MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY (PNR), PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AMBROCIO PINEDA, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.

This case was commenced by respondent Ambrocio
Pineda, in the Court of Agrarian Relations, to compel the Manila Railroad
Company – now known as the Philippine National Railways or PNR – and one
Mariano Mendoza, to recognize said respondent as tenant with respect to a given
tract of land and to modify the terms and conditions under which he would hold
said property.

The same is a narrow strip of land, 30 meters in width, located
at San Mateo, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.  It
admittedly belongs to herein petitioner, as part of its right of way for
railroad purposes in that place.  Hence,
petitioner’s railroad track runs lengthwise across the middle of said
land.  Prior to March 1, 1961, when the
present action was begun, said land – excluding the roadbed of the railroad
track, which is from ten (10) to twelve (12) meters in width – had been leased
to four (4) or five (5) persons, one after the other, the last of whom was the
aforementioned Mariano Mendoza.  Respondent
Pineda claims to have been working on said land and devoting the same to the
production of palay, for twenty-five (25) years, as
tenant of whoever was the lessee, up to the immediate predecessor of Men­doza,
one Maria Canlas, on a 55-45 share basis.  Upon expiration of the contract of lease
between Maria Ganlas and petitioner herein,
respondent was sued by Mendoza in the Court of Agrarian Rela­tions, because the
former (respondent Pineda) objected to the lat­ter’s (Mendoza’s) entry into the
land, for the purpose of cultivating the same. 
Pursuant to an interlocutory order of the CAR, dated June 6, 1960,
respondent remained in possession of the land and planted palay
thereon during the agricultural year 1960-1961. 
Three (3) months after the institution of that case, petitioner herein
filed, with the Justice of the Peace Court of Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga, ag­ainst respondent Pineda, an
action for forcible entry, which was dismissed, upon the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of said court to entertain it. 
Having subsequently learned that Pineda had already caused the palay produced during said agricultural year to be
threshed, soon thereafter, petitioner demanded from him the de­posit of the sum
of P380.00, as rental for the lease of the land.  Accordingly, respondent deposited said amount
with the local branch of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

Later, however, or on March 1, 1961, he instituted in that Court
the present action against petitioner herein and Mariano Mendoza, for the
purpose of compelling both to recognize him as the tenant on the litigated land
and of changing the nature of his tenancy, from one of share tenancy to that of
leasehold tenancy, as well as of reducing the amount of the rental.  On March 2, 1961, petitioner moved to dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction, which was denied by the CAR.  The latter, moreover, declared Mendoza in
default for failure to file his answer. 
In due course thereafter, or on September 23, 1961, the CAR rendered a
decision directing that respondent be maintained on the land in question, as
petition­er’s agricultural tenant; that the sharing of the produce between them
be changed, from one of share tenancy to that of leasehold tenancy, effective
the crop year 1961-1962; and that the rental for the use and occupation of said
land be fixed at P133.74 annually, beginning from said crop year.  This decision was, on appeal taken by
petitioner herein, affirmed by the Court of Appeals.  Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari, filed by pe­titioner herein, to which We have given due course.

The main issue in this appeal is whether or not the Court of
Agrarian Relations had authority to hear and decide this case, petitioner’s
contention being that said court had no jurisdiction to do so, the land in
question not being an agricultural land within the purview of the Agricultural
Tenancy Act (Republic Act No. 1199) and the Agricultural Land Reform Code
(Republic Act No. 3844), because said petitioner did not acquire and could not
have acquired said land for agricultural purposes, not being authorized either
by its charter or by Executive Order No. 399, series of 1951, other­wise known
as the Uniform Charter for Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, to
engage in agricultural production.  In
affirming the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Court of Appeals
held the opposite view, upon the ground that “with the use to which the
land has been primarily devoted, there can be no doubt that the same falls
within the category of an agri­cultural land contemplated by Republic Act No.
1199,” and that “this being the case, any attempt to dispossess the appellee of his landholding would be a case of
dispossession contemplated under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 1199 and
therefore falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Agrarian Rela­tions.”

This issue is not a novel one. 
Under substantially identical conditions, We held in Philippine National
Railways vs. V.A. del Valle^[1]
that the Court of Agrarian Relations has no jurisdiction over cases of this
nature.  We quote from our decision in
that case:

“According to Section 3 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act,
‘[a]gricultural tenancy is the physical possession by
a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally
possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the
former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of
which the for­mer agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a
price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both.’^[2] The
term ‘agricultural land’ as understood by the Agricultural Land Reform Code
is not as broad in meaning as it is known in the constitutional sense.  As in­terpreted in Krivenko
vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461, 471, the
phrase ‘agricultural land’, constitutionally speaking, includes all lands that
are neither mineral nor timber lands and embraces within its wide sweep not
only lands strictly agri­cultural or devoted to cultivation for agricultural
purposes but also commercial, industrial, resi­dential lands and lands for
other purposes.  On the other hand, by
Section 166(1) of the Agricultural Land Reform Code,
‘”[a]gricultural land” means land devoted
to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, salt
beds, fish ponds, idle land and abandoned land as defined in paragraphs 18 and
19 of this section, respectively.’^[3]

“It is obvious then that under the law, the land here in
controversy does not fit into the concept of agricultural land.  PNR cannot devote it to agriculture because
by its own charter, Republic Act 4156, PNR cannot engage in agriculture.

“Indeed, the land – which adjoins the railroad track on both
sides – is part of PNR’s right of way.  That right of way is not limited to the
particular space occupied by the roadbed or its main track.  It also includes the portions occupied by the
telephone and telegraph posts.  It
extends to a width of 30 me­ters which reasonably gives the train locomotive
engineer a clear commanding view of the track and its switches ahead of him.

“The entire width is important to PNR’s
rail­road operations.  Which should not
be hampered.  And, communication lines
must not be disturbed.  Buildings should
not be constructed so close to the track. 
Because, it is not so easy to prevent people from walking along the track;
animals, too, may stray into the area; obstructions there could be along the
track itself which might cause derailment. 
All of these could prevent the locomotive engineer from taking the
necessary precautions on time to avert accidents which may cause damage to the
trains, injury to its passengers, and even loss of life.

“Besides, the use of the strips of land on both sides of the
track in railroad operation is inconsistent with agricultural activities.  The contract of lease authorizes the railroad
company to enter upon the premises to make repairs, place its materials on the
land.  It may even take soil from the
land to fill up any part of the railroad track destroyed by water during rainy
days.  What if PNR should de­cide to
construct another parallel track on the land leased?  The occupant of the land cannot prevent or
stop PNR from doing any of these. 
Security of tenure so important in landlord-tenant relationship may not
thus be attained.

“The foregoing are considerations sufficient enough to deter
us from adopting the view that the disputed land – in narrow strips – is
agricultural land within the meaning of the Agricultural Tenan­cy Act and the
Agricultural Land Reform Code.  By
destination, it is not agricultural.”

Finding no reason to depart from the foregoing view, which We
hereby reiterate, the decision of the Court of Appeals is, ac­cordingly,
reversed, and the present case dismissed, without spe­cial pronouncement as to
costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

^[1] G.R.
No. L-29381, September 30, 1969.

^[2]
‘Emphasis supplied.’

^[3]
Emphasis supplied.  Paragraphs 18 and 19
of Section 166, Agricultural Land Reform Code, provide:

‘(18) ‘Idle
lands’ means land not devoted directly to any crop or to any definite economic
purpose for at least one year prior to the notice of expropriation except for
reasons other than force majeure or any
other fortui­tous event but used to be devoted or is suitable to such crop or
is contiguous to land devoted directly to any crop and does not include land
devoted permanently or regularly to other essential and more productive
purpose.

(19)
‘Abandoned lands’ means lands devoted to any crop at least one year prior to
the notice of expropriation but which was not utilized by the owner for his
benefit for the past five years prior to such notice of expropriation.’”