MANUEL ELIZALDE, FRED J. ELIZALDE, PRUDENCIO R. EUROPA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, CFI-ILOCOS SUR, BRANCH III, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REP…

It was the refusal of respondent Judge Mario J. Gutierrez^[1]
to grant the motion to quash of petitioners, who were the accused in a
prosecution for libel, notwithstanding the invocation of their constitutional
right to freedom of expression^[2] that led to this suit for certiorari
and prohibition.  All that could be
alleged in the information against them was the publication in the Evening
News, a newspaper of general circulation, of an item reproducing in full a dispatch from the Philippine News
Service, a reputable news-gathering agency. 
It summarized the testimony of Jaime Jose in a pending rape case wherein
the name of Vincent Crisologo, the offended party in
the information for libel, was mentioned. 
This excerpt from the recent case of Bocobo
v.  Estanislao^[3] comes to mind: “This is contrary to the
legal tradition of the Philippines dating back to the landmark case of United
States v. Bustos, where Justice Malcolm emphasized
that to prevent dilution of the constitutional right to free speech and free
press, every libel prosecution should be tested by the rigorous and exacting
standard of whether or not it could be violative of
such fundamental guarantee.”^[4] It is easily understandable then why in the
motion to quash, the main reliance was on the Bustos
doctrine, although other grounds were alleged as warranting the dismissal of
the information.^[5] When respondent Judge ignored such a
fundamental consti­tutional principle, the proper basis for a certiorari
and prohibition proceeding was laid. 
Petitioners are entitled to the remedies sought.

The alleged offending
news item was a reproduction of a news item coming from the Philippine News
Service, furnished the Evening News, of which petitioners Manuel Elizalde and Fred J. Elizalde
were the Publisher and Assistant Publisher and Prudencio
R. Europa was the Editor-in-Chief.  It reads thus: “Jaime Jose implicated Tuesday
Vincent Crisologo, son of Rep. Floro
Crisologo (N, Ilocos Sur) as among his four companions the night of the alleged
rape of a former nightclub hostess last year. 
Jose, one of four principal accused in the celebrated Maggie de la Riva
rape case, denied, however, the charges of forcible abduction with rape and
robbery filed against ham and his companions by Zenaida
de la Cruz, 28, and Araceli Sy, both nightclub
hostesses.  Jose mentioned Vincent Crisologo as among his companions while testifying in his
defense before Judge Francisco de la Rosa of the local court of first
instance.  Jose claimed that both Zenaida and Araceli went
voluntarily with his group to the Queen’s Court motel here in the early morning
of July 4, 1966.  Jose said Zenaida
and Crisologo went to a room together.  However, Jose said, the two girls complained
when he and his companions failed to give the girls any money.  * * *”^[6]
This was the continuation of such news item: “The girls charged that they
were robbed by Jose and his friends of cash and jewelry inside the hotel.  In their original complaint filed with the fiscal’s office, the two girls named Vincent Crisologo as among the accused.  The taxi driver, whose vehicle was used by
Miss de la Cruz, also identified Vincent Crisologo
among the five youths in the incident. 
But the girls later executed an affidavit saying that they were mistaken
in identifying Crisologo as among the five men who
allegedly abused them.  Jose testified
that he and Tillman were about to go to a party in Mandaluyong,
Rizal, on the night of July 3, 1966, when Crisologo
with three companions arrived.  Jose said
that young Crisologo wanted to borrow his car since
his car would be used by his congressman father.  Jose said that after the party they proceeded
to Pasay City
where Crisologo and a companion went to Bayside
nightclub to look for Crisologo’s girl friend.  Minutes later, Crisologo
and his friend went out of the club and they all proceeded to the Barbecue
Plaza where they drank liquor.  Shortly before 2
a.m., July 4, the group allegedly started for home in Jose’s
two-toned Mercedez Benz car.  On the way, a taxicab overtook them.  The cab allegedly carried Zenaida
and Araceli. 
Jose said that Zenaida called Vincent and
shouted for them to stop.  They then
proceeded to Queen’s Court motel, Jose said.”^[7]
The alleged offended party, according to the information filed by respondent
Provincial Fiscal, Jesus F. Guerrero, is Vincent Crisologo.  The information is dated February 5, 1970. 
Thereafter, there was a motion to quash filed by petitioners on August 14, 1970.  An opposition was then filed by an assistant
provincial fiscal on September 25,
1970.  The order by
respondent Judge denying the motion to quash came on December 17, 1970.  An extensive motion for reconsideration
submitted on February 23, 1971
having proved futile in view of an order of denial a month later from
respondent Judge, this petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed
with this Court.

As noted at the outset, certiorari
and prohibition lie.

1. Petitioners were prosecuted for libel because the Evening News
carried in its issue of September 1,
1967 a news item furnished it by the Philippine News Service.  It was a faithful and accurate summary of
what was testified to by a witness in a pending rape case.  That was all. 
The name of the alleged offended party, Vincent Crisologo,
was repeatedly mentioned in such testimony. 
It would have been a plain and simple distortion thereof if such a fact
were omitted by the Philippine News Service. 
The Evening News in turn published such item.  This is a case therefore that falls squarely
within the protection of the free press provision found in the
Constitution.  That such news item
possessed a defamatory aspect is beside the point.  It cannot justify a prosecution for
libel.  Even prior to the 1935
Constitution, under the previous organic act, the Philippine Autonomy Act of
1916, which contained a similar provision mandating a free press, this Court,
in the epochal Malcolm opinion in United States v. Bustos,^[8]
decided almost sixty years ago, to be precise on March 8, 1918, enunciated the
principle that the freedom of the press is “so sacred to the people of
these Islands and won at so dear a cost, [that it] should now be protected and
carried forward as one would protect and preserve the covenant of liberty itself.”^[9]
Thus it is clear that a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the
offending words find sanctuary within the shelter of the free press
guarantee.  This Court has since then
been committed to such an authoritative doctrine.^[10]
The opinion of Chief Justice Paras in Quisumbing v. Lopez,^[11]
a 1955 decision, is even more explicit on the matter.  Thus: “The newspapers should be given
such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively
perform their important role in our democracy. 
In the preparation of stories, press reporters and edition usually have
to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable
care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest
mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.”^[12]
At the beginning of this decade, this Court in Lopez v. Court of Appeals^[13]
expressed its commitment to such a principle in these words: “No inroads
on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on
what otherwise could be characterized as libel whether in the form of printed
words or a defamatory imputation resulting from the publication of respondent’s
picture with the offensive caption as in the case here complained of.  * * * If the cases mean anything at all then,
to emphasize what has so clearly emerged, they call for the utmost care on the
part of the judiciary to assure that in safeguarding the interest of the party
allegedly offended, a realistic account of the obligation of a news media to
disseminate information of a public character and to comment thereon as well as
the conditions attendant on the business of publishing cannot be ignored.”^[14]

2. To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to
petitioners for the alleged offending publication without doing violence to the
concept of privileged com­munication implicit in freedom of the press.  As was so well put by Justice Malcolm in Bustos: “Public policy, the welfare of society, and
the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public
opinion.  The inevitable and
incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege.”^[15]
He then quoted this excerpt from an American Supreme Court decision, Abbott v.
National Bank of Commerce: “The doctrine of privileged communication rests
upon public policy, ‘which looks to the free and unfettered administration of
justice, though as incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity
to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.”^[16]
Considering how ample is the protection afforded a person alleged to have
injured another’s reputation, it appears quite obvious that respondent Judge
did infringe on the constitutional right of petitioners to press freedom when
it denied the motion to quash.  He
apparently was equally unaware of this relevant paragraph in the Malcolm
opinion: “A privileged communi­cation should not be subjected to
microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.  Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the
protection which the law throws over privileged communications.  The ultimate test is that of bona fides.”^[17]
By no stretch of the imagination then could it be said that the Philippine News
Service and the Evening News exhibited mala fides
by the mere fact of narrating in a news item the testimony of a witness in a
rape case just because it did cast a reflection on the conduct of a third
party.  The prosecution in its pleadings
before the lower court could not deny the accuracy of what was reported.  Petitioners then ought not to have been
subjected to the annoyance, inconvenience, and trouble of going to a distant
province and defend themselves against a charge unwarranted under well-settled
norms of constitutional dimension.  The
doctrine of privileged communication moreover is explicitly provided for in the
Revised Penal Code, as an exception to the general principle that every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it is true in the
absence of “good intention” and “justifiable motive” thus:
“A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are
not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in
said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions.”^[18]

3. There being a denial of a constitutional right, a
jurisdictional issue was raised.  It has
been a well-settled doctrine since Conde v. Rivera,^[19]
that under such circumstances, the competence of a court to continue with a
pending case ceases.^[20] Nor is it to indulge merely in general
propositions.  In People v. Andres,^[21]
this Court precisely sustained a court of first instance when it quashed an
information for libel, the accused, respondent Andres, relying on press freedom
to show that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.  As pointed out in the opinion of Justice
Barrera, it was argued by the prosecution “that the trial court erred in
dismissing the case on a mere motion to quash, contending that the trial
judge’s conclusion on the face of the information that defendant-appellee was prompted only by good motives assumes a fact
to be proved, and that the alleged privileged nature of defendant­-appellee’s publication is a matter of defense and is not a
proper ground for dismissal of the complaint for libel * * *.”^[22]
That contention was rejected in this wise: “While there is some point to
this contention, yet when in the information itself it appears, as it does in
the present case, that the communication alleged to be libelous is contained in
an appropriate pleading in a court proceeding, the privilege becomes at once
apparent and defendant need not wait until the trial and produce evidence
before he can raise the question of privilege. 
And if added to this, the questioned imputations appear, as they seem in
this case, to be really pertinent and relevant to defendant’s plea for
reconsideration based on complainant’s supposed partiality and abuse of power
from which defendant has a right to seek relief in vindication of his client’s
interest as a litigant in complainant’s court, it would become evident that the
facts thus alleged in the information would not constitute an offense of libel.”^[23] Similarly, a motion to quash was
sustained in the later case of People v. Alvarez.^[24]
In the opinion of Justice Regala, it was pointed out:
“As heretofore stated, this Court has adopted a liberal attitude in favor
of the writer in matter of the relevancy of allegedly libelous statements in
judicial pleadings.  In U.S.
v. Bustos, et al., 37 Phil. 731, this Court found
occasion to express its opinion on privileged communications, to wit:  ‘* * * A privileged communication should not
be subjected to miscroscopic examination to discover
grounds of malice or falsity.  Such
excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over
privileged communication.  * * *’          It
is worthy to mention here that in the information for libel, there is no allegation
of the irrelevancy or impertinency of the questioned statements to the
cause.  Considering the above, We are of
the opinion and so hold that no error was committed by the lower court in
considering the questioned remarks of the appellee as
privileged and in consequently dismissing the information for lack of cause of action.”^[25]
In a third case, People v. Aquino,^[26]
reference was made to People v. Andres to demonstrate that it is fitting and appropriate
for a court of first instance to dismiss an information on a motion to quash
where the privileged character of the alleged offending publication is
apparent.  Respondent Judge ought not to
have betrayed lack of sensitivity to the categorical pronouncements of this
Court in the above three decisions that call for application.

4. Nor is a different conclusion called for just because the
heading of the news item arising from the testimony of Jaime Jose was worded
thus: “LINK CRISOLOGO SON TO PASAY
RAPE CASE.” How else could it have been expressed?  That was to portray with accuracy what was
contained in the news item.  What was
testified to was to that effect.  It
succinctly set forth the facts.  There
was no attempt to sensationalize.  The
tone is both neutral and objective. 
Again there is relevance to the following excerpt from Quisumbing v. Lopez: “The Court of Appeals found ‘that
the context of the article in question, is a fair, impartial and true report of
official or public proceeding authorized by law.  The news item was the result of a press
release in connection with an official investigation of the Anti-Usury
Division, N. B. I., and was a substantial, if not a faithful reproduction of
the said press release which was, in turn, an accurate report of the official
proceedings taken by the Anti-Usury Division. 
The article merely reported a raid on the ‘business offices of three
alleged money lenders;’ and related the steps actually taken or to be taken by
the proper officials relative to the investigation.  It did not go beyond the actual report of
official actuations.  The theory of the
petitioner, stripped of incidentals, is that while the body of the news item
may be considered as being fair, impartial and accurate report of an official
investigation of the Anti-Usury Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation and therefore privileged, its headline NBI
MEN RAID OFFICES OF 3 CITY USURERS,’ admittedly not forming part of the basic
press release but merely added by the respondents, is libelous per se,
because the petitioner had thereby been branded and condemned as a ‘usurer’
when as a matter of fact no criminal charge was even filed against him for the
crime of usury in any court of justice.”^[27]
Nonetheless, the newspaper publisher was not held liable.  The Chief Justice then explained why:
“We are of the opinion that the appealed decision is correct.  The petitioner, while assuming that the
article in question is privileged, argues that the headline (libelous per
se) added by the respondents rendered the same actionable, because said
headline is not borne out by the facts recited in the context.  We believe that nobody reading the whole news
item would come to the conclusion that the petitioner had been accused or
convicted of usury.  We agree with the
Court of Appeals that the headline complained of may fairly be said to contain
a correct description of the news story. 
The fact that the raid was conducted by anti-usury agents following
receipt of a complaint against the petitioner and two others, coupled with the
announcement by the Chief of the NBI Anti-Usury
Division that criminal action would be filed in the city fiscal’s
office, naturally would lead one to think that the persons involved were
usurers.  Nothing in the headline or the
context of the article suggested the idea that the petitioner was already
charged with or convicted of the crime of usury.”^[28]

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is
granted and the order of respondent Judge denying the motion to quash of December 17, 1970 as well as the
order of respondent Judge of March 25,
1971 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners
are set aside and nullified.  The writ of
prohibition is likewise granted and the restraining order issued on June 10,
1971 made permanent, respondent Judge or any person who may have taken his
place being prohibited from taking any action in Criminal Case No. 11-V for
Libel except for the purpose of dismissing the same.  No costs.

Aquino and Concepcion,
Jr., JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., concurs,
not because there is a denial of a constitutional right, but because there is
grave abuse of discretion in not recognizing what is clearly not libelous.

Antonio, J., concurs in the
concurring opinion of Justice Barredo.

^[1]
The People of the Philippines
as represented by Provincial Fiscal Jesus F. Guerrero of Ilocos
Sur was likewise named respondent.

^[2]
According to Article III, Section 1, par. (8) of the 1935 Constitution, then in
force at the time of this litigation: “No law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.” The same
provision is reproduced as Article IV, Section 9 in the present Constitution.

^[3]
L-30548, August 31, 1976,
72 SCRA 520.

^[4]
Ibid, 524.

^[5]
The other grounds alleged were that one news item could not be the subject of
separate libel suits, that only an editor or business manager could be held
liable for defamation, that because of failure to indicate the actual residence
of the offended party, the court was without jurisdiction, and that the action
had prescribed.

^[6]
Information for Libel, Criminal Case No. 11-V, Second Judicial District, Annex
A to Petition, 1-2.

^[7]
Ibid, 2-3.

^[8]
37 Phil. 731.

^[9]
Ibid, 740.

^[10]
Cf. United States
v. Cañete, 38 Phil. 253 (1918); Santiago
v. Calvo, 48 Phil. 919 (1926); El Hogar Filipino v. A. W. Prautch,
49 Phil. 171 (1926); People v. Burgos,
59 Phil. 375 (1934); Sayoc v. Chen, 110 Phil.
356 (1960); Deaño v. Godinez,
L-19518, November 28, 1964,
12 SCRA 483.

^[11]
96 Phil. 510.

^[12]
Ibid, 515.

^[13]
L-26549, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 117.

^[14]
Ibid, 127.

^[15]
United States v.
Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 742.

^[16]
Ibid.  The Abbott excerpt is found
in 175 US 400, 411 (1899).

^[17]
Ibid, 743.  Cf. Santiago v.
Calvo, 48 Phil. 919 (1926) and El Hogar
Filipino v. Prautch, 49 Phil. 171 (1926).

^[18]
Art. 354, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. 
Cf. People v. Burgos, 59 Phil. 375 (1934); Sayoc
v. Chen, 110 Phil. 356 (1960); Sison v.
David, 110 Phil. 662 (1961); Tolentino v. Baylosis, 110 Phil. 1010 (1961); Deles v. Aragona, Jr. Adm. Case No. 598, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 633; Cuenco v. Cuenco, L-29560, March 31, 1976, 70 SCRA
212.

^[19]
45 Phil. 650 (1924).

^[20]
Cf. Harden v. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741 (1948); Abriol v. Homeres, 84
Phil. 525 (1949); Chavez v. Court
of Appeals, L–29169, Aug. 19, 1968,
24 SCRA 663;
Celeste v. People, L-31435, Jan.
30, 1970, 31 SCRA 391; Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, L-30026, Jan. 30, 1971, 37 SCRA
420.

^[21]
107 Phil. 1046 (1960).

^[22]
Ibid, 1050.

^[23]
Ibid.

^[24]
L-19072, August 14, 1965,
14 SCRA 901.

^[25]
Ibid, 906.

^[26]
L-23908, October 29, 1966,
18 SCRA 555.

^[27]
96 Phil. 510, 511-512.

^[28]
Ibid, 513-514.