THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MIGUEL MENDEZ, ET ALS., DEFENDANTS, MIGUEL MENDEZ AND SEGUNDO GIANAN, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

This appeal was forwarded^[1]
to us by the Court of Appeals for resolution as involving purely legal
questions, principally as to whether due process was denied to the
accused-appellants by the Justice of the Peace Court of Virac,
Catanduanes, in a criminal case ^[2]
wherein the latter, reacting to said accused-appellants’ failure to appear and
adduce evidence in their defense at a scheduled hearing, despite seasonable
notice, and in view of previous repeated continuance, deemed the case submitted
for ‘decision after rejecting the defense counsels’ last-minute motion for continuance
on the ground that their clients were suddenly taken ill, and rendered a
judgment of conviction on the basis of the evidence already presented by the
prosecution.

Appellants Miguel Mendez and Segundo Gianan
were two of several persons^[3]
accused of the crime of slander by deed^[4] in a
complaint filed on 20 January 1962 in the Justice of the Peace Court of Virac by the aggrieved party, Alberto R. David.  Many postponements and continuances
characterized the case.  The proceedings
below liter­ally commenced and ended with motions seeking adjournment.

The initial hearing set for 26 March 1962 was postponed upon
motion of the complainant on the ground that he would take his oath as director
of the League of Liberal Party Legal Officers in Manila.  Reset for 3 May 1962, it was again postponed
upon motion of the complainant on the ground that he would appear as counsel in
a certain administrative case.  Set for
22 June 1962, it was postponed for the third time, for the reason that the
accused, Miguel Mendez and Castor Vargas, were absent and their co-accused,
Segundo Gianan, Pedro Gianan,
and Joel Vargas, although present in court, manifested through their counsel
that they were not ready for trial.

Likewise suspended were the subsequent hearings set for 9 July,
10 July, 3 August, and 22 August 1962. 
These were postponed for various reasons:  On 9 July, the defense questioned the
personality of the private prosecutor to conduct the prosecution without
authority from either the town chief of police or the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal.  On the 10th, the as­sistant
provincial fiscal assigned to handle the case requested for more time to study
the same.  On 3 August complainant got
sick, and on 22 August accused Segundo Gianan was sick
in his turn.

Finally, on 10 October 1962, the lower court was able to start
the trial which it previously re-scheduled for three consecutive days.  The prosecution began presenting evidence
until the following day.  On the 12th,
how­ever, accused Castor Vargas allegedly suffered a stroke and the parties
were forced to agree to a continuance. 
This was fixed on 5 November 1962 up to the 8th of the same month.

But once again further continuance was prayed for by the defense,
giving as an excuse this time the inability of accused Gianan
to appear at the hearings set by the court due to the fact that he was in
Manila at­tending to his wife who was allegedly under medical treatment.  This was granted by the court.

On 10 December 1962,
the trial was resumed and the prosecution continued presenting evidence.  The next hearing was also fixed and set for 3
January 1963 and the following two days.

On 3 January 1963, the prosecution adduced some more
evidence.  Thereafter, it rested its
case, with the court admitting all the exhibits.

During the same hearing, the defense manifested its intention to
file a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of irregularity of the
complaint.  The following discussion
transpired thereat:

“Atty.
Monjardin: 
Since there is no conspiracy in this case the accused herein cannot be
joined in one complaint and because of this representation will present a
memorandum to support our argument.

“Court:  In this connection, the Court gives you up to
Monday to submit and then we will proceed with this case.

“Atty.
Monjardin:  At
least ten days.

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

“Court:  I will give ten days, but if the case will be
again postponed the Court will be constrained to have the case deemed submitted
for decision.  I will give you up to
January 14.

“Atty.
David:  We beg for further
enlightenment.  After they fail to
submit, continuation of trial on the merits?

“Court:  Failure of defense to do that, case is submitted.

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x –
– – – – – – – – – – – – – –

“Court:  The case is definitely scheduled on
Friday.  Memorandum must be submitted
Jan. 14, trial of this case is definitely on Jan. 23,
session adjourned.”^[5]

Came 23 January 1963, the date set for the next hearing, but the
accused-appellants were nowhere in court when their case was called.  At this juncture, one of the defense counsels
asked for a thirty-minute recess to look for them.

When the session was resumed, the accused-appellants were still
missing.  The reason was supplied by
their counsel thus:

“Atty.
Monjardin: 
Your Honor, the defense wishes to manifest that two of the accused, the
persons of Miguel Mendez and Segundo Gianan could not
be present in Court because they thought the hearing of the case would be on
Jan. 24 . . . .  (Besides), no notice of
hearing was issued (to the bondsmen) and it is a matter of knowledge in criminal
cases that not only the accused are to be notified of
the hearing but also the bondsmen.  It is
improper to enter trial now.  Miguel Mendez
has sent me from Manila a medical
certificate which I request . . . . (to be) made part
of the record; and Segundo Gianan was stricken ill
only this morning, however no medical certificate could be presented now by
this representation.  We are asking
permission to submit said medical certificate in due time.  Because of the absence of the two accused,
hearing cannot proceed because it is the right of the accused to be
present.”^[6]

Acting on the foregoing manifestation, the lower court made the
following observation:

“Court:  . . . . (L)ast January 3, 1963, . . . . (the Court) acceded to counsel’s manifestation to file a
memorandum to support their conten­tion for the dismissal of the case.  In this connection counsel for the accused
even committed himself to the Court that the memorandum would be submitted
within ten days and the Court was made to understand that (with his) failure to
file the same, the continuation of the hearing will definitely go on . . .
.  Counsel for the accused was given
opportunity to file that memorandum . . . . yet no
memorandum was filed.  And now, . . . . the defense (claims
that it) is not ready for trial (because neither the two accused Miguel Mendez
and Segundo Gianan nor their witnesses are present) .
. . .  It should be borne in mind that
this case has been dragging on for a long time.”^[7];

denied the
motion for continuance as a mere subterfuge to delay the trial; and ruled that,
“under the circumstances”, the case should be, as it was, deemed
submitted for decision.^[8]

After reviewing the evidence of the prosecution, the lower court
found the accused Miguel Mendez and Segundo
Gianan guilty as charged, and sentenced them
to pay a fine of P250.00 each,
with subsidiary im­prisonment in case of insolvency, P180.00 as damages, and
costs.  The other accused, Pedro Gianan, Castor Vargas, and Joel Vargas, were acquitted.

On 15 March 1963, the judgment was promulgated.  But present in court on that date was Segundo
Gianan only. 
Accused Miguel Mendez failed again, for unspecified reasons, to appear.^[9]
He was merely provided with a copy of the decision.

Both appealed.  In their
common brief, three complaints were raised against the lower court:  (1) abuse of discretion in denying their
motion for continuance; (2) denial of due process in considering the case submitted
for decision without their evidence having been heard and duly appreciated; and
(3) unlawful promulgation of judgment insofar as Miguel Mendez is
concerned.  Contending that a judgment
tainted with such “irre­gularities” is null and void, appellants now
want us to reverse their con­viction and to remand the case to the lower court
for reception of their evidence.

(1)     The granting or
refusal of an application for continuance or postponement of the trial lies
within the sound discretion of the court.^[10]
This rule is, even independently of statute, universally recognized.^[11]
In this jurisdiction, the rule finds expression in the Rules of Court that
provides:

“SEC. 2.  Continuance or
postponement of the trial.  –
The court on the application of either party or on its own motion, may in its discretion
for good cause postpone the trial of the case for such periods as the ends of
justice and the right of the defendant to a speedy trial require.”^[12]

Expounding on this judicial discretion, former Justice Malcolm
said:

“Applications for continuances are addressed to the sound
discretion of the court.  In this
respect, it may be said that the discretion which the trial court exercises
must be judicial and not arbitrary.  It
is the guardian of the rights of the accused as well as those of the people at
large, and should not unduly force him to trial, nor for light causes
jeopardize the rights and interests of the public.  Where he conceives it to be necessary for the
more perfect attainment of justice, it has the power upon the motion of either
party to continue the case.  But a
party charged with a crime has no natural or inalienable right to a continuance.

“The ruling of the court will not be disturbed on appeal in
the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. 
When the discretion of the court is exercised with a reasonable degree
of judicial acumen and fairness, it is one which the higher court is loathe to review or to disturb.  The trial judge must be to a certain extent
free to secure speedy and expeditious trials when such speed and expedition are
not inconsistent with fairness.  Since
the court trying the case is, from personal observation, familiar with all the
attendant circumstances, and has the best opportunity of forming a correct opinion
upon the case presented, the presumption will be in favor of its action.  It would take an extreme case of abuse of
discretion to make the action of the trial court a denial of due process.”^[13]
(Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, we find no abuse of discretion on the part
of the Justice of the Peace Court of Virac.  The lower court was, in fact, too liberal in its grant of motions for
postponements and continuances.  Even
applications based on the most trivial causes which were usually not only unsubstantiated
but also prayed for only on the eleventh hour were granted.  If the court had decided to put a stop to
this anomalous practice, its action should be, and it ought to be, upheld.

Appellants asked for another continuance.  Whether this request was made in good faith
was for the lower court to assess in view of its familiarity with the
surrounding circumstances of the case. 
If the court had reasons to doubt appellants’ good faith and had a
well-founded belief that the application was merely intended for delay, its
denial thereof was no reversible error.^[14]

During the next to the last hearing, appellants were duly
notified in court of the trial set for 23
January 1963.  Aware of the
dozen postponements and continuances that had interrupted the proceedings, the
court even warned said appellants that it would no longer allow further delay
and would deem the case submitted for decision should attempt in this direction
be made.  This warning was not contested
but was ignored.  Appellants absented
themselves in an obviously vain effort to force a continuance.  Their flimsy excuses that they thought that
the trial was on the 24th, that their bondsmen were not notified, and that they
suddenly got sick on the very day of the trial unmasked their scheme to defeat
the speedy and expeditious determina­tion of the case.

While accused Miguel Mendez submitted a medical certificate
stating that he was suffering from hematoma and
swelling of the right leg and needed some rest, there was no showing that his
life or health would be endangered with his attendance of the trial.  His co-accused Segundo Guianan
did not even bother to submit a proof of his illness.  Under these circumstances, the lower court
wisely exercised its discretion^[15]
in denying the application in question.

(2)     Appellants aver denial
to them of due process by the court below when the latter, after denying their
last minute plea for further continuance of the hearing, considered the case
submitted on 23 January 1963
without receiving evidence for the defense. 
This claim must be rejected, for the transcript clearly evidences that
the accused had waived their right to introduce evidence on their behalf.

The record (quoted in pages 3 and 4 of this decision) is clear
that on 23 January 1962 the defense had made its fourth successive move for continuance
on the plea that it wished to ask for the dismissal of the charges on the
ground of irregularity of the complaint (a step that should have been taken
before trial), and asked for ten days to file a memorandum in support of its
stand.  The court granted the accused
twelve days (up to 14 January), with the explicit warning that the case would
be considered submitted if no memorandum was filed, and reset the hearing for
the 23rd.  Counsel for the accused made
no protest or remonstrance against the order.

On 23 January 1963,
because the promised memorandum had not been filed, the trial court denied the
defense’s further motions (its fifth since 22 August 1962) for postponement and declared the case
submitted for decision.  Instead of
interposing a protest or motion for reconsideration, the defense merely stated
as follows (transcript, pages 97-98)

“Atty. Monjardin:  We submit to whatever discretion the court
renders in regards to the case.

“Court:  This is the proper action for the court to
do.  The defense being not ready to enter
trial today after having manifested during the last hearing that it will file a
memorandum to the effect that the case be dismissed and that counsel committed
himself that in case he could not file that memorandum up to January 14, 1963,
the case that is set for today, Jan. 23, 1963, will proceed without any further
postponement.  Under the circumstances
wherein the defense is not ready as the two accused are not present and that
they have no witness, the court considers the case as submitted.  In view thereof, the case is submitted for
decision.

“Atty. Monjardin:  Submitted.” (Emphasis supplied)

In Abriol vs. Homeres,
84 Phil. 525, 534, speaking of the right of the accused to be heard or to
present evidence in his defense before being sentenced, this Court ruled:

“No court of justice under our system
of government has the power to deprive him of that right.  If the accused does not waive his right to
be heard but on the contrary – as in this case – invokes that right, and
the court denies it to him, that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed;
it has no power to sentence the accused without hearing him in his defense – –
– -.” (Emphasis supplied)

But in this specific case now before us, the accused, instead of
invoking the right to submit evidence, waived said right and submitted the case
without proof in their behalf.  Not only
this:  they made no move for
reconsideration nor prayed for an opportunity to submit evidence before or after
the sentence was promulgated.  They raise the alleged violation of their
right to be heard for the first time on appeal. 
To grant that plea, reopen the case, and send it back for trial anew
would be to sanction the plainly dilatory tactics adopted by these appellants
to harass and tire out the complainant, who had had to travel all the way from Manila
to Virac no less than twelve times.  We refuse to be a party to such reprehensible
trifling with the orderly administration of justice.  A complainant is as much entitled to speedy
justice as the accused-appellants themselves.

(3)     But there was no valid
promulgation of judgment in the case of appellant Miguel Mendez, because the
latter was not present during said promulgation.  Under section 6, Rule 116, of the old Rules
of Court, the defendant must be personally present during the promulgation of
judgment if the conviction is
for a grave or less grave offense.  Such
requirement is mandatory. “(I)n case of a failure to comply therewith the
sentence will be reversed, without disturbing the verdict, and the case
remanded with instructions to the court below to pronounce judgment in
accordance with the provisions of the statute.”^[16]

Considering that appellants were convicted of a less grave felony,^[17]
they having been sentenced to pay a fine of P250.00 each, the presence of every
one of them at the promulgation of the judgment below could not be dispensed
with.  There is, therefore, need to order
the trial court of Virac for proper promulgation of
its judgment against accused Mendez.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is
affirmed, but the case is ordered remanded to the Justice of the Peace Court of
Virac for promulgation and reading of the sentence to
the accused, Miguel Mendez, as required by law. 
The appellant, Segundo Gianan, shall pay
one-half of the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee,
and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Resolution dated 17 January 1967
of the Court of Appeals in its C.A.-G. R. No. 03908.  This appeal was originally raised to the
Court of Appeals.

^[2]
Criminal Case No. 1118.

^[3]
The other accused were Pedro Gianan, Castor Vargas, Joel Vargas, John Doe, Richard
Doe, Mike Doe, and other unidentified persons. 
Appellants and their named co-accused all pleaded not guilty.

^[4]
Punishable under Article 369 of the Revised Penal Code.

^[5]
T. S. N., 23 January 1963, pages 94.

^[6]
T. S. N., 23 January 1963, pages 95 – 96.

^[7]
Ibid., pages 96 – 97.

^[8]
Ibid., page 97.

^[9]
Mendez sent the court a telegram from Manila begging deferment of the
promulgation.  This was obviously ignored
by the court.

^[10]
United States vs. Lorenzana,
12 Phil. 64; United States vs. Ramirez, et al., 39 Phil. 738.

^[11]
17 Am. Jur.,
2d 118.

^[12]
Rule 118; emphasis supplied

^[13]
People vs. Ramirez, et. al., supra.

^[14]
Am. Jur., 2d, op. cit., page 163, and cases
cited.

^[15]
Ibid., pages 163 – 164.

^[16]
United States vs. Karelsen, 3 Phil. 223.

^[17]
See Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code.