LUCRECIA JEREZ, JULIA JALANDONI, JULIETA JALANDONI, EVA JALANDONI, CARMELO JALANDONI, JOSE JALANDONI AND ELISEO JALANDONI, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. EMIGDIO V. NIETES, JUDGE OF THE …

This Court has not had previously the opportunity to pass
squarely on the question raised in this petition for the review of a resolution
of the Court of Appeals sustaining an order of respondent Judge Emigdio V.
Nietes of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, reopening the proceedings in
the intestate estate of the late Nicolas Jalandoni, after having approved a
project of partition and final accounting, and allowing a plea of intervention
filed within the reglementary period by the other respondents, Lucilo Jalandoni
and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta, allegedly children of the deceased with an
illegitimate status.  The petitioners are
the widow and the legitimate children of the late Nicolas Jalandoni.^[1]

The Court of Appeals cannot be reversed for recognizing the
existence of such a power possessed by the respondent Judge to thus act
favorably on a motion to intervene even if submitted at such a stage.  That is the answer we give to the main issue
thus posed.  Our approval of the action
taken, how­ever, is not unqualified.  For
respondent Judge apparently was much too generous in his appraisal of the right
of the private respondents to intervene, accepting as established what ought to
have been proved.  A modification of the
appealed resolution is thus called for.

The facts are undisputed. 
Nicolas Jalandoni died on October 3, 1960.  Before the end of that month, on October 27,
a special proceeding^[2]
for the settlement of his estate was filed before the sala of respondent Judge,
petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, his widow, being appointed as administratrix.  A project of partition and final accounting
was submitted on June 14, 1966, resulting in an order from respondent Judge
dated June 15, 1966, approving the same. 
On June 29, 1966, respondent Lucilo Jalandoni, alleging that he is an
acknowledged natural child of the late Nicolas Jalandoni, and respondent
Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta, alleging that she is an illegiti­mate
daughter, sought to be allowed to intervene on the ground that they were
preterited in the project of partition which they would have respondent Judge
reject for being contrary to law.  Then
came on July 30, 1966 an order of respondent Judge allowing intervention and
reopening the proceedings to permit the movants, now private respondents,
“to present whatever evidence they may have to show their right to
participate in the estate of the deceased.” After a motion for
reconsideration, filed by petitioners, was denied, the matter was elevated to
the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction filed on September 3, 1966.

As set forth at the opening of this decision, the Court of
Appeals in a resolution of September 21, 1966 denied such petition to annul and
set aside the order of respondent Judge. 
The basis for such resolution, penned by Justice Martin with the
concurrence of Justice Rodriguez, Justice Esguerra concurring in the result
with a separate opinion, was explained in this wise:  “* * * that the determination of a prima
facie interest in an estate to justify reopening proceedings for the
settlement thereof is primarily addressed to the sound dis­cretion and judgment
of the probate court; that, while no supporting documents are appended to the
motion to reopen tending to show the personality to intervene, the said motion
is nevertheless verified upon oaths of the claimants of interest and the
probate court has authority to require the submission of at least a prima
facie showing of said interest; that the motion to reopen was filed on
June 29, 1966 before the order closing the proceedings of June 15, 1966 had
achieved finality and during the reglementary period within which the court
still had jurisdiction over the case and retained full power to amend and
control its process and orders so as to make them comfortable to law and
justice; that, because the closure order aforesaid had not yet become final,
the requirements of Rule 38 respecting relief from judgment do not apply and,
hence, the failure of the motion to reopen to allege any of the grounds therein
stated is not fatal; that the better practice in case of the appearance of
alleged preterited heirs is to secure relief by reopening the proceedings by a
proper motion within the reglementary period (Ramos, et al., vs. Ortuzar, et
al., G.R. No. L-3299, August 20, 1951), it being desirable that all aspects of
a controversy be ventilated in the same proceeding and thus avoid multiplicity
of suits; * * *.”^[3]

Evidently, an ordinary division of three Justices did not suffice
for a decision on such petition for certiorari and prohibition resulting in a
creation of a division of five.  Two
Justices dissented from the aforesaid resolution, the dis­senting opinion being
penned by Justice Lucero with whom Justice Villamor concurred.  The dissent is premised on the following
considerations:  “We should not let
Lucilo Jalandoni (alleged acknowledged natural son) and Victoria Jalandoni de
Gorrecita (alleged illegitimate daughter) to come in first and identify
themselves later, because the better policy according to jurisprudence (Asinas
vs. Court, 51 Phil. 665) is to require them first to produce prima facie
evidence of such a civil status before opening the door and letting them
in.  Under Section 2, Rule 12, Revised,
‘a person may, before or during a trial, be permitted by the court, in
its discretion, to inter­vene in an action, if he has legal interest in the
matter in litigation.’ The possibility of interlopers getting in for a share in
the estate cannot be totally discounted specially considering that the present
intestate proceedings had been ‘pending for the last six (6) years without a
motion to intervene having been filed by the present claimants in spite of the notice
of publication and the in rem character of the intestate
proceedings.  According to their
residence certificate, the claimants are residents of Iloilo City (Rec.
20).  The procedure adopted by the lower
court is more conducive to prejudice and unnecessary loss of time, effort and
expense than the method suggested by jurisprudence of requiring first a prima
facie evidence of status before letting them come in to intervene.  Hence, the order of July 30, 1966 sought to
be nullified under the present petition insofar as it reconsidered the approval
of the project of partition and the first accounting is unjustified, as
practically putting the cart before the horse instead of the horse before the
cart.  Moreover, the claims can be
asserted in a separate action against the legitimate children to whom the share
of the deceased Nicolas Jalandoni was adjudicated.”^[4]

Stress is laid in this petition for review in respondent Judge
allowing private respondents to intervene after the intestate proceedings were
closed.  We do not see it that way.  We repeat what we said at the outset.  The challenged resolution cannot be reversed
insofar as it recognized the power of respondent Judge to reopen the
proceedings and allow intervention. 
While it is undeniable that the question presented has not been
definitely passed upon before, still an indication of how such an issue should
be resolved is to be found in an opinion of Justice Tuason in Ramos v. Ortuzar,^[5]
referred to in the resolution of the Court of Appeals.  Thus: 
“The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested
in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is
left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence. 
Even then, the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same
case by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent
action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case,
for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and
executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.”

The above excerpt commends itself for approval.  We do so now and definitely hold that rather
than require any party who can allege a grievance that his interest was not
recognized in a testate or intestate proceeding to file a separate and
independent action, he may within the reglementary period secure the relief
that is his due by a reopening of the case even after a project of partition
and final accounting had been approved.

Such a view finds support in the doctrine of liberality as to
pleas for intervention so consistently followed and adhered to by this Court.^[6]
As was emphatically expressed by Justice Makalintal, speaking for this Court,
in Balane v. De Guzman:^[7]
“Respondent Judge would have done well to brush aside narrow
technicalities in this case, allow the intervention prayed for and thus avoid
needless delay in the resolution of the conflicting interests of all the parties.”

It is thus understandable why the resolution of the Court of
Appeals upholding the power of respondent Judge to reopen the proceedings and
allow intervention is not vulnerable to attack. 
It was within his competence to do so. 
The question remains, however, whether he did so in the appropriate
manner.  It is not the existence of the
power but the mode of its exercise that is open to question.  In that sense, the appealed resolution bears
further scrutiny.

It is indisputable that after the project of partition and final
accounting was submitted by the counsel for petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, as
administratrix, on June 14, 1966, re­spondent Judge approved the same and
declared closed and terminated the intestacy the next day, June 15, 1966.  Subse­quently, on a verified petition by
private respondents, filed on June 29, 1966, based on the assertion made that
they should have had a share in the estate as illegitimate children but that
they were omitted in the aforesaid project of partition, they sought to be
allowed to intervene and “to have the project of partition rejected for
being contrary to law.” Such a plead­ing, without more, resulted in the
questioned order of July 30, 1966, reopening the proceedings and reconsidering
the approval of the project of partition and final accounting, to enable the
private respondents “to present whatever evidence they may have to show
their right to participate in the estate of the deceased.” Although the
recognition of their right to intervene appeared to be tentative and
conditional, it cannot be denied that they were given a standing sufficient to
set aside the project of partition.

Respondent Judge acted too soon. 
The verified motion on the part of private respondents did not suffice
to call into play the power of respondent Judge to allow intervention.  There must be proof beyond allegations in
such motion to show the interest of the private movants.  In the absence thereof, the action taken by
respondent Judge could be considered premature. 
As was stated by us in an opinion penned by Justice Sanchez:  “No one may quibble over the existence
of the court’s discretion on whether to admit or reject intervention.  But such discretion is not unlimited.”^[8]

WHEREFORE, the resolution of September 21, 1966 of the
Court of Appeals is hereby modified in the sense that respondent Judge,
Honorable Emigdio V. Nietes of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Judicial
District, Branch I, or whoever may be acting in his place, is directed to
require private respondents Lucilo Jalandoni and Victoria Jalandoni de
Gorriceta to present evidence to justify their right to intervene in Special
Proceeding No. 1562 re Intestate Estate of Nicolas H. Jalandoni pending before
such sala.  In the event that they could
so justify such a right, the lower court on the basis of such evidence is to
proceed conformably to law.  Without
pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Teehankee, and Barredo, concur.

^[1]
Lucrecia Jerez, Julia Jalandoni, Julieta Jalandoni, Eva Jalandoni, Carmelo
Jalandoni, Jose Jalandoni and Eliseo Jalandoni.

^[2]
Special Proceeding No. 1562 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.

^[3]
Petition, Annex L, pp. 1-2.

^[4] Ibid,
pp. 6-7.

^[5]
89 Phil. 730 (1951).

^[6]
Cf. Ahag v. Cabiling, 18 Phil. 415 (1911); Joaquin v. Herrera, 37
Phil. 705 (1918); National Bank v. Phil. Vegetable Oil Co., 49 Phil. 857
(1927); De la Riva v. Escobar, 51 Phil. 243 (1927); Otto Gmur v.
Revilla, 55 Phil. 627 (1931); Barretto v. Tuason, 59 Phil. 845 (1934);
Santarromana v. Barrios, 63 Phil. 456 (1936); Tavera-Luna, Inc. v.
Nable, 67 Phil. 340 (1939); Pampanga Bus Co. v. Fernando, 70 Phil. 306
(1940); Seva v. Rivera, 73 Phil. 477 (1941); Gaw Sin Gee v. Peña,
79 Phil. 663 (1947); Peyer v. Martinez, 88 Phil. 72 (1951); Republic v.
Ysip, 89 Phil. 535 (1951); Republic v. Phil. Resources Dev.
Corp., 102 Phil. 960 (1958); Francisco v. Rodriguez, 6 SCRA 443 (1962);
Toledo v. Court, 8 SCRA 499, (1963); Lacuna v. Board of
Liquidators, 12 SCRA 469 (1964); Phil. Resources Dev. Corp. v. Republic,
13 SCRA 519 (1965); Zulueta v. Muñoz, 17 SCRA 972 (1966); Balane v.
De Guzman, 20 SCRA 177 (1967); Cue v. Dolla, 23 SCRA 832 (1968); Dizon v.
Romero, 26 SCRA 452 (1968); Roxas v. Dinglasan, 28 SCRA 431 (1969).

^[7]
20 SCRA 177 (1967).

^[8]
Cue v. Dolla, 23 SCRA 832 (1968).