the pending incidents. 
The judge was ready to rule on the motions.  Sto. Domingo
demurred, pleaded that his memorandum and opposition to the omnibus motion be
first considered; that in the event of an adverse resolution he be allowed at
least five (5) days from receipt to enable him to procure extraordinary relief
from the Court of Appeals.  The judge
thereupon declared that he would promulgate the resolution in open court on November 23, 1968, a Saturday.

On November 19, 1968,
Sto. Domingo filed a cautionary notice of appeal,
manifesting that he would appeal to the Court of Appeals in the event his
motion for reconsideration be thwarted. 
Admittedly, however, he withdrew the cautionary notice of appeal
later.  This withdrawal was granted by
the court on November 21, 1968.

On November 20, 1968,
upon Sto. Domingo’s urgent motion, the judge
calendared the promulgation of the resolution for Monday, November 25, 1968, at 8:30 a.m.

Allegedly informed that resolution on his reconsideration motion
would be adverse to him, Sto. Domingo’s counsel
sought the judge in the morning of November
23, 1968, asked the latter to give him a copy of the order before
the close of office hours on that day. 
The judge declined, instead stated that the order would be read and
released in open court the following Monday,
November 25, 1968.

A hectic day, November 25, began at 7:30
a.m. when Sto. Domingo’s counsel saw the
judge to ask for a copy of the order. 
The judge told him to wait until the order shall have been read in open
court.  An hour later, 8:30 a.m., when the case was called, Sto. Domingo’s counsel requested that the case be called
again at 10:00 a.m. purportedly on
the ground that he would first ask for the postponement of another case in Caloocan City.  The court granted the request.  At 10:00 a.m.,
the disputed order was read and promulgated in open court.  The parties secured their copies of the order
at 10:15 a.m.  The dispositive
portion of the order reads:  “IN
VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CON­SIDERATIONS, it is the opinion of the Court that
the reconsideration of its decision dated October 29, 1968 is not in order as the same had already
become final and executory.”

Then and there, Sto. Domingo’s counsel
orally moved to reconsider.  The judge
after hearing the arguments of the parties denied the motion.^[2] Sto. Domingo’s counsel was prepared to meet this
contingency.  He drew from his pocket and
exhibited to the judge a copy of the Court of Appeals’ restraining order.

It developed that some two hours earlier, at 8:04 a.m. on November 25, Sto.
Domingo’s counsel lodged with the Court of Appeals a three-pronged double
spaced 15-page petition with Annexes A to J for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction.^[3]
Counsel secured in the appellate court in about an hour’s time a full-page
single spaced typewritten summons and a one-and-a-half page single spaced
temporary restraining order enjoining the Court of First Instance of Rizal “from executing any order and/or writ of
execution x x x in Election
Case No. 10545″ and from declaring the decision in said case “final
and executory.”

Upon the other hand, with equal dispatch, Estrada tried to fend
off Sto. Domingo’s move when he filed with the Court
of Appeals, although belatedly, at 10:43 a.m.,
a 5-page opposition to the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
attaching thereto his oath of office.

At 10:52 a.m. before
the trial court adjourned, a bailiff of the Court of Appeals served on then
Judge Andres Reyes, presiding over the trial court, the summons and restraining
order; and at 11:50 a.m. likewise served
the summons and restraining order upon Estrada.

After hearing, respondent Court of Appeals rendered the disputed
decision of February 13, 1969,
mentioned at the start of this opinion. 
Reconsideration thereof was denied by said court, again voting three to
two, on May 22, 1969.

1.       The forefront
question to draw our attention is the correctness of the temporary restraining
order of November 25, 1968
issued ex parte by the Court of Appeals promptly upon
the filing therein of the certiorari, prohibition and mandamus petition.  The directive in that restraining order is
that respondents before the Court of Appeals refrain “from executing any
order and/or writ of execution issued by respondent Judge declaring the
decision in Election Case No. 10545 of the CFI-Rizal
final and executory, from removing petitioner from
his office as municipal mayor of San Juan, Rizal,
from installing respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada in
peti­tioner’s place as said mayor, and from otherwise molesting, disturbing
petitioner in, or excluding him from, his lawful exercise and performance of
his duties, rights and prerogatives as municipal mayor, until further orders
from this Court.” Well to remember is that the restraining order was
issued even before the trial court could release the very order complained of
in the petition.

The averments in Sto. Domingo’s
petition before the Court of Appeals upon which the restraining order was
issued are:

“17.   – That while
petitioner has been unable to secure an official copy of the resolution of
respondent Judge (for reasons hereinafter stated) he has been reliably informed
(and because of the afore-mentioned circumstances and the persistent reports
circulated by followers of respondent ‘Estrada’ that he (Estrada) will ‘sit as
Mayor on Monday’, has reason to believe) that at the hearing at 8:30 o’clock
this morning (Nov. 25), the respondent Judge will in open court
(1) dis­regard or strike out petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as prayed
for by respondent ‘Estrada’ on the ground that the Election Code does not
provide for a motion for reconsideration but only for appeal and that there was
no proof of service of the motion, both of which are incorrect; (2) declare as
final and executory his decision ousting petitioner
as Municipal Mayor of San Juan and installing respondent Estrada in
petitioner’s stead; (3) order the execution or enforcement of said decision
with the petitioner considered notified of said order in open court (as in a
criminal case) and to abide by the same (while respondent ‘Estrada’ takes his
‘oath’ as mayor immediately if not also ‘in open court’); and thereby deprive
petitioner of any opportunity to contest the said order and execution in the
appellate courts before they are carried out by the respondents over his objection.

18.     – That the aforesaid
actuations of respondent Judge have given rise to serious anxiety and great
tension among the parties and their followers, as well as among the people of
San Juan, Rizal and, as this petition is being filed
by petitioner, the respondent ‘Joseph Ejercito
Estrada’ and his men, many of whom are armed, are reported to be poised to
forcibly execute the order to be issued by respondent Judge this morning while
the petitioner’s men, despite his instructions and advice to them to keep the
peace and to ignore the taunts and challenges hurled at them by respondent
‘Estrada’ and his men, may not be able to restrain themselves if unduly
provoked or harmed, and unless a restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction is issued by this Honorable Court against the respondents, their
employees, agents, men and representatives, violence and disorder, and possibly
bloodshed, are likely to break out in the municipality of San Juan, Rizal to the consequent injury not only of the parties and
their men, but also of other people, and the petitioner will be forcibly and
unlawfully removed from his office as mayor without due process of law.

19.     – That in spite of
petitioner’s efforts to secure a copy of the respondent judge’s resolution up
to the close of office hours last Saturday, he has been unable to do so, he
being informed that the said Order would be read in open court this morning and
any written order would be released only thereafter; hence, the inability of
petitioner to attach a copy of said resolution to this Petition which, because
of the extraordinary circumstances above cited, has to be filed even before
receipt of said copy.  Petitioner,
however, shall file said copy by way of supplemental pleading immediately upon
receipt thereof this morning if the same is reduced to writing by respondent
Judge.

20.     – That by the
foregoing acts the disregard or striking out of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of his decision without just and legal ground, the denial of
petitioner’s remedy of appeal from said decision as provided by law, and the
execution of the said decision although the same is not yet final and executory (by reason of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and also the cautionary notice of appeal), and the opportunity
given to respondent ‘Joseph Ejercito Estrada’ and his
men to forcibly and unlawfully remove petitioner from his office as mayor
immediately without giving peti­tioner adequate opportunity to seek relief from
the appellate courts — the respondent Judge has unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from his office as Judge, unlawfully excludes the petitioner from enjoyment or
exercise of his legal right to move for the reconsideration of respondent
Judge’s decision and to appeal therefrom, and
likewise unlawfully sanctions the petitioner’s removal from his lawful office
without due process of law.”

We take a grave view of the averments in Sto.
Domingo’s petition before the Court of Appeals just transcribed.  We particularly note his statement that later
on that day, November 25, the judge in open court would disregard or strike out
petitioner’s (Sto. Domingo’s) motion for
reconsideration, declare final his decision, and order the execution or
enforcement thereof.  All of these upon
the allegation that Sto. Domingo had “been
reliably informed” of the contents of the trial court’s yet unreleased
order.  What is disturbing is that the
information thus obtained constitutes the substance of the lower
court’s resolution eventually promulgated on that day, November 25.

Whatever merit may be accorded to the averments in the petition
before the Court of Appeals aforesaid, our deepening concern for public policy
will prevent us from lending support to the appellate court’s restraining
order.  For, the information was secured
upon a betrayal of trust.  Not by the
trial judge; he had consistently refused to divulge the contents of the
resolution prior to its promulgation. 
The only logical conclusion is that the information must have been given
by those closely associated with the judge in the discharge of his official
duties.

Decisions or orders of courts must be kept inviolate until they
shall have been promulgated or released. 
Officials and employees of the courthouse must be strictly enjoined
against giving any information in advance as to what will be done by the
judge.  No opportunity should be afforded
the unscrupulous litigants, their lawyers, friends, relatives, sympathizers or
those with power or influence to go to court employees and by insidious means
and even bribery acquire advance information on the desired judgment or order
of the court.  Employ­ees should be made
to understand that they are not to succumb to greed, to temptations for
advancement in public service, that cause them to destroy the integrity of
court proceedings or court records.  A
relaxation of this rule would embolden officials and employees of the courts to
seek out interested parties in a case, give them the so-called “inside
information” on the decision or order, or furnish them with copy of an
unreleased decision or order, or hide, destroy or steal court records, or hold unserved a decision or resolution to promote a party’s
cause – thereby to earn a quick peso. 
Some such occurrence as has happened in this case should be stamped
out.  A contrary proposition would breed
graft and corruption and erode confidence in the administration of justice.

Since the information procured is the “fruit of the
poisonous tree”^[4]
the betrayal of trust – private respondent should not be allowed to benefit by
it.  Information immorally extracted
cannot be dignified with the imprimatur of courts of justice.  For this reason alone, we hold that there was
abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals in granting the
restraining order on the basis of the allegations rooted on what Sto. Domingo calls “reliable information”.

But herein respondent Sto. Domingo
avers that petitioner Estrada and his men, many of whom were armed, were
reportedly poised to forcibly execute the order enforcing the judgment as yet
to be issued in the morning of November 25. 
Said respondent told the Court of Appeals that a restraining order was a
necessity to forestall impending bloodshed because his men, in the words of his
petition before the appellate court, “despite his instructions and advice
to them to keep the peace and to ignore the taunts and challenges hurled at
them by respondent ‘Estrada’ and his men, may not be able to restrain
themselves if unduly provoked or harmed.”

This is an imagined wrong. 
It is so easy to conjure some such situation.  Rumors may be blown into hysteria.  Surely, the trial judge is not a party to
this alleged scheme.  Nor will he consent,
we are sure, to be a party to such dastardly acts.

It is because of this that courts should be careful, indeed very
cautious, in giving in to averments such as are heretofore recited.  Courts should be on guard against litigants
who swell up a picture into an alarming situation.  We do not hesitate to say that at the
time the petition (lodged in the Court of Appeals as
early as 8:04 a.m.) was being thought of, framed in
the minds of the lawyers and eventually typewritten, there was no such grave
problem of threatening armed clashes or bloodshed as would call for the remedy
of a restraining order from the Court of Appeals.  If tension such as was depicted by Sto. Domingo existed, it would not have escaped notice of
the trial judge.  He was at the vortex of
the alleged ominous events. 
Representations then could have been made to him in view of the alleged
turbulence of the atmosphere either to do away with the oral promulgation of
the resolution altogether, or after the promulgation thereof, to have
its enforcement delayed so that appropriate relief may be had in the appellate
courts.  So it is, that the averment in
the Court of Appeals’ petition that the judge would purportedly refuse to
afford respondent Sto. Domingo opportunity to seek
aid from the appellate courts is premature and at best pure conjecture.  And, if it were really true that there was
the gathering momentum leading to violence, we believe that guardians of the
law should likewise have known of the same – which is not even
suggested in the record – and readied themselves to
forestall armed clashes.

It thus results that there is a remedy elsewhere other than in
the form of a premature restraining order from the Court of Appeals.

Besides, if the judge would declare his decision final and executory, as he later on did, and the forces of respondent
Sto. Domingo would resist petitioner Estrada’s
takeover, such a resistance would certainly be patently illegal and indeed even
criminal.  Surely, impending bloodshed
can never be a valid ground to restrain a lawful assumption of office.  What will happen to the rule of law?

It is in the context heretofore recited that we hold that the
Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing ex parte the restraining order here complained of.  For this reason, we strike down the said
restraining order.

2.       We face the problems
ahead with an eye to the nature of election contest proceedings.

The statutory scheme clearly mapped out in the Revised Election
Code is that proceedings in election protests are special and expeditious.  The periods for filing pleadings are
short.  Trials are swift.  Decisions in municipal election contests are
to be handed down in six months after the protest is presented.  The time to file a notice of appeal is cut
short to five days from notice of the deci­sion.  Appeal is to be decided within three months
after the case is filed with the clerk of the court to which appeal is
taken.  Preferential disposition of
election contests except as to habeas corpus proceedings is set forth in the
law.^[5]
Even the Rules of Court make it abundantly clear that election cases enjoy
preferential status.^[6]
The proceedings should not be encumbered by delays.  All of these are because the term of elective
office is likewise short.  There is the
personal stake of the contestants, which generates feuds and discords.  Above all is the public interest.  Title to public elective office must not be
left long under cloud.  Efficiency of
public administration should not be impaired. 
It is thus understandable that pitfalls which may retard the determination
of election contests should be avoided. 
Courts should heed the imperative need for dispatch.  Obstacles and technicalities which fetter the
people’s will should not stand in the way of a prompt termination of election
contests.

Since 1966, when this Court in Lagumbay
vs. Climaco^[7]
projected the pressing need to strike a blow at the “pernicious
‘grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest’ slogan of some candidates or
parties”, we observe, to our dismay, that courts of justice still have to
cope with oft-recurring cases which come about in utter disregard of this rule.^[8]

These are the desiderata which should be uppermost in the mind of
courts of justice, if only to give substance to the constitutional precept that
“[s]overeignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.”^[9]

3.       The thrust of Sto. Domingo’s petition before the Court of Appeals is that
therein respondent Judge Andres Reyes did not resolve his motion for
reconsideration on the merits; that accordingly mandamus should issue to compel
him so to do; and that in the event the resolution be adverse, the judge be
directed to give due course to his cautionary notice of appeal.

The majority decision of the Court of Appeals gave its nod to the
posture so taken and directed the judge “to act upon and resolve
petitioner’s [private respondent’s] motion for reconsideration of the decision
in said case on the merits.”

A reading of the November 25 order of Judge Andres Reyes brings
about the salient points thereof, viz:

“To begin with, the Court does not believe that the filing of
a motion for reconsideration in an elec­tion case is in order x x x.

x                               x                                  x

And even granting for the sake of argument that the aggrieved party
can file a motion for reconsideration, the instant motion filed by Braulio Sto. Domingo is pro
forma and therefore, did not suspend the running of the period of
appeal.  It is pro forma
because the said motion for reconsideration was but a repetition of the
contents of the memorandum filed by the said protestee
and in a small way, a refutation of a portion of the memorandum filed by the
protestant, which the movant could have refuted by
filing a reply memorandum before the case was submitted for decision.  To make it short, the motion for
reconsideration merely makes reference to the contents of the memorandum filed
by both parties which had already been considered by the Court before rendering
its decision.  (Arnaldo
vs. Bernabe, 87 Phil. 379).

Not only this, even granting for the sake of argument again, that
the instant motion for reconsideration was not pro forma, still
the Court believes that the filing of the said motion was fatally defective,
and such being so, the motion is but a mere scrap of paper which did not stop
the running of the period for appeal.  x x x.

The motion lacked the required affidavit.  The affidavit is a very important requirement
considering the fact that a registry receipt does not show the nature of the
contents of the letter that has been mailed. 
The deficiency was not cured when the movant Braulio Sto. Domingo submitted
the affidavit of a certain Manuel Busico which is
dated November 13, 1968,
or four (4) days after the date when said motion was set for hearing.  The failure therefore of the protestee to attach the affidavit to the motion was fatal.

And not only this.  The
failure of the protestee to comply with the
requirements of Section 2, Rule 37, Section 4, Rule 15 and Section 8, Rule 13 x
x x is like­wise
fatal.  A copy of the motion for
reconsideration was not served on the protestant three (3) days before the date
set for hearing.  The record shows that
the protestant received the copy of the motion for reconsideration of the protestee only on November
13, 1968 or four (4) days after the said motion was set for hearing
by the movant on November 9, 1968.”

Nothing more forcefully downgrades the charge that the judge did
not fully resolve the motion for reconsideration than the recitals in the order
just quoted.  To be sure, Section 12, Article
VIII, Constitution, and Section 1, Rule 36, Rules of Court which require
express findings of fact in a decision, both have no application to the
questioned order.  Here involved is not a
decision on the merits but a mere order upon a motion to reconsider.  The judge could simply dish out a routine
capsule-form order “Denied for lack of merit” or “Motion for
reconsideration denied”.  And yet,
that kind of order would serve to immunize the judge against an unlawful
neglect-of-duty charge.  But the judge
did not merely content himself with a perfunctory order.  He wrote a reasoned out five-page resolution.

Nor is it correct to tag the judge’s order with failure to consider
the motion for reconsideration on the merits. 
Meaning should be attached to the judge’s statement that the motion for
reconsideration is pro forma because the same is “but a
repetition of the con­tents of the memorandum filed by the said protestee and in a small way, a refutation of a portion of
the memorandum filed by the pro­testant, which the movant
could have refuted by filing a reply memo­randum before the case was submitted
for decision.” The judge added that: 
“To make it short, the motion for reconsideration merely makes
reference to the contents of the memorandum filed by both parties which had
already been considered by the Court before rendering its decision.”
Implicit in these statements is that the judge waded through private
respondent’s motion for reconsideration, read and examined the merits of the
arguments therein, compared them with those set forth in private respondent’s
memorandum and then came to the conclusion that the arguments advanced would
not change the result.  Had the judge found
in that motion for reconsideration some argument of weight or substance which
would bring about a conclusion different from that reached in his decision,
surely enough, he would have spelled it out and written it in an amended
decision.  For, the presumption is that a
judge performs his duty to the best of his knowledge and ability.  Since the judge did not change his decision,
then under the circumstances his November 25 order amounted to a denial of the
motion for reconsideration on the merits. 
And this is quite clear from the dispositive
part thereof which stated that the order was “IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS”.

We thus find ourselves unable to go along with the Court of
Appeals’ insistence that the judge’s statement that the motion was pro forma
is not to be taken as a resolution of the motion on the merits.  The reasons the appellate court gave
are:  first, such pro forma
finding “merely supported [i.e., for the sake of argument]
the main thesis x x x that
the decision ‘had already become final and executory‘”;
and second, it is inconsistent for the judge “to say that the
remedy of reconsideration is not available and at the same time pass
upon it [the motion] on the merits.” Courts at times do not hesitate to
avail of all grounds to throw out a motion or pleading.  It is not uncommon to read in decisions or
orders some such statement as this: 
“Viewed from any angle, the petition in this case should be dismissed.”^[10]

For these reasons, it is difficult to hew to the Court of
Appeals’ view that the judge so unlawfully neglected his duty to rule on the
merits of the motion for reconsideration. 
It bears repeating that the judge did more than what was expected; that
instead of mechanically writing “Denied for lack of merit”, he
examined the arguments set forth in said motion and explained as cogently as he
could why it should not be granted.  His
order meets the rigid standards expected of his judicial position.

And more.  In the
resolution of a motion for reconsideration, judges wield sound discretion.  As Mr. Justice Edilberto
Soriano of the Court of Appeals, in his dissent to
the resolution denying reconsideration, aptly observed, “[h]ow he was going to go about it, or upon what ground or
grounds, is of little moment.” The fact is that the judge’s duty under the
premises is to grant or deny.  He did
deny.  He is not remiss in his duty.

We, accordingly, hold that the trial court’s order of November 25, 1968 properly ruled on
private respondent’s motion for reconsideration.

4.       The conclusion just
reached brings us to the next question: 
Did private respondent’s motion for reconsideration arrest the five-day
period for appeal set forth in Section 178 of the Revised Election Code?

To repeat, the motion for reconsideration of the decision was based
on four grounds, namely, the court erred (1) in reviewing and annulling the
decisions of the other branches of the same Court of First instance in
exclusion cases; (2) in rejecting the so-called “Boyong”
and “Dr. Boyong” votes; (3) in rejecting protestee’s evidence on the tampering of ballots after
revision; and (4) in appreciating certain ballots.  And we have said that the lower court in
rejecting this motion ruled that it was pro forma in that the
matters therein discussed “had already been considered by the Court before
rendering its decision.” There is much to the trial judge’s statement just
quoted.

On the first ground which refers to the decision of the other
branches of the Court of First Instance in exclusion cases, it is clear from
the decision that this matter had already been brought to the attention of the
trial judge before the decision was rendered. 
Said the trial judge:

“According to the protestee,
659 out of 1,508 excluded voters were able to vote, and 285 of them voted for
Estrada, 95 for Sto. Domingo, and 279 for lbuna.  This was
determined by a matching conducted by a witness for the protestee
by the name of Major Catalino Hernandez.  To represent the facts clearer, the results
of this matching are tabulated and appears on page 8 of Protestee’s
memorandum.

The protestee vigorously
claims that the ballots cast by these excluded voters should be deducted
from the number of votes credited to Estrada, Sto.
Domingo, and Ibuna.”^[11]

On the so-called “Boyong” and
“Dr. Boyong” votes, there is the admission
on the part of counsel for Sto. Domingo (during the
course of oral arguments before the trial judge on November 25, 1968 in support
of his verbal motion to reconsider the denial of his motion for reconsideration
of the decision) that “we raised this question in our memorandum because
of the exception laid down in the case of Abrea vs. Lloren but also on the principle of idem sonans.”^[12]

On the alleged tampered ballots, the trial judge, on pages 56 and
57 of the decision, explained quite in detail how, after this case had been
submitted for decision, the protestee (respondent Sto. Domingo), on August
27, 1968, moved to reopen the case alleging evidence to show that
said ballots were tampered.  Of the 264
ballots, respondent Sto. Domingo only claims 31 ballots
stating:  “By our count, a total of 31
ballots wherein the protestee was voted for Mayor
were rejected by the Court as marked ballots because of such ‘marks’ as ‘3
stars’, swastika figures, drawings of bottles of beer and the word ‘toma’, likeness of human face, carbon traces, ‘Jr. 007’,
‘xxx’ below OFFICIAL BALLOT, etc. appearing thereon.” On the question of
whether these 31 ballots should be counted for Sto.
Domingo, his counsel admitted that: 
“We cited the arguments and the
law applicable.  We learned this
appreciation only upon receipt of the decision. 
We could not have anticipated it because we have vigorously
maintained that the alleged ‘marks’ there were not placed by the voters
themselves but by other persons without their consent.  How then could our motion be pro-forma?”^[13]
Respondent Sto. Domingo in his motion for
reconsideration would want the trial court to read the memorandum of objections
filed by protestant (petitioner Estrada) to convince said court that its ruling
on this point was wrong.  But this
memorandum of objections had already been considered by the trial court when it
said, on page 57 of its decision: 
“Anyone who tampers these ballots must also be familiar with the
memorandum of objections filed by the protestant as early as May, 1968 in order
to harmonize the written objections with the physical appearance of the 264
ballots.”

Nor will the appreciation of 56 ballots given as the fourth and
last ground of the motion for reconsideration be of any importance.  The question of appreciation of ballots in
election protests comes up after those ballots have been challenged.  They are separated.  The parties are heard on their reasons pro
and con.  Only thereafter does the judge
weigh the relative value of the reasons given by one party or the other.

It is quite apparent then that the questions raised in the motion
for reconsideration have already been considered by the trial judge before the
decision of the case on the merits.  This
is an election protest.  Public policy
demands that it be instituted and finished with utmost promptitude.  It was indeed an utter waste of time for
private respondent to have sought reconsideration upon questions which, after
all, could have been very well decided by the appellate court.

We, accordingly, rule that where in an election protest
a motion for reconsideration of the decision on the merits presents questions
which have already been considered by the court
prior to or upon the promulgation of such decision, said motion for reconsideration
is pro forma and does not suspend the running of the period for
appeal.  This rule, we are confident,
helps remove from the reach of proclamation grabbers a dilatory device conveniently
used by them to keep them in office and to frustrate the victors from taking
the seats that are justly theirs.

As we look back at the facts, we discern a pattern of delay on
the part of private respondent.  Recited
by petitioner Estrada are the following which took place in the trial
court:  (1) Motion to reduce deposit from
P7,500 to P4,000 dated February 12, 1968;^[14]
(2) Motion for time to evaluate revision dated February 14, 1968;^[15]
(3) Motion to allow services of handwriting expert dated February 16, 1968;^[16] (4)
Motion to reset beginning of technical examination by handwriting expert dated
February 27, 1968;^[17]
(5) Urgent motion to suspend revision of counter-protested precincts dated
February 27, 1968;^[18]
(6) Motion to conduct matching tests with respect to Precinct Nos. 8, 72 and 77
dated June 5, 1968;^[19]
and (7) Petition to reopen the case to adduce evidence of tampering
dated August 26, 1968.^[20]
This last motion was granted by the judge despite the fact that the tampering,
on which evidence was to be adduced, was already previously brought to his
attention.

Indeed, even private respondent’s conduct after the trial court’s
decision is not arguably insulated from the charge of delaying tactics.  It was on the last day of the statutory
period fixed for appealing the main decision – November 4, 1968 – that private re­spondent’s motion for
reconsideration was filed.  And then,
instead of serving a copy thereof on petitioner personally, as had at times
been done before admittedly with previous pleadings,^[21]
service on petitioner was made by registered special delivery mail, with notice
that the incident would be heard on the following Saturday, November 9.  Copy of the motion and the notice of hearing
sent by mail did not reach petitioner on time. 
Petitioner actually received the mailed matter on November 13, four days
after the motion for reconsideration was set for hearing.  This was, of course, to be expected from the
experience people have with our postal system. 
Private respondent, we are sure, knew this.  Because, service was effected thru the mails,
private respondent won a week’s delay – the judge reset the hearing on the
motion for reconsideration on November 16.

On November 16, when the judge announced his readiness to rule on
the motion, we find private respondent objecting, asking that his memorandum
and opposition to petitioner’s omnibus motion be first considered and suing for
time to procure extraordinary relief from the Court of Appeals.  Private respondent won another week’s
delay.  The judge declared that he would
promulgate the resolution in open court on November 23, the next Saturday.  In the meantime, however, private respondent
made another move to postpone the promulgation. 
The judge again reset the same on Monday, November 25.

On November 25 at 8:30 a.m.,
private respondent’s counsel successfully obtained a one-and-a-half hour delay
upon the ground that he had to postpone another case in Caloocan City.  It turned out that, meanwhile, private
respondent’s lawyers were frantically attempting to secure a restraining order
from the Court of Appeals.  They filed a
special civil action with the said appellate court at 8:04 a.m. that same morning.  When private respondent received a copy of
the judge’s order disposing of their motion for reconsideration at 10:15 a.m., and when the judge denied private
re­spondent’s oral motion for reconsideration thereof, the latter was
ready.  Private respondent’s counsel came
out with the restraining order from the Court of Appeals.

Consider also the time consumed by the present proceedings in the
Court of Appeals.  Private respondent’s
petition was filed on November 25,
1968.  It was finally
resolved only on May 22, 1969.  And yet, upon the excuse that his motion for
reconsideration of the decision was not ruled upon on the merits, private
respondent would want the appellate court to command the trial judge first to
rule on the said motion and thereafter give due course to his appeal.  One may well imagine the baneful effects of
some such procedure.  Had his petition
prospered, it is not unlikely that by the time the case is finally decided, the
Pyrrhic victory which courts abhor would again be repeated.

It must be emphasized that the questions raised in the motion for
reconsideration could very well be disposed of, and with finality, on
appeal.  In the realities of political
life, it is unreasonable to assume that whatever be the resolution on the
motion for reconsideration, the defeated party would take that resolution hands
down.  It is not to be expected that
respondent Sto. Domingo, who is presently sitting as
Mayor, would not appeal from the decision adverse to him.

If any meaning is to be attached to the events in the lower
courts, it is that private respondent has, in ingeniously chiseled language, so
skillfully taken advantage of judicial procedure to stave off the day of
reckoning when petitioner would replace him as Mayor of San Juan, Rizal.  The pattern
of delay is patent.

A principle already forged by this Court is that a motion for
reconsideration which has no other purpose than to gain time is pro forma
and does not stop the period of appeal from slipping away.^[22]
It is in recognition of this doctrine that we hold that where a motion for
reconsideration in an election case is taken advantage of for purposes of delay
to the prejudice of the adverse party or where such motion forms part of a
matrix of delay, that motion does not stop the running of the five-day period
for appeal.

The foregoing discussions pave the way for an examination of the
remedies, if any, available to private respondent.

5.       Mandamus will not
issue to compel the trial judge to decide private respondent’s motion for
reconsideration.  That motion for
reconsideration, we say again, had been decided on the merits.  And even on the assumption that the court did
not so decide, mandamus will not issue. 
For, the court did decide; it denied the motion.  Perhaps in a way not satisfactory to private
respondent.  But then, mandamus is no
remedy to control the exercise by the court of its discretion.^[23]
Nor will it avail to compel him to resolve an incident in a particular way.^[24]
Reason for this is that the law concedes to judges the right to decide
questions according to their own judgment and understanding of the law.  If the court’s resolution is wrong, correctible
it is by appeal, not mandamus.^[25]

As unavailing is mandamus to compel the judge to approve his
appeal.  Private respondent has not
appealed from the judgment.  He cannot
rely on the cautionary notice of appeal which he has withdrawn.

6.       Nor will the writs of
certiorari and prohibition issue.  Their
function is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or
to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction.^[26]
Admittedly, the trial court had jurisdiction over the election case.  The questioned order of November 25, 1968 was issued in the proper
exercise of such jurisdiction.  Granting
or denying a motion for reconsideration indeed involves an exercise of discretion.^[27]
As was pointed out in Bustos vs. Moir, 35 Phil. 415, 417, an election case:  “It is absurd to claim that a court has
no jurisdiction to do the very thing which the law authorizes it to do.  The mere fact that it decides the question
wrong is x x x utterly
immaterial to the question of its jurisdiction.” And, discretion has not
been abused.

Respondent Sto. Domingo’s motion for
reconsideration did not stop the running of the five-day period for
appeal.  No appeal has been taken from
the judgment dislodging said respondent from his seat as Mayor.  Accordingly, that judgment has become final.

Besides, as adverted to earlier in this opinion, the trial court
– upon the allegations set forth in paragraphs 17 to 20 of private respondent’s
petition before the Court of Appeals based on alleged “reliable
information” – may not be restrained by the latter court from enforcing
the order of November 25, 1968 denying the motion for the reconsideration of
its main decision.  We have also said
that the trial court has correctly denied said motion for reconsideration.  It follows then that neither certiorari nor
prohibition will issue against the trial judge to stop him from proceeding with
the execution of his judgment.

7.       In fact, no
extraordinary writ may at all issue in the present case.  For, a rule that has definitely crystallized
because of frequent reiteration is that extraordinary remedies – such as mandamus,
certiorari and prohibition – may not be sought if there is another remedy as
adequate and speedy.^[28]
We have no doubt that an appeal within the statutory period from the
judgment rendered on October 29, 1968
in this election case is as adequate and as speedy as any special civil
action.  Faster it could be.  For, the law commands that election contest
appeals “shall be decided within three months after the filing of the case
in the office of the clerk of the court to which the appeal has been
taken.”^[29]
This is fortified by another statutory precept which directs the trial and
appellate courts to “give preference to election contests over all other
cases, except those of habeas corpus” and to “hear and
decide them without delay, within the time limits fixed by law, whether they
are holding regular sessions or not.”^[30]
But appeal, we have heretofore stated, is lost. 
No remedy is left.

8.       In a last ditch
attempt to keep this case alive, respondent Sto.
Domingo now comes to this Court with the plea “that in the remote
possibility that his petition” in the Court of Appeals “for any
reason be denied, the same be considered or treated as an appeal.”

Reasons there are why this cannot be done.  First. 
At the time the petition before the Court of Appeals was filed, the
judgment of the trial court was already final. 
Second.  Said respondent
cannot now invoke this Court’s power to help him retrieve his right to appeal
which he has deliberately discarded in favor of a special civil action – which,
mildly put, has served no purpose other than to delay these proceedings.  He has already eaten up almost one-half of
the term of office that the electorate, to all appearances, had not entrusted
to him.  He cannot gamble with one court
proceeding, and failing in this, resort to another.  Indeed, resorting piecemeal to one remedy
after another could be an instrument of oppression against the adversary.  Third. 
Respondent Sto. Domingo’s petition before the
Court of Appeals is bereft of any allegation indicative of any intention of his
to appeal.  On the contrary, it was meant
to procure a decision remanding the case to the court below for further
proceedings.

These are considerations which deter us from heeding Sto. Domingo’s plea that the special civil action in the
Court of Appeals be treated as an appeal. 
In those cases where this Court considered an appeal as a special civil
action or vice-versa, there was reason therefor:  to avoid delay and to thwart the commission
of injustice.^[31]
But for this Court to grant said respondent Sto.
Domingo’s plea, delay instead of being avoided would be encouraged; justice
instead of being advanced, denied.  No
equitable consideration there is which would give some semblance of authority
to consider the special civil action as an appeal, He lost his remedy of
appeal.  Not through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence,^[32]
or through the court’s own fault.^[33]
If negligence or mistake there was, we are certain it was not excusable.  The short of it is that private respondent
opted to travel the road of extraordinary remedies, not with the intention of
having the case brought up for appellate review on the merits.  Clear was his aim to have the present
questions decided first and, if adversely resolved against him, to appeal.  To legitimize such maneuvers is to run smack
against the letter and spirit of the election law.  Temporizing with delay in election cases is
repugnant to our sense of justice.  It is
our duty to hold that appeal as a remedy has been totally fore­closed to
respondent Sto. Domingo.

The merits of the election protest are not before us in these
proceedings.  But as this decision will
have the effect of affirming the finality of the judgment of the trial court
upholding the protest of petitioner Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, we have gone over the records of the Court of First Instance and the
Court of Appeals which have been elevated to this Court.  And we are satisfied that our decision here
does not defeat the expressed will of the electorate of San
Juan, Rizal.

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN –

(1) the judgment of the Court of Appeals promulgated on February 13, 1969 is hereby set
aside; and

(2) the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Election Case No. 10545 entitled “Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Protestant, versus Braulio
Sto. Domingo, Protestee“,
declaring Joseph Ejercito Estrada as the duly elected
Mayor for the Municipality of San Juan, Province of Rizal
in the elections held on November 14, 1967 with a plurality of 192 votes, with
costs against protestee, is hereby declared final and
executory as of November 5, 1968.

Our decision herein shall become final five (5) days from notice
hereof.

Costs against private respondent Braulio
Sto. Domingo.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Dizon and
Barredo, JJ., concurs
in separate opinion.

Makalintal, J., took no part.

---

^[1]
Election Protest 10545, Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch VI, entitled “Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
Protestant, versus Dr. Braulio Sto. Domingo, Protestee.”

^[2]
The verbal denial order was confirmed in a written order of the same date, November 25, 1968.

^[3] CA-G.R.
42386-R, Court of Appeals,
entitled “Braulio Sto.
Domingo, Petitioner, versus Hon. Andres Reyes, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, and Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Respondents.”

^[4] Nardone vs. U.S.,
308 U.S. 338,
341.

^[5]
Section 179, Revised Election Code.  See
also:  Sections 89, 172 to 178,
Revised Election Code.

^[6]
Section 1, Rule 22, Rules of Court.

^[7]
16 SCRA 175, 180.

^[8] See:  Ong vs.
Commission on Elections (1968), 22 SCRA 241, 256-257; Pacis
vs. Commission on Elections (1968), 22 SCRA 539, 542; Pedido vs. Commission on Elections (1968), 22 SCRA
1403, 1413; Aguam vs. Commission on Elections
(1968), 23 SCRA 883, 887-888; Pacis vs.
Commission on Elections (1968), 25 SCRA 377, 389; Solidum
vs. Macalalag, L-28666, May 20, 1969.

^[9]
Section 1, Article II (Declaration of Principles), Constitution.

^[10] See:  E.g. Giron
vs. Caluag, 8 SCRA 285, 292.  See also:  Espi­ritu vs.
Municipal Council, 102 Phil. 866; Hebron vs. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175; Buencamino vs. Hernandez, 8 SCRA 483; Palting vs. San Jose Petroleum, Inc., 18 SCRA 924;
Co Pek vs. Vivo, 18 SCRA 954, where although
the appeals were dismissed for being moot, this Court nevertheless decided the
issues on the merits.

^[11]
Decision of the trial court, p. 16; emphasis supplied.

^[12] Rollo, Court of Appeals, p.
247.

^[13]
Oral arguments on the oral motion for reconsideration of the resolution denying
private respondent’s motion to reconsider the decision.  Rollo,
Court of Appeals, pp. 248-249; emphasis supplied.

^[14]
Record of Election Case 10545, Court of First Instance of Rizal,
p. 55.

^[15] Id.,
p. 66.

^[16] Id.,
p. 72.

^[17] Id.,
p. 95.

^[18] Id.,
p. 97.

^[19] Id.,
p. 224.

^[20] Id.
p. 279.

^[21]
This was admitted by private respondent’s counsel in the oral arguments before
this Court.

^[22] Valdez
vs. Jugo, 74 Phil. 49; “Y” Shipping
Corporation vs. Erispe (1967), 20 SCRA 1, 4; Lonaria vs. De Guzman (1967), 21 SCRA 349, 354.

^[23]
Board of Election Inspectors vs. Sison, 55
Phil. 914, 917; Eugenio vs. Tan, 84 Phil. 563,
565; Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors
Association vs. Court of Industrial Relations (1968), 23 SCRA 492, citing
Inchausti & Co. vs. Wright, 47 Phil. 866;
Marcelo Steel Corporation vs. Import Control Board, 87 Phil. 374; Palileo vs. Fred Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272; Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91
Phil. 608.

^[24]
Santiago Labor Union vs. Tabigne, 17 SCRA 286,
287, citing Lupisan vs. Alfonso, 78
Phil. 842, De Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 75 Phil. 824, Morada vs. Caluag, 5 SCRA
1128.  See also:  Dy Cay vs. Crossfield & O’Brien, 38 Phil. 521, 528; Montalbo vs. Santa­maria,
54 Phil. 955, 963; Quianzon vs. Provincial
Fiscal of Ilocos Norte, 58 Phil. 594, 597; Eugenio vs. Tan, supra; Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association vs.
Court of Indus­trial Relations, supra.

^[25] Id.

^[26]
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 65, Rules of Court; Pacis vs.
Averia (1966), 18 SCRA 907, 914-915, citing cases;
Gray vs. Kiungco (1968), 25 SCRA 216, 218, citing
Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil.
666, 669; Ang Ching Gi vs. De Leon, 79 Phil. 580, 582; Ong Sit vs. Piccio, 78
Phil. 785, 789; Tarnate vs. Daza, 76 Phil. 842; Claudio vs. Zandueta,
64 Phil. 812, 819; Westminster Bank vs. Torres, 57 Phil. 422, 425-426; Tayko vs. Capistrano, 53 Phil. 866, 871; Sabado vs. Gonzales, 53 Phil. 770, 777; So Chu vs. Nepomuceno, 29
Phil. 208, 210-211.  See also:  3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963
ed., pp. 143, 159.

^[27]
Lucero vs. Dacayo (1968), 22 SCRA 1004, 1007;
Gray vs. Kiungco, supra.

^[28] Lidasan vs. Commission on Elections (1968), 22 SCRA
975, 977.  See also:  Giron vs. Caluag (1963), 8 SCRA 285, 291; Republic vs. Perez
(1963), 8 SCRA 337, 342; Harrison Foundry & Machinery vs. Harrison
Foundry Workers’ Association (1963), 8 SCRA 430, 434, citing cases;
De la Cruz vs. Sta. Maria (1963), 7 SCRA 992, 1000.

^[29]
Section 178, Revised Election Code; Portillo vs. Salvani,
54 Phil. 543, 550; Querubin vs. Court of
Appeals, 82 Phil. 227, 229-230.

^[30]
Section 179, Revised Election Code.

^[31] Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz
(1966), 16 SCRA 784, 785; Mutuc vs. Commission
on Elections (1968), 22 SCRA 662, 665; People vs. Doriguez
(1968), 24 SCRA 163, 168; Sotto vs. Mijares,
L-23563, May 8, 1969.

^[32] Punzalan vs. Papica,
L-13804, February 29, 1960;
Pacis vs. Averia, supra,
p. 915; Pendon vs. Cabatuando
(1968), 25 SCRA 184, 190-191.

^[33]
Gavan vs. Wizlizenus, 48 Phil. 632, 636; Dais vs.
Court of First Instance, 51 Phil. 396, 403.

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