THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VICENTE MONTERO Y BRAGAS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

It was an unfortunate
turn of events that led to appellant Vicente Montero y Bragas
taking a hand in a street brawl where a neighbor, Rufo
Naboa by name, was involved with two brothers,
Salvador Balacano and Avelino
Balacano, the former of whom died, with the latter
having survived and having lived to testify as the sole eyewitness against
him.  Prosecuted for frustrated homicide
with Avelino as the offended party, and for murder in
the case of Salvador as the victim,
Montero was acquitted of the former charge and convicted of the latter offense,
being sentenced to reclusion perpetua
with indemnification to the heirs of the deceased
in the sum of P12,000.00.  Hence, this
appeal.  The main basis for seeking a
reversal by appellant is the failure of the prosecution to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.^[1]
A careful study of the evidence discloses that a more careful and intensive
scrutiny thereof would sustain the stand of appellant.  While there were five witnesses for the
prosecution, the sole testimony directly pointing to him as the one who fired
the fatal shot came from one of the offended parties, Avelino
Balacano, but contradictions of a serious character
minimized the worth of his assertions on the stand.  It is true a sister, Editha
Balacano, testified, but she came to the scene of the
affray after her brother Salvador
was shot.  Moreover, she was quite
certain that he held in his hand a long gun, presumably the one used, but the
declaration of an objective and neutral witness was that the slug recovered
from the body of the deceased did not come from the rifle of the accused, but
possibly from a firearm, like a local sumpak.  Moreover, there was no proof of any motive
that could have led appellant to perpetrate the act.  Reference then to the authoritative principle
that only by proof beyond reasonable doubt could the constitutional presumption
of innocence be overcome, affords more than ample warrant for the appealed
judgment being overturned.  We reverse.

According to the appealed
decision: “The only issue is who inflicted the injuries on the
victim.”^[2] This
was the answer: “The testimony of Avelino Balacano strongly yields the conclusion that accused was
the one who shot the deceased Salvador Balacano.  Avelino Balacano testified in a spontaneous, candid, frank and
straightforward manner that while he and his brother Salvador were walking along the railroad track and
upon reaching the house of the accused, they were immediately followed by the
accused and his companions.  Accused was
armed with a short gun while his companions were with lead pipes.  Thereafter, he was immediately stabbed by the
son of the accused, Henry, and for which he shouted to his brother.  This caused his brother to look back and at
that precise moment, he was shot on the forehead causing him to fall.  Thereupon, the companions of the
accused immediately stabbed and hit him with lead pipes.  The
testimony of Avelino Balacano
was corroborated by her sister Edita who likewise
declared that when she was informed by Avelino
that their brother Salvador was shot, she immediately went to the railroad
track and there found her brother Salvador sprawled and [beside] him was
Vicente Montero holding a gun together with his companions like Carding, Henry
Montero, Eden Negro and Rufo.  Henry was with a bladed instrument and the
other companions were with lead pipes. 
When she shouted for help, they all ran away.”^[3]
That was all.  The lower court concluded
that appellant, who was the only one prosecuted, was the guilty party.  As pointed out at the outset, had there been
a more thorough appraisal of the evidence submitted, without the grave
contradictions having been ignored, and with the other circumstances casting
doubt on the guilt of the accused considered as well as the lack of motive
evaluated, the judgment could have been different.

The rest of the opinion
will be devoted to a discussion of the above propositions.

1. It is undoubted that the only person who could testify as an
eyewitness to the alleged guilt of appellant was Avelino
Balacano. 
After alleging that he was stabbed, it was to be expected that he would
run away from the scene of the occurrence, after warning his brother Salvador
that he should do the same.  That was what
happened.  He was hardly in a position
then to be quite precise as to what transpired next.  What is not open to question was that Salvador
was shot.  He did categorically declare
on the stand that it was appellant who did it. 
Under the circumstances, such affirmation coming from a single witness
should have been the subject of a thorough and dispassionate appraisal.  This Court, in a number of cases, had
precisely based its judgment of acquittal on the insufficiency for conviction
based on a testimony of a single individual. 
So it was held in People v. Ricarte,^[4]
where this Court, through Justice Perfecto, noted the lack of persuasiveness of
such evidence when it betrayed “contradiction” and “an attitude
apparently inconsistent with the truth.”^[5]
The testimony that led to the conviction came from the lone eyewitness, Avelino Balacano, as noted,
brother of the deceased.  On direct
testimony, he was quite positive that appellant, armed with a short-gun,^[6] shot the deceased.^[7]
On cross-examination, he admitted that he testified differently when there was a
police investigation of the incident.  To
quote his exact words: “Hindi ko nakita kung anong baril ang ginamit
niya sa kapatid
ko.”^[8] Nor did he inform the police, again
as shown in cross-examination, that the one who stabbed him was a son of the
accused.^[9]
Then came People v. Cauilan,^[10]
where this Court, with Chief Justice Moran as ponente,
spoke of the worthless character of the testimony of a single witness as
“self-contradictory” and “inconsistent with previous
statements” made by him.^[11]
It was the same Justice Perfecto whose opinion in People v. Valencia^[12]
rightfully disregarded the lone, unreliable and uncorroborated testimony of a
single witness.^[13]

2. This is by no means to assert that acquittal would necessarily
be entailed by the inability of the prosecution to have available more than one
witness.  As far back as 1902, in United
States v. Cabe,^[14]
reported in the first volume of the Philippine Reports, Chief Justice Arellano
spoke for this Court thus: “The fact that only one witness testified is
not an obstacle to our becoming fully convinced as to the certainty of the
occurrence and of the guilt of the defendants, because, in addition to the
testimony of this witness, we find grave and conclusive circumstantial
evidence, based upon proven facts, * * *.”^[15]
The Cabe decision was cited with approval in
subsequent cases.^[16]
So it should be, if the weakness associated by the lone testimony is remedied
by circumstantial evidence “grave and conclusive” in character.  In this prosecution on the contrary, the
circumstantial evidence pointed the other way. 
The appealed decision summarized the testimony on cross-examination of
Simeon Molina, the chief of the ballistics section of the Manila Police
Department thus: “In said cross-examination this witness declared that he
cannot say with certainty whether Exhibit G-1 is a slug.  It is possible that it is a fragment of a
projectile or pellet like a bullet fired from a rifle barrel.  The pellet was fired from a firearm like
shotguns or the local ‘sumpak‘ which has a GI pipe
used as a barrel and another pipe welded on a rear and where a firing pin
device is placed.  The cartridge is
placed inside the GI tube and made to meet with the other tube.  When the improvised firing pin hits the
primer of the cartridge, it causes a discharge. 
The weight of Exhibit G-1 is 23-1 grains while the bullet weight used in
Exhibit H-1 is 37 to 40 grains.  It is
possible that Exhibit G-1 might have been fired from a ‘sumpak”
because of the shape and weight of Exhibit G-1. 
It resembles the deformed birdshot, pellet 18.  Exhibit H-1 appeared not to have been
tampered.”^[17]
It is worth noting that in a recent case, People v. Tiongson,^[18]
what was testified to by the same Simeon F. Molina proved decisive.  As summarized in the opinion of the then
Justice, later Chief Justice, Makalintal: “The
above firearms, as well as the cartridge cases and bullets found at the scene
of the crime, and the bullets extracted from the bodies of the victims, were
all submitted to the Criminal Investigation Laboratory of the Manila Police
Department to determine which firearms but allege certain circumstances which,
they contend conducted by Simeon F. Molina, ballistics technician of said
laboratory, who submitted a report (Exhibit P) and testified in court on his
findings.  According to Molina, except
for four .30 caliber fired bullets and one .30 caliber fired carbine cartridge
case, as to which no conclusions could be made because of their deformed or
mutilated condition, all the bullets and cartridge cases examined by him came
from the firearms marked Exhibits G-3, G-4, G-5 and G-6.  None of them, he said, could have been
discharged from appellant Yacat’s weapon (Exhibit
G-1) which, although also of caliber .30, is not of the carbine type but a
Browning automatic rifle.  And as far as
appellant Antonio’s Garand rifle (Exhibit G-2) was
concerned, no bullets or empty shells from such a firearm were submitted to
Molina for examination.  It is
significant to note further in this connection that when Exhibits G-1 and G-2
were surrendered the first had its magazine still containing 17 live
ammunition, and the second had its clip with 8 rounds, likewise undischarged.”^[19]
It went on to state that in convicting two of the appellants reliance was
placed “on the testimony of Ramon Lopez and Pacifico
Arceo to the effect that all the soldiers took part
in the shooting, and on the statement of Detective Napoleon Albano
that they made an admission to that effect when he questioned them.”^[20]
Then the opinion made clear why the findings of the ballistics expert should
prevail: “The evidence given by Lopez and Arceo
implicating appellants Yacat and Antonio is, as
previously observed, contradicted by the finding of the ballistics expert
presented by the prosecution that not a single bullet or cartridge case found
in the premises or extracted from the victims’ bodies came from the firearms of
said appellants.  Arceo
testified as to the number of soldiers who participated, but could not
positively identify them individually at the trial.  Considering the exciting and rather confused
events of the evening, it is not improbable for him to be mistaken as to the
exact number of the assailants.  The
testimony of Ramon Lopez concerning the part played by Yacat
and Antonio is hardly any better.”^[21] The result was acquittal.  So it should have been in this case.  That would have been to accord deference to
the landmark Cabe ruling of Chief Justice Arellano.

3. The conclusion that the appellant ought to have been acquitted
is reinforced by the doctrine announced by Justice Trent in United States v. Sy Quingco,^[22]
a 1910 decision: “While it is true that the testimony of one witness is
sufficient to sustain a conviction, if such testimony establishes the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, we think that the testimony of the one witness
in this case is not sufficient for this purpose. * * * The appellants have the
presumption of innocence in their favor until the contrary is proven.  The positive testimony of the two appellants
is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to their guilt.  This doubt must be resolved in favor of the
appellants.”^[23]
Mention may likewise be made of United States
v. Olais,^[24]
where Justice Malcolm warned against considering lone testimony being
“sufficient to support a judgment of conviction [unless] it satisfies
beyond reasonable doubt.”^[25]
Certainly unless there be an unwarranted relaxation of such standard to justify
a verdict against an accused, appellant should have been acquitted.  The appealed decision would assume that the
aggressors against the Balacano brothers were
companions of appellants.  There was no
competent proof that such was the case. 
As a matter of fact, they apparently remained at large.  He was the only one charged.  He was also indicted for stabbing the lone
eyewitness, Avelino Balacano,
but he was acquitted.  It did not serve
the cause of clarity for the decision concerned with the prosecution of a
single individual to harp repeatedly on the participants of a street brawl
whose connection with the appellant was assumed rather than proved.  There would likely have been no departure
from the aforecited authoritative precedents, if
greater attention were paid by the lower court to the testimony of
appellant.  He started by saying that he
was peacefully at home in Gagalangin, Tondo around ten o’clock
in the evening of August 9, 1970,
when he heard his neighbor, Rufo Naboa,
shouting for help.^[26]
He went down and “saw him grappling and rolling with his enemy.  [He] shouted at them to stop.”^[27]
He was armed with his rifle.^[28]
His interference was purely for the purpose of pacifying them, but evidently
the Balacano brothers resented what he was doing, and
they both rushed at him.^[29]  Then he fired successive shots upwards,
purely a defensive measure on his part.^[30]
Nor was there anything out of the ordinary for both brothers to run away.^[31]
Thereafter, he “heard loud gunshots and also not so loud gunshots.”^[32]
By that time, they had gone quite far, and he himself “was by the door of [his]
house.  He did not notice anymore what
else happened.”^[33]
He was intensively cross-examined.  He
remained steadfast.  Nothing to the
contrary was elicited.  If at all, the
additional questions added to the credibility of what was testified to by
him.  To the question as to how he tried
to stop the brawl, he answered that he said: “Itigil
na iyang away na iyan.”^[34]
He admitted that in addition to Naboa and the two Balacano brothers, there were many other persons, but he
could not remember their names as his attention was focused on the two persons
grappling.^[35]
He then reaffirmed that he saw the brothers running away from the scene of the
quarrel.^[36]
The lower court however failed to accord any weight to his testimony as well as
to that of his witness, one Leonardo de Asis, a
laborer living on the same street where his house was located and likewise an
eyewitness to what transpired.  What
cannot escape attention is that appellant’s version was not at all
discredited.  Nor could it be said that
there was any motive on his part to inflict any injury on the victim.  There is thus more than ample justification
to sustain the plea of appellant for a reversal of the judgment of conviction.

4. With the “grave and conclusive circumstantial
evidence,” to follow United States
v. Cabe, negating appellant’s guilt and the
“positive testimony” to quote from Sy Quingco pointing to lack of culpability on his part, the
constitutional presumption of innocence ought to have dictated a different
result.  Without proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the judgment should have been one of acquittal.  That is to pay heed to what was said in the
leading case of United States v. Lasada:^[37]
“By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise, but
it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an
inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the
certainty of guilt.  Absolute certainty
of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge but moral
is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof
requisite to constitute the offense.”^[38]
Necessarily then, in the language of the recent People v. Dramayo^[39]
decision: “Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive
at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on
trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of
conviction.  It is thus required that
every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account.  The proof against him must survive the test
of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.  The conscience must be satisfied that on the
defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not
only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime.  What is required then is moral
certainty.”^[40]
Dramayo was cited with approval in subsequent cases.^[41]

5. Nor is there any persuasive force to the argument that as a
general rule, respect is to be accorded to the findings of fact by the trial
court.  This Court has never allowed such
a principle to take precedence over the consti­tutional provision that an
accused is presumed innocent.  Quite apropos
then is this excerpt from People v. Macaraeg:^[42]
“In essence, what is contended for by counsel is that the constitutional
right to be presumed innocent is not to be nullified by the application of the
well-settled doctrine that matters of credibility are for the lower
court to decide in the absence of a fact or circumstance which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.  Such a principle may without inaccuracy be
looked upon likewise as a presumption, one moreover borne out by
experience.  It is easy to discern that a
trial judge is better situated than an appellate court in the appraisal of the testimony
offered.  The witnesses are there before
him.  He hears them testify; he observes
their demeanor.  He can sense the
tell-tale signs of prevarication.  It is
not too difficult for him to distinguish between honest mistakes and deliberate
fabrications.  Thus a judge, especially
one who has had years on the bench and with the training and habitude in the
art, may be trusted to sift the false from the true.  It is not likely that he can be easily taken
in by the adroitness and skill of counsel or the well rehearsed performance of
the individual on the stand. 
Nonetheless, such a doctrine certainly cannot rise above the
constitutional presumption of innocence which can only be overcome if the proof
of guilt is beyond reasonable doubt.  A
doctrine of this Tribunal, however well-grounded in our past decisions, cannot
prevail as against a mandate of the Constitution.  In that sense, it is understandable why
counsel for the accused would invoke such a right.”^[43]
It is not only understandable.  He must
be sustained.  The appellant must be set
free.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of October 15, 1970
insofar as it found appellant guilty as principal of the crime of murder and
sentencing him to life imprisonment, with a liability of indemnifying the heirs
of the deceased, Salvador Balacano, in the amount of
P12,000.00 as well as of paying the costs, is reversed and set aside and the
accused acquitted of such offense.  This
decision is immediately executory.  His immediate release is hereby ordered.

Barredo, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., and
Martin, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., did not take part.

^[1]
According to Article IV, Section 19 of the Constitution: “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, * * *.”

^[2]
Decision, Appendix to Brief for Appellants, 25.

^[3]
Ibid, 25-26.

^[4]  78 Phil. 112 (1947).

^[5]
Ibid, 115.

^[6]
T.s.n., Session of September 28, 1970, 7.

^[7]
Ibid, 8.

^[8]
Ibid, 16.

^[9]
Ibid, 19-20.

^[10]
79 Phil. 272 (1947).

^[11]
Ibid, 274.

^[12]
82 Phil. 657 (1949).

^[13]
Cf. People v. Aparato, 80 Phil. 199 (1948);
People v. Lanas, 93 Phil. 147 (1953); People v.
Calacala, L-18348, May 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 156;
People v. Capadocia, L-5796, Aug. 29, 1966, 17 SCRA
981; People v. Bayongan, L-23658, April 26, 1968, 23 SCRA 237.

^[14]
1 Phil. 265.

^[15]
Ibid, 266.

^[16]
Cf. United States
v. Colombro, 8 Phil. 391 (1907); United
States v. Oracion
and Lambino, 18 Phil. 530 (1911); United
States v. Mondejar,
19 Phil. 158 (1911); People v. Sope and Cruz,
75 Phil. 810 (1946).

^[17]
Decision, Appendix to Brief for Appellant, 20-21.  Exhibit G-1 was the slug; Exhibit H-1 was the
rifle surrendered by the accused.

^[18]
L-9866-7, November 28, 1964,
12 SCRA 402.

^[19]
Ibid, 407-408.

^[20]
Ibid, 408.

^[21]
Ibid.

^[22]
16 Phil. 416.

^[23]
Ibid, 418-419.  Cf. United
States v. Ambrosio,
17 Phil. 295 (1910); United States
v. Callapag, 21 Phil. 262 (1912); United States
v. Baua, 27 Phil. 103 (1914); People v.
Lope and Cruz, 75 Phil. 810 (1946).

^[24]
36 Phil. 828 (1917).

^[25]
Ibid, 829.

^[26]
T.s.n., Session
of October 2, 1970,
97-98.

^[27]
Ibid, 98.

^[28]
Ibid.

^[29]
Ibid, 98-99.

^[30]
Ibid, 99.

^[31]
Ibid.

^[32]
Ibid.

^[33]
Ibid.

^[34]
Ibid, 103.

^[35]
Ibid, 103-104.

^[36]
Ibid, 104.

^[37]
18 Phil. 90 (1910).

^[38]
Ibid, 96-97.

^[39]
L-21325, October 29, 1971,
42 SCRA 59.

^[40]
Ibid, 64.

^[41]
Cf. People v. Palacpac, L-27822, Feb. 28,
1973, 49 SCRA 440; People v. Zamora, L-34090,
Nov. 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 47; People v. Alvarez,
L-34644, Jan. 17, 1974, 55 SCRA 81; People v.
Reyes, L-36874-76, Sept. 30, 1974, 60 SCRA 126;
People v. Beltran, L-31860, Nov. 29, 1974, 61 SCRA
246; People v. Roa, L-35284, Jan. 17, 1975, 62
SCRA 51; People v. Padirayon,
L-39207, Sept. 25, 1975, 67 SCRA 135; People v.
Ordonio, L-33829, Dec. 19, 1975, 68 SCRA 397; People v. Ramirez, L-30635-6, Jan. 29,
1976, 69 SCRA 144; People v. Godoy, L-31177, July 15, 1976, 72 SCRA
69; People v. Berame, L-27606,
July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 184.

^[42]
L-32806, October 23, 1973,
53 SCRA 285.

^[43]
Ibid, 291.