PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, PETITIONER, VS. PILAR POBRE, VICTORINO CUSI AND COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES CREATED UNDER SPECIAL ORDER NO. 732 DATED FEBRU…

On May 9,
1967, the Philippine
National Railways – hereinafter referred to as PNR – filed a petition for mandamus and certiorari (G.R. L-27501) against the Court of Appeals and the
spouses Victorino Cusi and Pilar Pobre, praying for judgment
as follows:

“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that –

1.  A writ of mandamus
be issued by this Honorable Court compelling respondent Court of Appeals to
exercise its appellate jurisdiction and to resolve the merits of the petition
for mandamus and certiorari in CA-G.R. No. 38906-R of the respondent Court of
Appeals and a writ of certiorari
issue declaring null and void the Resolutions of the respondent Court of
Appeals dated February 28, 1967 and April 6, 1967.

2.  Petitioner prays of such other and further relief
as may be just and equitable in the premises.”

Because our resolution of
May 17, 1967 dismissing the PNR^‘s petition
mistakenly referred to it as “Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals”, on July 16 of
the same year the PNR filed a motion stating, inter alia,
that it had “never filed a petition for review in the above-entitled
case” but “an original action for mandamus
and certiorari dated May 3,
1967″; that this court had exclusive original jurisdiction to grant the
writs therein prayed for because they were to be directed against the the Court of Appeals; that it had no remedy by appeal nor
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law
against the resolutions issued by said court on February 28 and April 16, both
of the year 1967, in CA-G.R. No. 38906-R; and prayed that its “original
action for mandamus and certiorari, be given
due course.” As our resolution of dismissal of May 17, 1967 referred, in reality, to the original action
for mandamus and certiorari filed by the PNR on May 9 of the same year, We consider its motion of July 16, 1967 as one for the reconsideration of said
resolution.

At the outset it must be
stated that whether the printed petition filed by the PNR is one for the review
on appeal of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals mentioned therein, or a
special civil action for mandamus and
certiorari against said court and the
private respondents named in the petition, makes no substantial difference as
far as our resolution of dismissal is concerned, the essence of which is that,
upon the allegations made in the aforesaid petition, the same was without
merit.

To further clarify
matters, We advert to the following facts disclosed by
the record:

It appears that in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal an action for damages was
filed by the spouses Victorino Cusi
and Pilar Pobre against the
PNR (Civil Case No. 7948).  After the
latter had filed its answer, the court, upon motion of the plaintiffs, issued
an order dated November 17, 1964 requiring the said defendant to file a third
party complaint against the United Housing Corporation mentioned in its
answer.  As said defendant showed no
willingness to file the third party complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion to
compel it to do so.  This motion,
however, was denied by the court on March 21, 1966 upon the ground that “it is
discretionary for a defendant either to file a third party complaint or not
against a third person not yet a party to the original action (Annex
“C” of the printed petition pages 116-117).

More than one year later,
or more specifically, on August 11, 1966, the PNR changed its mind and filed a
motion for leave to amend its answer by including therein a third party
complaint against the United Housing Corporation (Annex “D” of the
printed petition pages 118-119), to which was attached the amended pleading it
intended to file.  This motion was denied
by the court in its order of November 28, 1966 for the reasons stated in the following
portion thereof:

“Examining the record of this case, it is shown that since November 17, 1964, upon motion of
plaintiffs, defendant was directed to file a third-party complaint against the
United Housing Corporation.  Defendant
failed, however, to comply with said Order and plaintiffs filed again on February 4, 1965 another motion to
compel defendant to comply with said Order of November 17, 1964. 
Again on March 9, 1966,
plaintiffs filed another motion to re-compel
defendant to implead the United Housing Corporation
but notwithstanding these motions defendant consistently refused and failed to
file action as indicated.

On the basis of the above and considering that defendant’s counsel
was given all the opportunity to implead the United
Housing Corporation as third-party defendant but failed to do so it is now too
late for him to amend his Answer after he allowed more than three years to
lapse after the filing of his Answer and plaintiffs have already presented
their evidence and rested their case.

We also note that the amendment of the Answer seeks to alter the
defense in that the responsibility is shifted to the United Housing Corporation
which, however, has not been given the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses of the plaintiffs it was not brought in as third-party defendant
prior to plaintiffs’ presentation of evidence.

In the case of Rodgers vs. Dick No.
L-18220, April 30, 1963, it
was held that “pleadings serve to determine the issues of law and/or fact
raised by the respective pleaders. 
Accordingly there must be, and there is a limit as to the time at which
a party may amend his own pleading. 
Amendments may be made, therefore, within the time and under the
conditions prescribed in the Rules of Court, generally, before the trial or
hearing of the case or issue on the merits. 
Indeed, otherwise, there would be no way to determine and limit the
nature of the evidence to be presented or admitted or of the arguments that the
parties may adduce.” (italics supplied.)

In the case of Jai-Alai Corporation vs. Ching Kiat G. R. No.
L-7969 (March 30, 1960) it was also held:

“With respect to plaintiff’s other
motion to bring the new parties-defendants, we, likewise find that the trial
court did not err in denying the same. 
The Motion was made 5 years after the filing of the complaint and when
the trial was already on rebuttal stage. 
It was also unnecessary since the persons proposed to be brought in were
not really indispensable parties.”

Premises considered this Court finds the Motion of defendant
Philippine National Railways to be without merit and the same is DENIED.

Let this case be set for reception of defendant’s evidence on
December 15, 16, 1966, January 5, 6 and 12, 1967, all at 9:30 o’clock a.m.”

The motion for
reconsideration of this order filed by the PNR under date of December
29, 1966 was also
denied by the court in its order of January 12, 1967 in which the following was said:

“x x x
this Court finds no justification for setting aside its Order of November 28,
1966, as it believes that the
reasons and grounds given by us in the Order of November 28, 1966 more than
justify the denial of defendant’s Motion to Amend its Answer at this stage of
the proceedings.  We may state further
that unlike other situations, this particular case is unique in that defendant
was advised and ordered by the Court at the instance of plaintiffs to implead the
United Housing Corporation as a third-party defendant, and notwithstanding our
Orders on the matter, defendant refused and thought it best perhaps not to
bring in the United Housing Corporation as third-party defendant.  x x
x.”

It is petitioner’s
contention in the petition for mandamus
etc., now before Us that the above-mentioned orders of November 28, 1966 and
January 12, 1967 were issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal with grave abuse of discretion and that, therefore, a
writ of certiorari and another of mandamus should be issued for their
annulment and to compel said court to admit the amended answer with a
counterclaim and third-party complaint mentioned above.

It appears, however, that
besides the petition for mandamus and
certiorari under consideration (G.R.
L-27501), the PNR had previously filed with this court (G.R.
L-27123) and with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 38906-R), similar petitions
for mandamus and certiorari for the same purpose of annulling the aforesaid orders
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and to compel
the latter to admit its amended answer with a counterclaim and third-party
claim.  In this connection, the pleadings
before Us show that prior to
February 1, 1967 the PNR filed against the same respondents herein a special civil
action for mandamus and certiorari docketed in this court as
G.R. L-27123 to obtain exactly the same relief prayed for in G.R. L-27501.  We dismissed said petition (G.R. L-27123) by
our resolution of February 1, 1967.  On
February 9 of the same year, the PNR filed an amended petition for mandamus and certiorari dated February 6, 1967 just to file almost immediately a motion for
its dismissal.  Again, on February
28, 1967, the same
party filed a motion to withdraw its motion to dismiss.  In view of this confusing
steps taken by the PNR, this Court issued a
resolution on February 29, 1967 to this effect:

“(1)  to deny the petitioner’s motion of February 9,
1967 ‘to dismiss the amended petition for mandamus
and certiorari dated February 6,
1967,; (2) to deny petitioner’s motion of February 28, 1967 ‘to withdraw motion
to dismiss’ the amended petition for mandamus
and certiorari of February 9, 1967;
(3) to declare the resolution of this Court of February 1, 1967 dismissing the
original petition for certiorari as
final; and (4) to furnish the Court of Appeals a copy of this resolution for
reference in connection with Case CA-G.R. 38906-R pending in that court,
entitled ‘Philippine National Railways, petitioner, versus Cecilia Muñoz Palma, et al., Respondents.'”

After We
had dismissed the petition for mandamus
and certiorari in G.R. L-27123, the
PNR went to the Court of Appeals where it filed a similar if not identical petition
docketed as CA-G.R. L-38906-R.  On
February 28, 1967, the Court of Appeals dismissed said petition on two
grounds:  firstly, that as the action
pending before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Civil Case No. 7948) involved an amount of damages exceeding the maximum
amount within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, the writs prayed for
were not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; secondly, because the petitioner
had previously filed with the Supreme Court an identical petition which was subsequently
dismissed.

It appearing from the
foregoing that the PNR, herein petitioner, is raising in the petition for mandamus and certiorari now before Us (G.R. L-27501) one and the same issue for
the third time:  the first time in
G.R. L-27123, and the second before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 38906-R, it
is clear that We must deny, as We hereby deny its motion of June 15, 1967
praying that We give due course to its petition.

Our resolution of May 17,
1967 is hereby
declared final.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.