G.R. No. L-26149. April 30, 1971
ADELAIDA E. VDA. DE CALADO, FELISA CALADO, WILLIAM CALADO, ROMEO CALADO AND AGUSTIN CALADO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND ACOJE MINING COMPANY, IN…
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission
in its ROI-WC No. 1830 wherein, upon review of the decision of its Acting
Referee awarding physical disability benefits to petitioners upon a claim filed
by them for death benefits, the Commission reversed said decision and
completely absolved respondent company, hereinafter to be referred to as Acoje, from any liability under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, notwithstanding it is undisputed that the deceased, upon whom, it is unquestioned,
petitioners were dependent, died of
tuberculosis contracted during and in the course of employment, the Commission
holding that since the deceased died more than two years after contracting the
disease, petitioners are not entitled to any death benefits and that the claim
they had filed therefor could not be converted into a
claim for physical disability benefits, since none was filed by the deceased,
as to whom it was exclusively personal.
The background facts
stated in the Commission’s decision, as gathered and adopted by it from the decision
of the Acting Referee, are as follows:
“Tomas Calado worked with the respondent
company, first as an underground miner and then as a head miner from March 8, 1948 to December 17, 1959. x x x. The works of a miner were to timber, drill holes, put the track rails, shovel area and
blast dynamites; while the duties of a head miner were to direct the work of
the miners, mucking machine operators, muckers and timbermen. The head
miner also helped his men when they raised the timber and cap, dug the
foundation of the track rails and drilled holes.
“On December 18,
1959, Tomas Calado vomitted
blood for the first time during his employment and so he was brought to the Acoje Mines
Hospital. On said date, an x-ray examination of his
lungs was taken by Dr. Mario A. Bataclang, Jr., which
showed a finding that the patient was suffering from advance pulmonary tuberculosis.
The patient was treated in the hospital until March
17, 1960 because
after that date he left the hospital, although there was still a need for
further treatment of his advance pulmonary tuberculosis. x x
x.
Tomas Calado asked for vacation leave but the
company denied it because he was always asking for vacation. Instead, the company let him sign(ed) his resignation paper so that he resigned voluntarily on
April 11, 1960
and went to his home at Bayto, Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
“Evidence further disclosed that Calado
died on June 4, 1962 of
pulmonary hemorrhage due to PTB (Exh. ‘A’).”
Significantly omitted
here, however, is the very relevant specific finding of the Acting Referee,
which does not appear to be denied by Acoje, that
when Calado left the company hospital on March
17, 1960, Dr. Bataclang, Jr., the company physician did not issue a
release paper allowing the patient to work.
As already stated, upon
these facts, the Acting Referee denied petitioners’ claim for death benefits
but granted them physical disability benefits.
Acoje’s motion for reconsideration having been
denied, the case was elevated to the Commission where Commissioner Cesario Perez rendered the decision absolving Acoje and reversing that of the Acting Referee upon the following
rationale:
“On the basis of the foregoing facts, we agree with the Acting
Referee that the claimant and her four minor children, who are the dependents
of Calado, may no longer recover death benefits
because his death had occurred more than two years from the date his pulmonary
tuberculosis became compensable on December
18, 1959. The provision of
law in point is Sec. 8 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, pertinent portion of which, for convenience, is hereunder quoted:
‘Sec. 8. Death Benefits. – If the disease contracted or injury
received by the employee as provided in section 2 hereof causes his death within two years from the date of such
injury or sickness, the employer shall pay the compensation to the persons
entitled thereto. x x x.’
“From the above-quoted provision, it can easily be gleaned
that recovery of death benefits can only be had if two indispensable
requisites concur, and they are:
“1. That the injury or illness must satisfy the
requisite conditions prescribed in Section 2 of the Act; and
“2. That death should occur within two years from
the date the injury or illness was received or contracted.
“While Calado’s pulmonary tuberculosis
which resulted in his death might have been aggravated by, or the result of the
nature of his employment with the respondent company, the stubborn fact
remained that he died after two years from the time his pulmonary tuberculosis
became compensable on December 18,
1959. Hence, his dependents
could no longer recover any benefits under said Section 8 of the Act.
“However, although the present claimant was denied the
benefits under the afore-quoted provision of law, the Acting Referee awarded
her compensation under Section 14 of the Act.
We believe this is error on the part of the Acting Referee. The right to the benefits emanating from the
different sections of the Workmen’s Compensation Act relating to physical
disability for labor, whether temporary or otherwise, except death benefits
under said Section 8, is a right that personally belongs to the injured or
sick worker and the same is not transferred to his dependent upon his
death. In other words, said right, if
not enforced by the worker concerned during his lifetime, is extinguished upon
his death. The following authority on this particular point is very
enlightening:
‘Claimant contends that if she is not entitled to death benefits
she should, however, be entitled to the total disability benefits that the late
Elias Moraña, her deceased husband, should have
received before his death. We find this
argument to be without merit. The right
to the benefits emanating from the different sections of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, as amended, relating to the physical disability for labor,
whether temporary or otherwise, except death benefits under Section 8 of the said Act, is purely personal
to the injured worker and the same is not transferred to his dependents upon
his death. This should easily be gleaned
from the context of our Decision in the
following case:
“’x x x. The decisive issue involved appears to be
whether death benefits may still be recovered by the dependents of a deceased
worker even if such death occurred after two years from the illness was
contracted in the course of work. The unajudicated claim filed by his widow, claimant
in this case, seeking compensation under Section 14 of the Act, has become
unenforceable upon his death. The right
of the widow or other
dependents to claim compensation under the Act is governed by
Section 8 in conjunction with Section 2 of Act 3426, as amended. x x x.'” (Moraña, et al. vs. Acoje Mining
Co., Inc., WC Case No. 1617-ROI-January
11, 1966, citing Maria Vda. de Castro vs. Acoje, Case No. 101, February 18, 1960).
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision, under review, should
be, as it is hereby, REVERSED, and the respondent absolved from any liability
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. No
pronouncement as to costs.”
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration filed with the Commission
en banc was denied on March
16, 1966, hence this appeal wherein the following alleged errors
are assigned:
“I. RESPONDENT WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION
COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RIGHTS TO DISABILITY COMPENSATION BENEFITS
UNDER SEC. 14, ACT 3428 AS AMENDED, IS PERSONAL TO THE INJURED OR SICK LABORER
AND THAT SAME BENEFITS DO NOT ACCRUE TO HIS LEGAL HEIRS UPON HIS DEATH; and
“II. RESPONDENT WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION
ERRED IN ABSOLVING RESPONDENT COMPANY OF LIABILITY UPON A GROUND WHICH IS A
MATTER OF DEFENSE TO RESPONDENT COMPANY BUT WHICH IS NOT BEING INVOKED BY SAID
COMPANY.”
We do not hesitate
to reverse the Commission’s decision.
It is clear to Us that the Acting Referee’s decision which the Commission refused to affirm
is more in consonance with the humane spirit of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act as a measure of social justice. Indeed, to recognize petitioners’ claim as covered by the law, one does not have to resort to generous
liberality in construing its provisions; all that needs be done is to apply
them fairly and reasonably so that the clearly discernible noble objective of
their enactment may not be defeated.
There is no controversy that Tomas Calado was
employed with Acoje, that he contracted tuberculosis
that arose out of and in the course of such employment and that he eventually
died of said illness. Neither is there
any question that petitioners were his dependents. That tuberculosis is a compensable sickness is expressly recognized in Section 2 of
the law. Acoje
does not and cannot dispute the fact that from the first time Calado vomitted blood and
exhibited other symptoms of the disease, he repaired to the Company hospital
and was treated thereat; he was not cured; when he left the hospital, the
company physician refused to issue to him any release paper allowing him to
work; he asked for a sick leave, Acoje denied;
instead, he was made to sign resignation papers; scarcely over two years
thereafter, he died of the same malady.
Outside of hospital and medical services, the record does not show that
Acoje ever paid either Calado,
in his lifetime, or his dependents, herein petitioners, after his
death, any compensation in any form.
Worse, Acoje denies it is liable for any
compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act; its only defense: prescription, because alledgedly
Calado did not file any claim during his lifetime,
while, on the other hand, the fact that he died more than two years after he contracted tuberculosis has deprived petitioners of any right to claim
any death benefit.
We cannot countenance
such a narrow view of the Compensation Act which shuts off the human value
considerations animating its provisions.
It just does not appear legally sound, much less morally justifiable,
that the case of petitioners be considered as not falling within the ambit of
the Act’s protection. The fundamental
purpose of the Act is to prescribe and establish a system for the payment by
employers of compensation to their employees or the dependents of the latter for any injury or death suffered by them arising out of and in the course of
their employment, which, if availed of, it must be emphasized, excludes all
other rights and remedies accruing to the employees or workers, their personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws.[1] The elaborate procedure outlined in its
provisions for effectuating such basic objective has been designed to
facilitate as much as possible
the granting of the contemplated relief, surely, not to obstruct or impede the
same. Said prescribed procedure imposes
upon both parties, the employee or his dependents, on the one hand, and the
employer, on the other, the taking of certain steps by which they can preserve
and protect their respective rights.
The scheme of the Act is
such that the steps required to be taken by the claimants correspond with those
to be taken by the employer and vice versa. The injured party or his dependents are
obligated to notify the employer of the injury as soon as possible[2] and to file the corresponding claim within
specified periods.[3] On the other hand, under Section 37 of the
Act, the employer is under duty to “keep a record of all injuries, whether
fatal or not, received by his employees in the course of their employment, when
the same come to his knowledge or attention,” and “As soon as
possible after the occurrence of an injury resulting in absence from work a day
or more, the employer shall give written notice thereof to the Workmen’s
Compensation Commissioner on blank forms specially prepared by said
Commissioner for which the employer shall make requisition in due time, or in
case of necessity or emergency, or for lack of forms, on any other paper,
containing the information hereinafter prescribed.” According to the
second paragraph of this same provision, the employer shall set forth in such
notice whether the liability for compensation is admitted or controverted.
In connection with these
required notices, however, the Act itself dispenses with the requirements of
notice and claim by or from the injured party under certain circumstances, such
that “in case medical, surgical, and hospital services and supplies have
been furnished voluntarily by the employer, notice of the injury or sickness
within the time limit (specified) shall not be necessary and if the employer
has voluntarily made the compensation payments, the claim for compensation to
be made within the time limits (specified) shall no longer be necessary.”[4] It is easily understandable, indeed, why the
law so provides. The sole and only
purpose in requiring early notice of injury and filing of a claim within the
brief periods fixed in the Act, is to afford the employer the earliest
opportunity to investigate the facts relating to the injury and to duly controvert or oppose the claim in connection
therewith,[5] thereby making it as hard as it is possible to do so for any false fabricated or excessive
claim to be made and paid. Accordingly,
where such opportunity appears to have been opened or afforded to the employer,
it does not matter that the statutorily required notice has not been given by
the injured party or the ones supposed to act for him. Thus, by express provision of the Act, “failure to (give)
or delay in giving notice shall not be a bar to the proceeding …. if it is shown that the employer,
his agent or representative had knowledge of the accident or that the employer
did not suffer by such delay or failure.”[6] In Hernandez vs. W.C.C. supra, this Court held that
the filing of a request for retirement …. predicated on sickness causing (the worker’s) disability from working substantially fulfills the
requirement of a claim …” (p. 24) Indeed, earlier, in Manila Railroad
Co. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 10 SCRA 41, this Court considered
the silence of the employer after having notice of an injury or death of any
of its workers or employees and his failure to give the Commission the report required by
Section 37 as a waiver of the
defense that the claim has been filed out of time. (p. 44)
As a matter of fact, failure on the part of the employer to give the notice to the Compensation Commission required by the Act is an offense punishable by
fine[7] and according to Section 45, such “failure …. shall
constitute a renunciation of his right to controvert the claim ….,”
which means that he cannot put up any defense at all, except perhaps that of
absence of employer-employee relationship.
It is easy to see that the reason for this is that in the same manner that the employer is given the opportunity to
prepare his defenses by requiring timely notice and claim by the
injured party, the latter should also be given early notice of the
negative stand of the employer, so that he may opportunely take the necessary
care in preparing and preserving his evidence.
Relative to these considerations, it is always important
to bear in mind that the obligation of employers to pay the compensation
provided in the Act is mandatory
and that as a matter of public
policy expressed in the Act itself, said compensation cannot be renounced or
waived by a laborer or beneficiary,[8] so much so that, as this Court has already
ruled, even if the same has in fact been formally waived already by the
claimant, such waiver “cannot ….. exempt (the
employer) from liability ….. in view of the provisions
of Section 7 of Act 3428, (the Compensation Act) as amended, which considers as
null and void any contract or device of any sort intended to exempt the employer
from all or part of the liability created by said Act.”[9]
It is true that in Luzon Stevedoring Co. v. Hon. De
Leon, 106 Phil. 562, this Court considered compliance by the claimant with
Section 24 of the Act, which requires the giving of notice of the injury or
death to the employer “as soon as possible” and the filing of a claim
“not later than two months after the date of injury or sickness, or in
case of death, not later than three months after death”, as the
“condition precedent to maintenance of any compensation proceeding under
the Act” and that “non-compliance with that requirement bars
recovery for compensation.” (p. 565) And in the
resolution of the motion for reconsideration of the decision in Pantranco vs.
W.C.C., G.R. No. L-16490, June
29, 1963 (8 SCRA 352) this Court went as far as to
clarify that notwithstanding actual notice or knowledge of the injury by the
employer, such notice or knowledge does not by itself constitute a claim and that unless a separate claim is filed by the claimants within the
period provided therefor in the Act, “an award
(would) not (be) warranted in law.” (10 SCRA 14, 19.)
In other words, it may be said that what the Workmen’s Compensation Commission
has done in the case at bar in denying petitioners claim, is seemingly in line
with the above decision, it appearing that neither Calado
in his lifetime, nor said petitioners have filed the formal claim prescribed by
the Act. What the Commission has failed
to perceive, however, is that the said decisions are predicated on the fact
that the employer has on his part and notwithstanding the noncompliance by
the claimants, complied with the statutory requirement to report the accident
causing the injury in the manner and within the period provided for in the
Act. Otherwise stated, this Court warts
to make it clear now, that in line with the spirit and purpose of the
Compensation Act and consistent with the public policy therein voiced that
claims for compensable injuries or death are not waivable,
any employer who, having actual notice or knowledge, directly or indirectly, of any compensable injury or death suffered by any of his
employees or workers, violates Section 37 of the Act by failing to report the
same and to controvert its liability therefor within
the period stated in said section is under an inescapable obligation to pay the
corresponding compensation in full whenever and howsoever a demand therefor is made by the party entitled thereto, the failure
of such party to give the notice or to file the claim required by Section 24 of
the Act notwithstanding. We hold that
unless this view is adopted, the public policy declaring claims for
compensation non-waivable would be open to facile
circumvention and might just as well be cast aside.
In the present case, We
have a situation wherein, as already indicated at the outset of this decision,
it is not disputed that Tomas Calado, an employee of Acoje, “contract(ed) tuberculosis caused by such
employment” and, as a matter of fact, died therefrom
barely two years from the time the said sickness was diagnosed by the company
physician at the company hospital, and inspite of the
fact that nothing in the record shows nor is it even alleged that Acoje ever reported the same, much less controverted
its liability therefor as required by Section 37 of
the Compensation Act, and merely because Calado did
not file any claim for compensation within the period specified in Section 24
of the Act, coupled with the fact that he died more than two years from the
time the sickness was discovered, the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, the
very instrumentality instituted by the Act to implement its provisions and
effectuate its humane spirit and objective, held that Calado’s
heirs, herein petitioners, are not entitled to compensation. To say the least, We
cannot conceive how such a conclusion can be said to be within the
contemplation of the Compensation Act.
Surely, this Court cannot go along with the Commission’s reasoning. Indeed, We are
surprised that the Commission has taken such a position, for as against the
precedents it has cited, namely, its own decisions in Morana
et al. v. Acoje, W.C. Case No. 1617-ROI, January
11, 1966, and Maria Vda. de Castro v. Acoje, Case No. 101, February 10, 1960, the Commission had itself ruled in another
case, Plaza v. Madrigal Shipping Co., Workmen’s Compensation Commission Case
No. 9578, that a failure to present a claim for compensation within the
statutory period is a defense which must be seasonably pleaded. (See Montemayor,
Vol. II, 1967 ed. p. 138.)
We feel that to deny compensation to petitioners on the technical grounds
invoked by Acoje and the Commission in the appealed
decision would be intolerable and shocking to the social conscience.
As We
have also indicated earlier above, the Compensation Act imposes upon both the
employer and the employee or those acting for the latter the obligation to take
certain steps within respectively specified periods, whenever an injury or
death is suffered by the employee which by its nature is compensable under the
Act. Now, according to the Act, the failure of the claimant
for compensation, either the
employee himself or those who may act for him, to take the steps so required of
them would bar recovery,
whereas, on the other hand, the failure also of the employer to take the steps also required of him would constitute a waiver of any defenses he might otherwise have against a claim for compensation. The question that is posed before Us in the case at bar is plainly this, inasmuch as both the employee or claimant and the employer have failed to comply with the steps
required of them by the Act,
should compensation be allowed,
considering, it should be
emphasized, that it is not disputed
that, by its own nature, the sickness, tuberculosis, which Calado
contracted because of his employment and from which he died is statutorily compensable?
We hold that it is obvious that an affirmative answer to this
question is inevitable.
In Kapisanan
ng Mga Manggagawa
sa Alak etc. vs. Hamilton
Distillery Co., 35 SCRA 8871, We already pointed out that in deciding labor
cases, We should always be guided by the constitutional provision which ordains
that “the State shall afford protection to labor” and declares as a
principle that “the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the
State” as well as Article 24 of the Civil Code which provides that
“in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties
is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence,
mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for
his protection.”
Such, naturally, must be
our perspective in resolving the issues now before Us. As between the employee and the employer, no
choice is left as to who should bear the consequences prescribed by the law,
when both of them fail to comply with the mutual obligations imposed upon them
by the law. Obviously, it is the employer
who must assume liability, if only because it is always the employer
who can better afford it. When an
employee suffers injury, sickness or death caused by his employment, no one
should expect that in such predicament and faced with the possible loss of all
means of subsistence and support, such employee or his
dependents, not infrequently ignorant of the intricacies of the matter, would
be able to give needed attention to the technical requirements of the law, so
that they may be compensated. On the
other hand, an employer has all the resources and facilities by which he can
readily comply with all the technicalities of the law. Withal, when a compensable injury or death
takes place, and having knowledge or notice thereof, the employer does not
report it to the Commission, it does
not lie in the lips of such employer to allege that no claim has been
filed by the employee or his dependents because his own failure to report may be considered as an attempt to escape from
the legal consequences of such injury or death and his statutory obligations therefor, hence it would be morally untenable to allow him
to escape liability in such circumstance.
Apart from giving the claimants an opportunity to adequately prepare
and preserve the evidence in support of their claim, the more
important purpose of the Compensation Act in requiring employers to make the
report referred to in Section 37 is to enable the Commission to undertake the
mission imposed upon it by the public policy contained in the Act to see to it that due compensation is totally paid in all instances of compensable injury or
death, any formal or implied waiver of the persons entitled thereto
notwithstanding.
Moreover, in such a
situation where the employer has violated the Act, it is not unreasonable and
We hold it to be plainly within the spirit of the Act, to construe its Section
25 which provides that the notice may include the claim”, in the sense
that in the cases of implied claims or excusably delayed notices, as those already
ruled upon by this Court as well as in similar instances, such implied or
excusably delayed notices should be considered to be in legal contemplation, at
the same time the claims required by the Act, with the result that in such situations, the employer may no longer be heard to invoke the defense that no claim has
been filed. After all, We have already held in many cases that there is no required
form for notices and claims for compensation in all instances where the employer has actual knowledge of the injury or death. (See cases cited under comments on
Sections 25-27 in Montemayor, Labor, Agrarian Social Legislation, 1967 ed., pp. 109-111.)
Before closing this discussion, We wish to make it very clear that although We did hold
in the cases of Luzon
Stevedoring and Pantranco, referred to above, that an
employer is not bound to pay
compensation if no claim therefor has been
filed within the period
specified in Section 24, this
was because timely report and controversion were made
by the employers in said cases. We could
not have meant otherwise, since on the very day the Pantranco
resolution was promulgated, January 30, 1964, We held in another
case, Manila Railroad Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, G.R. No.
L-19377, that if “in spite of the notice (of injury) …..,
the company remain(s) silent and fail(s) to give to the
Commission the report required by Section 37 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act,
….. the
company is deemed to have waived its defense that the claim is not compensable
because of the claimant’s failure to file it within the statutory period.” (10 SCRA 41, 44)
We shall now turn to the
other aspect of respondent’s position.
According to respondents, because Calado died
more than two years after his tuberculosis was first discovered or diagnosed, it would be violative
of Section 8 of the Act which
provides that:
“SEC. 8. Death Benefit. – If
the disease contracted or injury received by the employee as provided in Section two hereof causes his death within
two years from the date of such injury or sickness, the employer shall
pay to the persons entitled
thereto, or, in case there shall be none, to the person representing the
deceased employee the burial expenses
in the amount of two hundred pesos, and shall also pay to or for the
following persons, in the order of priority and during the periods hereinafter set forth, compensation equivalent to
the following percentages of the average weekly wages of the employee as
determined in Section nineteen of this Act:
x x x.”
to allow
petitioners, his dependent heirs, to
recover. In this particular respect, the respondents may be technically
correct. We cannot, however, sanction
their corollary conclusion that Acting Referee Pedro A. de Leon erred in holding that although petitioners may not be
entitled to death compensation benefits, they may, however, receive disability benefits corresponding to the
period from the day he fell sick up to the time of his death under Section 14 of the Act which provides:
“SEC. 14. Total disability. –
In case the injury or sickness causes temporary total disability for labor, the employer shall, during such disability, pay to the injured employee
a weekly compensation equivalent
to sixty per centum of his average weekly wage but not less than fourteen pesos per week, except in the
case provided for in the next following paragraph. No compensation shall be allowed for the
first three calendar days of
incapacity resulting from an injury except the benefits provided for in the
preceding sections but if the incapacity extends beyond that period, compensation shall be allowed from the first day of such incapacity.
Such weekly payments
shall in no case continue after the disability has ceased,
nor shall the aggregate sum paid
as compensation exceed in any
case six thousand pesos. But no award of
permanent disability shall take
effect until after two weeks have elapsed from the date of injury.”
The
reason given by the Commission for denying the claim of petitioners is that “the right to the
benefits emanating from the different sections of the Workmen’s Compensation Act relating to physical disability
for labor, whether temporary or otherwise, except death benefits under said Section 8, is a right that personally
belongs to the injured or sick worker and the same is
not transferred to his
dependents upon his death.” (p. 3, Decision of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, Annex A of the Answer). Acoje, in turn
argues, rather stoically, that “Where,
therefore, an injured or sick
employee fails to file a claim
for disability benefits during his lifetime, such failure should not be laid at
the door of the employer. If the employee slept on his rights and failed to exercise them when he could, the fault is his.” (pp. 5-6, Acoje’s brief.) In other words, respondents posit
that petitioners are not entitled
to any compensation whatsoever because whereas petitioners cannot invoke Section 8, since Calado’s
death took place beyond the two-year period therein fixed, neither can they rely on Section 14, considering that Calado did not personally or thru an authorized person file
any claim for disability compensation during his lifetime.
As We
have already indicated earlier above, respondents’ purely legalistic posture
can never win the sympathy of this Court.
Respondents’ approach is manifestly inconsistent with the evident
intent of the Compensation Act to make employers liable for compensation for
any work-connected injury or death of any of their employees or workers which
the employers do not report to
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission or do not disclaim liability for by
means of a formal controversion as required by the
Act within the period therein provided. Thus, had the respondent Commission only properly
analyzed all the relevant circumstances of this case in the
light of the considerations We have discussed in this opinion, it would have
undoubtedly realized that in law and in equity, and precisely because Acoje failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of
the Act for it to report Calado‘s illness
and controvert its resulting
liability therefor, an omission for whose consequences
it should naturally suffer, Calado should be deemed as having effectively filed the
required claim for disability
compensation, within the meaning of Section 25 of the Act, the moment he reported to the company hospital
and physician and was actually diagnosed and treated thereat for tuberculosis, a statutory
compensable disease. So, even assuming without deciding that, as Acoje contends and the respondent Commission has
held, the right to file a claim
for disability compensation is “purely
personal to the injured worker and the same is not transferred to his dependents upon his
death”, We hold that
petitioners may not be prejudiced by said ruling of the respondent Commission, for the simple reason that, as a matter of law, Calado
must be considered as having actually
filed the required claim, and, in consequence, his right to compensation for
disability corresponding to the period
up to his demise, had already accrued before his death and, accordingly, the
same constitutes an asset of his
estate transmissible to his heirs, herein petitioners, free, on account of its
special nature, from any liens or obligations.
Resort to the American authorities cited by petitioner on this point is unnecessary because, after all, the decisions referred to would make
the transmissibility of the right in question dependent upon respective
statutory provisions. We prefer to lay down Our own construction of the Compensation Act of Our own country in the
sense expressed in this opinion even if there should be any contrary opinion in
other jurisdictions.
It is to Us indisputable
that it is the clear intention of our Workmen’s Compensation Act to make it the
inescapable duty of employers to pay disability compensation to any employee
and worker who suffers a work-connected injury for as long as he is so
disabled, and in the event that should such employee or worker should die later
as a result of the same injury, to pay death behefits
to his dependent heirs, in addition to the disability benefits that might have
already been paid, provided that
such death takes place within two years from the date of the injury, such that
disability benefits are supposed to be distinct, separate and apart from death
benefits and, consequently, the loss of the right to claim the latter because
of the expiration of the two-year period, should all the more preclude the
possibility of denial of the former, as otherwise, the public policy of the Act
of making the payment of compensation for all work-connected injuries mandatory
and non-waivable would be rendered nugatory. It is, likewise, clear to Us that under the
Act, the most decisive factor in determining the liability of an employer in
compensation cases is his strict
compliance with the duty to file with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
within the period fixed in the Act, a corresponding notice of the injury or
death, whether work-connected or not, suffered by any of his employees or
workers, and to formally controvert its liability therefor,
if it is not work-connected or is otherwise totally
defective, within the time also fixed in the Act, which duty naturally begins
to attach from the moment the injury comes to his knowledge in one way or
another and, particularly, when the employee avails of the medical or hospital
services which the employer is required by the Act to provide (Section 13)
and, consequently, the filing of a formal claim by the party entitled is only of secondary importance, considering that a controversion
may even be filed before any
claim is made, and may, at least, be invoked only when a controversion
is duly filed by the employer, considering that the Act expressly provides
that the absence of such controversion “shall
constitute a renunciation of his right to controvert.” (Sec. 45)
At this juncture, We note that, significantly, respondent Acoje
is completely silent in its brief regarding petitioners’ third assignment
of error to the effect that respondent Commission should
not have relieved Acoje from liability on the ground
of non-filing of any claim for disability compensation by Calado,
since that defense was not pleaded
by Acoje before the Commission. Petitioners cite Manila Railroad Company vs.
Perez, G.R. No. L-20171, June 29, 1965, 14 SCRA, 504 in which Our
present Chief Justice held for the Court thus:
“Moreover, the question of whether a disability resulting
from aggravation taking place before the effectivity
of Republic Act No. 772 is compensable under said original Workmen’s
Compensation Law was not raised in the Commission, not even
in the motion for reconsideration
of the decision of its Acting Chairman.
It was not even one of the grounds alleged in support of the petition
for review by certiorari filed with this Court. Hence, the defense must be deemed waived and
cannot be, as it is, raised for the first time in petitioner’s
brief. As held in Viaña
vs. Al-Lagadan (54 Off. Gaz. 664):
‘The first ground is untenable, petitioner not having invoked it
before the rendition of the Referee’s decision on Feb. 23, 1953.
The objection to the application of Act No. 3428, upon said ground, was
made for the first time when petitioner sought a review of said decision by the
Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner.
The non-applicability of said Act x x x is, however, a matter of defense, which cannot be
availed of unless pleaded in the employer’s answer to the claim for
compensation filed by the employee or his heirs. Petitioner herein having failed to do so,
said defense may not be entertained (Rolan v. Perez,
63 Phil. 80, 85-86).’ (See, also, Manila Yatch
Club, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-19258, May 31, 1963.)”
Whether
or not the foregoing ruling is squarely applicable to the case at bar, We are of the view that in line with the principle therein contemplated,
it is not good policy in regard to social legislation like the Workmen’s
Compensation Act for the Workmen’s Compensation Commission to go out of its
way in absolving an employer from liability for compensation for work-connected
injury or death of his employee or worker by upholding grounds not invoked by
the employer himself as a defense before it.
Lastly, Acoje, without making any specific assignment of error on
the point, would like this Court to hold that Acting Referee de Leon’s award is
excessive because it covers the period after April 11, 1960 “when Tomas Calado resigned from his work” and up to his
death. (pp. 15-16, Acoje’s
Brief) Under the rules on appellate procedure, generally, an alleged error may
not be considered by the court, without a corresponding specific assignment
thereof. (Sec. 7, Rule 51) On this
ground alone, We could ignore Acoje’s
plea. In any event, Our
reading of the factual findings of the Commission is that Calado did not spontaneously
resign. According to said findings, he
was asking for a sick leave due to his tuberculous
condition but Acoje “denied it because he was
always asking for vacation. Instead, the
Company let him sign(ed) his resignation paper, so
that he resigned voluntarily on
April 11, 1960
and went to his house at Bayto, Sta. Cruz, Zambales.” (Decision of the
Commission, p. 1, Annex B of the Answer.) Ordinarily, the findings of
the Commission bind this Court, but under the peculiar circumstances of this
case, for this Court to uphold the conclusion of the Commission, which, at
best, is an erroneous inference or deduction from Calado’s
bare act of signing resignation papers presented to him by the company, that Calado resigned voluntarily would be, to say the least,
tantamount to giving premium to a practice that is plainly a circumvention of
the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which should, on the contrary, be roundly
denounced as being close to being antisocial and inhuman.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the appealed decision
of the respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission is reversed and the
decision of Acting Referee de Leon is affirmed in toto,
with triple costs against respondent Acoje.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs except as
to that paragraph in the opinion, which assumes the continuing vitality of the
resolution in Pangasinan Transportation v. WCC, as to
which he expresses no view.
[1]
Sec. 5, W.C.A.; Hudencial v. S. P. Marcelo & Co., Inc.,
L-23969, Feb. 27, 1971.
[2]
Sec. 24, Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended.
[3]
“Not later than 2 months after the date of injury or sickness, or in case of
death, not later than 3 months after death.” (Id.)
[4]
Id.
[5]
Hernandez v. W.C.C., 14 SCRA
219, 224.
[6]
Sec. 27, Workmen’s Compensation Act.
[7]
Last par. Sec. 37.
[8]
Elago v. Phil. Sugar Estates Dev. Co., G. R.
No. 41855, Oct. 26, 1943.
[9]
Jose C. Aquino et als. v. W.C.C., 15 SCRA, 631, G. R. No. L-18333, Dec. 29, 1965.